A PEACEFUL WORLD IS POSSIBLE

IN HONOUR OF JUDIT BALÁZS

Edited by
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UNIVERSITY OF WEST HUNGARY PRESS
SOPRON
2012

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International and Regional Institute of the Faculty of Economics of the University of West Hungary

is greeting with respect and love

the 70years old
Professor
JUDIT BALÁZS!

The colleagues of our institute and other researchers dealing with peace and political sciences present this book of studies, providing a summary of all scientific fields related to the works of Judit Balázs and to the workshops founded or lead by her.

PREFACE

GALTUNG, Johann:
A Peaceful World is Possible – also Today
*(*In Honour of Professor Dr Judit Balázs)*

It was not that obvious that a leading person in European peace studies should emerge from Hungary after the Cold War; given the steering of research, and the official doctrines about peace and security. Of course, we also had that, and have it, in the West; but with more space for alternative approaches. Like, for instance, for the rather obvious: trying to identify what the issue is about; exactly, which are those clashing, incompatible, contradictory goals, and then start searching for solutions, rather than the primitivism of pointing nuclear-tipped missiles at each other.

Judit Balázs was that person. She is very well prepared, not only having the knowledge but also has visions, rare among academics, and she has a charming personality that touched us all. Many of us saw the Cold War, which was guided by the power politics of some misguided politicians, as a misunderstanding. Moreover, many of us had worked for decades with the dissident movement in the East and the peace movement in the West. Then came that political genius in the late Soviet Union who found the formulas inside their New Thinking – please take note, there was that precious commodity in the East, not in the West. Moreover, the Cold War collapsed; and all the Western leaders could say was "nobody could have predicted this"– certainly true of themselves.

Judit became a symbol of a new reality spanning the West vs. East gap, in thought, speech, and action – as the president of the European Peace Research Association, EUPRA, between the years of 1993 and 2000. She made EUPRA meaningful even if communist propaganda had given peace a bad name to many in the East. In addition, she played a leading role in IPRA, the international one, founded in 1964.

"The resolution of international conflicts through negotiations" is one of Judit's trademarks. It happened for the East-West conflict of 1973-1975 through the initiative and guidance of the late president of Finland, Urho Kekkonen. That conference, with its famous three baskets – political-economic-human rights – made evident to most that a reasonable solution was at hand. There was a sigh of relief when the Final Declaration came in spring 1975. The civil-political human rights situation in the East improved. However, they quickly sabotaged by the Western superpower wanting to

prove the power of military as opposed to political power, and started the deployment of "theater" (meaning us, Europeans) missiles. We lost at least 10 years; we could have had 1989 already in 1979.

But leaving that aside, there is an interesting factor: Finland-Hungary, with Estonia the Finno-Ugrian islands are in the Indo-European ocean of Roman-Germanic-Slavic languages. Have a look at the language structure. There are interesting things. Judit became a party to this "peace plot", and we celebrate her in gratitude, in the name of our common beloved friend Híkan Wiberg as well, a pillar for peace studies for decades.

A peaceful world is possible –is it also today? When the wall fell, the Soviet Union imploded, WTO was dissolved, the market took over where the plan had failed (to fail some years later) and the West lost an enemy. However, already in 1992 NATO found a new enemy: Islam, keeping NATO alive, headed by an islamophobe.

Peace studies emerged during the Cold War, but the West vs. Islam is different. Are we up to the new challenge?

Let us first note that earlier enemies of the West, German Nazism and Soviet Bolshevism were products of the state system, maintained by states, and collapsed with those states.

True for the West, but not for Islam. 1.6 billion Muslims around the world constitute an *ummah*, the community of the believers, and many of them see the Westphalia state system as incompatible with their professed – *shahada!* – meaning Monotheism. If a state collapses, it can be Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Somalia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia or Libya, or the regime changes there, it does not mean that the Islam collapses, often just the contrary. The West has discovered this. Inter-state warfare was abating in favour of the state terrorism of Bush I & II, Obama's extra-judicial executions, drones and special commands operating without governmental consent. Even little Norway, deeply Americanised, plays a role with some new weapons and platforms and a huge arms industry, praised by the present minister of attack (sailing under the false flag of defence) as the new miracle for the economy, ready to take over when the oil peaks, runs out.

That state terrorism breeds terrorism and vice versa surprises nobody. In addition, Islam grows in depth and numbers.

There is another difference from the state-run Cold War. We in Europe are not that different, much shared history, empathy and sympathy with both Liberalism and Marxism. Muslims know the West; most of the 57 OIC countries were colonies.

However, Western ignorance of Islam is appalling and tragic; with more knowledge, the huge overlap in values would become evident. There is no need to clash. Yes, Islam moved to the West, it conquered, and was stopped.

Yes, the West moved to the East and the South, it conquered, and was stopped. But how was it? Compare 800 years of al-Andalus, 711–1492, on the Iberian Peninsula with the 200 years Western crusades, 1095–1291, and you sense a difference: *kyoshi, conviviencia* in the former, brutal killing in the latter.

Conclusion: let 100 Judits of all kinds blossom all over.

FÁBIÁN, Attila:
Greetings to a Friend on her Birthday

Only few occasions may be as joyful and solemn as a good friend's 70th birthday. Such sentiments are particularly justified if the birthday stands as a milestone on a "scientific highway" which, in the course of several decades of a scholar's activity, has taken us to several discoveries. One must also find it encouraging that in this moment the continuation of a rich and fruitful lifework seems to be granted.

Inevitably, any try to give, just on one or two pages, a detailed review of the results of a rich life-work would be futile. It is especially so if the scholar has been an economist, a researcher of supra-national issues, a UN special envoy, a University Professor, a University Department Leader, a Vice Rector, and a Guest Professor in Egypt, as well. All that is true in the case of Professor Dr Judit Balázs, in praise of whose achievements this volume has been edited and published.

<div align="center">*</div>

Dear Judit,
Please receive kindly these heart-felt words from me, a friend of yours, who has now known you for almost twenty years. Over that period, the world's traditional values have been further eroded to such a degree that intimidation and corruption have become the most, while talent turned out to be the least of all the agents that help one to prevail. In spite of all these, you managed to keep going on the right way – and that is, beyond doubt, the first thing to say on this joyful day of yours.

The lifespan of an individual human being, especially if it is full of enlightenment, draws a parallel with time-periods marked by the Sunlight and the Moonlight, the former represents the individual's active period and the latter intimates the years he or she spends in retirement. Much the same way as the Sun illuminates the Moon, the light – generated by the active, full-of-work years – reflects on the years of retirement, and so the two phases make the span complete. Therefore, today it is only right for us to celebrate your birthday, dear Judit, for it makes us remember the once beginning of the Sunlight period of your life. At the same time, it also marks your life's Moonlight stage, that you are about to begin. We who congratulate you on that occasion see our own life much the same way as we see yours, thus we feel personally involved in the atmosphere of this day. That stands valid to

all of us; your friends, your colleagues, your students; too numerous to single out.

That common atmosphere must have motivated most of those colleagues who contributed to this volume by writing essays and scientific papers. In addition, it especially applies to me, with regard to the more than fifteen years we spent working together at the University in the tiny country town of Sopron, West Hungary. I remember the heroic beginning there, burdened with, among other things, the then lack of infrastructure. I also remember that, from the very beginning of your work in Sopron, a capacity crowd of rational students of economics has always filled the chambers where you held lectures or guided studies of seminars. We, for quite some years on end, wondered about the cause of that. With the course of time, we have realized that the curriculums you teach are both correct and multicolor. Even more important is, perhaps, that a special combination of your humanity and benevolence radiates out from your manner and words, which induce the young to enter their names on your list of students, to attend your lectures, and to undertake tasks of extracurricular activities under your guidance.

Over those long years, you taught several subjects – the total number and the exact description of them all is hard to tell; you must be the only one who could do it. How you managed to save time to prepare for all of them, how you managed to keep your knowledge up-to-date seems to be a mystery for many of us. It is so, especially when one comes to think of the many extra hours that you spent on listening to your students, who frequently came in order to consult you, or to talk to you about their personal problems and then asked you for an opinion. The number of hard-to-obtain books and periodicals – that, on such occasions, you gave them from your own library – is only exceeded by the number of the advices you gave tailored to their needs and to their special personal circumstances. This applies to both your university students and your candidates for doctorate; a higher-than-average proportion of them have gained Master's Degree or become scientific workers or researchers.

The almost two decades that passed since those hard years of the beginning have led to the present day's satisfying set of conditions and standard management at our University. In the sine-qua-non work needed for that you have had a large part.

You opened some 'gates to life' for several of your colleagues, thus helping them to see different walks of life and gain experience on the international fields of researchers' activities. I was also given such a chance in 2000, the year of IPRA's World Conference, in the work of which both you and I

took part. There I learned so many things that I needed twelve more years to fathom and understand all the explicit and implicit lessons.

Moreover, a great deal of other common work followed. The earliest stage of that was marked by IPRA's 20th ('Jubilee') World Conference held in Sopron in 2004, while the latest stage is about to be highlighted by the next of such conferences, the one in Japan, where this volume is going to be published.

Being not the only one, who may say such positive facts. Several other colleagues of ours could enumerate many examples of your kind help, assistance and guidance. In addition, in a sense, it is only natural, for it is a simple fact that your innate element is social life and human relations. You are sociable. You radiate vitality on people, and feel 'the batteries of your soul' recharged whenever you see you have managed to help someone, especially if he or she is a student. What could I now say? What could I now wish you? One can only say THANK YOU! One can only wish you MANY MORE OF ACTIVE YEARS!

Dear Professor Balázs, dear Judit,
Now, when you are about to begin the Moonlight phase of your life-work, please, remember that IPRA, as well as your students at the University of West Hungary, are ready to welcome you back. Your students in Egypt are still 'hungry' to get advices from the "sage – that is: you – who tells stories of moral". Africa, Turkey, and several other places involved in your course of life will remain open for you.

Your smaller circle of family-members and friends are also looking forward to reading new writings of yours. Your grandchildren should like you to read for them from "*Grandma Judit's Fairy Tales about Life and Adventures.*" In addition, I, if I may mention one of my hopes in such a serious and formal moment as this is, expect you to publish your new cookery book.

WE ALL WISH YOU LONG LIFE WITH ACTIVE YEARS!

a friend of yours
Attila Fábián

PEACE ON GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEVEL

MATUS, János:
Peace on Global, Regional and National Levels

Abstract
Peace is a very complex condition under the influence of numerous factors. It requires a holistic approach relying on numerous disciplines and commitment to understand existing reality. This paper attempts to present some facts and concepts that demonstrate important changes in international relations, which might shed different light on the possibility of a peaceful world. Threats to peace are now different from that during the Cold War. The fundamental ambivalence of international political and economic relations is that the main source of uncertainty lies in the sphere of economy. Openness to the world economy can be the source of increasing wealth, but it also can be the source of instability and social conflict in with the danger of spilling over from one country to another. Analysis of the satisfaction of basic human needs can be a possible approach to dealing with the root causes of conflict. In practical terms, building valued relationships may bring us closer to a peaceful world.

Formulation of the fundamental question
The world is flat. One may find this surprising statement in a book by Thomas Friedman the well-known American publicist (Friedman, 2005 p. 5). Obviously, the scientific merit of this "new discovery" is highly disputable and easily refutable; however, the signal inherent in the contention mentioned above deserves attention. Actually, this characterization of the world has been a quotation from the statement of an Indian businessman who started companies in Bangalore with the objective of tapping into American service industries (Friedman, 2005 p. 7). By the establishment of such enterprises, he offered cheap labour force to US companies on the one hand side, and he created job opportunities for a number of well-educated young Indian men and women on the other. The typical function of these companies are executed by the so-called "Call Centers" where calls of US citizens on behalf of US businesses and answering partners via telephone are offered by Indian entrepreneurs to US companies. This is one of the interesting examples of outsourcing.

The real meaning of the assertion about the flatness of the world is that "we, the humanity as a whole, have become each other neighbours". Information technology eliminated distances and made us capable to cooperate

and work together in the same work process; and in principle, all participants can benefit from it. Thomas Friedman considers this development as an important element of globalisation that which he divided into three main eras (Friedman, 2005 pp 9-11).

The first era lasted from 1492 until around 1800 when the discoveries of new continents interconnected the whole world. Key actors in this period were national states that played primary role in establishing connections among countries. State power was the most essential element among the capabilities of states. In relative terms, the world changed from large to medium during this period. The second era lasted from 1800s until the year 2000. Key agents of change were the multinational companies that drove global integration in this period. Major technological breakthroughs in the area of transportation and communication also supported the process of globalisation. They substantially reduced barriers to international economic relations s in this phase. In relative terms/Practically, the world continued to shrink and changed from medium to small. The third era of globalisation is happening now, since the year 2000, under the ever-increasing influence of individuals who can rely on new capabilities offered by info-communication technologies. Instead of states and the MNCs, the individual has become the key actor in the recent phase of globalisation. Information technology empowered individual people to act freely in establishing contacts with other people in faraway places. In the third phase of globalisation, the world continues to shrink: Relatively, from small to tiny.

In the first and second eras of globalisation, power and profit motivated key actors. Consequently, conflicts and wars characterised international relations for nearly five centuries. According to Jack Levy, an American political scientist, between the years of 1495 and 1975 European states had been involved in 119 big wars (Levy, 1983 pp 88–91). Relative peace and the prevalence of cooperation over conflict have been a gradual achievement of the past half century. Now, when we look ahead at the next decades, we have to ask ourselves what will be the motivation of principal actors and the main driving forces in international relations. Will those forces help to maintain international peace and security or they contribute to more instability, conflict and eventually to war?

Possible answers on global level

Probably the most sensible context where we can place the problems of peace is globalisation since most of the major international trends are somehow in relation to this ubiquitous international force. There is a dispute over the impacts, nature, spatial and temporal expansion of globalisation. Some put emphasis on the overall benevolent and constructive nature

and longevity of globalisation. Others tend to emphasize the negative, even destructive nature and the reversibility of it. Diverging views on the impact of globalisation underline the importance of careful analysis of the interplay of overt and hidden forces inherent in this major international trend.

Concepts about the origin of globalisation abound. There are expert opinions that maintain that this process started in the last decade of the 20th century and might have a connection to the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe. This concept puts emphasis on the evolving new international order with major changes in the international system. Elements of conflict decreased and cooperation strengthened in the relationship of states. The danger of interstate war decreased to minimum level due to more cooperative relationship among the great powers. Areas of interactions among states especially in individual regions expanded and intensified. Regarding the interaction capabilities of states, a major shift is happening from the military instrument to economic capabilities. These important developments seem to justify the concept that links globalisation to the history of the past two decades. Other experts like Thomas Friedman divide the process of globalisation to three eras identifying the beginning of the first phase with the beginning of the evolution of the modern European state system.

Berry Buzan and Richard Little analyzed a much longer period of world history with the aim of giving an overview of the evolution and gradual expansion of the international system. They gave an interesting description about the evolution of ancient, classical, medieval and modern regional international systems and their gradual expansion. From our point of view, one of the most important conclusions of the two British authors was that in geographical sense the world has become global by the middle of the 19th century (Buzan–Little, 2000 pp 242). By that time, the newly discovered technical means of transportation interconnected all land areas of the globe. Though in geographical sense the world has become global, nonetheless the extension of state interactions has not reached their limits. Buzan and Little underlined the role of technological and social capabilities of states in the further development of globalisation.

They also gave an overview of the evolution of political communities from the early chiefdoms to the modern European states. Physical and social capabilities have been the bases of interaction among political communities in all historical periods. They identified four sectors of interactions: military-political, economic, social and environmental. Historically military-political and economic sectors of interactions were the most intensive. Military-political interactions involved discord, conflicts and wars. Economic interactions encouraged cooperation and made states interested in peace. Conclusion by Charles Tilly: "state makes war and war makes state" underlines the historical

role of the military-political interactions in the formation of states and the evolution of the international system (Buzan–Little, 2000 p. 377).

Since the four major sectors of interactions and the capabilities of states to interact in those sectors determined the peaceful or conflicting nature of the world throughout long historical periods it is of crucial importance to study the shifts in importance of those interactions in recent times and especially in the future. Relative decline of the role of military force and the growing importance of economic, social and environmental cooperation of states, in itself is an encouraging development and may contribute to a peaceful world. This has been an important change after the end of the Cold War when the arms race and the danger of the nuclear war posed serious threat to peace. The fundamental question is whether more intense interactions among states in economic, societal and environmental affairs may lead to a stable and more peaceful world, or not?

Different schools of international relations theory give different answer to this question. Classical political realism as well as Neorealism maintains that conflict-seeking nature of the state has not changed and military power remained the main instrument of state power. States have no higher authority above themselves, the world is anarchic and the danger of war is constant. Realism also believes that human nature has not changed much in the course of history and we should consider as a potential source of conflict (Burchill, 2001 pp 70–99). Liberalism has more optimistic view of the prospect of peace. Liberals believe that international institutions may alleviate the consequences of anarchy and the danger of conflict and encourage states to cooperate. Liberal school of international relations theory does not see human nature as source of conflict and considers bad institutions as impediment to peaceful cooperation (Burchill, 2001 pp 29–65). Constructivist school is the most optimistic regarding the peaceful world. Constructivists maintain that increasing communication and interaction may contribute to better understanding among people of different countries. Because of deeper knowledge and understanding of each other, people may redefine their identity and states would reformulate their national interests. Knowledge as a non-material factor in international relations may become an increasingly important condition of peace (Burchill, 2001 pp 209–228).

There is an interesting parallel between the changing balance of sectors of interactions among states and the changes in the influence of the schools of international relations theories. Realism was the most influential school of thought throughout the Cold War and still realistically thinking it today. However, Liberalism, more specifically Neoliberalism is gaining ground at the expense of realism. At the same time, the positions of the neo versions of the two schools reached consensus on certain issues regarding the theory of

international relations. For instance, neorealists accepted the notion that international institutions have certain role in the management of interstate conflicts. Neoliberals on their part accepted the neorealist position about the anarchic nature of the international system. Nevertheless, sharp disagreement remained in several basic problems between the two schools (Baldwin, editor, 1993 p. 271). Liberals skilfully used the victory of democratic systems in the past two decades that underlined the concept of democratic peace. The idea put forward by Immanuel Kant has become a popular research theme again with the basic hypothesis: democratic systems do not fight war against each other. So with the spread of democracy in the world peace is becoming more stable.

The impact of regions
Peace and security are closely interrelated terms and conditions. Both of them are dependent on domestic and international environment. Due to ever-increasing interdependence of states, the impact of international environment is strengthening. A closer look at the present international environment will show that parallel with global trends; a seemingly contradictory trend has also been emerging in the past two decades: regional integration. The end of the Cold War had different effects on different regions. Domination of superpowers weakened due to the end of ideological rivalry. Political and military influence decreased substantially. As a result, some of the geographical regions of the world became politically more stable, economically more prosperous and consequently more peaceful. However, some other regions suffered negative consequences of the declining interest of great powers. Political instability because of economic hardship and ethnic rivalry hit hard the poorest nations of the world.

Scholars of a number of Western European universities and research institutions – including the Copenhagen School – have realised this trend and developed the theory of Regional Security Complexes – RSCT (Buzan-Waever, 2003 pp 40-89). They built on the idea of Carl Deutsch with regard to "security communities" (Holsti, 1995 p. 372). Deutsch defined security community as a relationship between two or more states where the likelihood of war has disappeared. Members of the community stand ready to discuss any conflicts of interest and reach a common solution by mutual compromises. Carl Deutsch considered countries in the North-Atlantic region – practically members of NATO that time – a security community.

RSCT extended the scope of Deutsch' idea and analyzed all regions of the world including peaceful and conflict seeking ones. Unfortunately, not all regions are equally peaceful. Some of them are in the state of war. In some regions, the use of violence is a recurring feature.

Part of Europe, integrated in the European Union, is peaceful but its neighbourhood is not. The answer to the question: if the peaceful world is possible that will largely depend on the outcome of the interactions between the EU and its neighbours. The future of the Mediterranean region, the Balkans and the Eastern neighbourhood – the post-Soviet space – are the key issues for the EU, regarding security, stability and peace on the European continent. Looking at the turbulences in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean one has serious doubts about the prospects of stable peace in the near future in these trouble spots.

North America with the United States as the largest military and economic power, and the recent developments in regional cooperation, the creation of the North American Free Trade Association with Canada and Mexico in particular represent the cornerstone of stability globally. Again, the neighbourhood carries elements of instability, especially countries in the Andean region of South America, which is one of the major sources of illegal drug trafficking. The Southeastern part of the continent, members of MER-COSUR represent a more stable and more peaceful sub-region. South American states fought a number of wars among each other following the withdrawal of Spanish colonial rule in the 19th century. The remnants of colonialism may still trigger violent conflicts and even war as it happened in 1982 when the United Kingdom and Argentina went to war over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. It is internal political instability and failed economic policies in some countries that may threaten regional peace and stability in South America.

In South Asia, the relationship between India and Pakistan – two nuclear powers – gives ground to serious concerns. Territorial dispute supplemented the danger of nuclear rivalry – the issue of Kashmir – and ethnic and religious rivalry. The two countries fought three major wars during the Cold War. Domestic political situation may also have an impact on the relationship of the two countries. Pakistan is more unstable both politically and economically. India's economic performance in the past years have been outstanding and contributed to internal political stability. As a result, India increased its superiority in relation to Pakistan. This change in the balance of power decreased the danger of war but the occurrence of cases of non-conventional warfare increased. Internal situation in Afghanistan and the contentious nuclear program in Iran do not help to alleviate the tension in Southeast Asia.

East Asia has become the economic engine of the world in the past two decades. Especially China's economic performance has been spectacular. Economic conditions in East Asia in general offer possibility for stable domestic and regional conditions for political stability and peace. The chances

of regional cooperation are better in Southeast Asia based on ASEAN espe-cially after the expansion in mid 1990 with the acceptance of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam as full members. They have not institutionalized regional cooperation in Northeast Asia, yet. Economic conditions might be favourable for the creation of institutional framework; however, political conditions may not be ripe for that. China and Japan seem not to be able to close bitter historical memories yet. Nevertheless, most of all the strange policies of the North Korean regime and the differences in its judgment by the other states constitute an impediment to the process of integration. In addition to that, the nuclear program of North Korea, a sad reminder of the Cold War, con-tributes to the uncertainty of peace in East Asia. Finally, territorial disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea may caution us from being overly optimistic about undisturbed peace in East Asia.

Sub-Sahara Africa has been the single most conflict stricken continent in the past two decades. As the superpower rivalry ended, a number of African countries experienced the negative impact of the lack of foreign patrons es-pecially in economic terms. African countries are suffering from ethnic con-flicts, failing economies, deteriorating health conditions, bad governance and the negative consequences of globalisation. Liberal economic standards that are beneficial for strong states with stable economy further weakened weak states with vulnerable economy all over Africa (Buzan-Waever, 2003 pp 450-451). The Failed States Index characterized the situation in Africa in the following way. Out of the 20 countries of the world where the state is in the most critical condition 14 countries are in Africa. Somalia, Chad, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo stand on the first four places in the rank-ing of failed states (Foreign Policy Magazine, 2012.). Regional cooperation in Africa is underdeveloped. The only overarching institution the African Union is capable to execute certain crisis management functions but its actions are far from reaching the level of demand. ECOWAS in West Africa is relatively the most developed sub-regional economic institution with a modest peace-keeping capability. However, the cooperation of West African states has a fundamental weakness; since its leading country, Nigeria suffers from seri-ous ethnic, religious and consequently political division. The shadows of the Biafra war of 1967 still hunts this country. Southern Africa has drawn a great advantage of the elimination of the Apartheid regime and the inde-pendence of Namibia. Countries in Southern Africa created the Southern Af-rican Development Coordination Committee (SADCC) in 1979 that they transformed into South African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. The new Republic of South Africa joined SADC and had the economic poten-tial to take a leadership role in it but it failed to do so due to internal political instability. The Horn of Africa is even less integrated. Neighbourly relations

are mostly hostile due to wars during the process of decolonisation and afterwards. Because of a civil war in Ethiopia, they created a new state, Eritrea that continues dispute over certain territories with Ethiopia. The only existing sub-regional organization the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is practically dysfunctional. The rest of Africa, including the Central and East African states is the least structured without any regional organisations. The second largest country in Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been one of the scenes of most expensive operations by the international community aimed at crisis management and peacekeeping, including the failed ONUC mission by the UN between 1960 and 1964. Bitter memories of that tragic failure still have impact on decisions regarding peacekeeping in Africa.

The Middle East represents the most complex and complicated issue for politicians and researchers who wish to predict the chances for peace in the near or more distant future. No other situation is more dangerous than the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East, and no other issue claimed more of the United Nation's time, attention and resources – financially and intellectually – than the crises in this region. They laid down the foundations of the UN peacekeeping both conceptually and in practice here. They extensively used the experience of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), established in 1948, in subsequent UN operations (The Blue Helmets, 1990 p. 13). Unfortunately, the results are not in balance with the efforts of the international community. Nevertheless, the Middle East remained one of the main concerns of the international community. This region is vital for the international economy because more than half of the world proven oil resources are here. Thanks to huge revenues from the export of oil, it is an important marketplace for goods and services and for arms export. In the first half of the 1990s, when they reduced defence expenditures globally, 40% of annual arms export went to the Middle East (Murray-Viotti, 1994 p. 485). In many cases, the Middle East has been the testing ground of new weapon systems in real life situations.

The most deep-seated conflict lies in the relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbours. This conflict led to four major wars. The heart of the conflict is the unresolved Palestinian problem. Numerous attempts, both military and diplomatic, at the solution of this issue failed in the past decades. No military solution is possible. The only remaining solution is diplomatic one with the help of the United Nations based on Security Council resolution 242 of November 1967. According to Stanley Meisler, this resolution was probably the best-known resolution of the Security Council in the first fifty years history of the UN. Two elements of the resolution contain the key for the solution of the conflict. First, withdrawal of Israeli armed forces

from territories occupied in the Six Day War in June 1967. Second, acknowledgement of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force (Meisler, 1995 pp 180-181). This wording of the resolution contains the notion of equal security but the opposing parties understood the two elements are differently. Arabs consider the first element as the more important, Israelis put emphasis on the second one. One of the representatives of classical political realism, John Herz identified this problem as the "security dilemma" which existed in world history for a long time and served as a basis for irrational arms race (Herz, 1976 pp 72–98). The Middle East has been the region the hardest hit by the "security dilemma" which resulted in arms race and consequently the wars. No other regions had to face this dilemma with so many tragic consequences. Unfortunately, there is no way out in sight now. In addition to the existential threats, posed by the opposing sides mutually against each other, it is necessary to recall the deep division regarding civilizations, religions and ethnic conflicts. However, some less politicised issues such as protection of environment and sharing of water supply and other natural resources might offer opportunities for cooperation among the opposing parties. Regional organisations like the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Maghreb Arab Union have not proven effective enough to contain violent conflicts.

Relations between politics and economics

In the last two decades of the 20th century, attention began to shift away from the relationship between military and international peace and security to the relationship between economics and international peace and security. Michael Mastanduno, using quotations from scholars of earlier periods, concluded on that the relationship between economics and security is one of the most critical problems of statecraft. Unfortunately, it remained a neglected area of study in international relations (Mastanduno, 1998 p. 825). One of the representatives of post-classical realism, Robert Gilpin defined international political economy in the following way: "interaction of state and market to influence the distribution of power and wealth in international relations" (Gilpin, 1987 p. 11). International political economy as a concept began to attract more attention as rivalry in the international scene began to shift gradually from military field to the area of economic relations. This change was the most obvious among the great powers. From the point of view of the United States, the military allies turned to economic rivals. The former Soviet Union/Russia the former military rival lost its military capability, ceased to be military rival, and was not able to compete with the US in

the field of economy either. Economic competition and rivalry among states brought about new kind of challenges with different impact on international peace and security.

The history of relationship between state and market has not produced an undisputed correct solution. One fact is sure: leaders of states and economic actors had common interests in all historical periods. Governments were always interested in collecting taxes and entrepreneurs needed certain protection of states. However, it has gradually become clear that state and market operate according to contradictory logic. Modern national state experts control over national borders but market favours free movement across borders. State organization is hierarchical and operates according to the principle of order and obedience but market organization is vertical and operates on the principle of consensus agreement. Political and economic theories developed different concepts about the details of this relationship and the effect of these concepts have changed from time to time. Gilpin identified three basic ideologies of political economy: nationalist, liberal and Marxist (Gilpin, 1987 pp 25-64).

The first form of nationalism in the economy was mercantilism that dominated international economic relations in the initial phase of the evolution of the modern European national state. Mercantilism first was an economic policy, which subordinated economy to the political objectives of the state. In practice, it supported export and tried to block import from foreign countries thus protecting national economy. The equivalent of mercantilism in political thought and practice was political realism whish considered national survival the most important goal of the state. Military force was the most important assurance of national survival and the economy was supposed to contribute to the maintenance of military power. Both mercantilism and political realism assumed that the relationship among states is conflicting and the danger of war was constant. The close relationship between mercantilist and political realist assumptions about the nature of state behaviour and the international system was underlined by the fact that between 1648 and 1814 more than one third of wars broke out because of trade and navigation disputes. Great Britain and the Netherlands fought three naval wars in this period (Holsti, 1995 p. 45). All states followed mercantilist economic policies and tried to increase their economic gains at the expense of other states until the middle of the 19th century.

We could trace the beginning of economic liberalism to the dates of 1846 and 1854 when the Parliament in Great Britain repealed "Corn Laws" and "Navigation Laws" respectively (Paret, 1986 p. 258). Until that time, they only allowed British ships to transport foreign goods to British ports. This change happened 70 years after the publication of Adam Smith's fa-

mous book: "The Wealth of Nations," in which he criticised protectionism and proposed unrestricted trade among nations as mutually beneficial economic policy. They only accepted liberal economic ideas of Adam Smith when Great Britain realised that "free trade was the weapon of the strongest," –with the words of Bismarck – (Paret, 1986 p. 223). Adam Smith's economic theory became the foundation of modern economic science but the practice of liberal international trade remained contentious with varying intensity of disputes in different periods. The extent of state intervention into the economy is at the heart of the debate. Adam Smith preferred minimum intervention.

Unfortunately, an essential part of Adam Smith's theoretical heritage has been forgotten or neglected. 17 years before the publication of "Wealth of Nations," he wrote a book under the title of "The Moral Sentiments" in which he called attention to the importance of sympathy, solidarity and benevolence in the society. He underlined the importance of justice and morality that restrains selfishness. In his economic theory, Adam Smith assumed that competition channels economic self-interest toward the social good. According to Stanley L. Brue, we should combine the message in the two important works because they are complementary and not contradictory (Brue, 1994 pp 71-74). It is understandable why economists neglected "Moral Sentiments," but it is less understandable why political science has not realized its relevance, which is increasing today and will continue to do so in the future. We should not neglect morality and justice totally in international relations because they directly link to security and peace.

Another important assumption of Adam Smith was the "harmony of interests" between states. Unfortunately, this idea proved premature and justifiably became the target of criticism by political realists who qualified "harmony of Interests" between states to be a utopia. E. H. Carr British historian was one of the sharpest critics of it (Carr, 1964 p 43). After more than two centuries, we may reconsider harmony of interests from a different point of view. Is it realistic today to assume that because of integration and globalisation states' interests are more in harmony than decades and centuries before? The answer to his question may help us to formulate a more precise idea about a peaceful world in the future.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye suggested a more differentiated understanding of liberal traditions. They identified three kinds of classical liberal theory: First, commercial liberalism, which stressed the pacific effect of trade; second, democratic liberalism, which emphasized the pacific effects of republican government; third, regulatory liberalism which assumed that rules and institutions affect the relationship of states in a positive way (Nye, 1988 p. 246). Commercial liberalism originated from the theory of Adam

Smith. We may trace democratic liberalism back to Kant's idea of republican government. Regulatory liberalism has multiple roots including the Wilsonian idea regarding the role of international institutions. One negative aspect of debate about liberalism today is the rejection of all three kinds by increasing number of disillusioned people. While commercial liberalism, and first its practice requires serious reconsideration, one may view democratic and regulatory liberalism as a positive factor in support of peace.

The third ideology of international political economy is Marxism and neo-Marxism. Marx was the first who studied the consequences of the expansion of capitalist system and the export of capital. In opposition to the other two schools of thought, neo-Marxism views economy as superior to politics. Based on the analysis of the internal and international relations of states, Marx concluded that conflict was the dominant feature. This conclusion led to the concept of class struggle. This conclusion is similar to the conclusion arrived at by political realists and economic nationalists. However, economic nationalism differs from Marxism substantially in its judgment of the domestic economy that it does not consider conflicts. There is a similarity between Marxism and Liberalism; it is the fact that both give priority to economy over politics. There are essential differences as well since Marxism emphasises the dominance of economy, liberalism puts emphasis on the independence of economy. Furthermore, Marxism sees conflicts in the relationship of states; Liberalism assumes the dominance of harmony of interests. Because Marxism and neo-Marxism put conflicting relationships in the centre of their analysis, it makes difficult to attribute to them a constructive role in achieving peaceful world.

Economic liberalism became dominant after WW II in the capitalist world system and began to implement its ideas through international financial and trade institutions. The socialist economic system remained in a self-imposed isolation until early 1990s. By the 1970s because of structural changes in the world economy, a reverse trend started with the emergence of new protectionism in the developed countries. GATT was successful in the removal of tariffs and quotas as major impediments to international trade. New protectionist measures took the form of nontariff barriers that discriminated against imports and offered assistance to export (Spero-Hart, 2003 pp 85-86). This is a clear reversal from the ambitious plans of the postwar years regarding removal of all barriers to international trade. Old issues like the trade of agricultural products remained the bone of contention. Subsequent rounds of trade negotiations had to face unresolved old and emerging new disputes. The creation of World Trade Organization has not brought the solution yet. The fact that after 10 years of negotiations the Doha Round

is still unfinished demonstrates the complex nature and the increasing difficulty of international trade issues.

International monetary system underwent numerous changes since the creation of the Bretton Woods system in 1944. The elimination of gold standard by President Nixon in 1971 shook the system in its foundations. Liberalization of banks and financial institutions by the US government in the 1960s led to the proliferation of affiliates over the world and large capital assets began to move from one country to another taking advantage of changing interest and exchange rates. By 2001 because of speculative currency exchange, the world financial flows exceeded trade flows by a factor of 30 to 1 (Spero-Hart, 2003 pp 20, 28). Huge amount of money with its unpredictable movement among countries undoubtedly created opportunities in some countries and introduced the elements of risk and instability into the system too. We cannot analyse financial crises of the 1990s and of the first decade of the 21st century without the impact of these developments in the international monetary system.

The flow of foreign direct investments also contains unpredictable elements since international regulation is meagre in this area. Between 1975 and 1990, the UN made an attempt at the initiative of the non-aligned movement to accept a Code of Conduct of Multinational Corporations; however, it remained a sharply disputed politicised issue and finally failed.

In spite of all problems and dispute regarding the social and environmental consequences of liberal economic policies, liberalism remains in dominant position in the international economy. Undoubtedly, it is a strong argument in support of liberalism that unprecedented wealth has been created in the past decades. There are strong counterarguments too, which emphasize the unprecedented gap in living standards between rich and poor (Grieco-Ikenberry, 2003 pp 333-334). Theoreticians will not be able to find solution to this basic dilemma. Politicians do not have enough stimuli yet to make appropriate policy decisions. Protest movements emerged, occasionally peaceful, other times increasingly violent, against globalisation that was singled out as the main source of increasing conflicts in the world.

Possible solution

Conflict and violence originate in the minds of people under the influence of perception of reality and beliefs. We can use the same mental mechanism in principle in service of peace as well. John Burton used the theory of human needs to show a possible way to peaceful human behaviour. He identified two traditional ways of conflict management: First, deterrence of the conflict by stipulating punishment, second, suppression of the conflict with coercion. Both ways can result only in temporary solution because they do not ad-

dress the causes of conflict. Burton relying on his experience in international diplomacy concluded that conflict is the consequence of frustration of certain ontological human needs (Burton, 1990 pp 21-22). Traditional political and economic theories ignore human needs. From the analysis of the impact of globalisation, it becomes obvious that basic material needs of a large percentage of the world's population are not satisfied. Burton adds that such non-material needs as recognition of identity, autonomy, dignity and bonding are suppressed in many parts of the world (Burton, 1990. pp 32-33.) Coercive suppression of non-material and the neglect of material needs generate protest, conflict and violence. The present international political and economic systems do not seem to care much about these fundamental causes of conflicting human behaviour.

Traditional concepts relating to ideologies and state power neglect the level of human needs. They are not suitable to deal with the root causes of aggressive behaviour. Deterrence and coercion has not been effective in the management of conflict during the history. Burton concluded that valued relationships among people are the main constraints on anti-social aggressive behaviour (Burton, 1990 pp 46-47).

Coming back to Friedman's assertion about the flatness of the world and the power of the individual in establishing relationships relying on information technology we may have certain optimism regarding a peaceful world.

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> ***A Peaceful World is Possible If YOU Make a***
> ***Contribution***

Historic developments since founding of the UN

When attempting to make our world today more peaceful, it is essential that we place our present condition in a historical context. We must know how we have arrived at our present situation. What efforts have been made to create peace in the past century? How successful have they been? How does this help us to understand what might be successful today?

The creation of the United Nations after World War II, in 1945, certainly indicated that many around the world aspired to have a peaceful world. Nevertheless, a peaceful world has certainly not been achieved. On the other hand, very important developments since the founding of the UN are now making world peace more possible. It is essential that those attempting to create a peaceful world today are aware of these achievements.

Very significant has been the expansion of the UN system into over fifty organizations, as the UN has expanded its mission from primarily responding to violent challenges to peace after they happen, to long term peace-building.

This includes organizations that focus on development, health, refugees, drugs, environment, education, trade, disarmament, peacekeeping, and many other topics. You can very quickly see the names of all of the agencies in the UN system in the organization chart at www.un.org.

One of the most important peace developments has been human rights. It is very surprising to many, who live today those human rights was never mentioned in the League of Nations Covenant, adopted in 1919, after World War I. In a very significant movement toward peace, human rights are mentioned seven times in the United Nations Charter. This then was rather rapidly followed by the development of a Universal Declaration on Human Rights by the UN General Assembly in 1948. Its basic principles were later included, in 1976, in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These three documents are now referred to as the International Bill of Rights.

A number of additional treaties have been created that focus on specific human rights standards. These include elimination of discrimination against women, rights of the child, elimination of torture, the rights of people with disabilities, and rights of migrant workers. Treaty bodies have been created

that monitor the implementation of each of these treaties. In addition, a UN High Commissioner of Human rights was created by the UN General Assembly in December 1993. The Commissioner is responsible for overseeing the support of human rights treaty standards throughout the UN system.

"Efforts to attain global support for the standards in these human rights treaties were vey significantly expanded in 2006, when the General Assembly created a Human Rights Council. The Council has forty-seven members from 47 UN member States. In 2007 created an "institution building package" to guide its work. This includes the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) "which involves a review of the human rights records of all 192 UN Member States once every four years". The Council also has an "Advisory Committee which serves as the Council's 'think tank' providing it with expertise and advice on thematic human rights issues and the Complaint Procedure which allows individuals and organizations to bring human rights violations to the attention of the Council." (*www.ohchr.org*)

The UN General Assembly World Summit also significantly expanded the peacebuilding capacity of the UN system in 2005, when it unanimously supported a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) resolution. R2P asserts that the government of each State has the primary responsibility for the protection of its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. In other words, sovereignty is not a right but a responsibility. This means that "a state's failure to protect its own citizens would no longer be seen, as in the past, as no one else's business, but as the entire world's concern....Much emphasis was given to the importance of ...countries assisting other countries under stress before the break-out of a crisis or conflict. In 2006, those provisions were reaffirmed by the Security Council through the adoption of resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and through resolution 1706 on the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur, Sudan." (Cremades, Beatriz, Escrina)

Also very relevant for peacebuilding has been the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, there were tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, but there was general agreement that an independent, permanent criminal court was needed. The Rome Statute that was adopted with the support of 120 States on 17 July 1998 created this. As of July 2012, 121 States had ratified the treaty. "The mandate of the Court is to try individuals rather than States, and to hold such persons accountable for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, namely the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression, when the conditions for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction over the latter are fulfilled." (*www.icc.org*) The ICC is not

part of the United Nations system. Its seat is at The Hague in the Netherlands.

Also significant in the growth in peacebuilding has been change in the international environment since 1990, because of the end of the Cold War. In a supplement to his 1992 *Agenda for Peace,* in 1995 Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared:

> Many of today's conflicts are within States rather than between States. The end of the Cold war removed constraints that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. As a result, there has been a rash of wars within newly independent States, often of a religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and cruelty.

After citing this statement, Balázs, Owsiak and Diehl, in an article on "The Shift from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding", conclude that "the peacebuilding missions of today are "well-suited for intrastate conflict." (1997)

This information on the expansion of peacebuilding reveals that it must cope with an ever more complicated array of human activities that range across a complicated array of political, ethnic, economic and religious borders. One example of efforts to develop an understanding of this complexity is "The Role of Walls, Borders and Boundaries in National and International Affairs: Typology, Underlying Trends, and Implications for Conflict Resolution." (Arai, Babbitt, Clements, Lodgaard and Anand, 2011) They assert that five walls have been created in the name of State sovereignty and nationalism: political walls, walls created for national security, trade walls, religious walls, and civilizational walls. Of course, it is quite obvious that different human activities have very different boundaries. These three are pointed out in this article: (1) the walls between economic cooperation and security policy, (2) the walls between interdependence and integration, (3) walls around civil society networks and international companies. After providing this conceptual framework, the authors analyze its implications for conflict management. They suggest three steps that will "mitigate the dysfunctional effect of walls on interstate or intergroup relation." (1) A balanced assessment of the purpose a given wall is serving. (2) For walls that create or threaten to create violent conflict, what are the possible approaches for creating bridges rather than walls, or to meeting the needs of the salient parties so that walls are not seen as necessary? (3) A response based on integration rather than separation of social processes. (19-20)

Expanding Participation in the UN System
The expanding peacebuilding agendas of the UN system, as well as the emergence of new technologies for communications around the world, have

stimulated the expansion of participation in the UN system. Many of the departments of governments of UN member States other than their foreign offices must now be involved. The peacebuilding agenda now includes issues on the agendas of virtually all academic disciplines and people from many professions. This expanded peacekeeping agenda now involves (1)) a greater diversity of civil society organizations (NGOs), (2) business organizations, (3) local governments, and (4) members of parliaments of UN member States.

1. Civil Society Organizations

The UN Charter says that ECOSOC "may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which are concerned with matters within its competence". NGO participation in the UN System has widely expanded beyond this statement through practice. Over 13,000 civil society organizations have established a relationship with the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). The vast majority is what the UN considers to be NGOs, but also included there "institutions, foundations, associations and almost a thousand indigenous people's organizations. Over thirty-three hundred NGOs have Consultative Status with ECOSOC. Over five hundred NGOs are accredited to the Commission on Sustainable Development (a subsidiary body of ECOSOC), and 1500 NGOs are associated with the Department of Public Information (DPI). DPI helps these NGOs gain access to, and disseminates information about, issues in which the United Nations is involved, so that the public can better understand the aims and objectives of the UN and support its work". (*www.un.org/en/civilsociety*)

NGO involvement at UN headquarters has now spread beyond consultation with ECOSOC. Opportunities for NGOs to address public sessions have spread beyond ECOSOC to include committees of the General Assembly. NGOs have also participated in what have been labeled as 'formal panels' and 'informal panels' of General Assembly committees. NGOs have also acquired access to a broad range of private meetings of committees and sub-committees of the General Assembly. Particularly significant is that a 'Consultative Group' of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council, composed of members of several NGOs, has met informally with Presidents of the UN Security Council. A NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGOWG) was created in 2000. "NGOWG now focuses on implementation of All Security Council resolutions that address this issue. The NGOWG serves as a bridge between women's human rights defenders working in conflict-affected situations and policy-makers at UN Headquarters." (*www.unpeacesecurity.org*)

NGOs have also developed an array of relations with UN Secretariats. The diversity of modes for NGO contact with members of the Secretariat is impressive. They include regularly scheduled meetings with NGOs, repre-

sentation of NGOs on committees, Annual Consultation meetings with NGOs, Symposia for NGOs, and NGO participation on national steering committees. Policy papers are posted on the web for NGO comment. Support for NGOs is provided through training and financial support and NGO creation. NGOs support secretariats financially and serve as their stand-ins. Secretariats and NGOs collaborate through joint research and joint implementation and monitoring of programs. There are NGO Liaison Offices at the headquarters of UN agencies throughout the UN System. It is particularly significant that the growing involvement of NGOs with UN decision-making bodies and secretariats has come with very little change in formal rules that were established for NGO access to the UN in 1950.

With respect to its involvement with civil society organizations, this statement now appears on the UN web site:

> The United Nations is both a participant in and a witness to an increasingly global civil society. More and more, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society organizations (CSOs) are UN system partners and valuable UN links to civil society. CSOs play a key role at major United Nations Conferences and are indispensable partners for UN efforts at the country level. NGOs are consulted on UN policy and programme matters. The UN organizes and hosts, on a regular basis, briefings, meetings and conferences for NGO representatives who are accredited to UN offices, programmes and agencies (www.un.org/en/civilsociety)

It is important to bear in mind that NGOs have held many conferences parallel with UN conferences. A very significant recent example is the Rio+20 People's Summit, held at the same time as the Rio+20 United Nations Sustainable Development Conference, in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012. This conference was held two decades after a conference that created a system of international conventions and policy documents designed to bring the human economy back into balance with the global environment. Over 110 UN member States participated in the conference. Two hundred civil society groups, including environmentalists, unions, religious groups and indigenous tribes, took part in the People's Summit. Greenpeace, Oxfam, and the Via Campesina international peasant movement supported it. Moreover, a number of other participants, including Ukranian green education pioneers, survivors of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, organic food organisations, the 100 Million Trees program and ITPA, a Brazilian conservation group. The Brazilian government also supported the People's Summit with $5m.

Finally, a London Guardia report on the Rio+20 conference indicates the potential relevance of chief justices of States to peacebuilding:

The most important side-event in 2012 may be the first-ever gathering of the chief justices of the world's supreme courts – the UNEP-organised World Congress on Justice, Law and Environmental Sustainability. Supreme court justices from all over the world (including the UK) met on Sunday night in the splendour of Rio de Janeiro's own Tribunal di Justiça to make it absolutely clear that environmental rights were part and parcel of the rule of law, to be enforced alongside, and indeed as a component of, basic human rights. (*www.guardian.co.uk/environment*)

2. Business Organizations

The UN website states: "The business community has played an active role in the United Nations since its inception in 1945. A number of UN organizations have a successful history of co-operating with business. Recent political and economic changes have fostered and intensified the search for collaborative arrangements." (*www.un.org/partners/business*) Jane Nelson in Building Partnerships provides a detailed account of these developments: Cooperation Between the United Nations System and the Private Sector. Secretary General Kofi Annan established the United Nations Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP) in 1998. UNFIP is responsible for administering and developing partnerships between UN agencies, departments, and programs and the private sector. UNFIP works with corporations and foundations that wish to support UN causes

Recently there have been efforts to involve these corporations in meeting standards that conform to UN declarations and covenants on human rights, labor and environment. Toward this end, Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed the creation of the UN Global Compact (UNGC) in an address to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 1999. He urged business corporations to join an international initiative involving UN agencies, labor and civil society. In July 2000, more than 50 corporation heads met with the Secretary General at United Nations Headquarters for the launch of the UNGC.

Now more that 1700 companies from 130 States participate in the UNGC, working to advance universal principles that are derived from these four documents:
- the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- the International Labor Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work;
- the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and
- the UN Convention Against Corruption.

Jane Nelson asserts that the UNGC includes these nine principles:

Human Rights:
— (1) Business should support and respect the protection of human rights within their sphere of influence; and
— (2) make sure their own corporations are not complicit in human rights abuses.

Labor Standards:
— (3) Business should uphold freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
— (4) the effective abolition of child labor and;
— (6) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

Environment:
— (7) Business should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges,
— (8) undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibilities; and
— (9) encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies. (*Nelson, 348*)

There are UNGC Offices in six UN agencies: UN High Commissioner for Human rights (UNHCHR), UN Environment Program (UNEP), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), International Labor Organization (ILO), and UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In April 2004, Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed an open debate of the Security Council on the role of business in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding.

The peace mission of the UNGC, defined by the UNGC Office in 2005 in *Enabling Economies of Peace: Public Policy for Conflict-Sensitive Business*, identifies a range of actions that governments and international organizations can undertake to assist private-sector efforts to promote conflict-sensitive business practices. In 2002, the UNGC Office also created a *Business Guide for Conflict Impact Assessment and Risk Management*. The UN website reminds business of the "contributions of the UN System to commercial order and openness" and informs them of the contributions of specific organizations in the UN system to worldwide business, including the International Maritime Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, World Health Organization, International Telecommunications Union, and World Meteorological Organization. (*www.un.org/partners/business/otherpages/factsheets*)

It is very important that the UNGC web site provides this explanation of its mission. "The Global Compact is not a regulatory instrument – it does not

'police', enforce or measure the behavior or actions of companies. Rather, the Global Compact relies on public accountability, transparency and the enlightened self-interest of companies, labor and civil society to initiate and share substantive action in pursuing the principles upon which the Global Compact is based." (*www.unglobalcompact.org*).

It is very significant that the UNGC has not only business corporations as members, but also business associations, labor organizations, civil society organizations, academic institutions, and cities. This extended membership involves other organizations that can help to motivate business corporations to meet the goals of the Global Compact.

The UNGC web site explains the reason for non-business participation: "Non-business participants are an integral to the UN Global Compact. They contribute much needed perspective and expertise that complements the efforts of business participants. Our non-business participants include entities such as civil society organizations, business associations, labour organizations, academic institutions and cities. Each offer knowledge and thought leadership in shaping special initiatives and work streams; developing tools and research; setting international labour standards; furthering partnership projects; and helping to hold business accountable with respect to their commitments to the Global Compact and its ten principles." (*www.unglobalcompact.org*)

3. Local Governments
When considering the actual, and potential, roles of local governments in peacebuilding. It is important to recall that the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) was founded in the Netherlands, in 1913, with the goal of promoting democratic local self-government. The United Towns Organization (UTO) was founded in 1957, in Aix-le-Bains, France. In 2004 IULA and UTO it merged to form United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), with headquarters in Barcelona. Of course, it is a global organization with over 1000 cities as members and 112 national city organizations as members. There are also four other global organizations of local governments that focus on specific issues. Metropolis is the World Association of larger cities. Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI) has an environment focus. The Conference of Mayors for Peace has a peace focus. Of course, the Association Intenationales des Maires Francophones has a language focus. There are also regional organizations of local governments in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Arab and Islamic local government organizations as well.

There is now increasing involvement of local governments in the UN system. Cities were on the agenda of Secretary General Kofi Annan, when he said that local governments should be given more authority to deal with the growing number of problems that are emerging as the world enters the "urban millennium." UN-Habitat (UN Human Settlements Program), established

in 1977, "is mandated by the UN General Assembly to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all. … It has a special relationship with local authorities, including Mayors, Councillors, and their municipalities in countries around the world to strengthen and maintain dialogue with central and local governments." (*www.unhabitat.org*) In June 2012, Joan Clos, the Executive Director of UN-Habitat said that "It is in cities around the world that the pressures of globalization, migration, social inequality, environmental pollution and climate change and youth unemployment are most directly felt. On the other hand, cities have been the cradle of innovation for centuries and they currently produce more than 75% of the world's GDP [Gross Domestic Product]. From this point, urbanization is a driver for global economic growth and development. Good urban development is a key to achieving global sustainable development." (*www.un-ungls.org*)

A UN Advisory Committee of Local Authorities (UNACLA) was established in Venice, in January 2000, at a meeting called by the Executive Director of UN-Habitat, and attended by mayors from all over the world and presidents of inter-State associations of local authorities. A sub-committee of UNACLA, an Advisory Group of Experts on Decentralisation (AGRED), held its first meeting in Gatineau, Canada in March 2004. Its membership includes experts from twelve countries around the world and representatives of Metropolis and United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), two inter-State organizations of local governments. AGRED's function is "to guide the international dialogue on decentralisation and provide advice on strengthening local authorities around the world." (*www.unhabitat.org/unacla*)

In 2004, UN-Habitat and United Cities and Local governments (UCLG) held a meeting in Barcelona on the theme of "Local Governments, Partners for Development." At this meeting the Executive Director of UN-Habitat and six mayors selected by UCLG signed an "Agreement of Cooperation" aimed at expanding their collaboration on issues such as: (1) the Global Campaign on Urban Governance, (2) the Global Observatory of Local Democracy and Decentralization, (3) Localizing the Millennium Development Goals, (4) the International dialogue on Decentralization, and (5) the UN Advisory Committee of Local Authorities (UNACLA). (*ww2.unhabitat.org/unacla/agreement_of_cooperation.asp*)

The Best Practices and Local Leadership Program (BLP) were established in 1997. It is a global network of government agencies of States, local authorities and their associations, professional and academic institutions and grassroots organisations dedicated to the identification and exchange of successful solutions for sustainable development. Together with UN-Habitat's Urban Indicators Program, the BLP created the Global Urban Observatory (GUO), UN-Habitat's facility for monitoring global trends in sustainable

urban development and evaluating progress in the implementation of the UN-Habitat agenda. This network of local and State Urban Observatories are governmental agencies, research centers and educational institutions that are designated as the "workshops" where monitoring tools are developed and used for policy-making.

Two years after UNACLA was formed, a World Urban Forum met to examine one of the most pressing issues facing the world today: the impact of rapid urbanization. It is projected that in the next fifty years, two-thirds of humanity will be living in towns and cities. The World Urban Forum is a biennial gathering that involves non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations, urban professionals, academics, local authorities and national and international associations of local governments.

At least eleven agencies in the UN System have projects that focus on local governmental problems. This clearly reveals the growing understanding that efforts to cope with a wide range of issues on the broadening peace-building agenda of the UN system require collaboration with not only the governments of States, but also with the governments of local communities. At the same time, it reveals growing appreciation by local governments of the roles that they must play in peacebuilding. These developments mean that it is essential that citizens in local communities know of the growing involvement of local governments in peacebuilding and insure that their local government is aware of this and has become involved. But there is almost no recognition of this in public media and scholarship. Therefore, it is essential that peacebuilding scholars place this need on their agenda.

Very relevant for the future of peacebuilding is the creation of a World Associations of Cities and Local Authorities Coordination (WACLAC) It was established in 1996, to provide a coordination mechanism for international local government associations in their work with the United Nations. In 2002, the President of WACLAC stated that "the local and the global are not two separate realities. They are two sides of the same coin. We express, therefore, our full support for the Millennium Goals. We will campaign to promote them across the world." (*www.un.org*) Over thirty members of the Council of Europe have ratified a European Charter of Local Self-Government. It is a key objective of WACLAC to achieve the global goals of this Charter. We must mention here, that now, there are an increasing number of books on global democracy that certainly have relevance to peacebuilding. Two very relevant recent ones are:
- Daniele Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and Raffaele Marchetti, eds., 2011, *Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives,* and
- Cliff DuRand and Steve Martinot, eds., 2012, *Recreating Democracy in a Globalized State.*

4. Parliamentarians

The fact that parliamentarians have long been included in UN General Assembly delegations of some member States has provided one impetus for extending their involvement in the UN. (Alger, 2010) For some years, there have been meetings of parliamentarians attending a session of the General Assembly. In November 2002 the President of the General Assembly, Jan Kavan, offered a special greeting to these parliamentarians "as my colleagues, being myself not only the President of the 57th United Nations General Assembly, but also a member of the Parliament of my own country, the Czech Republic."

In 1995, on the eve of the UN 50th anniversary celebration, the International Parliamentary Union (IPU) convened a special session of its governing body (Inter-Parliamentary Council) in the UN General Assembly Hall. (The IPU was founded in 1889, twenty years before the League of Nations! It began as an association of individual parliamentarians, but now is an organization of the Parliaments of States.)

After a three-day debate, the Council adopted a declaration calling for close cooperation between the UN and State Parliaments, and for IPU to facilitate this process. The Secretary General of the IPU states that it also called for a formal agreement between IPU and the UN that would provide a framework for cooperation "mirroring at the international level the relationship which exists at the national level between government and the parliament." (*Johnsson, 2003, 23*)

In pursuit of this agreement, the IPU signed a cooperation agreement with the UN in 1996 that calls for Parliamentary Hearings to be held every year during the fall session of the General Assembly. The IPU "organizes Parliamentary Hearings as an opportunity for members of parliaments to exchange views with United Nations officials, representatives of the United Nations diplomatic community, as well as scholars and leading academics. The United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the IPU usually open the meeting. Hundreds of parliamentarians from every region of the world participate." (www.ipu.org/un-e/un-hearings.htm) Also supportive of its aspiring role in global governance, was IPUs adoption, in 1997, of a Universal Declaration on Democracy that affirms that democracy is an international principle applicable to international organizations and States in their international relations, and that "the principles of democracy must be applied to the international management of issues of global interest." (*Johnsson, 2003, 22*)

At the UN Millennium Summit, on 30 August and 1 September 2000, a conference of some150 Speakers, Presidents or Presiding Officers of State Parliaments gave an important impetus to increased cooperation between

the UN and the IPU. Their declaration "outlines a strategy for providing a parliamentary dimension to international cooperation. ...globalization demands that greater attention be paid to the wishes of the people. That, in turn, means reinforcing the role of parliament and its members as intermediaries between the complexities of international decision-making and the day-to-day existence of the individual....They pledged their support to the IPU as the world organization for inter-parliamentary cooperation and for relaying the vision and will of its members to intergovernmental organizations." (*Johnsson, 2003, 24-25*)

The Parliamentary Hearings have evolved over the past few years into a substantive and interactive debate on the main issues of the international agenda. The conclusions and recommendations of the Hearing provide a parliamentary input into the work of relevant bodies of the United Nations system. The role of the Parliamentary Hearing as "a regular feature of the program of events held at United Nations Headquarters on the occasion of the sessions of the General Assembly" was highlighted in a resolution of the General Assembly in 2004, "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Inter-Parliamentary Union." (A/RES/15/19). (*www.ipu.org/un-e/un-hearings.htm*)

In 2006, the Parliamentary Hearing at the 61st United Nations General Assembly focused on "Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building: Reinforcing the Key Role of the United Nations". The discussions centered on the following aspects

- the main findings of the 2006 United Nations Secretary-General's Report on Conflict Prevention;
- the new UN Peace-Building Commission: challenges and expectations;
- the fight against corruption, nationally and internationally, and implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption (October 2003) and other multilateral instruments;
- follow-up to the 2005 World Conference of Speakers of Parliaments: how to strengthen parliaments in their interaction with the United Nations**.** (*www.ipu.org/Splz-e/unga06.htm*)

The IPU web site reports that these are the "leading IPU partners within the United Nations system": UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UN Division for the Advancement of Women (UN-DAW), UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF).

"IPU has chosen building a reciprocal relationship between IPU and multilateral institutions starting with the UN, a relationship that does not alter the fact that both institutions are and should remain independent of each other." (*Johnsson, 2003, 28*)

IPU opposition to proposals to establish a formal parliamentary structure in the WTO reflects its opposition to proposals to establish a directly elected UN Parliamentary Assembly, and proposals for a World Parliament. It strongly supports the belief that the IPU, composed of members of the parliamentary branch of States, offers the appropriate method for "providing a parliamentary dimension to international cooperation." (*Johnsson, 2003, 21*)

Expanding Participation in Global Governance Beyond the UN system
Obviously, civil society organizations, business organizations, local governments and parliamentarians that are increasingly involved in the UN system are also involved in activities relevant to peacebuilding beyond the UN system. Many civil society organizations are involved in a diversity of field activities around the world. (*Alger, 2009, 321–324*) This diversity is presented in the twenty-one chapters of *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of NGO Peacebuilding*, edited by Oliver P. Richmond and Henry F. Carey. Also very informative is Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, by Reychler and Paffenholtz, a 543-page handbook for members of NGOs active in peacebuilding in the field.

Katrina West, in her volume on humanitarian NGOs in Rwanda and Afghanistan, has indicated that they have six types of field activities:
— general humanitarian,
— preventing humanitarian crises before they occur,
— protecting civilians from military activity,
— providing relief, such as clothing, shelter and medicine,
— forcible humanitarian actions that enforce penalties for violations of humanitarian laws, and
— restorative actions that resolve conflicts and develop peacebuilding. (*West, 2001, 13-18*)

There is a vast literature that reveals the widespread influence of transnational business corporations on world affairs. Sorcha MacLeod and Douglas Lewis in Transnational Corporations provide a very useful overview*: Power, Influence and Responsibility.* Doris Fuchs has written a book on *Business Power in Global Governance* that is focused on global governance outside the UN system. Her analysis indicates that there are three dimensions of business power:
• Instrumental power involves „using transnational and supranational lobbying activities to influence policies." She observes that „one can no-

tice evidence of increasing lobbying activities of business actors at supranational institutions and in international negotiations." (163)

- Structural power that involves capital mobility and competition for capital enhance the effect of lobbying".
- Discursive power that is „enhancing the perceived legitimacy of lobbying activities and positions." (164)

I provide an overview of global and regional organizations of local governments in „Searching for Democratic Potential in Emerging Global Governance: What Are the Implications of Regional and Global Involvements of Local Governments?" (*Alger, 2011*) The contributors to Cities and Global Governance analyze the extensive roles that local governments, and their inhabitants, play in global governance*: New Sites for International Relations. It is* edited by Mark Amen, Noah J.Toly, Patricia L. McCarney, and Klaus Segbers, Xiangming Chen; Trinity College, USA has provided a very challenging review of this book:

> Are cities rising and national states falling in a globalized world? The essays in this book address this timely question through a complementary set of case studies that demonstrate the varied mechanisms and ways by which cities and regions, or the subnational, are critical to global governance of diplomacy, environmental politics, and other domains. The book challenges both Urbanists and international relations scholars to meet each other across their disciplinary to divide their advance cooperatively in their increasingly intersected fields of inquiry.

Of course, Parliamentarians are also extensively involved in world affairs outside the UN system. We have already provided information on the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). In addition, there are at least forty-seven inter-State organizations of parliamentarians, of which nine are global. Three of these have broad agendas and six have specific agendas. The specific issues are corruption, business, nuclear disarmament, drug control, the World Bank and UN-Habitat. Very significant is Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGGA), founded in 1978-1979 by parliamentarians from around the world to take joint action on global problems which cannot be solved by any one government or parliament. PGGA is a network of 1350 individual legislators in 118 elected parliaments. The three programs of PGGA are international law and human rights, population and environment. Lluis Maria de Puig provides a very informative overview of the global activities of parliamentarians in *International Parliaments, 2008.*

How are you involved?

Everybody is increasingly linked around the world in their daily life in many ways, including the internet, things that they eat, other things that they purchase, and their environmental links around the world. Of course, those reading this article have also been thinking of the ways in which they are, or could be, linked around the world by their membership in civil society organizations, their business involvements, their local government, and their parliamentarians. Thus, everybody has a very complicated array of opportunities for being involved in peacebuilding. Making decisions about how to develop an effective approach is so challenging that many may feel it necessary to ignore the challenge. On the other hand, the fact that all have the opportunity to participate should make us become more optimistic about the possibility of creating a peaceful world

James O'Dea has responded to this challenge in a recent book: *Cultivating Peace: Becoming a 21st Century Peace Ambassador.* Here are three quotes from the introduction to this challenging volume:

- The peace movement "is shifting from being framed solely by its opposition to war and human rights violations to the systemic work of creating nonviolent cultures and just and sustainable societies."
- "Peace is so large and encompassing because it brings together inner security and global security."
- "An ambassador to peace is someone who recognizes the importance of transforming both inner blockages to peace and those blockages in external relations, cultures, and systems that prevent peace in the world. Peace ambassadors become skillful in learning the art, the practice, and the science of peace while cultivating peace within themselves." (O'Dea, 2012, XIV)

O'Dea challenges everybody to become a Peace Ambassador. He does this by emphasizing the broad agenda of peacebuilding, by indicating that everybody has the responsibility of being an ambassador, by the importance of a personality that is helpful to the peace ambassador, and by the importance of:

- framing the problem far more widely than the former practice of merely opposing those, who instigate wars or those who profit from arms sales. Psychology, spirituality, science, and systems theory are now at the table with law, political science, diplomacy, and other established approaches to social change and political negotiation. What is emerging is a map of the whole; it looks at the dynamic and interactive nature of the relationship between parts and the whole, from inner and outer. (XV)

O'Dea certainly provides an excellent overview of the responsibilities of citizens of democracies in an ever more globalized world. Moreover, how

these responsibilities might be met by becoming a peace ambassador. On the other hand, I think that most people will need the information about expanding global involvements that have been provided by the literature cited in this chapter before they will be able to apply the "shift in consciousness" that will enable them to become an effective peace ambassador.

Peacebuilding Responsibilities of Citizens in Democracies
In this ever-more globalized world, it is obvious that every citizen in a democracy has the responsibility to be involved in the development, and implementation, of the UN system policies of their country in the UN system. (*Alger, 2007*) This includes these items:

1. Everybody must have knowledge of the *organization of the UN system*.
2. Everybody must know, that since its founding in 1950, the goal of the UN system has evolved from responding to violence after it happens, to *long-term peacebuilding*.
3. Everybody must have knowledge of the *UN system policies of their* executive and legislative representatives in the government of their State.
4. Everybody must be involved in efforts to develop the UN system policies of *these officials.*
5. Everybody must know that participation in the UN system now includes not only their representatives in their State government, but also in *civil society organizations, business organizations, local governments, and parliamentarians.*
6. Everybody must know which civil *society organizations in which they are members* are involved in the UN system, and be making efforts to participate in the development of the UN policies of these organizations.
7. Everybody must know which *business organizations in which they are involved* are members of the UN Global Compact, and whether these business organizations are meeting the responsibilities of members of the UN Global Compact or not. Involvement in these business organizations can include investment, being a consumer of their products, being an employee of this organization, or being a citizen in a community in which this business organization has significant influence.
8. Everybody must know that local governments are involved in the UN system, whether *their local government* is making efforts to be involved, and informing their local government what their UN system policies should be.
9. Everybody must know about the involvement of parliamentarians in the UN system.

10. Everybody must know which of their parliamentarians are involved in the UN system, what their policies are; attempt to have an impact on these policies.

After acquiring this background knowledge, each citizen should chose a couple of important issues on the UN system agenda which are of considerable interest to them and in which they have the most useful background. Then they should develop a strategy for becoming involved in the development of the policies of the UN system on these issues.

This participatory strategy should include efforts to participate in the development of the UN policies of their representatives in their State government,, relevant civil society organizations, business organizations, their local government, and relevant parliamentarians.

In addition, it would be useful for all people to check the names of all organizations in the UN system and find if some names list functions in which they have had a useful experience. These names include issues that are relevant to virtually every academic discipline and every profession.

Those who are members of a local chapter of the United Nations Association in their country can be assisted in their effort by going to the Advocacy Agenda of their association. For example, UNA-USA's Advocacy Agenda on its web site is UN funding, Human rights, International Treaties that the US has not ratified and Millennium Development goals. UNA-USA offers very useful background information on these issues. Of course, UNA-USA is a member of the World Federation of UN Associations (WFUNA) that has members in over 100 States, so citizens of those States can obtain assistance from their UN organization.

After acquiring this relevant background, everyone should develop a *vision of a peaceful world that they think might be achieved, a*nd ask themselves: How might I contribute to achieving this vision, through the government of my State, civil society organizations, business organizations, my local government, parliamentarians, my academic discipline, my profession?

Then everyone might see possibilities for involving others in working with them in achieving their vision and attempt to involve them.

In conclusion, obviously this is a very challenging task, because everybody is involved in a diversity of ways and must make very difficult choices. Your response may be: "This is too complicated a task to respond to. Therefore, I must leave it to others to respond." However, I urge you to take this view.

> This is good news. I am having ever more opportunities to contribute to peacebuilding. Obviously, I cannot fulfill all of them, but I

must immediately select several that are most relevant to my inter-
ests and competence, and begin working on them. *If everybody does
this, we will certainly have a more peaceful world.*

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VÉRTESY, László:
Economic Security and Political Trust

World economies and world policies have been strongly transformed in the last 100 years. Countries came awake of the fact that the development of their own economies can be accelerated by international cooperation. They recognised other think, too: the untroubled functioning of worldwide cooperation is not possible without peace. Its basic factors are trust and security.

With the births of the nation states, the nationality awareness has deepened. National languages, cultures, traditions and identities have become new, outstanding values. People always want to preserve and develop them deeper and better, and of this desire, conflicts can rise especially between neighbour nationalities. At the same time, borders are open, moving is getting easier and because of this, migration and brain drain have increased enormously.

The borders of the countries are quiet only in papers, in the international contracts and the appearance of weapons of mass destruction, the threat of terrorism, the civil population's high exposure to dangers in case of a conflict seem to open new dimensions and make the international solidarity necessary.

The global world goes more and more over national borders. Appearance and fast expansion of multinational firms, interlocking production between countries prepare the start of a new kind of international cooperation. By using the Internet, the international cash flow moving is now possible on the spot. According to experts, the estimated value of short-term capital flow for speculative purposes is 6-7 thousand billion USD per day and this amount can circulate even more times a day in the stock markets and stock exchanges of the continents. From money driven economy we are going into the financial bubble. The value will probably increase because financial returns are normally higher than production incomes and there is not an efficient international institutional control. Another negative impact is the withdrawal of an important part of the free capitals from the productive sphere; and by consequence, unfortunately the economic growth is slowing down.

Because of the different economic developments in some countries and regions, they made not only a deep impact on the structures of world economy but also new positions of power have been set. The world economy is getting more and more accessible: at the beginning of the 70's only 13% was

the participation of the foreign trade in GDP of the total world: according to the forecast of the World Bank, this rate will increase to 31% for 2015.

How is it possible to harmonise such elements in an advantageous way? The solution is in both the national and international policy: ***respect tradition and the common wish of development.***

With other words*:* we have to protect the population from the negative consequences of the globalisation and in the same time we have to make sure that people will profit from the advantages of it. If we support both factors, respect and develop the values of the other part, then everybody will benefit from the result.

Economic power and safety

Classical western economic studies define the material welfare of the persons, the families and the small communities by three main factors:

— ways of earning,
— qualification and
— housing.

The three factors have a strict connection: higher income will help to have better accommodation and higher education, higher qualifications can give better jobs, and a closer accommodation to the workplace can improve the employment and the schooling. Vicious circle: if all the three elements are missing there is no opportunity to move off, if all the elements are available there are no more problems, people do not have to worry about anything.

From the point of view of economic expectations, the picture is clear: the members of the first group can only hope or expect a casual chance or a miracle – important and necessary human considerations but not economic categories. Members of the second group: they expect a better future on the bases of the solid background and their eventual pessimism is of psychiatric origin – neither this would be an economic category. The smaller conflicts are leading to enormous dissatisfaction and crises are generating by the first group.

Table 1: Determinative countries of the world's security

Country	GDP (Bn $)	Military expenditure (World =100)	Army staff (Thousand, active)	Nuclear weapons[1]	Expected economic growth	Expected political influence
USA	14658	41.0	1458	X	m	h
China	10086	8.2	2285	X	h	h
Japan	4309	3.4	230		m	m
India	4060	0.9	1325	X	h	h
Germany	2940	2.7	251		m	h
Russia	2223	4.1	1027	X	m	h
UK	2173	3.6	198	X	l	h
Brazil	2172	2.0	328		h	m
France	2145	3.6	353	X	l	h
Italy	1774	2.0	293		l	l
Mexico	1567	0.8	268		m	l
S. Korea	1458	1.8	687		m	l
Spain	1369	0.7	128		l	l
Canada	1330	1.4	68		m	l
Indonesia	1030	2.7	302		m	l
Turkey	961	1.0	667		l	m
h = High, m = Medium, l = Low						

Sources: IMF 2010, SIPRY Yearbook 2012, opinion based on investigations of several professional institutions

On national basis, security means the social-economical situation of the country that – of course – will make its effect on the political-military domain as well. With a close relation to this we have to take in consideration the reforming ability of the nation, the market economy relations (particularly provision dependency) and human factors (ethnics, nationality, human rights, social situation, etc) and protection of the environment, modernity of the national defence which have at least the same importance.

The priority list of the countries, which have crucial role in the world's security, is very different according to the world economic, political and military powers. By now, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the most important deciding forum of the world policy, are not the five biggest economic or five strongest military forces. Furthermore, it

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[1] Without Israel, North Korea and Pakistan

seems probable that in the present and future advanced countries the degree of economic, demographical and social development will be very different and certainly it can be expected a very fast realignment. So much depends on the wisdom and responsibility of the leaders and of positional staffs of the great-power countries: will they go through the process stirring up only small conflicts?

What is sure in the world economy? The good experts can see only the basic tendencies: World trade remains the engine of the world economy. Participation of the services in the world economy will be higher, the R+D[2] become more and more important due to the technological revolution and innovations. The role of BRIC countries[3], especially China's position is growing. The decline of the West is predicted. The gap between poor and rich countries is getting wider. The new relations of the new economic powers will bring up new policies, too.

The security of the nation states is in inverse proportion to the open economy: if the dependency is smaller, the ambitions of the government will strengthen. Nowadays, in most countries of the world the biggest risk of the catering is energy security but it is very easy to predict that in some years the situation might drastically change and food or drinking water will take the main role.

First, we can identify risk factors for the national economies in the negative secondary effects. Drug, illegal weapon trade, money laundering, organised crime, industrial espionage, sabotage, terror, damaging environment – the common point of them is that all of them are increasing. The problem of the coordination between demographical boom and suitable catering is not resolved. The polarisation of the society is increasing in almost every country: because of the realignment of the incomes on a worldwide scale, the distance between the poor and the rich is getting bigger and the low pole becomes more and more vulnerable.

Many people think the conflict boom will burst not here but at the clash of the civilisations and cultural circles (opinion of Samuel T. Huntington[4] and colleagues). Characteristically, the nationalism heated by religious engagement and ethnical differences enhances the conflicts, which were created on the ground of poverty, and pushes them towards local and /or regional conflicts.

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[2] Research and Development, with 4-5% of GDP in the developed countries
[3] Brazil, Russia, India, China
[4] The Clash of Civilization and the Remarking of World Order, 1996

Economic attendance and trust

Present tendencies greatly affect the future events. Rational attendance is based on applied (adaptive) attendance, on a detailed analysis of the economic processes and conditions of previous periods, but it also means the study of the interaction of future tendencies.

In literature, first the Chicago school, especially John F. Muth studied the problem on scientific level, later Robert E. Lucas developed the idea. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1995. In the so-called Prospect Theory[5], he traces the psychological approach, his Policy Ineffectiveness Proposition[6] deals with the ineffectiveness of government measures in the macro economy. Each theory was criticised: from Milton Friedman to Joseph Stiglitz, Stanley Fischer and others. There is a lot of literature of the pros and cons. The school of reflexive modernisation gives different approaches: it says the risk does not exist, there is only insecurity and the risk is merely one of the ways to deal with the obscure future.

Attendance is not equal to hope. "50% of economy is psychology. Economy is the product of the mankind not of the machines" – said A. Herrhasen[7]. From this aspect, even the economic attendance has a mostly psychological nature, although its future realisation is a real fact. It is interesting to look at the extent of the realisation: good attendance is the realistic one, where the expected degree of realisation is the highest possible, where the author in a previous phase could feel, presume or know for sure what the upcoming results would be.

The basic element of economic attendances is the trust. Everybody can have trust in the society, the government, the policy, the business, the enterprise – so many basic-stones of good expectations. Without trust, there is no positive expectation, only fear of the chaos and the anarchy. In such cases, even the latent capitals available in the economies keep away, showing up in saving forms and the venture capital is totally absent. That means, because of the economic attendances the economic environment can worsen and ends with being worse than it would be expected by right of the real, objective situation. Trust is the indispensable base of the success, between trust and success there is the positive attendance as the driving force of business initiative. The same mechanism works in similar way also in the policy and politics.

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[5] Prospect Theory (PT), founded by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. The problem is investigated by methods of psychotherapy, too: the different human motives in the risk management.

[6] Policy Ineffectiveness Proposition (PIP) by Thomas J. Sargent and Neil Wallace

[7] Alfred Herrhausen (1930–1989) former president of the Deutsche Bank

Economic and political attendance can be manipulated. In the macro-level, creation of a positive view of the future and the suitable environment for it is the task of the government and the media at first. Shaping the healthy view of the future will be useful in every domain: on individual, business, social and national economy levels. Individual, business and society together define the national economies so, if the economy progresses in the correct direction, the nations will have faith, dignity and trust in the future. People can be manipulated, the society is made of people, and people direct businesses, too.

To see the importance of the previous points it can be précised that the positive view of the future will bring positive changes in not only the economic expectations but will also contribute to the realisation of them in fact. As a fact, faith in the business environment, a realistic preview of the welfare will contribute to the progress of the economy and develop the business life and the entire society. At this point, the expectations have a special role. Manipulations can be a risk on international level as well: a review issued by one of the credit-rating agencies, one of the so-called "independent", or a rating of member countries by IBRD[8] or IMF[9] can turn many countries into strongly advantageous or disadvantageous financial situations in very short time, even in one day or one hour. Many examples of such speculations are well known.

Trust everywhere can be lost in one minute, while the regain of the good reputation can take long years. Desire of the positive view of the future is a human quality. Everybody can build on it. Of course, not relying on promises that will broke almost immediately. People's behavior will change in mass – that is the experience taken from the mass psychology – and will follow schematised models.

The definition of a successful businessman in the classical capitalism of the western world is someone who started from the bottom, developed his business gradually and conquered the market. Tricksters were condemned in some systems, and even if law did not condemn them, their reputation was pejorative in the public opinion. However, if the average man sees and hears every day that success can be acquired more easily by cheating and breaking the law and one can also forget the moral law and do not have to fear the consequences, people will gradually form their similar ''ideal'' and will follow the given model. They will base their economic expectations not on the progress of their business but on corruption, on social capital and on earning without working.

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8 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
9 International Monetary Fund

Real rational economic expectation is more than the hope of an entrepreneur. First, it is a realistic expectation based on the experience of previous time. There is not a general recipe, particular ages and situations offer a range of solutions and means, and we can and have to choose between them. Each political community has its responsibility to define for itself the ideas and principles that will be able to connect the individuals and create the social-economic environment that will lead people in the direction of the value-creating behavior – in thoughts first and in actions after.

The purpose of the work of confidence is to convince the enterprises and the population, using the convenient sets of tools in function of the different targets. Losing the trust of the population can provoke the failure of the government. In the micro-economy, on the level of the enterprises this is the main task of PR[10] departments. In the macro-economy, on the level of the national economy the responsibility is to the government in power and to the professional apparatus (ministries, spokesmen offices of the leading institutions, etc.) On international level, international organizations of world policy and world economy and professional institutions and multinational companies manage this task.

In business life, confidence index usually has two categories, one is to measure the business confidence, and the other is the customer's confidence itself. Data acquired by the method of sampling by interrogation reflect the opinion of the market, what type of evolution they are expecting for short and medium term. This method of forecasting is more and more popular in the decision-making process, concerning the business activity or the forms of savings and planning. According to the experience, the method gives correct evaluation, if the sampling and the data analysis were correct. In international life, political trust has a similar function; here the subjects of the analysis are the nation states.

Booms and busts based on economic expectations have always meant not only the success and cataclysms of cash- and trade management but have also affected the society and business in their integrity. Just one example: the social crisis manifests itself in the crisis of moral values, in the distortion of their role or, in extreme cases, in their absence.

Security of economic cycles
Scientific study of economic boom started in the second half of the 19th century and its relation to the economic expectation was clear from the beginning. Some people think the dynamic movement of the economy is equal to cyclic economy, it means uphill and downhill parts alternate each another. If

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[10] Public Relations

the alternation is compulsory, how can we speak about economic attendance then? It is clear: after the depression, there comes the boom; and every expansion has an end, which is followed by stagnancy.

In fact, the process is more complicated. Nowadays from Kitchin to Juglar, Kondratieff and Simiand we know the description of several economic time cycles. Each theory can be partly correct; in some conditions, short cycles of 2-3 years are predictable and in some other situations cycles lasting for 40-50 even 100 years are possible. The scientific life has a precise forecast, so why do we need rational expectations?

Economical cyclic campaigns (view agricultural production) are possible only in some defined domains and even there is only one dimension of the boom-diagram, the time period is predictable, because the yield, the quantity, the quality and the price of the production are uncertain. Meteorological factors can affect the yield (frost, precipitation, wind, etc.) and in addition, in the modern national economy the agriculture gives only 2-3% of GDP. Do industrial and service campaigns exist? In certain cases their cyclic character can be justified more easily than in the agriculture, it is enough to mention the seasonal tourism. In some other fields the undulation is weak or totally absent. The fact that cycles are unique makes the forecasting still more difficult. Surely, the economic processes do not have the same type of cycle twice or more times.

According to latest researches, the crisis is not a necessary element of the cycles. Other opinions put the main stress on the monetary world: the official interest rate of the national bank, monetary management and credit policy deeply affect the growth of the production. Many experts had the opinion that inflation gives helping hand to the economic growth but we witness more and more often that a high inflation results in negative growth.

The trust is only in few basic points: in the boom phase the production of capital assets increases faster than the consumption, the cash flow is faster, etc. In the presence of these elements, the growing conjuncture seems to be sure. The transmission from the depression to the growth is hardly perceptible. However, the transmission from the expansion to the depression is immediately clear in the business world and in people, a change to the opposite sense takes years – this is the role of the subjective element of the human behavior. What is more, it is not compulsory that cycles show undulating character, in some theories the boom is a kind of circular motion where the causes of the expansion and depression are always present together at the same time but in different extent[11].

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[11] T. Szentes: A világgazdaságtan elméleti és módszertani alapjai. Aula Kiadó, Budapest, 1995

The experience of previous cyclic motions affects the psychological motivations: economic optimism or pessimism to great extent have their origin in previous market actions. When we assess the prosperity of an enterprise, the focus is on the evolution of productiveness and profitability and not on the cyclic nature. The same points are important on national level as well, although their measurement is more complex and complicated. Good government – economic policy – endeavours to enlarge both of them on micro- and macro levels. The engine of the expansion is not merely the market mechanism or „the invisible hand", but the man himself.

The evolution of the boom in a country, of course, depends on external conditions; but first, the nature of the management is decisive. With dilettantism in the management, the expansion can be good only by chance, with professionalism, even the most difficult periods can be survived. Nowadays, the new tendency in the advanced countries is that governments support not mainly the increasing part of the cycle, nor the casual growth but the sustainable development, a long-lasting process that brings a modest expansion index – and in long term, without extremities, with the future of oncoming generations in view.

Security and peace
Two or three centuries ago, first time in the Western world, later in the 20th century everywhere, the evolution of the national identity and the spread of nation states became a common feature. Nowadays internationalism and globalisation are the general and typical tendencies. The horizontally (more and more countries are members) and vertically (the cooperation is getting deeper and stronger) growing economic integrations give a new perspective to the international regionalism. The most important precondition of the development of long perspective is the world peace. Economic security and peace presume and complement each other.

Peace is the synonym of a calm, non-violent period. The total peace of the humanity is an idea born together with humanity. All the great world religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, etc.) include this wish, sometimes the promise of it. The scientific approach in the modern Western world starts with Immanuel Kant's[12] book, „Perpetual Peace"[13]. The recipe is still the same: states have to make an alliance, an internationally accepted jury should make decisions in conflicts, and the execution of the decision should be the task of a common army with imperative force against the rebels – in other words: stable peace has to be institutional. By now, the highly

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[12] The basic works are the essays of Rousseau and Saint Pierre
[13] Zum ewigen Frieden, Königsberg 1795

developed forms of this idea include a complex international federation, an efficient and good world-governance.

Peace, policy, politics and economy are in strict relationship. Peace is not possible without an active, directed policy that means not only the absence of wars, but the ban on causing war provocation as well. Policy must not tease any conflicts because this would provoke a war easily. As Karl Clausewitz wrote in his famous book[14]: "war is not else but the continuation of the policy by other means". Nowadays, the national security is not a question of military policy any more.

Complex security means stable national and international environment, with general wide defensive force. The world peace is the peace realised among people and nations of the Earth and it has a strict connection to the safe economic situation, the freedom, the goodwill and several other human values. In this sense, the policy does not have and could not have a continuation because the final aim is the peace itself.

From economic point of view, the governments have to create the basic conditions that are necessary to soften social conflicts. In people's education (mostly in young, receptive age) the value of non-violence, the civilised solution of conflicts should come to the front. How is it possible to achieve such aims? The first step is to create the main components of the security. For most people, the main element of the security is the economic security, which means not only a momentary opportunity to survive but also the long stability of it, which we can hope with trust and reason: the security of food and other material goods, the security of health and the security of the person.

Some advanced countries offer 1-2% of GDP to help the developing countries. The final solution is not that but to help their own economic growth in the socially underdeveloped regions or at least to try to lessen their disadvantages. Another important element is the security of human environment in broad and narrow sense, starting from the peace of the soul to the security of families and small communities, and the security of the nations and countries and finally the security of law. The diminution of the sense of danger is the essential interest of every man, every government and every international institution.

A war conflict that goes over regional borders can easily escalate to world war; now, we do not have an international force that would be able to stop any of the powerful countries. Beyond the instable character of the national borders, the lack of resources presents another problem. Inside the

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[14] In the book Vom Kriege: „ Der Krieg ist eine blosse Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln".

country, the unfair distribution of goods, outside, the envy can/will generate conflicts. In the modern history, we do not have many examples of successful solutions. Even in such a situation where economy is dominant, logistics will get the main role in a possible new war.

The efficiency of the army now depends not on the personal courage and bravery any more; but rather on the abundance and modernity of the applied techniques, followed by the speed of new supplies and undisturbed logistics. The bigger part of the population live in cities, that means the food reserves disposable now in the villages, in countryside should be replaced by a centralised catering system for the whole population (controlled by the government). Only very few countries in the world have food and energy reserves which would be sufficient for several months. Since the 20th century, we can observe that the civil population is getting more and more endangered by a similar situation, – is total protection possible? The respect of the Geneva Conventions, in war situation, the outcome depends only on the goodwill of the governments and military staff, the warranty is incomplete.

In a world that is monopolised by military force, the calculable danger and threat have changed to unpredictable, multi-dimensional risk, where the number and measure of risk factors are continually increasing. The prevention will be more and more difficult. In addition, the order has changed: in peace, the risks of economic security have first priority; in war, the military risks have the main role. This mono-polar world will not last forever.

Instead of the interpretation of the security limited to only military sense and with the end of the Cold War, the complex interpretation has taken a leading position. Within this, the economic aspect has taken the main focus. Of course, all other aspects can be important, too. In fact, we can only discuss and analyze the topic in its complexity. The future depends on us, people in the world.

BRAUCH, Hans Günter:
> ***From Reconceptualizing Security to Sustainability Transition with Sustainable Peace***

A Personal Introduction: Reminiscences of Judit Balázs

Twice in IPRA's history and in different phases of European and world history, Judit Balázs organized IPRA conferences in Hungary, the 10th IPRA General Conference in Győr (1983), and the 20th IPRA General Conference in Sopron (2004). They offered Hungarian hospitality to support intensive scientific discussion by peace researchers from all parts of the world.[1]

NATO's 'double decision' of 12 December 1979 to deploy new intermediate range nuclear weapons (INF) and to enter into bilateral US–Soviet negotiations concerning their prohibition, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, marked the beginning of the second Cold War. The result was a major rearmament during the administration of President Reagan. While the meeting in Győr happened during this second Cold War, the 20th IPRA Conference took place after the Cold War had ended with the symbolic opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. Six months earlier, on 2 May 1989, close to Sopron, the foreign ministers of Hungary and Austria had cut a hole in the so-called 'iron wire' and subsequently the barbed wire between both countries was dismantled. This offered an opportunity for thousands of East Germans to leave the Socialist bloc and join their relatives and friends in the West.

The two IPRA general conferences in Győr (1983) and Sopron (2004) demonstrated that a 'peaceful transition' was possible from the militarized order of the East–West conflict to a new post-Cold War order. But less than two years later several wars were triggered by the collapse and fragmentation of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Yugoslavia (1991–1999). Unresolved problems, partly due to the peace treaties following World War I (1918), but also to historical memories of experiences during World War II, were rekindled by ethnic nationalism. It resulted in the greatest bloodshed

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Europe has experienced since the end of World War II. Several related violent conflicts involved different ethnic groups as well as NATO.

Resulting from the Peace of Trianon (1920), one-third of the population of Hungary was forced to live as minorities in other countries (Slovakia, Romania and Serbia). That the issue of Hungarian minorities did not result in a second major ethnic conflict in east-central or south-east Europe was due to restrained Hungarian policymakers and the active role of the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel. The EU's Balladur Plan also meant that the card of EU membership was actively played to counter nationalist efforts to discriminate against Hungarian and other minorities.

In the preface to the proceedings of the Győr IPRA conference, Chadwick F. Alger, as Secretary General of IPRA (1983–1988), pointed to a "healthy dynamism in peace research" with an increasing understanding "that enduring peace would require not only a great reduction in armaments and diminution of violence but also demilitarization of societies, enhanced economic well-being, greater social justice and broader cultural autonomy for the peoples of the world". Alger observed a "broadening perspective of peace" addressing "the connections between various peace issues, e.g. between militarization and development, between arms races and human rights, between cultural autonomy and development" (Alger/ Balázs 1985).

If my memory serves me correctly, I met Judit Balázs for the first time during the 11th IPRA Conference in April 1986 in Sussex, then again four years later during the IPRA Conference in Groningen in 1990, at the IPRA Conference in Sopron in July 2004, and again in 2008 at the 22nd IPRA General Conference in Leuven.

These personal meetings with Judit Balázs stand for three different contextual phases of European history that had a direct impact on the conceptual debates within peace research and international relations. This was also the case at the IPRA meetings in 1986 in Brighton, when the second Cold War (1980–1987) was in full swing; in 1990 at Groningen, when the world was in an open transition and expecting a 'peace dividend'; and in July 2004 after Hungary had joined NATO and had just joined the EU on 1 May 2004.

The four IPRA Conferences where I had long conversations with Judit Balázs also stand for turning points in my own scientific interests. These resulted in two major global scientific dialogue research projects: i) Analysis of Armaments Dynamics and Disarmament (1981–1989); II) Reconceptualization of Security (2001–2011).

In this text for the 70th birthday of Judit Balázs, I will briefly refer to the first project, linked to my early participation in IPRA (1977–1994). I will then present selected results from the second project, that Úrsula Oswald

Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz and I launched in Sopron (2004)[2] and that resulted in the three volumes that we presented at the IPRA conferences in Leuven (2008)[3] and in Sydney (2010).[4] Finally, I will outline the goals of a third project on "Sustainability Transition with Sustainable Peace", to be launched in September 2012 with a workshop in Mexico and to be discussed at future IPRA conferences.[5]

First Global Dialogue Project: Armament Dynamics and Disarmament
As Secretary General of IPRA, Chadwick F. Alger suggested in late 1985 that I organize a Commission on Weapons Technology and Disarmament at the 11th IPRA conference at the University of Sussex. Thirty-two papers were presented during five sessions at the University of Sussex in April 1986 and stimulated lively discussions (Hoag 1986). This first meeting of what has now become IPRA's 'Security Commission' has resulted in several publications addressing the scientific interests and political concerns of peace researchers during the second Cold War (Alger/Stohl 1988; Brauch 1989). Chadwick F. Alger also suggested that I should invite a colleague from the East as a co-chair of this commission, which touched on politically highly sensitive issues. I followed this second piece of good advice and invited two colleagues from east-central Europe to become successively my deputies as chair of IPRA's Study Group on Weapons Technology and Disarmament: Pál Dunay, an international lawyer from Budapest in Hungary, and Czeslaw Mesjasz, a physicist and economist from Cracow in Poland. Czeslaw Mesjasz later became my successor at the 13th IPRA Conference in Groningen (1990), and both colleagues joined me as co-editors of the second major global dialogue project.

Second Global Dialogue Project: Reconceptualizing Security
In the proceedings of the 13th International Conference of IPRA – its 25th anniversary – in Groningen in July 1990, one of the three sections dealt with "Reconceptualizing Security", with contributions by Randall Forsberg, Lothar Brock, Patricia Mische and Úrsula Oswald Spring. In her introduction, Elise Boulding (1992: 65) referred to the emerging debate between adherents of both narrow and wider concepts of security. While Forsberg (US) and

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[2] See at: <http://www.afes-press.de/html/download_sopron.html>.
[3] See at: <http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/hexagon_03_PressConf_
     Presentations.htm#16July>.
[4] See at: < http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/hexagon_04_PressConf_
     Presentations.htm#sydney>.
[5] See at: < http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/sustainability_workshop_overview.htm>.

Brock (Germany) used the narrow concept of military security, Mische (US) and Oswald Spring (Mexico) addressed environmental security dangers.

Probably inspired by this IPRA session in 1990, at the 20th IPRA Conference in Sopron in July 2004 Czeslaw Mesjasz, my successor on the IPRA Commission and deputy chairman of AFES-PRESS, Úrsula Oswald Spring and I launched a new global research project that eventually resulted in the *Global Human and Environmental Security Handbook for the Anthropocene* (GHESHA).[6]

At Sopron in July 2004 I worked closely with Úrsula Oswald Spring, and after Sopron the original co-editors invited Úrsula Oswald Spring to become a co-editor. She was later joined by Navnita Chadha Behera (India) and Patricia Kameri-Mbote (Kenya) in order to strengthen the voice of women scholars from the South. My first deputy on the IPRA Commission on Weapons Technology (1986–1988), Pál Dunay (Hungary), was another co-editor of the first and third volume of the handbook.

End of the Cold War: A Peaceful Political Transition
In the twenty-one years between the IPRA conferences in Győr (1983) and Sopron (2004), it could be seen that a 'peaceful transition' to a "Peaceful World is Possible". The three previous transitions of international European and global order since the French Revolution (1789) have been the result of wars and revolutions: firstly, the order established at Vienna in 1815 emerged from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars; secondly, the order established at Versailles in 1919 followed World War I and the Russian Revolution; and thirdly, the order established at Yalta and San Francisco after World War II resulted in the emergence of two competing ideological, political and military systems. But during 1989 and 1990, there was a peaceful fourth transition of global international order with the sudden end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Warsaw Treaty Alliance and Comecon.

But the many hopeful expectations of peace researchers at the 13th IPRA General Conference in Groningen (1990) were not fulfilled. The 'peace dividend' did not happen, and twenty-three years after the turn of 1989, world military expenditure has surpassed the levels of the Cold War (SIPRI 2012). Rather, the wars in the post-Yugoslav space, the war started by Iraq (1990) and the conflicts against Iraq (1991, 2003), as well as the Western military involvement in Afghanistan (2001–), have reminded us that the prevailing Hobbesian mindset in international politics and realist worldviews in international relations have not been overcome, nor has the 'institution of war'

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[6] See Brauch et al., 2008, 2009, 2011; at: <http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/hexagon.htm>.

been overcome as Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (1912–1997) repeatedly called for.[7]

Since the IPRA conferences in Győr (1983) and Sopron (2004), Judit Balázs and her native Hungary experienced a major societal, political and economic transition with the collapse of the Socialist system and the introduction of a market economy and a liberal Western-style democratic system. Ten years after the Iron Curtain was cut by the last Socialist foreign minister, Gyula Horn, on 2 May 1989, Judit Balázs completed her habilitation at the Budapest Defence University in 1999 and obtained the degree of Dr. hab. in Military Sciences. Subsequently she was appointed full professor in the Department of International and Regional Economics in the Faculty of Economics at the West Hungarian University in Sopron.

Contextual Change and Conceptual Innovation

The reconceptualization of security in the 21st century[8] has gradually evolved since the end of the East–West conflict (1989–1991) and has been influenced by a) the end of the Cold War, b) processes of globalization, and c) the emerging impacts of global environmental change. Since the late 1970s, an expanded concept of security has been discussed in academia (Krell 1981; Buzan 1983).

In the policy debate, the 'security concept' has gradually widened since the late 1980s. Ullman (1983), Mathews (1989) and Myers (1989, 1994) put environmental concerns on the US national security agenda. Since the early 1990s, many European governments have adopted an extended concept of security. Using this, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) distinguished between the wideners, who included an economic and environmental dimension, and the traditionalists, focusing on the primacy of a narrow military concept of security (Walt 1991; Chipman 1992).

The Copenhagen School (Wæver, 1997; Buzan–Wæver–de Wilde, 1998) distinguished five dimensions (widening: military, political, economic, societal and environmental) and five referent objects ('whose security?'), or levels of interaction or analysis (deepening: international, regional, national, domestic groups, individual). But they did not review the sectorialization of security from the perspective of national (international, regional) and human security (Brauch 2009).

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[7] The German physicist and philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker was a major critic of the nuclear armament of Germany from 1957 and was also a conceptual founder and supporter of peace research in the 1960s. His research team launched the debate on non-offensive defence in 1972, arguing that Central Europe could not be defended but only destroyed by nuclear weapons.

[8] This section relies on Brauch (2008, 2009, 2009c).

They also distinguished five levels of analysis: international systems, international subsystems, units, sub-units, and individuals. Others referred to five vertical levels (Møller 2003) of security analysis: a) global or planetary (Steinbruner 2000), b) regional (Buzan–Wæver 2003), c) national (Tickner 1995), d) societal (Møller 2003) and e) human (UNDP 1994; CHS 2003). Some suggested expanding the human security discourse to the environmental dimension, especially to interactions between the individual and humankind as the cause and victim of global environmental change (Brauch 2008a, 2009).

Since the 1990s, in European security debates an 'extended' concept of security has been used by governments and in scientific debates. Møller (2003) distinguished a 'national' and three expanded concepts of 'societal', 'human', and 'environmental' security. Oswald (2001, 2007, 2009) introduced a combined 'human, gender and environmental' (HUGE) concept of security (*Table 1*).

Table 1: Expanded Concepts of Security

Concepts of security	Reference object *(security of whom?)*	Value at risk *(security of what?)*	Source(s) of threat *(security from whom/ what?)*
National security *[political, military dimension]*	The state	Sovereignty, territorial integrity	Other states, terrorism (sub-state actors)
Societal security *[dimension]*	Nations, Societal groups	National unity, identity	(States) Nations, migrants, alien cultures
Human security	Individuals, Humankind	Survival, quality of life	State, globalization, GEC, nature, terrorism
Environmental security *[dimension]*	Ecosystem	Sustainability	Humankind
Gender security	Gender relations, indigenous people, minorities	Equality, identity, solidarity	Patriarchy, totalitarian institutions (governments, religions, elites, culture), intolerance

Source: Møller, 2001, 2003; Oswald, 2001

Within the UN, NATO and the EU, different concepts of security coexist: a state-centred political and military concept, and an extended security concept with economic, societal, and environmental dimensions. A widening and deepening of the security concept has taken place in OECD countries, while some countries have adhered to a narrow concept of national security that emphasizes the military dimension.

Although since the 19th century the key 'actor' has been the state, it has not necessarily been the major 'referent object' of security, often referred to as 'the people' or 'our people' whose very survival is at stake. A major debate (Wiberg 1988; Walker, 1990, 1993) has evolved since the late 1980s over whether the state as the key referent object ('national security') should be extended to include the people (individuals and humankind as 'human security'). Walker (1988) discussed the complexity of a non-state-centred redefinition of security to include the security of the 'individual' or 'global peoples'. Buzan (1991), following Waltz's (1959, 2001) man, state and war, distinguished between the international, state and individual levels of analysis and emphasized the inherent tension between the latter two, but he remained critical of the human security approach (Buzan 2004a).

From 1947 to 1989, national and military security issues became a matter of means (armaments), instruments (intelligence) and strategies (deterrence). Whether a threat, challenge, vulnerability, or risk (Brauch 2005a, 2011) becomes an 'objective security danger' or a 'subjective security concern' also depends on the political context. Müller (2002: 369) argued that the traditional understanding of security "as the absence of existential threats to the state emerging from another state" (Walt 1991; Baldwin 1995; Kolodziej 2005) was challenged both with regard to the key subject (the state) and carrier of security needs, and its exclusive focus on the "physical – or political – dimension of security of territorial entities" that are behind the suggestions for a horizontal and vertical widening and deepening of the security concept. The concept of security has also been interpreted as a reaction to globalization (Mesjasz 2003, 2008).

In security discourses, different concepts for security dangers are used: *threats, vulnerabilities, challenges, uncertainties*, and *risks* dealing with both *hard* (military) and *soft* security issues (drugs, human trafficking, migration). Within the EU, *national* and *internal* security issues (justice and home affairs dealing with issues of asylum, migration and citizenship) are distinguished.

While the classical means and instruments of a narrow security policy have remained the military and diplomacy, in the EU this classical *domaine réservé* of the nation state has entered a process of fundamental transformation with close consultations, common policies and strategies, and increased common voting in international institutions (UN, OSCE). In many international regimes (food, climate, desertification), the EU is a full member alongside its twenty-seven member states. Its evolving common *European Foreign and Security Policy* (CFSP) and *Security and Defence Policy* (ESDP) have affected the traditional national military and diplomatic leverage.

Within international organizations sector-specific security concepts are widely used, such as 'environmental security' (Brauch 2003, 2009), 'food security' (FAO 1996; Oswald 2009), 'global health security' (Leaning 2009), 'energy security' (Jacoby 2009), and 'livelihood security' (Bohle 2009).

The political and scientific concept of security has changed with the international order. With the Covenant (1919), the concept of 'collective security' was introduced. After World War II, the concept of 'national security' was launched in order to legitimize the global role of the US. After 1990 the concept of security widened and deepened and new ideas such as 'human', 'environmental', and 'sectoral' security were added to the policy agenda.

After the independence of the United States (1776), the French Revolution (1789), the wars of liberation in Latin America (1809–1824) and the emergence of new independent states (1817–1839), four global contextual changes occurred in Europe that resulted in new international orders:

- The *Peace Settlement of Vienna* (1815) and the European order of a balance of power based on a Concert of Europe (1815–1914) in an era of imperialism (Africa, Asia) and post-colonial liberation in Latin America.
- The *Peace of Versailles* (1919) with the collapse of the European world order, a declining imperialism and the emergence of two new power centres in the US and the USSR with competing political, social, economic, and cultural designs, and a new global world order based on the security system of the *League of Nations* (1919–1939).
- The *Political Settlement of Yalta* (February 1945) and the system of the United Nations discussed at the conferences in Dumbarton Oaks (1944), *Chapultepec* (January–February 1945), and adopted at *San Francisco* (April–June 1945).

With these turning points during the European domination of world history, the thinking on security changed. After the French Revolution, the idea of '*Rechtssicherheit*' (legal predictability guaranteed by a state based on laws) gradually evolved. With the Covenant of the League of Nations, '*collective security*' became a key concept in international law and international relations (IR).

Since 1945, this concept of 'national security' has become a major focus of the discipline of IR. During the Cold War, the modern 'security concept' emerged as a political and scientific concept in the social sciences, which were dominated by the American and Soviet strategic cultures. With the end of the Cold War, its prevailing security concepts had to be adjusted to the new political conditions, security dangers, and concerns. The process of a 'reconceptualization of security' and 'redefinition of security interests' that was triggered by the global turn and slightly modified by the events of 11

September 2001 and the subsequent US-led 'war on terror' has become truly global. The dominance of the two superpowers has been replaced by an intellectual pluralism representing the many different traditions but also cultural and religious diversity (Oswald 2008; Arends 2008).

The drivers of the theoretical discourse on security and the intellectual centres of conceptual innovation have shifted away from the United States. During the 1980s, conceptual thinking on 'alternative security' in Europe searched for alternatives to mainstream deterrence doctrines and nuclear policies (Weizsäcker 1972; Brauch–Kennedy 1990, 1992, 1993; Møller 1991).

By 2008, discourses on security were no longer a primarily American social science (Crawford/Jarvis 2001; Hoffmann 2001). American conceptualizations of national security were challenged by alternative security experts in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s and also by new national perspectives during the 1990s, e.g. in France (Lacoste, Bigo, Badie), in the UK (Buzan, Booth, Smith, Rogers), Canada, and Germany (Albrecht, Czempiel, Senghaas). There has been a re-emergence of geopolitics in southern Europe (France, Italy, Spain) since the 1990s. In other parts of the world, a new school of geopolitics has emerged (Dalby–Brauch–Oswald Spring 2009; Brauch–Dalby–Oswald Spring 2011).

Groom and Mandaville (2001: 151) noted an "increasingly influential European set of influences that have historically, and more recently, informed the disciplinary concerns and character of IR" stimulated by the writings of Foucault, Bourdieu, Luhmann and Habermas and by peace research by Galtung, Burton, Bouthoul, Albrecht, Czempiel, Rittberger, Senghaas and Väyrynen (Albrecht–Brauch 2008).

Since 1990, new centers of conceptual innovation have emerged. New journals on IR and security problems have been launched, pan-European Conferences on International Relations (ECPR) have taken place, and since August 2005, there have been three world conferences on international relations in Istanbul (2005), Llubljana (2008) and Porto (2011). New centers of intellectual and conceptual innovation have emerged in the security realm:

- In Europe, *Aberystwyth*, *Paris*, and *Copenhagen* are associated with critical 'schools' of security theory (Wæver 2004).
- The *human security concept* was promoted by Mahub ul Haq (Pakistan) with the UNDP report of 1994, developed further by the *Human Security Commission* (CHS 2003), and globally promoted by both.
- Civil society organizations in South Asia developed the concept of *livelihood security*.
- International organizations introduced the sectoral concepts of *energy* (IEA, OECD), *food* (FAO, WFP), *water* (UNEP), *health* (WHO), and *soil security* (UNCCD; Brauch–Oswald Spring 2009, 2011).

- In the US, Canada, Switzerland and Norway, the concept of *environmental security* emerged during the 1980s and 1990s.
- The Earth System Science Partnership (ESSP) and its four programmes: IHDP (International Human Dimensions Programme), IGBP (International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme), WCRP (World Climate Research Programme) and Diversitas resulted in global scientific networks that indirectly address new security dangers and concerns.

Trends in the *reconceptualization of security* have been: a) a *widening*, *deepening*, and *sectorialization* of security concepts; b) a shift of the referent object from the state to human beings or humankind (*human security*); c) a perception of *new security dangers* (threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks) and *securitization* of new security concerns; and d) a search for new non-military strategies to face and cope with newly perceived security dangers and concerns and new environmental dangers, hazards, and disasters that pose a 'survival dilemma' for affected and vulnerable people. These new drivers and centres of conceptual innovation have fundamentally challenged the narrow state-focused concept of security held by traditionalists and realists during the Cold War. This world view of experts working on war, security and strategic studies still determines the political mindsets of decision-makers in the post-Cold War era (Albrecht–Brauch 2008).

From The Holocene to the Anthropocene: Transition in Earth History
While the end of the Cold War marked the first peaceful global transition of the structure, strategies and policies of international politics since the French Revolution (1789) and the Congress of Vienna (1815), and of the Westphalian sovereignty-based system of nation states, the transition from the Holocene period of Earth history to the 'Anthropocene' is more profound.[9]

The Holocene began with the end of the glacial period about 12,000 years ago and marked the onset of major human progress and the development of advanced civilizations in the Mediterranean, in China, in India and in Meso-America. In earth and human history a fundamental change has occurred since the industrial revolution (1750) from the '*Holocene*' to the '*Anthropocene*' due to increasing human interventions, especially through the burning of fossil energy; this has resulted in an anthropogenic period of climate change. The 'Anthropocene' concept was introduced by Crutzen (2002) as "a new geologic epoch in which [hu]mankind has emerged as a globally

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[9] This text relies heavily on Brauch/Oswald Spring (2011) and Brauch/Scheffran (2012).

significant – and potentially intelligent – force capable of reshaping the face of the planet" (Clark–Crutzen–Schellnhuber 2004: 1).

The 'Holocene' is a period of geological transition with dramatic environmental change; a major rise in sea level has been caused by the melting of the huge ice sheets that covered large areas of the northern hemisphere. The natural variability in climate during the Holocene has had a major influence on the development and collapse of advanced civilizations (Fagan 2004; Diamond 2005; Bluemel 2009: 104). The Roman empire coincided with the 'Roman optimum', while its collapse occurred during a cooler period when massive migrations of peoples from Central Asia to Europe and from northern Europe to the Mediterranean took place (Issar–Zohar 2004: 14, 2007: 12; 2009: 125). The second climatic downturn led to the "little ice age" (Fagan 2000, 2002) that coincided in Europe with bad harvests, famines, pandemics (plague), and the Thirty Years War (1618–1648).

The role of climate in the decline and fall of civilizations has been disputed between climate determinists and climate sceptics (Brown 2001). Since the 1930s, the anthropogenic model has placed all the blame on human malpractice (Issar–Zohar 2007). The neo-deterministic paradigm "emphasizes the dynamic interaction between the natural environment … and the human society" (Issar–Zohar 2009: 110-120). Many neo-determinists have argued that during the Holocene cold periods, changes in precipitation and long periods of drought triggered massive movements of peoples. Due to natural climate variability, longer periods of drought and famine resulted in the sudden collapse of several advanced civilizations (Diamond 2005).

Since the late 19th century several authors have referred to human intervention in nature (Marsh 1864, 1965; Stoppani 1873; Vernadsky 1926, 1998) and the earth system, facilitated by major population growth (Malthus 1798) brought about by technological and medical advances, and by the availability of cheap fossil energy sources (Mc Neill 2000, 2009). Crutzen (2006: 13–17) pointed to the chemical impacts of human activities during the Anthropocene that have resulted in increasing air pollution, acidification of precipitation, and major changes in land use (Vitousek–Dantonio–Loope–Westbrooks 1996). Crutzen (2006: 16) concluded that the "still growing impacts of human activities on earth and atmosphere" make it "appropriate to emphasize the central role of [hu]mankind in geology and ecology by using the term 'Anthropocene' for the current ecological epoch".

In response to the gradual understanding of the anthropogenic contribution to *global environmental change* (GEC) and climate change in the Anthropocene, the 'sustainable development' concept was adopted in Rio de Janeiro (1992) at the *United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development* (UNCED). It became a key policy goal of UN Secretary-General

Kofi Annan's *Millennium Report* (2000) and at the *World Summit on Sustainable Development* (WSSD) in Johannesburg (2002), where "the need for harnessing science and technology in support of efforts to achieve the goal of environmentally sustainable human development in the Anthropocene was generally recognized" (Clark–Crutzen–Schellnhuber 2004: 3).

Crutzen (2006: 17) argues that as humankind "will remain a major geological force for many millennia" it is necessary "to develop a world-wide accepted strategy leading to sustainability of ecosystems against human induced stresses" and that this will be "one of the greatest tasks of humankind, requiring intensive research efforts and wise application of the knowledge."

This fundamental change in earth and human history provides the third causal chain for a reconceptualization of security. The societal and political impacts of this global change, far more severe than the end of the Cold War, is gradually being understood by policymakers and specialists in international relations and security, who have launched a process of securitization of the causes, effects, impacts and societal outcomes of global environmental change (Brauch 2009a; Brauch–Oswald Spring 2009; Oswald Spring–Brauch 2009, 2009a).

During the 21st century, the relationship between the causes and severe societal outcomes of GEC and climate change may have a number of results: environmentally-induced massive and forced movements of peoples; protests induced by hunger and famine and small-scale societal violence; possibly violent conflicts within and between countries. These results pose many security dangers that have increasingly been addressed by governments and by international organizations.

The causal linkages and possible extreme, sometimes fatal, societal outcomes have been discussed from four perspectives:

1. *Determinists* have claimed that climate change will lead to wars during the twenty-first century. This argument has been put forward by scientists (e.g. Lee 2009), by humanitarian organizations and NGOs, and by a few governments.
2. *Empiricists* have stressed (Dalby–Brauch–Oswald 2009; Oswald–Brauch–Dalby 2009) that environmental stress and climate change have contributed to forced migration and small-scale violence. They have analyzed the securitization of the impacts of climate change (Brauch 2009; Scheffran 2011; Scheffran–Brozska–Brauch–Link–Schilling 2012) and reviewed the conflict constellations triggered by climate change (WBGU 2008).
3. *Sceptics* have pointed to a lack of evidence in the peer-reviewed, quantitative literature on the links between climate change and wars (Gleditsch–Nordas 2009).

4. *Deniers* have challenged both the idea of anthropogenic climate change (Lomborg[2] 2009, 2004) and the links between climate change and possible conflicts that might pose security threats. For different reasons many governments have expressed this view within the UN context.

While future climatic scenarios can be simulated and socio-economic trends can be projected, specific events (Gaddis 1992–1993) such as climate conflicts and wars as the outcome of decisions by future policymakers cannot be predicted; rather, several 'conflict constellations' can be foreseen (WBGU 2008; Bauer 2011) that may possibly escalate into violence.

Figure 1: Channels of threat multipliers and threat minimizers
Source: UN-SG (2009: 7).

The UN Secretary-General in his report on climate change and security (UN 2009) distinguished between two discourses linking climate change with security and sustainable developments that a) referred to five channels through which climate change (as a threat maximizer) could affect security, and b) as 'threat minimizers' could result in sustainable development (*Figure 1*).

Most states have confirmed the finding of the IPCC that climate change is real and human-induced but many Annexe 1 countries (UNFCCC) and Annexe B countries (Kyoto Protocol) have failed to implement fully their commitments or to adopt legally binding commitments for major reductions in GHG emissions. In addition, they have postponed the implementation of a legally binding post-Kyoto climate change regime from 2013 to 2020. The longer decisions on major legally binding GHG reduction targets and their full implementation are postponed, the more likely it is that the societal impacts of dangerous and catastrophic climate change will trigger significant international, national and human security consequences during this 21st century.

From Rio 1992 to Rio+20: Paralysis of Global Climate Governance
The outcomes of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 and of the second Earth Summit (Rio+20) in June 2012 point to a fundamental change in global climate governance. While in 1992 two international conventions (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD)) were signed, and several policy documents approved (Agenda 21, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Statement of Forest Principles), two decades later the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) adopted a 'legally non-binding outcome document': *The Future We Want*, calling for a green economy in the context of *sustainable development* (SD) and poverty reduction, an institutional arrangement for SD, a framework for action and follow-up.[10]

The first earth summit in Rio established a framework for international climate governance with legally binding commitments for developed industrialized countries (Annexe 1, UNFCCC), and the Kyoto Protocol (1967) adopted quantitative emissions limitations and reduction obligations (QEL-ROs) for Annexe B countries. But two decades later global climate governance is paralyzed due to the failure of the Conference of Parties (COP) in Copenhagen (2009), Cancún (2010) and Durban (2011) to adopt a legally binding post-Kyoto climate regime once the obligations adopted under the KP expire by the end of 2012.

For this reason I suggested the concept of a 'Climate Paradox' (Brauch 2012, submitted) that refers to a fundamental contradiction in the behaviour of both developed (G8) and developing and threshold countries (G20), as reflected in their policy declarations and their lack of implementation of these policy commitments. Most government representatives confirmed the IPCC

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[10] See: UNGA (2012). *Draft resolution: The Future we Want*, A/66/L.56 (24 July 2012).

findings that climate change is increasingly being influenced by human interventions in the earth system, and they supported the goal of stabilizing the increase in global average temperature at 2 °C above the pre-industrial level by the year 2100. Since 2007, the G8 countries in their annual summit declarations, most recently in May 2011 in Deauville (France), have supported the goal of developed countries reducing emissions of greenhouse gases in aggregate by 80% or more by 2050, compared to 1990 or more recent years. Consistent with this ambitious long-term objective, we will undertake robust aggregate and individual mid-term reductions. … Similarly, major emerging economies need to undertake quantifiable actions to reduce emissions significantly below business-as-usual by a specified year.

In November 2011 in Cannes, the G20 countries adopted a declaration that proposed fostering clean energy, green growth and sustainable development:

59. We will promote low-carbon development strategies in order to optimize the potential for green growth and ensure sustainable development in our countries and beyond. We commit to encouraging effective policies that overcome barriers to efficiency, or otherwise spur innovation and deployment of clean and efficient energy technologies. …

60. … A green and inclusive growth will create a broad spectrum of opportunities in new industries and in areas such as environmental services, renewable energy and new ways to provide basic services to the poor.

At the political level many OECD states – among them half of the G8 – have failed to implement their legal obligations under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (1990–2012) and to adopt a post-Kyoto regime. The Durban outcome "included a decision by Parties to adopt a universal legal agreement on climate change as soon as possible, and no later than 2015". This reflects the dominant business-as-usual mentality among government representatives; they postpone legally-binding commitments to their successors.

The system of rule or democratic governance is not relevant in distinguishing the different climate performance of the G8 and of the G20. Rather, there is a significant implementation gap among democracies between a majority of EU countries (leaders) and large OECD countries in North America and in the Asia-Pacific region (laggards) who had legally binding reduction obligations. Among the G20 countries different strategies of business first,

development first, and reformist approaches towards a long-term transformative change to sustainability could be observed.[11]

New Project on Sustainability Transition and Sustainability Peace
The emerging international research and dialogue project on *Sustainability Transition and Sustainable Peace Project* (STSP) will address key scientific and political challenges of the 21st century:

- The relative failure of international efforts to address, face and cope effectively with the impacts of global environmental change and global climate change has resulted in a 'climate paradox'. Major industrialized and democratic countries were unable or unwilling to comply with the legally binding and declared commitments that they adopted during the first Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War.
- This failure is reflected in the inability of the international community as represented by the world of states to agree on a legally binding follow-up regime to the Kyoto Protocol by the end of 2012, and in the relative failure of the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC at COP 15 in Copenhagen, Denmark (2009), COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico (2010), and COP 17 in Durban, South Africa (2011).
- Most G8 countries have failed to initiate measures to implement their announced goal (2007–2011) of reducing their GHG emissions by 80% by 2050; in May 2012 in their *Camp David Declaration* at their summit in the USA, they dropped previous policy commitments.
- In the *G20 Leaders Declaration* approved in June 2012 at Los Cabos (Mexico), they did not adopt any agreement on financing climate change activities in developing countries.
- The *United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development* in Rio de Janeiro on 20–22 June 2012 did not adopt any legally binding decisions besides the 'outcome document'.

This sceptical diagnosis of the paralysis of global environmental governance since 2009 may lead to two different approaches on international security and environmental policy:

- a *business-as-usual policy* that assumes that market mechanisms, economic initiatives, technological fixes and military power will be able to cope with the consequences of political inaction;

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[11] A paper on the climate policy of the G20 will be presented at the 24th IPRA Conference in Mie City (2012).

- a willingness to move towards a *fourth sustainability revolution* that re-
  quires a range of efforts to move towards a long-term transition to-
  wards sustainability.

This is also reflected in different policy debates (Report of the UN Secre-
tary-General on *Climate change and its possible security implications* of 11
September 2009) and in scientific discourses that are so far not conceptually
linked:
- on the *securitization of the impacts of global environmental and climate
  change* caused by this international inability and lack of political will to
  act in a proactive manner; policy decisions are postponed to decision-
  makers' successors and to the next generations of citizens who will be
  the ones who have to pay the price;
- on the need to initiate strategies, policies and measures that aim at a
  s*ustainability transition* during the 21st century.
  — The *first debate* has been primarily policy-driven and has gradually
    evolved since the turn of the millennium in the framework of inter-
    national, national and human security. The *scientific discourse* (Schef-
    fran–Brzoska–Brauch–Link–Schilling 2012) has been pursued from
    different policy and scientific perspectives and with different scien-
    tific methods.
  — The *second debate* has also partly been policy-driven, e.g. by the de-
    bate on a green economy launched by UNEP, OECD and different DGs
    of the European Commission. The *scientific discourse* on sustainabil-
    ity transition has evolved, initially in Europe, since the conferences
    in Amsterdam (2009), Lund (2011) and Copenhagen (2012). It is
    taking place within the *Sustainability Transitions Research Network*
    (STRN) and is documented in the new journal on *Environmental In-
    novation and Sustainability Transition* (EIST) and the book series
    Routledge Studies in Sustainability Transitions (from 2010).

This emerging global scientific dialogue project tries to link this emerg-
ing debate with the experience of international relations and *environment,
security, development and peace studies* by addressing the possible impacts
of alternative policy trends on both international peace and security.

All three technical revolutions, the first (agricultural) revolution of
10,000 to 6,000 years ago, the second (industrial) revolution of 1750–
1890/1914, and the third revolution in communications, transport and in-
formation (CTI) technologies since 1890 or 1920 (also called the 'second in-
dustrial revolution'), have resulted in a higher and more violent level of war-

fare and have thus impacted negatively on international peace and security. This experience raises several new key research questions:

- Will the suggested fourth sustainability revolution lead to new multiple and potentially violent conflicts within and between countries?
- Might the suggested sustainability transition in the energy sector reduce the potential of resource-related violent conflicts and wars?
- From a scientific and conceptual perspective, which strategies, policies and measures might be needed to combine the proposed process of a long-term transition of scientific institutions and the new knowledge of societies and of the business community, as well as new forms of governance, with the goal of a sustainable peace?

These questions will also be addressed in papers to IPRA's *Ecology and Peace Commission* (EPC) in future IPRA conferences. This scientific dialogue may result in another handbook on sustainability transition and sustainable peace that will address conceptual, theoretical and empirical linkages between environmental studies and peace research.

A scientific analysis of the linkages between a cultural, societal, political and economic process of 'Sustainability Transition' and the normative goal of a 'Sustainability Peace' faces many conceptual, methodological, theoretical and empirical challenges. While the emerging scientific discourse on 'environmental innovations and sustainability transition' has so far primarily addressed technological innovations, societal changes and governance issues, this proposed new project is conceptualized much more broadly, and addresses seven dimensions of sustainability transition: temporal, spatial, scientific, societal, economic, political, and cultural. This means bringing in not only the dimension of 'international' and 'transnational' relations but also the perspective of normative peace research, by addressing in a proactive manner potential security dangers that may result in violence, conflicts and wars. The scientific and policy goal is to initiate a process of anticipatory understanding and learning about societal, political and economic hotspots that may trigger complex and chaotic 'cascadic' (Kominek–Scheffran 2011) societal processes in the 'global risk society' (Beck 2007) during the 21st century.

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CLEMENTS, Kevin P.:
The Prevention and Transformation of Violent Conflict in the 21st Century

The First and Second World Wars, the Korean War, the Cold War and the Vietnam War were all examples of nationally organised conflicts. They are good examples of what (Kaldor, 1999)calls "old wars", fought between states over ideology, territory and Empire. The United Nations (like its predecessor the League of Nations) was established primarily to prevent such inter- state conflicts occurring. The United Nations was the 20th century embodiment of Westphalian nation state principles. It was not that successful during its early years and was paralysed by the cold war during the 1960s but it started to make important progress on the resolution of trans-national violence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.

Since 1990, however, these inter-state wars have become progressively more infrequent. There are, however, new patterns of armed violence occurring in the 21st century. Transnational organised violence (inter-state conflict) is increasingly being replaced by intra-national violence and by a slight increase in the incidence of "trans national" terrorist violence initiated by new kinds of state and non state actors. (Patrick, 2007) This new type of violence is not spawning many new states but does pose important challenges to national and regional order and stability. This new violence is also proving much more difficult to deal with than traditional inter state violence. This is because intra state and modern transnational violence is more likely to be fuelled by personal, familial, class, religious, ethnic and gender based dynamics rather than political ones. This new violence is often coupled with high levels of political, economic and social asymmetry in terms of power, influence and capacity, which means that it has a tendency to persist long after its immediate triggers /precipitants have been addressed.

So what characterises these new conflicts or what Mary Kaldor calls "New Wars"? (Kaldor, 1999). In the late 1990s Kaldor argued that "New Wars" had the following characteristics:
- They take place in response to different types of globalising pressures, [economic, political (e.g. Human Rights) and social] and
- normally occur in places where states are unravelling. [This is an interesting contrast with the wars generating independent states in the middle of the 20th century, which more often than not emerged from con-

flicts and battles over which groups possessed a monopoly of power within particular state frameworks].

- They are normally (but not always) identity and sectarian conflicts with strong ethnic/religious dimensions.
- Instead of being fought between uniformed armies, they deliberately target civilians.
- Instead of focusing on winning hearts and minds, they use fear and hatred. (ethnic cleansing, genocide, systematic rape) and
- They are heavily criminalised as well. They are financed through illegal trade in diamonds, oil, logging, smuggling or plain old loot and pillage.

This was certainly a very accurate description of most of the conflicts, flowed out of the unravelling of the former Soviet Union. In recent times, however, there has been a deeper internationalising of some of these more nationally based and initiated conflicts, e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo etc. What is clear, however, is that there are elements of Kaldor's new war scheme in most of the conflicts of the 21st century. What is also clear is that those groups involved in such violence have a vested interest in perpetuating it. These conflicts are enormously profitable for those who can take advantage of porous borders and "Bad neighbourhoods" (Goodhand, 2003). There are many parts of West Africa, the Horn of Africa, Congo, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East, for example, which qualify as "bad neighbourhoods" or conflict systems with uncontrolled borders, high levels of political instability and insecurity as well as drug and people trafficking, gun running and the free movement of different types of armed groups.

These conflicts continue to embody significant identity and religious dimensions; are still fought by civilians as well as military actors, and continue to use fear and hatred to destabilise those communities within which they are operating. They also tend to be heavily criminalised (e.g. Afghanistan) but they also have significant new political dimensions to them as well. They are often framed explicitly in terms of oriental versus western value systems and there is normally a political as well as a criminal and sectarian agenda. The political struggles of the 21st century are often around the appropriateness or otherwise of market led development and western democratic forms of governance versus the more autocratic or anocratic regimes of the past (M. G. a. C. Marshall, Benjamin, 2009).

While there is some evidence that the overall incidence of significant armed conflict is decreasing (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002) those wars that continue are proving increasingly intractable. Conflict ridden regions contribute to this intractability but the economic, so-

cial and political conditions of countries that have experienced violence for longer than 5 years are such that they are unable to generate virtuous dynamics capable of generating stable government, thriving economies and political will in favour of ending violent conflict. All the recent wars of the last ten years, for example, are characterised by mass atrocity, destroyed infrastructure, retarded development, humanitarian crises, internally displaced persons, expanding poverty, disease, higher military spending, political breakdown, capital outflow and brain drain.

The actors that might be capable of generating change and transforming these malign conditions into benign ones very often flee into exile thereby generating a huge skills shortage when it comes to the creation of stable peace. These vicious dynamics are generating a large number of direct and indirect victims of violence.

From 1991–2011, for example, 3,000 were killed in the attack on the World Trade Centre; 41,000 plus lost their lives in Afghanistan post occupation; there have been 150,000 plus deaths in Iraq post occupation (655,000 according to the Lancet of 2008),180,000 in the Yugoslav conflict; 200,000 in the Sierra Leonean Civil War; 3.8 million in the Congo. (385,000 lost their lives through direct violence and an estimated 3 million in indirect violence). (Gurr & Marshall, 2005); 3,000 plus people have lost their lives in demonstrations against the Assad regime in Syria since January 2011. This is by no means an exhaustive list of battle deaths over the past twenty years but it does demonstrate something of the lethality of the New Wars in the 21st century.

The challenge facing analysts is what some of the underlying causes of violence and war are.

In the first place, there are clearly some economic drivers of conflict and violence. Scarcity or the threat of scarcity is a powerful source of both violent conflict and defence. (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) for example, argue that war causes poverty and poverty in turn also increases the likelihood of violence and civil war. They also suggest that countries with low, stagnant, unequally distributed per capita incomes, dependent on a narrow range of primary commodities face dangerously high risks of prolonged conflict.

These dangers are exacerbated by what they call the "Conflict Trap". This trap means that countries that have experienced one incidence of widespread organised violence double their chances of another such incidence within a five-year period. If countries have a second episode of violence within the first five years after the initial conflict, they quadruple their chances of relapsing into violence within the next five years. Once states, societies and communities, therefore, lapse into conflict for economic or any

other reason their chances of generating stable peaceful relations afterwards are relatively slim.

A second major driver of violence and conflict is abuse of human rights. War is very positively correlated with the truncation of civil and political rights and the extreme abuse of human rights. Human rights violations are always a good sign of division, polarisation and the demonization of the other. In the 1990s, for example,

72% of states involved in Civil Wars also reported extra-judicial executions; torture; police and prison violence; mistreatment of refugees and immigrants (Turpin & Kurtz, 1997). Gross violations of human rights are normally a sign that the rule of law has broken down and/or that civil society is excluded horizontally and vertically from political voice and legitimacy. Certainly, we know from the Arab spring in 2010-2011, that State repression of political dissidents is a major trigger to armed conflict. This happened in Libya, and widespread public protest in Syria (2011) is generating some appalling examples of state sponsored repression and death as the ruling regime seeks to hold on to power by whatever means possible.

A third source of violence in the 21st century is regime type or political system. There has been, for example, a long-standing debate in the field about whether democracies are more peaceful than autocracies. (Rasler & Thompson, 2005). The evidence strongly suggests there is a phenomenon that can be called "The democratic peace". In the early years of the 21st century, for example, only 12% of established democracies were involved in civil war; 45% of one party dictatorships were involved in civil war and 30% of the states with a transitional or uncertain democracy were involved in civil war (M. G. Marshall & Jaggers, 2004). The evidence is quite strong therefore in relation to the capacity of democracies to maintain reasonably high levels of peacefulness. Unchallenged autocracies (e.g. Singapore) also have a capacity to maintain high levels of peacefulness. What Marshall and Jaggers discovered; however, was that countries moving from autocracy to democracy or vice versa (what they call anocracies) were especially at risk of political violence. Thus, regime type and transitions from one regime to another are powerful predictors of levels of violence.

These economic, political and regime type explanations go a long way towards describing some of the major dynamics of violent political conflict in the 21st century. These sources of violence are supplemented by identity, value based and ideological conflicts but they provide a general framework capable of explaining many modern day conflicts. The challenge facing policy makers and practitioners, however, is what sorts of responses are most likely to generate effective responses to the many dilemmas facing the world.

What is clear is that we are going to need some new paradigms for dealing with these new conflicts. Kaldor's solution to the New Wars is (I) to promote cosmopolitanism as opposed to parochialism, (II) Human Security and (III) the States' Responsibility to Protect. (Kaldor, 1999, 2007). These are three laudable objectives but are not that politically popular within States responsible for much of the violence of the 21st century.

What I would like to argue for in this chapter is a response to violence that does not depend completely on the role of state actors (many of whom are responsible for the violence in the first place) but rather entrusts some critical non state actors and communities with responsibilities for countering the dynamics conducive to the new wars.

I start from the assumption that it is impossible to generate permanent solutions to violence which are themselves violent. As Gandhi said, "I object to all violence because when it appears to do good, the good is always only temporary but the evil it does is permanent." If violence is not delivering stable peace, and there is no indication that it is, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, the DRc etc, then it is vital that theorists and practitioners start thinking of some alternative paradigms whereby peace might be achieved by more peaceful rather than violent means and by non-state rather than state mechanisms alone. In the process it is important to listen to those who have what I call a "Vocational Commitment" to Non Violence, i.e. who espouse political and social philosophies that are framed in terms of doing no harm and working out ways in which good might be done.

The Quakers and Mennonites (two of the historic peace churches within Western Christianity) believe that true human fulfilment comes from attempting to live life in the spirit of love, truth and peace, and with a deep reverence for all life. These beliefs give rise to a strong commitment to equality, justice, compassion and a desire to treat each person with ultimate respect. These are good values for individuals seeking to develop some radical alternatives to living lives in the spirit of enmity, hostility, untruth and revenge. Social Scientists, however, have a responsibility for ensuring that these kinds of values have some foundation in the principles of social interaction and what lies at the heart of stable community. It is not enough to enjoin people to act non-violently these injunctions have to be accompanied by solid sociological reasons for non-violent action.

When thinking about non-violent versus violent paradigms, for example, it is important to map out why non-violent strategies are preferable to the violent and at what levels they are most likely to work effectively. Here are some lessons that flow from successful examples of non-violent strategising and action. (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000) Non-violence works because it is mutually empowering. It does not diminish opponents but treats them

with respect. It builds resilient relationships and solidarity between peoples and is willing to suffer rather than inflict suffering. This tactic of absorbing suffering rather than inflicting it is particularly challenging for many people accustomed to normal adversarial politics, but it has proven efficacious in a range of different examples where non-violent tactics and strategies have been employed to advance social change (e.g. the Indian Independence Struggle, the battle for desegregation in the United States, the velvet revolutions of Eastern Europe etc). Successful non-violent strategies also embrace and promote changes that advance the interests and needs of the poorest, weakest and most vulnerable in all communities. These groups are both an important untapped social resource and a source of political legitimacy. Non-violent action also speaks truth without fear and acts on the basis of rigorous social, political and economic analyses. It is based on reality based optimism and hopefulness but most of all it works because it promotes networks of effective action and progressive coalitions across class, gender and ethnic divisions.

Non-violence works because it provides a singular way of moving towards both positive and negative peace[1]. What peace researchers have discovered over the course of the last 50 years is that while it is often possible to generate peace agreements, or truces between warring parties. It is much more problematic getting these agreements to stick unless they are accompanied by a commitment to cooperative, sustainable and relatively egalitarian communities (Galtung, 1971). These communities are not only capable of preventing the state or those in positions of authority from acting violently and oppressively towards citizens, but more positively, they are capable of ensuring that state systems act to guarantee welfare, social security, the rule of law, and social continuity.

Building sustainable peace, therefore and responding to new wars effectively not only requires states and markets pulling together within predictable rules and arrangements but it also requires integrated actors and communities capable of building trustworthy, empathic and predictable relationships. Such actors emerge from secure attachments to family and friends but they are most likely to exist within strong, resilient and relatively equal

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[1] Johan Galtung coined the terms 'negative peace' and 'positive peace' in the late 1960s. (J Galtung, 1971). Negative peace refers to the absence of violence and positive peace refers to the restoration of broken relationships, cooperation, equity, equality and the removal of the structural and cultural sources of violence.

communities. [2] Peacebuilding, therefore, is a never-ending process that occurs at micro-meso and macro levels. Each one of these levels has a role to play in the construction and maintenance of harmonious and peaceful relationships and each one has an important role to play in dealing with new wars-especially those that are resource based, criminalized, and based in fear.

While we need some sociological understanding of why non-violence is or is not important, it is also helpful to understand what ethical frameworks undergird different types of social systems, and whether or not they are oriented primarily towards cultures of peace or cultures of violence. There are many different kinds of ethical frameworks could be explored in this regard. For the purposes of this chapter, I wish to focus primarily on the work of Emmanuel Levinas (1988, 1989) since he has a very elegant rationale for welfare and non-violence from which it is possible to extract criteria for determining whether different types of actions will generate fear and anxiety or confidence and peace. I want to introduce Levinas' rationale for non-violence and then explore what this means for those interested in reversing delegitimizing, dehumanizing dynamics and building sustainable peace at the inter-personal, inter-group, national and global levels.

Most peaceful communities have emerged relatively spontaneously and organically, as individuals, groups and societies have evolved through time. Still, ethicists, philosophers and religious leaders have invested considerable effort in developing ethical and philosophical justifications for intentional non-violence and peacefulness. These perspectives tend to take two directions.

The first, epitomized by Emmanuel Kant and Neo-Kantian philosophers like John Rawls (Rawls, 2005) emphasizes individualist approaches to peace and peacefulness and lay great stress on agreed rules, impartiality and individual abilities to discern fair, just, and peaceable solution to problems. According to this perspective, peaceful and tolerant communities flow from the character and "virtuous qualities" of individuals who abide by specific principles such as fairness and justice. Those who espouse these "virtue ethics" see moral value and inclinations toward peacefulness as residing primarily in individuals' attitudes, traits, and motives rather than in social relationships.

The second perspective is drawn from relational ethics and has been given its most recent expression in what is now known as a feminist ethics

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[2] These relationships can also be described in Susan Opotow's terms as "Moral Inclusion" i.e "relationships in which the parties are approximately equal, the potential for reciprocity exists, and both parties are entitled to fair processes and some share of community resources" (Opotow, 1990)

of care (Held, 2006). This approach focuses attention away from individual character and directs much more attention to the ways in which ethical imperatives toward peacefulness and justice flow primarily from relationships with family, friends, and meaningful "others". It is in relationship that one discovers the true source of ethical responsibility and obligation and from which it is possible to draw wider ethical bases for justice and peacefulness.[3] According to this perspective, more important than individual "character" or "virtue" are relational capacities to care, trust, empathize, reciprocate and be compassionate. These relational qualities are what generate stability, altruism, mutual consideration, solidarity and a concern for the welfare of others. The central argument is that peaceful, tolerant people emerge out of good relationships. Thus, although non-prejudiced individuals will have a positive contribution to make to building tolerant, peaceful communities, this perspective holds that relations between individuals and social categories are much more important to building peaceful and sustainable communities than the character traits of any specific individual.

Much of what is now thought of as relational ethics flowed out of the work of French moral philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas (1988; 1989). Like millions of 20th century European Jews, Levinas understood suffering and despair personally and directly. He was dispatched to a concentration camp and lost many of his family and friends in the Holocaust. It is probably not surprising, therefore, that he focused a good deal of his early philosophical attention on why such violence occurred in Europe and how such violence might be prevented in the second half of the 20th century. He was interested in exposing the roots of violence, racism, sexism, and classism, and working out ways of preventing such pathologies in the future (see Burggraeve, 2002). Levinas' work was oriented toward controlling individuals and collectivities who tried to totalise, tyrannise, delegitimize and destroy those they could not face or tolerate.

Levinas sought to develop a sociological and relational justification for an ethical life that would guarantee that human beings do not kill each other. To do this, he wished to remove any possible justification for causing harm to others or for killing those who are doing no harm. Levinas knew that he could not stop all human aggression and conflict, but he still worked to develop a methodology and framework for engaging the "Other" to make aggression the bluntest and least effective of all instruments for realising human potential and serving the common good.

In order to do this, he developed an ethics of responsibility that flows from a profound awareness of the universal vulnerability of all human be-

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[3] See (Slote, 2007) (Held, 2006) for elaborations of both these positions**.**

ings. In "Ethics as First Philosophy" (Levinas, 1989, pp 75-87), he argues that the ethical attitude flows from our basic awareness of each other, and from understanding of our common and shared vulnerabilities. By focusing on ways in which we can enhance awareness of the vulnerable Other, in all its singularity and uniqueness, Levinas argues that we will discover why non-violence towards others is the human imperative and why it lies at the heart of well-functioning social systems.

Levinas suggests that each human being on the planet faces a triple vulnerability.

First, there is a permanent physical vulnerability; we may die anytime and we will all certainly die sometime. Levinas sees this as an extremely important equaliser, as mortality is a fate that awaits all of us. How we respond to the certainty of our mortality will have an important impact on whether or not we will have a disposition to non-violence or violence. He believed that an acknowledgment of our individual and collective mortality could generate a softening of our demands on one another as we individually and collectively confront death. In this reflective process he suggests that we need others to help us live and to die.

Levinas was interested in mortality as a spur to thinking about ways of enhancing life, such that confronting mortality generates broader concerns about meaning, value, specialness, and our particular place in the world.

In response to psychological research on mortality salience, Levinas would likely ask how widely or narrowly we define our boundaries of responsibility and care. If we have some idea of species identity, for example, Levinas argues that an awareness of mortal vulnerability should generate an openness to thinking more profoundly about relational obligations across boundaries of national difference. If we have narrow conceptions of identity based on kin, locality and a strong sense of group identification then consciousness of mortal vulnerability may generate less generous behaviour.

The second vulnerability with which Levinas grapples has to do with living in the company of others. The fact that we exist alongside others generates what Levinas calls a psychological vulnerability. He argues that other people constitute a psychological threat simply because they are *Other*. This is existentially unsettling as we never know whether or when we are going to be taken advantage of and it is all too easy to become wary of others instead of trusting them. Grappling with psychological vulnerability in our social relationships is, therefore, a critical element in determining the extent to which we will adopt an ethics of care instead of an ethics of fear. If we adopt a paranoid disposition towards others and try and allay that with deterrent threat and coercive capacity that will generate very different types of behavioural outcomes than if we have a positive disposition towards others and

look for ways in which, at minimum, we can co-exist, or more optimally develop strong and robust relationships with others (see Kramer & Messick, 1998, for a related argument).

Thirdly, and most importantly, however, is what Levinas identifies as our moral vulnerability. Since I am an Other for the Other, I am not only potentially threatened by the Other, but I also constitute a threat to the Other. The awareness of our moral vulnerability, or our capacity to do harm to others, is absolutely critical to the evolution of Levinas' sociological ethic, because it requires each individual to decide what sort of relationship they wish to have with others – especially with those who are strangers. He writes: "As a threat to others I am here in the world with no right to exist; if I cannot claim to be harmless, how can I claim any right to be here?" (Levinas, 1989, p. 80)

This capacity to harm others is a fundamental challenge to all inter-personal, inter-group and inter-national relationships.

Levinas concludes that the only solution to this moral vulnerability is to address intentionally the ways in which we individually and collectively may threaten others. He comes up with an elegant solution that underpins all relational ethics.

In his view, the only way that individuals and collectivities can establish their harmlessness to others is to accept unconditional (and unlimited) responsibility to and for the Other. This is a compelling sociological argument for a deepening of relationship minimally, by accepting a responsibility not to kill the other. More optimally, it is done by accepting responsibility for the welfare of the other. For this to happen, individuals, groups and institutions must think much more extensively and intentionally about what sorts of social, economic and political relationships will create a peaceable community and guarantee its continuity through time.

Rational choice theorists, on the other hand, argue that it is irrational not to care about individual welfare and maximisation of resources for one's self. When thinking about building sustainable peace, it seems equally irrational not to care about the welfare of others and the welfare of the community – however narrowly or broadly we wish to define the boundaries of that community. Here, it is also important to note that there are good selfish as well as altruistic reasons for doing so. Levinas' argument is that because human beings are equal in their vulnerability they can only be truly safe in relationships where selfish interests give way to the interests of the other and vice versa. Moreover, this unconditional responsibility for the Other is an imperative that does not have to be justified by any social contract, political system or special relationship between me and the Other. (A.H Lesser, 1996, p. 149). It is an argument that assumes an acceptance of responsibility

without any expectation of return except for that most precious return of all, namely human trust. When we accept responsibility for the welfare of others, we are in fact creating the only solid basis for a peaceful community and for dealing with the triple vulnerabilities of human existence. As such, the argument for an ethics of responsibility grounded in deep reciprocity provides a compelling social psychological and political rationale for an ethic of non-violence.

The real heroes are those who subordinate self in the promotion and building of resilient and inclusive relationships. These people create communities of inclusion and possibility rather than exclusion and fear. The challenge facing peacebuilders, therefore, is to illuminate the heroic actions that build rather than destroys social relationships. This may be one reason why feminists have been so prominent in developing relational ethics and the ethics of care. Women in most communities of the world "heroically" sacrifice self on a daily basis to ensure the well being of families, neighbourhoods and communities (E Boulding, 2000).

Initially, Levinas advances these arguments in relation to dyadic relationships but from there he extrapolates to much more complex relationships, including triads, groups and institutions. There are all sorts of other issues come into play when one adds more complexities to social relationships, and especially when there are major discrepancies of power, privilege and prestige. For example, why should I have responsibility for an Other if that Other may be exploiting or threatening to exploit me? The ethics of care and responsibility therefore, are based on some degree of equality of power, privilege and opportunity, which is why promoting equality is a prime contribution to peacefulness. Indeed, according to work I have done on the Global Peace Index, those societies that rank most highly on levels of Peacefulness are those that have a radical commitment to equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes and the welfare of others.[4]

Levinas' method for resisting selfishness and engendering "positive othering" is based on an engagement with what he calls the Face of the Other. This is an important means of enhancing relational capacity, and it is also critical to preventing the delegitimisation and dehumanisation of others. By focusing on the Face, especially the Face of those who suffer, or are in pain, or the Faces of the subordinate, the imprisoned or the marginalised, we begin to establish our human obligations and responsibilities. It is rare, for example, for most people in the West to focus much attention on the faces of those suffering in the New Wars of the 21st century. What this requires,

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[4] See the following URL for discussion about the GPI
   http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi/results/rankings.php

therefore, is deep and radical attention to the concrete and particular features of the Face in encounters between the self and the other. We engage the Other not only in terms of his/her individual differences but in a deeper acknowledgement of the Other's incomparability, uniqueness, and distinctive singularity (Lévinas & Hand, 1989, p. 83) Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, by acknowledging the Other's singularity, individuals and groups generate processes for combating prejudice, enemy imaging, and for building more sensitive community. In conscious engagement with the Face, Levinas suggests, we discern the ethical basis for responsibility, which begins not from ourselves and is not based on our individual virtue or capacities but on a deep recognition of the Other. In the encounter with the Face, we see joy and happiness as well as misery and suffering. It is by paying attention to the Face of the other that we can begin resisting the totalising forces, which challenge the deep and incomparable individuality, which flourishes in sustainable relationships. This is particularly crucial to building cultures of peace and tolerance and to combating murderous ethnocentrism.

A critical part of this dynamic, which is also highly relevant to building inter-group harmony, is the central importance of hospitality, especially when it is directed towards those who are strangers to us. By being welcoming and friendly, we acknowledge the vulnerabilities that we share as human beings and attend to others with care and single-minded attention. Many people feel somewhat ambivalent about others and the notion of an Other. They have experienced more pain than pleasure at the hands of others. Levinas' argument is that even for these people, focusing on another in the way he explains it will generate gentleness rather than fear.

When we cease attending to the singularity of others in community and ignore justice, we start rendering Others faceless and in this process generate the conditions for harm, violence and genocide. Building on Levinas, in her book *Precarious Life*, Butler (2006) states that

> *" Those who remain faceless or whose faces are presented to us as so many symbols of evil, authorize us to become senseless before those lives we have eradicated, and whose grievability is indefinitely postponed"* (Butler, 2006, p. XVIII).

Implications for Building Peaceable Communities
So what does all of this have to do with all the new wars currently afflicting the world? I wish to argue that highlighting the sanctity of the inter-subjective – that is, acquiring a radical reverence for all life (Schweitzer, 1966) and deriving social and political ethics from a deep responsibility-to-and-for-the-Other (Levinas, 1988; 1989) are critical to the development of harmonious and peaceable communities. They are critical because most sta-

ble peaceful communities rest on: (1) a commitment to and the practice of equality, justice and responsibility (Galtung, 1996); (2) the cessation of relationships of domination and subordination (Wallerstein, 1974); (3) the expansion of trust and mutuality across boundaries of difference (Sennett, 2003); and (4) a deeper reverence for nature and commitment to sustainable development (Singer, 2001).

What is interesting about these positive peaceful dynamics is that they all depend on individuals and groups controlling egotism, selfishness and greed. They all vindicate Levinas' concern for personal relationships where there is a commitment to the care of others and the promotion of cultures of peace as opposed to cultures of war, violence and revenge (De Rivera, 2008). Cultures of peace flow from experiences of positive informal and formal relationships at the micro and meso levels. It is very difficult for rule-based political institutions to legislate for these types of relationships. Their presence enables families, groups, and organisations to generate strong, welcoming, inclusive groups and associations, while their absence means that solidarity is much more likely to be achieved by divisions between in-groups and out-groups.

Because state systems can not legislate for friendship, compassion, empathic awareness and an ethic of responsibility, the onus is upon individual actors who have experienced positive attachments to others in the past to reproduce these relationships in the future. While political systems can generate macro conditions for empathic awareness, equality of opportunity and outcome, and social and political security, their willingness to do so also depends on individuals and groups articulating these values as ideals and making commitments to realise these ideals in practice. Societies that are thought of as peaceful (Humanity, 2010) tend to value the Levinas' ideals of empathy, a commitment to the welfare of others and hospitality to strangers (see Humanity, 2010).

The intentional pursuit and achievement of sustainable peace and justice, therefore, requires perspectives, which draw on the wisdom of many academic disciplines, but it also requires specific cultures and communities having some positive visions of what harmonious communities look like. Without an ethic that is firmly relational the probability of achieving peaceful relationships, intentionally, is slight. If the visions are not inclusive and cross-culturally sensitive, or worse primarily ethnocentric, this too is problematic since transferring ethnocentric visions from one place to another will inevitably generate cultural dissonance and, if imposed on others, incompatibility and conflict. This has what happened during periods of imperialism and colonialism. The negative peace that flows from Empire, whether

it be Pax Romana, Pax Brittanica, or Pax Americana, is inherently unstable and cannot be considered the basis for sustainable peace with justice.

Most states, however, are not positively peaceful in terms of indirect or structural violence (Galtung, 1971) and many that are subject to violence have high levels of spontaneous and organised criminal violence. It is also true that the atomization and pace of modern industrial communities makes it challenging for most members of such communities to pay attention to the interests of others in the ways in which Levinas suggests we should.

Most member states of the United Nations, for example, have high levels of vertical and horizontal inequality and there are far too many minority groups systematically and deliberately excluded from sources of political, economic and social power (Gurr, 1993); (Stewart, Holdstock, & Jarquin, 2002). Competition over scarce resources, ideological differences, protection of personal or group identity remains important proximate sources of conflict. Inequality, corruption and criminality as Kaldor highlighted (Kaldor, 1999) are also potent sources of structural un-peacefulness. These last three factors certainly make it difficult to treat others were reverential respect.[5] Of these three factors, however, the one, which seems to undermine relationship and trust most of all, is the levels of inequality. Unequal societies perform less well on most indicators of well being, health, education and peacefulness. General life chances are more restricted in unequal societies than in more equal communities (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). As Marshall Sahlins (1972) put it: "Poverty is not a certain amount of goods, nor is it just a relation between means and ends, above all it is a relation between people".

Unfortunately, those who are deprived relatively and absolutely are those who are more likely to live in a state of unpeacefulness rather than those who are not. On a basis of the research evidence, therefore, it is clear that equality is critical to building sustainable peace. Equality is implied rather than developed in Levinas' theory and yet is critical to establishing an appropriate contextual base for radical relational ethics and the creation of cultures and structures of peace. The recognition of human equality is critical to the development of an ethics of care and responsibility. This is why it is important to know what states, societies, markets and individuals are doing to advance equality. Most advanced industrial states do not have explicit objectives in favour of equality but they do have educational, health and social policies that create safety nets below which citizens are not allowed to fall. The pursuit of equality and justice as a peacebuilding exercise, therefore, requires both ethical and political as well as social science justification.

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[5] See the latest version of the Global Peace Index 2010 for examples of the drivers of violence and unpeacefulness (Humanity, 2010).

There have to be compelling reasons for individuals, groups, and communities to move in this direction, otherwise the tendency is to maintain the status quo and reinforce existing patterns of power, prestige and inequality.

There are, therefore, important ethical, relational and communitarian reasons for promoting positive peace. As (Johan Galtung, 2010) argues, it is vital that we know the deep psychological, sociological, anthropological and political sources of both direct and indirect violence if we are to promote realistic scenarios for both negative and positive peace. A negative peace, which ignores or fails to address structural and cultural sources of violence, will always be unstable and a positive peace that exists alongside large amounts of direct violence would be somewhat oxymoronic and difficult to imagine.

So how do we, as peace researchers, and practitioners interested in the social and psychological conditions for peacefulness, combine the negative and positive peace agendas? In particular, what are some of the research and practice concerns that might guide scholars and practitioners seeking to develop systems that prevent or transform violent conflict and build stable and sustainable peace?

At a basic level, it is vital that researchers and practitioners identify and politically locate those who are articulating particular visions of peace from a range of cultural and gender perspectives. (E. Boulding, 2001) writes:

> *"Peace cultures thrive on and are nourished by visions of how things might be, in a world where sharing and caring are part of the accepted lifeways for everyone. The very ability to imagine something different and better than what currently exists is critical for the possibility of social change"* (E. Boulding, 2000, p. 29)

Within specific cultures, outsiders and insiders need to be able to identify different cultural visions of peace in order to ascertain which individuals and institutions embody and espouse them and whether they are contested or mainstreamed. Those who have a commitment to an ethic of responsibility and coherent visions of peace and justice are those who will be most inclined to constitute idealist peace constituencies that will advance both positive and negative peace. Those who are content to let political leaders articulate concepts of peace will probably be content with negative peace and more inclined to adopt realist state-centered perspectives of how to control direct violence.

Because of this bias peacebuilding has been seen primarily as an issue of states, governance and legitimacy, rather than a dynamic that rests principally on peaceful individuals, families, organizations and communities. This preoccupation with the role of the state in peacebuilding has fed di-

rectly into the neo-liberal economic agenda, the neo-conservative political agenda and most recently, into what is known as liberal peacebuilding. Critics of liberal peacebuilding argue that many researchers and practitioners over the past 25 years have worked too intimately and are too closely associated with promoting the specific political and economic agendas of official governmental agencies (Roberts, 2009). The consequences of this is that they have tended to ignore the critical roles of individuals, groups and institutions in generating structural stability and the communitarian conditions for peace. This has generated a preoccupation with top-down, didactic strategies, which have done little or nothing to advance positive attitudes between different ethnic, class and gender groups. (Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009).

Without wishing to diminish the importance of state institutions, and the regional and multi-lateral institutions associated with them, this chapter argues for much closer attention to the individual, group and community in the building of positive peace.

Although state systems and markets have important roles to play in the achievement of sustainable peace, communities and civil society actors need to be given equal or greater prominence. These are the spheres within which individuals live most of the time and the quality of their inter-personal, group and inter-group relationships is a critical determinant of whether or not communities will be capable of fostering trustworthy, reciprocal and peaceful relationships (Saunders, 2005). During times of violent conflict and fragility, the burden of care and responsibility for responding to uncertainty falls heavily on individuals, families and communities. The adequacy of the coping and survival mechanisms of these actors will determine, to a large extent, whether or not, and how soon, normal politics and commerce will regenerate after conflict. If community relations have been deeply broken during the conflict, the prospects for rapid recovery will be slight. If strong and inclusive community has persisted through the conflict then the prospects for post war recovery will be brighter. This is one area within the social psychological and sociological perspectives might help illuminate the dynamics of peacefulness and unpeacefulness.

The independent role of community and civil society networks in determining stable peace is relatively under-theorised and needs to be given greater attention. Just as Skocpol (1985) called for the state to be brought back in when sociology focused too much attention on the role and significance of society and community in the 1970s and 80s, it may be time to bring community back in for the 21st century. This is especially relevant for post-conflict environments where violence has destroyed trust, hope, identity and family ties. How insiders and outsiders work with civil society and

community leaders to rebuild these relationships is a question that needs much closer attention (see Pouligny, 2005 for an extended discussion).

Peace researchers and practitioners also need to understand the ways in which cultures and structures of domination (at all levels) generate adversarial behaviour and impede or prevent the development of reciprocal and mutually beneficial relationships. Dominant-subordinate relationships certainly prevent the emergence of empathic consciousness that Levinas argues is so critical to peaceful relationship. Resisting domination creatively is an important dimension of positive peace and critical for dealing with new wars. It is a problem needs to be analysed in its own right; however, given that those who are dominant determine who are or are not included in their specific moral communities. One approach to this issue of domination is to concentrate on what Kenneth Boulding talks about as integrative as opposed to threat-based power or exchange-based power (K. Boulding, 1989). Integrative power is the power of love as opposed to threat-based power that rests on coercive capacity, and exchange based power, which rests on the market. Integrative power is critical to the functioning of the other two faces of power. It is what generates individual and collective dispositions to act peacefully. The ratio of integrative power to threat-based and exchange-based power is critical to concepts of good citizenship, because it is necessary for active citizens and communities to feel a part of the prospects for sustainable peace.

However, this is a rather radical direction to consider when most pre- and post- conflict peacebuilding, as construed by the United Nations and related agencies, focuses primarily on governance rather than the building of peaceful relationships. The United Nations stresses state building before community building, national security before human security, the disarming of warring parties and the decommissioning and destruction of weapons before processes aimed at social healing and reconciliation. These objectives are important but it is equally important for external and internal interveners to work with the strengths of local communities instead of focusing on state-level deficiencies. What is absolutely important in conflict environments is identifying resilience and capacity in action and working with agents that have these qualities. In concrete terms, then, this means a willingness to suspend "cooky cutter" exogenous prescriptions for development and peace and an expanded willingness to engage with the complexities and singularities of specific conflict sites. Such efforts should be accompanied by the development of groups, organisations and institutions capable of delivering goods, services and relationships that can satisfy basic human needs

and generate a reasonable basis for social harmony and unity. These may include state institutions but should not be confined to the state.

The building of sustainable peace is something that challenges every human being on the planet. It is not something that is the exclusive preserve of those living in zones of conflict. It demands everyone's attention as we work out how to accept responsibility for the welfare of others. We must learn to re-individualise radically the Other while building just and caring communities; re-humanise those who have been demonised; resist efforts to disrespect and debase others and create the conditions whereby peaceful processes are seen as a dimension of all human relationships and not the exclusive preserve of states.

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BROCK-UTNE, Birgit:
Globalisation, Inequality and Linguistic Imperialism

A personal introduction

My good friend, the well-known Hungarian peace researcher and economist Professor Judit Balázs, has committed her whole career to research concerning the economic security of whole population, also to the have-nots. She has been concerned with economic systems that lead to inequality. She has also been engaged in the resolution of international conflicts through non-violent means and through negotiations. She was one of the founding mothers in 1981 of the IPRA (International Peace Research Association) commission Women, Militarism and Disarmament and the one who had the responsibility for the meeting of that commission in Győr in Hungary in August 1983. I shall never forget how well she organised that meeting, and what a support she was for me and my daughter, through difficult days that coincided with the seminar. (Brock-Utne 1985). Our warm friendship started in those days. Later I have had the pleasure of lecturing at her university in Sopron. She personally drove me to Sopron when I was teaching at the European University of Peace in Stadtschlaining in Austria. Like so many of our encounters, most of them at IPRA conferences, we passed hours together going from serious academic discussions to personal stories, from laughter to tears.

In two publications arising from two conferences in Norway, one in May 1998 and one in May 2008 Judit (Balázs 1989, 2009) shows how the inequal world, which the present type of globalisation leads to, makes for violence and crime. In her chapter in the *Language and Power* book Judit (Balázs 2009) also makes a connection between globalisation and linguistic imperialism. In my chapter here, I shall first discuss globalisation, then discuss the invisibility of non-violence, while paying a visit to our common friend from IPRA, Elise Boulding (Brock-Utne 2012a). Then discuss the phenomenon of linguistic imperialism in Africa, focusing on Rwanda and show that linguistic imperialism also takes place within academia in the Nordic countries, giving Norway and Denmark as examples.

Globalisation – inequality and violence

The term globalisation is ambiguous. Sometimes it is used simply to describe increased human interactions through travels, studies abroad, dissemination of music, literature, movies and exotic foods, as well as the arrival of the internet. But, in present national and international politics globalisation is

first and foremost a term that denotes the radical change that has taken place in international economic relations and politics during the last 30 to 40 years, promoted by the breakthrough of neo-liberalism. This is also the way Judit Balázs (1999, 2009) uses the word "globalisation". Opening national borders everywhere for the unhindered movement of capital, goods and services, these policies have turned most of the world into one single, gigantic market on the premises of transnational corporations, denying poor peoples the right to use such protective measures that the rich countries guarded themselves with during their own industrialisation. The global financial crisis, which was unleashed in 2008 by reckless speculations in the USA, was a telling reminder about other risks inherent in neo-liberalism.

A striking feature of this globalisation is that the process is seemingly automatic. What this means is that it is driven by actions of capitalistic forces, helped by politicians who falsely feel that the hidden hands of these forces are the best means to create prosperity and economic stability. Their states have more or less abdicated from economic governance. Thus, the shaping of the world is increasingly left to forces that have no democratic mandate and are not responsible to the peoples. Few countries, if any, have carried out a political process where the pros and cons of globalisation were weighted and evaluated in a wide-ranging public debate, whereupon a considered choice was made by the parliament. Nowhere was a decision made to dismantle the welfare state and create a world market where democratic bodies had no say. It was just allowed to happen. Another crucial aspect of the neo-liberalistic proclamation of open borders is that the free movement does not include the most important items; human beings. Even if the right to move is considered fundamental, persons are excluded from the neo-liberal agenda, something that is contrary to basic liberal principles. One reason is simply that rich countries in the North try to prevent an influx of other people from the South than the ones they happen to import to perform dirty and low paid jobs. Another reason is that the transnational corporations profit from wage differences, which permit them to use cheap "manpower" in the South to produce goods and services for the North. Here rich states and corporations have joint interests, which they hide behind euphemistic rhetoric about the blessings of what they call free markets. The result is that human beings are denied the freedom to move, which is limited to the marketing of capital, goods and services.

According to the advocates of neo-liberalism, their market policy is benefiting the whole population. What is happening in practice is the opposite. Economic and social differences grow tremendously. Globalisation tends to reinforce existing inequalities, including those of gender, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, age and disability (Bystydzienski 2009). Not every-

body is able to gain in a brutal competition for resources, jobs and profits. Some are becoming millionaires or milliardaires. Others are left at the bottom, poor, jobless and powerless. A new class society is emerging, with all that this implies for lost solidarity, divisions, antagonism and criminality. Such social degradation is naturally providing a fertile ground for terrorist actions (Vieille 2009). And who is to blame?

Between nations differences grow as a consequence of globalisation. Poor developing nations have small chances to gain in a competition on the world market with transnational corporations, which may dispose larger financial resources than states in the South with millions of mouths to feed. In spite of that, the World Bank and the IMF are using the debt trap in which these countries are today caught to pressure them to apply even more of the neo-liberalistic prescriptions that have brought them into the trap. Judit Balázs (1999) notes that the impact of globalisation on the economy is more and more visible through the growing inequality, and the growing polarisation in the society. She sees the most alarming effect of globalisation in the eroding of human values, in the disappearance of traditional national values, in the growing rootlessness and uncertainty in which people now find themselves. She describes how this is happening also in the countries in Eastern Europe, countries that before grasping the system of economic neo-liberalism, had a much greater equality and greater economic assurance for the majority of the people. She sees globalisation as a neo-liberal economic system that works as a trap. She describes the world as running towards the one-fifth-four-fifth society (Balázs 1999). Likewise, York Bradshaw and Michael Wallace (1996) find that the most striking feature of the so-called global village may be summed up in one word: *disparity*. An effect of the globalisation of capital is increased differences between the haves and the have-nots. The ratio of the income of the richest 10% of the population to the poorest 10% for the world as a whole is, according to the 2005 Human Development Report, 103 to 1 (UNDP 2005). Ignoring inequality in the pursuit of development is perilous according to the Report on the World social situation 2005 from the United Nations (UN 2005). The report bears the telling title: *The Inequality Predicament*. Focusing on economic growth and income generation as a development strategy is ineffective according to this report, as it leads to the accumulation of wealth by a few and deepens the poverty of many. We further learn that:

> High levels of military spending have impeded the progress of social development, as those countries that allocate a substantial share of total government expenditure to the defence sector also tend to reserve the lowest portion of the budget for the social sectors (United Nations 2005:5).

The 2010 Human Development report notes that there is no convergence in income because on average rich countries have grown faster than poor ones over the past 40 years. Economic growth has been extremely unequal. The divide between developed and developing countries persists: a small subset of countries has remained at the top of the world income distribution, and only a handful of countries that started out poor have joined that high-income group. Some countries have suffered serious setbacks, particularly in health, sometimes erasing in a few years the gains of several decades. In six countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and three in the former Soviet Union life expectancy has fallen below what is was in 1970.

The neoliberal policies, the building down of the state and privatisation of social sectors like health and education have led to increasing inequalities all over the world. As Judit Balázs (2009) notes, globalisation is not a process to unify free nations; it is a process which forces nations into one hierarchical system, with the rich ones at the top. Macleans A. Geo-JaJa (2009) describes the experience of Africans being exposed to the economic restructuring imposed by the international financial institutions. Imposing change from the outside cannot work. In 1999, Africa's population represented 50 percent of the poorest global decile, whereas in 1970 its share was 16 percent. In addition, 39 percent of Africans were found in the lowest global decile in 1999, compared with 17 percent in 1990.

Non-violence made invisible

Non-violent resolution to conflicts, though they are often much more effective and certainly longer lasting than violent solution of conflicts are often not studied, do not reach the media and not the history books (Brock-Utne, 2011). History books give more attention to violent struggles that fail to achieve their objectives than to non-violent struggles that succeed.

When both a violent and a nonviolent action have been used, the violent one is the one that is described in history. The violent action of April 2 1944 against the dictatorship of Martinez in EI Salvador was not successful in getting the dictator to resign. The nonviolent action of May 9 *was* successful. Yet April 2 is the one described in history books and celebrated, not May 9!

In 2003, the Palestinian village of Budrus mounted a 10-month-long nonviolent protest to stop a barrier being built across their olive groves. Brazilian filmmaker Julia Bacha[1] asks why we only pay attention to violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict. "If we don't pay attention to nonviolent pro-

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[1] http://www.ted.com/talks/julia_bacha.html?utm_source=newsletter_weekly_2011-08-31&utm_campaign=newsletter_weekly&utm_medium=email (accessed 25.5. 2012)

tests, they are invisible. But I have seen that if we do, they will multiply." Julia Bacha (2012) says on Ted-talks.

Judit Balázs might well have been one of the women peace researchers our mutual friend Elise Boulding (1981) interviewed when she wanted to find what priorities women peace researchers had for peace research. In 1981, the American peace researcher Elise Boulding, later on the first female President of IPRA, published a study showing the different preferences between female and male peace researchers when it came to topics within peace research to study in depth. The female researchers claimed that there had been so much mindless data gathering done in peace research, mostly by male peace researchers, so little imaginative thinking on how to create a non-violent world and solve conflicts through negotiations.

The Boulding study showed that women scholars working in peace research often went back and forth between the jobs of community organiser, peace researcher, journalist and peace activist. This study also showed that women peace researchers had other priorities in peace research than their male colleagues. Women researchers, according to Boulding, wanted more emphasis on the social and economic consequences of the arms race. Female peace researchers found that negotiation processes were studied far too little. There was also too little attention paid to the development of models of peaceful settlement of conflict. If female researchers were allowed to do research on what they found most lacking and especially important in peace research, models for nonviolent conflict solutions would have high priority. Elise Boulding was very concerned with the role women have played in peacemaking and how this role has been undercommunicated and made invisible (Brock-Utne 2012a). She saw patriarchy as closely linked to militarism.

> Like the peoples of the Third World countries women feel they are asked to maintain an order they did not help create. If they are going to be participants in the international arena, they want it known that the old patriarchal order, which for centuries has meant the domination of women by men, has to go. They see patriarchy and militarism as closely linked (Boulding 1990:46).

The inequal world that Judit Balázs (2009) writes about also has a gender dimension. In his book: *The Myth of Free Trade: The Pooring of America* Ravi Batra (1994) shows how 80% of the population of the US became poorer in the decade where neo-liberalism really took off (1977–1988). Batra did not look at the gender dimension of the problem. However, that was done by a Norwegian social scientist. Berit Ås (1999) found that those people in the poorest tenth and ninth decile were mostly women and their

dependents. In the US during the late 1980ies 51percent of a special family type, single mothers and their dependents, fell under the poverty line while only 8,6 percent of single mothers in the Swedish welfare state did so (Ås 1999).

Linguistic Imperialism and globalisation

In his book: *English-Only Europe?* Phillipson (2003: 162) notes that "Linguistic imperialism builds on the assumption that one language is preferable to others and its dominance is structurally entrenched through more resources to it". The use of English as the Language of Instruction (LOI) in the so-called Anglophone countries in Africa and the use of French as the LOI in the so-called Francophone countries must be looked at as cases of linguistic imperialism. These languages, although spoken comfortably only by a small minority, are given preferential treatment to the detriment of the African languages spoken by the great majority (Brock-Utne and Hopson 2005, Brock-Utne and Skattum 2009, Prah and Brock-Utne 2009, Brock-Utne 2012b). There is now a tendency that English is becoming the language of globalisation also in some former Francophone countries in Africa like Rwanda. In Europe English is posing a threat to the languages of smaller European nations, especially in research and academic publishing. Even in Hungary, several university courses are taught in English in order for Hungary to get into the market to attract foreign students (Lindblom 2009). In the following a couple of examples of this globalising influence of English, one from Rwanda and on from the Scandinavian countries will be given.

Knutsson (2012) shows how the attempt by the government of Rwanda to manage globalisation after the genocide made the government launch the document Vision 2020. The Vision is meant to bring Rwanda from an agrarian to a knowledge society, leap-frogging the industrial phase. Vision 2020 entails a set of educational policy priorities. Rwanda had since independence from Belgium retained French as the language of instruction from the fourth grade and was termed a "francophone" country, though the whole population, Hutus and Tutsis alike speak Kinyarwanda and many of them also Kiswahili. In Parliament, in administration at the national level and in the Supreme Court Kinyarwanda was the language predominantly used. In an article published in 2006 Michele Schweisfurth (2006:703) mentions that the Government of Rwanda at the time insisted on a trilingual education policy (Kinyarwanda, French and English) to secure greater equity between groups who favoured one or the other language. She notes that development partners, on the other hand, expressed concern for the potential impact of a trilingual policy claiming that learners struggling in one language may be further handicapped by having to cope with three and that quality in educa-

tion, as a dimension of EFA, may suffer. A trilingual policy might have been good for Rwanda provided that Kinyarwanda, a language which is spoken by 99.4 per cent[2] of the population (Rwanda 2005:38), had been the language of instruction and French and English learnt as foreign languages, as subjects. The "development" partners got their way and in 2008 both the national language Kinyarwanda and French were ousted from all levels of education and replaced by English (Rosendal 2010)[3]. The decision to use English as the LOI from the very first Grade of primary school was implemented at the end of 2008 in violation of recommendations by UNESCO and the African Union. The sudden change in language-in-education policy was not foreseen in any education sector documents. However, on 8th October 2008 (Rwanda 2008, here taken from Rosendal 2010:131) the Cabinet resolved as follows:

> As a part of enhancing Rwanda's role within the East African Community in particular, and at international level in general, Cabinet requested:
> - The Minister of Education to put in place an intensive programme for using English in all public and Government sponsored primary and secondary schools and higher learning institutions;
> - The Minister of Public Service and Labour to put in place a programme to help Government employees at all levels learn English, starting with Top Ranking Officials.

A better way to strengthen the east African community would have been to make Kiswahili a language to be studied since both in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda Kiswahili is more widely spoken and better known than English. Rachel Hayman (2007) notes that in terms of education policymaking in Rwanda after the genocide, the UK and the World Bank have been the most influential development partners. The development partners engaged in the textbook sector in Rwanda were the World Bank, UNICEF and UK (Hayman 2007). The UK was not involved in Rwanda prior to the genocide but is now the largest bilateral donor to Rwanda, and the largest education sector donor. Apart from donor pressure there has also been a transfer of models of educational policy and practice from neighbouring countries, such as Uganda and Tanzania, through the return of Tutsi refugees who fled the country before or during the genocide. Michele Schweisfurth (2006) terms

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[2] According to the 2002 census (Rwanda 2005:38)
[3] See Rosendal, Tove (2010). Linguistic Landshapes. *PhD. thesis.* University of Gothenburg. Can be retrieved at: http://www.avhandlingar.se/avhandling/ccb1d24dee/ Published as a book in the autumn 2011 in Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag.

this transfer *'second generation colonialism'*, as a number of these policies have their origins in British colonial models. However, the children of the educated elite are able to cope in this system because of good and expensive private schooling, extra tutoring, assistance at home and extra resources, the mass of African children are not. When he comes to Rwanda Knutsson (2012) mentions that most of the people who master English in Rwanda, belong to the contemporary political and economic elite that used to be in the diaspora in so-called Anglophone neighbouring countries. He notes "There is an evident danger that the switch to English as the new language of government, business, diplomacy and scholarship, will generate relative deprivation among the old French-speaking elites who perceive their opportunities to be diminishing. Moreover, frustration may emerge among the poor majority of the population (Knutsson 2012:194).

Also in the Nordic countries English, the foremost language of globalisation, threatens the local languages, especially as academic languages. It must be looked at as a case of linguistic imperialism when university professors in Norway get more research money from their institutes when they publish in English than when they publish in Norwegian (Brock-Utne 2009). Phillipson sees domain loss as a symptom of linguistic imperialism. This means that there are domains where the language people normally speak and use, is not used any more and the scientific vocabulary within that domain is not being developed in the native tongue. There is reason to be concerned. At the moment, domain loss is happening in many of the smaller European countries.

In 1991, Norwegian state institutions were given the possibility of introducing "performance salary" as a part of local salary negotiations. Before that, all associate professors had the same salary and so did all professors. The whole reward system fits well with the commercialisation of higher education that has also hit European universities (Brock-Utne 2002).

One of the institutes in the Faculty of Humanities, the Institute of Philosophy, started not long after rewarding the academic staff for their published books and articles. The table below shows the rewards given the academic staff at that institute already in 1997 depending on the type of publication as well as the language being used for their academic publishing.

When this example was presented to the staff of the Institute for Educational Research at an end of the year seminar in 1997, there were protests among our academic staff. We saw the system as a danger both to our own language and to the obligation a university has to the rest of society. We saw it as a threat to democracy. Unfortunately, the example from the Institute of Philosophy was the beginning of a trend, which was to be continued and become institutionalised all over the Norwegian university system.

Table 1: Bonus paid by the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Oslo in 1997

Types of publications	For publications for an international audience, written in an international language	For publications for a Nordic audience written in Norwegian
Book – authored	15 000 NOK	7 000 NOK
Book–edited (covers also editing of issues of professional journals)	5 000 NOK	2 000 NOK
Doctoral thesis	15 000 NOK	7 000 NOK
Article in a professional refereed journal	7 000 NOK	1 000 NOK
Book review in a professional refereed journal	1 000 NOK	200 NOK
Referee work in a professional journal- per article refereed	500 NOK	200 NOK

In 2004, the Norwegian Association of Higher Education Institutions published a dossier called: *Vekt på forskning*[4] (UHR 2004). This publication institutionalised a reward system dividing journals and publishing companies into three levels, level zero (no reward given to the institution or researcher – most publishing companies in developing countries belong to this category even if they publish in English), level 1 (reward given), level 2 (higher reward given – normally three times higher as level 1). On the internet, one can find a list of 486 ranked publishing companies. Of these 55 companies are ranked at level 2, while 431 companies are ranked at level 1. No Norwegian publishing company is ranked at level 2, not even the University Publishing Company (Universitetsforlaget) or other academic publishers like Fagbokforlaget, Gyldendal Akademisk, Cappelen Akademisk or Tapir Akademisk. More than 80% of the publishing companies ranked at level 2 are based in the US.[5]

Points are given for one-authored books published by a publishing company ranked on level 1 (5 points), and one-authored books published by a publishing company ranked at level 2 (8 points). Chapters in books published by a publishing company ranked on level 1 are rewarded with 0.7 points, at level 2 with 1 point. Each point was in 2006 rewarded with 40 000 NOK

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[4] In English: Emphasis on Research

[5] This is the web site dealing with the ranking of publications: www.uhr.no/forskning/ publiseringsutvalget/om_vitenskapelig_publisering From this web site you are led to the updated lists, which can be found at: http://dbh.nsd.uib.no/kanaler/.

(6 500 US$) which comes to the university centrally. Normally the central university unit keeps 25% and sends the rest to the faculties where the academic staff members employed, who have generated the revenue. The faculty keeps some of the money and distributes the rest to the different departments. The departments decide how much of the money will go to the academic staff member who has written the article/ chapter/ book and how much will be part of a research fund for which everyone in the academic staff can apply. At my institute the academic staff member who has generated the points will get about a tenth of the sum for her or his own research purposes.

When it comes to academic journals, a list of 1758 ranked journals is given, among which a tenth are ranked at level two and the rest at level one. Only four of the many peer-reviewed academic journals published in Norwegian have been ranked at level two–*Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap* (Journal of Law[6]), *Historisk Tidsskrift* (Journal of History[7]), *Edda* (A name from the Norse Saga[8]) and *Maal og Minne* (Oral and written literature[9]).

Within the field of Educational Research, no academic journal where any of the articles is written in another language than English has been ranked at level two. Scholarly articles on level one are rewarded with 1 point and at level two with 3 points.

The law of Norwegian higher education of 12th of May 1995 contained the following paragraph: "The language of instruction in Norwegian universities and colleges is normally Norwegian" (§2.7). The paragraph had come into the law after quite a lot of pressure from the Norwegian Language Council. At one point, the Ministry of Education tried to delete the paragraph

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[6] All laws in Norway are written in Norwegian. *Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap*, has been a channel for Nordic academic law studies, and builds links between lawyers in the Nordic countries, since its first issue in 1888. This is the academic journal where interpretations of laws and discussions around them take place. The journal also publishes reviews of current books.

[7] The journal is the longest running academic journal in Norway. It has been the central channel for Norwegian historians since its first issue in 1871, read by researchers and students as well as teachers of history. *Historisk tidsskrift* is the journal of the Norwegian society of historians, a society for those who have had at least two full terms of study of history at a Norwegian university and are engaged in historical research or dissemination of such research. The editorial board had to fight hard to have the journal be recognised at level 2.

[8] Edda was the name of a book of stories and tales written by Snorre Sturlason around 1200. The journal *Edda* was founded in 1914 as a Nordic journal for the academic study of Nordic literature. The journal is one of the leading journals within studies of literature written in the Nordic languages.

[9] The direct translation of *Maal og Minne* is "Language and Memory". The journal publishes articles which deal with Norwegian language and Norwegian oral and written tradition like literature from the Middle Ages, names of places in Norway, folk tales and oral literature still alive among people in remote areas. *Maal og Minne* publishes two numbers each year. It publishes articles mostly in Norwegian, Swedish and Danish but also some in German and English.

but Parliament put it back in. In 2002, a new law of Norwegian higher education was proposed. Here it was again suggested to do away with paragraph 2.7. There were protests against the deletion of this paragraph from the University of Tromsø, from the Norwegian Language Council and from some academics. Yet the paragraph was taken out of the new law of Norwegian higher education on 1st of August 2005. It was argued that the paragraph had to be taken out because of the "current internationalization of universities" (Kristoffersen 2005). When this important paragraph is not there any more, we cannot demand from non-Norwegian speaking university professors that they learn the Norwegian language in order to teach and tutor our students in our language and in order not to force the academic staff to hold their meetings in English. This development is also a threat to Norwegian as an academic language (Brock-Utne 2009).

The situation described above is going on in approximately the same pace in Sweden and Denmark. In Sweden, the NGO called Språkförsvaret (http://www.språkförsvaret.se/) keeps a well up-dated web site, mostly in Nordic languages, showing the increased use of English in the academia and business in the Nordic countries.

Below is an example from the University of Copenhagen in Denmark.

As we see while only ten percent of the theses were written in English in the decade 1960–1979 from the year 2000 hundred percent were written in English. This development which can be looked at as an effect of globalisation, makes for more unequal societies, widens the gap between the rich and the poor and threatens democracy. Languages, according to Judit (Balázs 2009:104) reflect the nation's view of the world. They also reflect the very value system we act by. In short: language is a factor, which determines the identity of groups and individuals of one nation. Therefore, languages are essential components of the living heritage of mankind...The experts estimate that, once the national languages are pushed into the background, "language imperialism" paves the way to more mass-manipulation.

Table 2: The language in PhD. theses in economics at the University of Copenhagen

Years	Number written in Danish	Number written in English	Percent written in Danish	Percent written in English
1960–1979	9	1	90	10
1980–1984	10	3	77	23
1985–1989	10	5	67	33
1990–1994	7	14	33	67
1995–1999	6	21	22	78
2000–2004	0	49	0	100

Source: Tom Fenchel m.fl: Forskeren i samfundet: Publicering, evaluering og formidling–debattinlägg inför Forskningspolitisk Årsmøde 4/3 2008. p.5[10]

When one has to be in perfect command of a foreign language, a language that is the mother tongue of another cultural group, to access knowledge, this means cutting out from this knowledge acquisition the majority of people.

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[10] The translation of this source from Danish is mine. The source can be found in Danish at http://www.språkförsvaret.se/sf/fileadmin/PDF/ForskerenISamfundet2008.pdf – Accessed on 20. July 2012

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Dadhich, Naresh and Kumar, B. Arun:
Gandhi and Peace

Gandhi was a ceaseless activist and a great humanist who expressed deep concern and love for the suffering people and worked for mitigating their sorrows. His whole life and activism was characterized by an effort to analyze and seek solutions to the perennial problems of human existence. Thus, his concern not only transcended all aspects of man's individual and social life, but also that of the territorial boundaries drawn by nation states. From the perspective of peace, Gandhi's thoughts and actions offer a vision of peace which is holistic, dynamic and greatly relevant for contemporary era. Thus, as Thomas Weber has rightly remarked, Gandhi provides a signpost for moral living, leaving us with some valuable insights about the way life should be oriented so as not to become dysfunctional to the self, society or planet.[1]

For Gandhi peace is not a static situation of inaction or acquiescence. Rather it is a process involving resolution of conflict situations with active nonviolence and conformity to truth and thereby contributing to a progress toward a better stage of purposive living of human beings. His vision of peace recognizes a conscientious man to engage actively in the vindication of truth and freedom against all forms of tyranny and exploitation. It presupposes presence of courage, adherence to nonviolence, morality and altruistic values and renunciation of hatred and violence as a matter of principle.

Manifestations of Peace
Gandhi offers a holistic vision of peace. This vision of Gandhi visualizes the individual, society, nation and the world at peace within as well as in interaction amongst themselves. At the core of this vision lies the concern for the righteous living of individuals, which is presupposed to be the determining factor of institutional practices in the society.

At the Individual Level: Recognition of Essence of Individual Existence and Leading a Life Accordingly
One the fundamental determinant of Gandhi's thoughts and actions has been his understanding of the essential nature of human existence. He said, "Man is neither mere intellect, nor the gross animal body, nor the heart or soul

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[1] Weber, Thomas, Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor, Cambridge University Press India Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, 2007, p. 12.

alone. A proper and harmonious combination of all the three is required for the making of the whole man.[2] Like many of his predecessors, Gandhi recognized that the total self of the individual was an amalgam of the externalized apparent self and the internalized real self. Human beings have two distinct inheritance – I) the biological and II) the socio-spiritual; or in other words man as an evolved being of the animal kingdom and man as a bearer of divinity within. Gandhi's outlook being a spiritually oriented one, the purely biological and the mundane affairs of worldly life were subordinated to the ethical primacies of human existence. Although Gandhi agrees with the anthropological contention that man is an evolved being of the animal kingdom, he emphatically differed to assert that man's existence simply as an evolved brute does not explain the essence of his identity as a being who is different from an animal. For Gandhi, on the contrary, man is different from a brute in the sense that he has a conscience, which guides him to lead a righteous and social life. This conscience, according to Gandhi, is a part of the supreme divine force that permeates all creations and determines existence of each and all. Thus, man's divinity distinguishes his particular existence. To quote Gandhi, "In eating, sleeping and in the performance of other physical functions man is not different from the brute. What distinguishes him from the brute is his ceaseless striving to rise above the brute on the moral plane."[3] He further asserted "Such education should automatically serve to bring home to children the essential distinction between man and brute, to make them realize that it is man's special privilege and pride to be gifted with faculties of head and heart both; that he is a thinking no less than a feeling animal, as the very word 'manushya' shows, and to renounce the sovereignty of reason over the blind instincts is therefore to renounce man's estate. In man, reason quickens and guides the feeling; in brute, the soul lies ever dormant. To awaken the heart is to awaken the dormant soul, to awaken reason and to inculcate discrimination between good and evil."[4] He said, "For man is higher than the brute in his moral instincts and moral institutions. The law of nature as applied to the one is different from the law of nature as applied to the other. Man has reason, discrimination, and free will such as it is. The brute has no such thing. It is not a free agent, and knows no distinction between virtue and vice, good and evil. Man, being a free agent, knows these distinctions, and when he follows his higher nature shows himself far superior to the brute, but when he follows his baser nature can show himself lower than the brute."[5]

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[2] Gandhi, M.K. India of My Dreams, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 2009, p. 186
[3] CWMG Vol. 83, p 242
[4] CWMG Vol. 64, pp 61-62
[5] CWMG Vol. 30, pp 363-64

The theistic leanings of Gandhi determined his perception about human life. His belief in the divinity and supremacy of the conscience was fundamental to his conception of man and human life. Gandhi recognized man's divinity as the element, which distinguishes him from other creations, and therefore he stressed upon the orientation of human efforts in the direction of realization of this divinity. Since Gandhi believed that this divinity is present in the individual in the form of conscience. So according to him this conscientious realization of the self is the principal goal of life. He also said that as an individual proceeds towards the progressive realization of the self, he should condition his actions based on such a realization. Therefore, for Gandhi the true or real existence of human life implied the accumulation of virtues of moral progression exhibited principally in the form of pursuit of truth (which he equated with God)[6] and nonviolence (which involved the broadest possible understanding of benevolence or love.)[7]

However, Gandhi's personal experiences in life made him conclude that in actual practice human beings failed to behave in a righteous manner despite their conscious, divine, rational and social self. This contradictory behaviour, according to Gandhi, was on account of ignorance of individuals. Gandhi personally experienced the disastrous consequences when such ignorance of human beings got institutionalized. In South Africa, he protested against the apartheid policies pursued by the state and in India, he protested against the exploitative colonial regime of the British. Likewise, he bitterly criticized modern civilization and called it a satanic civilization. He was bitterly critical of the above conditions and wanted an early end to the façades generated by the institutionalized ignorance of human beings. For this, he thought it essential to change the individual from within so as to bring out a change in his externalized social existence. He wanted to liberate the individual from the clutches of the unethical desires, that creep into the human mind and distort his virtuous life and also threatens the survival of humanity.

Thus, freedom of the individual is one of the central concerns of Gandhian thought. The freedom that he sought was not absence of all restrain. Rather it meant acceptance of all restraint, which will act as a catalyst to self-actualization in the transcendental sense. At the more expedient and temporal level, it meant obeying rules and regulations to avoid chaos. Thus, he said, "If it be said that the restriction is itself barbarous then freedom from all restraints should be the law of man. If all men were to act according to this lawless law, there would be perfect chaos within twenty-four hours. Man being by nature more passionate than the brute, the moment all re-

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[6] CWMG Vol. 33, p. 155
[7] CWMG Vol. 49, p. 67

straint is withdrawn, the lava of unbridled passion would overspread the whole earth and destroy mankind."[8] He said, "The highest form of freedom carries with it the greatest measure of discipline and humility. Freedom that comes from discipline and humility cannot be denied; unbridled license is a sign of vulgarity injurious to self and one's neighbours."[9]

Distinguishing between external freedom and internal freedom, he recognized that real freedom implied one's own rule over the self, *swaraj* as he called it, in accordance with certain principles that underlie the quintessential existence of man. Such a freedom, he therefore claimed, could not come from any external agencies or conditions, but only through an inward change brought about by an inward prayer and a definite and steadfast adherence to the voice of the mighty spirit residing within. This pursuit, he recognized, could not be an ascetic endeavour because the phenomenal world, on account of it being inherent with innumerable relative truths, served as the indispensable means for self-actualization in the transcendental sense.

These two conditions of leading a life symbolic of the true-self of one's existence and living it within the empirical world, Gandhi contended, could only be satisfactorily met when the individuals achieved a mastery over their senses so much so that the glittering attractions of the earthly things lost their hallucinating power on them and they remained, consequently, undiverted from the quest of the transcendental truth or God.

The inherent weaknesses of existing institutions and practices in his contemporary societies, both of the East and the West, profoundly disturbed him and instilled in him an urge to seek solutions to the problems posed by these. In his analysis, he concluded that unless these were not reconstituted on ethical principles there was little scope for achieving any real progress and happiness of humanity in general.[10] In the process, Gandhi proffered a vision, underlying which were a few principles or values that were not completely original but radical in so far as the revolutionary interpretation and use that Gandhi made of these in his private and public life.

In his contemplation of peace, also one finds Gandhi transcending existing interpretations and usages. For him it neither meant a passive acquiescence of things or conditions or mere abstinence from violence to maintain status quo. Nor did it confine to an individual virtue without social implications. Peace as an internalized value in the individual, in Gandhi's view, meant the individual recognizing the essence of his existence and living a life

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8   CWMG Vol. 30, p. 364
9   CWMG Vol. 30, p. 520
10 Parekh, Bhikhu, Colonialism Tradition and Reform: An Analysis of Gandhian Discourse, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1989, p.10

according to it. Such a life essentially meant the imbibing of ethical principles like truth, *ahimsa*, *astheya*, *aparigraha*, etc. which he equated with *swaraj* or self-rule and conditioning one's behavior accordingly to promote social harmony and progress. Consequently, in Gandhian contemplation an individual striving for peace progresses towards a more evolved existence together with other members of the society.

At the Societal, National and International Level: Larger Manifestations of Peace and the Means to Realize it

Gandhi conceived some definite social, economic and political programmes and gave them a practical shape in his dexterous and multifarious career as a freedom fighter, statesman, social reformer and a leader of the masses. Through the reform of the self, he visualized transformation of the social, national and international scenario.

At the societal level Gandhi visualized a cohesively knit order characterized by community living promoted by values of equality, fraternity, tolerance and justice. Through the advocacy of oceanic theory of individual-society relationship, Gandhi presented such a view of social order in which both the individual and the society were at peace within and between themselves. In such an order, the society is the individual writ large; operates on moral principles; is devoid of all types of exploitations and coercive tendencies and exists for the welfare and progress of all within. The individual in it transcends from individualistic concerns to think about and act in terms of entirety of the society. The resourceful in such a society act as trustees of the resource at command and use it for the benefit of all. Simple and ethical living is reflected in renunciation of materialistic pursuits. Recourse to the path of sustainable development is made to cater to the needs of the masses. Production is for the masses and it imbibes the essential spirit of *swadeshi*, *khadi* and cottage and village industries. The rural and the urban also exist as complementary units. Lastly, whenever differences arise these are amicably resolved through nonviolent means.

In the domain of politics, Gandhi's views challenged the conventional views on the nature and domain of politics. He not only conceived a broader notion of political power, but also assailed all dichotomous distinctions made between private and public morals,[11] religious values and politics[12] and ethical principles and political expedience. Politics, in modern times, he recognized, had pervaded all aspects of individual life[13] and as such, it had become indispensable to the individual. However, a politics bereft of the

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[11] CWMG Vol. 42, p. 395
[12] CWMG Vol. 13, p. 66
[13] CWMG Vol. 17, p. 406

quintessence of religion or *dharma*, he contended, was not only as useless as a corpse but also fatal to man's quintessential existence. Consequently, he emphasized upon the introduction of religion into politics, or "spiritualisation of politics" as he called it. The two became inseparable for Gandhi. This inseparability meant subordination of politics to ethics and organizing the former on principles deduced from the latter. It also meant that politics should become a means for articulating and reflecting the basic value commitments essential for human existence. The state's goal, he emphasized, ought to be *sarvodaya* or the uplift, welfare and good of all who live within its domain. In the process, he recognized certain protective, prohibitive, economic and international functions of the state.

At the international plane, Gandhi visualized a peaceful world order where nations coexisted without the fear of other nations. There is no exploitation and coexistence with cooperation for promoting a purposive living is the aim of all nations. There is no conventional army and nations renounce war and other violent means to resolve conflicts. Instead, whenever disputes arise these are resolved through nonviolent means.

Means to Realize Peace

The notion of peace in Gandhi's thought is essentially an attitude of mind and a way of life based on the firm desire to vindicate just causes, correct wrongs and convert the wrong doers by voluntary self-suffering and by patient and active use of means that are non-violent and intrinsically just. It recognizes active resistance to evil by good and resolution of the conflict. *Satyagraha*, he contended, is a weapon of the morally vigilant, courageous and the active, rather than being a weapon of the weak or the coward or the unarmed and the helpless.[14] It is not a means of the morally weak and timid persons. It is based on renunciation of hatred and violence. Gandhi thought it appropriate to re-designate his struggle as satyagraha and also to contend that satyagraha was not passive but an active struggle which demanded a lot of courage, steadfast adherence to morality, imbibitions of altruistic values and renunciation of hatred and violence as a matter of principle.

The concept of truth is central to Gandhian thought and activism. For Gandhi it is the raison d'être of all existence and is not only therefore the all-inclusive deterministic principle but also the most logically preferred principle. According to Gandhi, all individuals should have a steadfast commitment to this principle of truth if he is to evolve as a human being. The individual, he emphasized, should exhibit this commitment in all his thoughts, words. Simultaneously, he also considered it the right of every individual to

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[14] CWMG Vol. 14, pp 406-407 and Vol. 69, p. 343

determine truth for himself. Gandhi referred to the seeker of truth as satyagrahi. The satyagrahi envisioned by Gandhi is a person who discovers truth and on the basis of his understanding of truth (relative truths as he called it) acts upon it in a committed manner. For the discovery of truth, Gandhi recognized the need for the individual to take recourse to his rational faculty, self-experience and faith. Gandhi's own life and activism is illuminative of the use of all these faculties that have influenced human beings' thought and action since evolution. Such an effort to discover truth, according to Gandhi, should be a continuous effort so that one can progress towards the realization of the ultimate truth, which he equated with God. He said, "In our endeavour to approach absolute truth, we shall always have to be content with relative truth from time to time, the relative at each stage being for us as good as the absolute"[15]. Thus, according to Gandhi clinging on to relative truth and efforts to accumulate more and more relative truth to reach the ultimate truth is the ideal goal of every human being.

Since the relative truth is not the final truth, the satyagrahi, according to Gandhi, should always be ready to examine the point of view adopted by him from time to time. Such a view also reflects Gandhi's position of viewing truth as a dynamic, multifaceted and evolving in nature. Such being the nature of truth for Gandhi, along with his belief that as mortal beings all individuals have inherent weaknesses, he contended that the final or ultimate truth cannot be realized and therefore it is essential that the value of nonviolence has also to be steadfastly adopted by the individual. He said, "There is no search greater than that of Truth. The only means of finding it out is through nonviolence in its extreme form."[16] He also said, "My study and experience of nonviolence have proved to me that it is the greatest force in the world. It is the surest method of discovering truth and it is the quickest because there is no other. It works silently, almost imperceptibly, but none the less surely."[17] Thus for the satyagrahi nonviolence is as indispensable as his belief and practice of truth. Therefore Gandhi concluded that "If a man dedicated to truth commits violence, he will sacrifice truth"[18] and recognized that truth without nonviolence will tantamount to untruth. According to Gandhi, nonviolence and truth are like the twin sides of the same coin, the absence of one denies the absence of the other. He regarded truth and nonviolence as convertible terms.[19] According to Gandhi, the whole of universe is governed by the principle of nonviolence. His conception of nonviolence is

[15] CWMG Vol. 14, pp 406-407 and Vol. 69, p. 343
[16] CWMG, Vol. 23 p. 367
[17] CWMG Vol. 25, p. 322-3
[18] CWMG Vol. 14 p. 157
[19] CWMG, Vol. 14, p. 97

one of the widest interpretations of the term available in philosophy. He did not limit it to the negative understanding of the concept, namely absence of or refraining from violence. On the contrary, he included in it the positive notion of love for the opponent and suffering his attacks without retaliation in words, actions or thoughts.[20] Gandhi's belief in this regard was that such an attitude could only be cultivated by an individual who believed in nonviolence as a matter of principle or faith rather than as a matter of policy. This, together with such other emphasis like selfless motive, courageousness and active efforts to resolve conflicts, differentiates satyagraha from passive resistance where commitment to nonviolence is superficial, opportunistic or forced.

Like truth and nonviolence, morality too is an inseparable aspect of peace. Elaborating a close relationship between truth and morality, Gandhi contended truth to be the basis of all morality.[21] Observing moral laws, therefore for Gandhi, meant the imbibitions of all the values manifested by truth like tolerance, honesty, nonviolence, altruism, simple living, self-restrain, sincerity, discipline etc.

One of the essential manifestations of Gandhi's emphasis on observing moral laws was his advocacy of the principle of purity of ends and means. This principle emphasized upon the purity or sanctity of not only the goals that are sought to be achieved but also upon the means adopted to realize these goals. Means for Gandhi was the end in the process of making and therefore only pure means could ensure the purity of the end. He did not believe in the dictum that end justifies the means.[22] Thus, he said, "There is such close connection between the means and end that it is difficult to say which of the two is more important. Or we may say that the means is the body and the end is the soul."[23] He asserted that the individual should concentrate on means over which he has some control and if he loses control over the means, he will lose all control over the end.[24] This emphasis of Gandhi on purity of ends and means also led him to stress upon the inculcation of discipline and self-restrain by the satyagrahi. In this context, he emphasized upon many vows like asteya, aparigraha, brahmacharya, etc. to be adhered by the satyagrahi.

Gandhi recognized the importance of the exploited being conscious of their experience of injustice and deprivation. Therefore, he endeavoured to raise the consciousness of the individuals about their exploited condition

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[20] CWMG Vol. 13, p. 295
[21] CWMG Vol. 39, p. 33
[22] CWMG Vol. 85, p. 368
[23] CWMG Vol. 23, p. 69
[24] See CWMG Vol. 58, p. 318

and motivate them to work actively toward the amelioration of their grievances rather than being apathetic, despondent and fatalistic. Recognizing the importance of arousing such a consciousness, Gandhi said, "A satyagraha for instance, must first mobilize public opinion against the evil which he is out to eradicate by means of a wide and intensive agitation."[25] The apathetic or the callousness of the authorities was sought to be confronted by way of creating public opinion against their evil act and in favour of the satyagrahi's objectives. Therefore, he recognized *satyagraha* as a process of conflict resolution by mutual understanding and by educating public opinion through reason, discussion and self-suffering.[26] Gandhi recognized the need and significance of an awakened and intelligent public opinion in his *satyagraha* campaigns. He emphasised on the need for mobilizing public opinion in favour of justice and fairness. It was his beliefs that when public opinion was sufficiently roused against a social abuse, "even the tallest will not dare to practice or openly lend support to it."[27] Thus, to realize the set objectives of a satyagraha campaign Gandhi was emphatic about a dependence not merely on the appeal of the satyagrahi's own conscience but also on the awakening of the slumbering conscience of a large number of people and ultimately, the stifled conscience of those responsible for enacting or administrating unjust laws and social abuses.

Gandhi laid down stringent conditions while one attempts to resolve conflicts in nonviolent way. One of the conditions was that any such effort should always stay away from being resorted for any unjust cause. Since it implied a steadfast adherence to truth, he recognized that there could not be any partnership with untruth. Consequently, Gandhi recognized that a feeling and experience of specific grievances constituted an indispensable part of a satyagraha. This feeling or experience and the consequent reaction, he recognized, ought to be serious and intending to provoke ameliorative action rather than being a trivial and chronic opposition indicative of a casual reaction. He said, "If you dissent you should take care that your opinions voice your innermost convictions and are not intended merely as a convenient party cry."[28]

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[25] Gandhi M. K. Satyagraha, Bharatan Kumarappa (ed.), Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1958, p. 77

[26] Gandhi as quoted by Ram Rattan, The Autonomy of Gandhi's Satyagraha, in New Dimensions and Perspectives in Gandhism, V.T. Patil (ed.) Inter Publications, New Delhi, 1989, p. 45 Horsburg, H.J.N., Non-Violence Aggression: A Study of Gandhi's Moral Equivalent of War, Oxford University Press, London, 1971, p.77

[27] Bose, N. K., Selections from Gandhi, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1972, p. 225

[28] Gandhi M.K. Bharattan Kumarappa (ed.) Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1984, p. 91

According to Gandhi, honesty or sincerity was an essential quality of a satyagraha and this sincerity was not just a matter of having an intense position on moral questions but also a matter of accepting the costs that a person was willing to pay in order to see these principles realized. He conceived satyagraha as a means which could be adopted only by the spiritually strong person. Only a spiritually strong person, Gandhi believed, could transform himself into an impersonal moral force latent with the capacity to remove injustice and transform relationships amongst individuals. He recognized it as a weapon of a man possessing steady wisdom and indomitable courage and mental strength. He emphasised upon adequate training of the individual and participation in the Constructive Programme.

According to Gandhi, all well-intended conflict resolution efforts should seek to ennoble the opponent and strive for promoting simultaneously the welfare of those against whom it was launched. In effect, it tries to remove the animosity of the opponent towards those who are opposing and resolve the conflict thereby. Gandhi thought it more important to motivate the perpetuator of the evil to cultivate an aversion to the evil mentally. He believed that when an individual or a group of individuals became transformed internally, their resultant action would be more peaceful and there would be a reduction of the volume of violence. Positive changes in the prevailing attitudes and values of the individuals in the society will activate positive values of life and alter the normative structure of the society, and take it towards a higher realm of existence characterized by qualitative differences in human life and promote peace.

Constitutionalism formed an essential part of satyagraha. Its exhaustion was deemed by Gandhi as a precondition for launching a direct action of the extra-constitutional type and facing the penalties thereof in a civilized manner. He said, "Since satyagraha is on of the most powerful methods of direct action, a satyagraha exhausts all other means before he resorts satyagraha. He will therefore constantly and continually approach the constituted authority, he will appeal to public opinion, educate public opinion, state his case calmly and coolly before everybody who wants to listens to him, and only after he has exhausted all these avenues will he resort to satyagraha."[29]

Gandhi advocated a recourse to such constitutional devices like wait and watch; assessment of facts by public enquiry; tours; negotiations; arbitration; political associations; protest meetings and processions; etc. before inaugurating a *satyagraha* struggle.

Gandhi used such concepts like compromise and negotiation in his philosophy of *satyagraha*. However, these negotiations and compromises do

[29] CWMG Vol. 43 p. 135

pertain to renunciation of truth and nonviolence. Gandhi said that there could be no compromise with the eternal principles implicit in the minimum demand raised while initiating the conflict resolution process. This however does not mean an advocacy of stubbornness because Gandhi was also emphatic about self-questioning or in other words reviews of original stand from time to time during the conflict resolution process. Thus, Gandhi was also emphatic about persistent examination of weaknesses within.

Believing all coercion to be a manifestation of *himsa* and therefore contradictory to the principles of truth and nonviolence, Gandhi recognized the futility of coercive techniques to promote peace. A chief objective of *satyagraha*, he said, was "to neutralize and ultimately entirely to displace violence and enthrone nonviolence instead, to replace hatred by love and to replace strife by concord."[30] Gandhi contended that violence begot more violence and proved ineffective to wean away the opponent from acting in an unrighteous manner. It was his firm belief that coercive tactics could not resolve conflicts on an effective and permanent basis.

Gandhi relied on persuasive methods and voluntary suffering to affect a "change of heart" of the opponent and influencing him to act justly and in consonance with truth. Passivity is also uncharacteristic of a Gandhian understanding of peace. When rational persuasion seemed to prove ineffective to influence the opponent to desist from evil or doing injustice, Gandhi emphasized upon the need for voluntarily undergoing suffering on the self, and thereby to influence the opponent to act in a righteous manner. Instead of passivity, coercion and violence Gandhi recognized the potency of self-suffering as means to affect a lasting solution to all conflicts and said, "It opens the inner understanding of man."[31]

Gandhi conceived a wide variety of tools and forms of satyagraha – nonviolent non-cooperation, civil disobedience, fasting, peaceful picketing, hartal, etc. Nevertheless, the mode and tactics to be used were to be decided according to the emergent situation of the *satyagraha* campaign. Every such tactic was to be used with civility, discipline, discrimination and nonviolence. Otherwise, he recognized, it would result in certain destruction.

In the course of his Satyagraha campaigns, Gandhi elaborated and employed a wide range of methods. He compared *Satyagraha* with a tree and its tools or methods with that of its numerous branches. All these methods had, at their core, a common conformity to the notion of purity and unity of ends and means, adherence to the principle of nonviolence and an accordance of importance to such factors like that of time and place. Nevertheless, these

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[30] Bose, N. K., Selections from Gandhi, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1972, p. 154

[31] See Iyer Raghavan N. The Moral and Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1973, p. 301

varied between the two extreme position of being the most negative or limited one, to that of the most positive or comprehensive one. These could be broadly classified into four categories: purificatory and penitential devices; forms of non-cooperation; methods of civil disobedience; and the constructive programme. These are indicative of efforts for self-perfection (progress towards essential values perceived to be the essence of human existence) and based upon this self-realization imbibing it in one's interaction with individuals and institutions at social level.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it may be said that Gandhi adopts a holistic vision of peace. He deliberates upon it as a virtue of the individual as well as a manifestation on the societal, national and international plane. He does not limit it to any static or passive condition, which accepts things as they are even if it is wrong. On the contrary, he views peace as a process of resolving conflicts and correcting the wrong or unjust situations through active and nonviolent participation and adherence to certain ethical principles, which have the potency to provide effective and lasting solution to various types of conflicts. Thus, Gandhi's view offers a more comprehensive, useful and pragmatic view of peace.

VESA, Unto:
On the Reconstruction of Broken Societies
– Yugoslavia as a case study

The world has experienced the scourges of war hundreds of times after the Second World War and in tens of locations even after the end of the Cold War; about thirty major armed conflicts have been going on every year, sometimes a few more, sometimes a few less. Tens of millions of people have been involved; millions have died, wounded, lost their homes and left their countries as refugees. Most of the armed conflicts in recent decades have been 'internal' – not inter-state – although foreign powers have more often than not interfered as supporters of one party or another in such seemingly civil wars. The challenge of healing broken societies does not concern only those countries, where wars have taken place, but is of universal concern, if we really are to believe in the old dictum that peace is indivisible. Reconstruction needs not only the co-operative efforts within the societies concerned, but the support of outside world as well. Let us discuss what the most central lessons to be learnt from the past are.

The first lesson then undoubtedly is that we should try to learn from the past, both the failures and the successes. History is full of examples of cases where reconstruction – as a healing process of the society – has not succeeded for decades, because the warring parties have not really attempted to reconcile their views and interests but instead maintained and nourished the mutual hostilities that served as the breeding ground of their conflict from the very beginning. The hostile atmosphere can poison the minds of people in such societies for generations, which again increases the probability for the reoccurrence of wars. However, there are cases, where the warring parties at the end of their armed conflicts have made a serious attempt to 'start a new life': to learn to live in peace with the enemy of yesterday, and to turn a new page in the history. The post-war history of European integration is, of course, a well-known case, where all parties have internalised as their priority goal the idea of getting rid of centuries of 'arch-enemy' thinking and policies and instead build their common future on common interests. There are other positive examples, too. For example, we can refer to Indochina. After a long and cruel war where more than a million people lost their lives, we nevertheless cannot find today a sense of revenge on the part of the Vietnamese people or leaders; they were quite soon ready to normalise their relations with the United States, which astonished many observers

already in the seventies. As an explanation, some have referred to the role of the Buddhist culture. Another remarkable case, much discussed today, is of course South Africa, where the wise leadership of President Nelson Mandela set national reconciliation – a rainbow nation – as its overwhelming priority and where the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission became the embodiment of this effort. Its final impact and success may yet be too early to assess. Therefore, the first lesson is that we can and should try to learn not only from the past, and from the experiences of others.

Second, when we discuss the reconstruction of broken societies, we also have to explore the reasons why they broke. If we take Yugoslavia's case as the example, we need to ask, why it 'failed', why it dissolved, why it led to the succession of a series of disintegration wars. As in all historical analyses, we should try to avoid simplistic one-factor explanations. For decades, in Tito's Yugoslavia the official policy had aimed at creating a new Yugoslav identity in order to suppress and abolish the 'old' identities of being a Croat and Serb, etc. Everyone was aware of the old hostilities and the mass cruelties during the Second World War and civil war, but in a way the official policy was aimed at making people forget these, instead of discussing them, which would have been a painful, but possibly a healing process, something like the *Vergangenheitsverwaltung* in the post-war Germany. Therefore, in the 1980s, when the external world that had kept the country together, changed, when the economy deteriorated, when social disparities grew, and when the government resorted to gross violation of human rights and of minorities, and when the door to revived nationalism was opened, the ground was ready for the mutual blame, hatred, xenophobia, and spirals of violence. As in all civil wars, we find a multitude of intermingling causal factors. However, Yugoslavia and its leaders and peoples were not the only ones that failed; Europe also failed in conflict prevention, not only the European Community (and later the Union), but also the CSCE (and later the OSCE), and the wider international community as well. In hindsight, at least we can recognise that the outside world was unprepared to face with the situation, making hasty and false decisions, the consequences of which it was not able to predict and to cope with. There were early warnings from the researchers who were better acquainted with the Yugoslav history, society, and state than most key decision-makers, but their warnings were not heard.

When we study the causes and processes of Yugoslav's failure, we may also benefit from a comparative perspective. In the beginning of the 1990s, immediately after the Cold War, there were volatile situations both in the Balkans and in the Baltic region. In both sub-regions, there was plenty of emergent nationalism, minority rights violated in the past, the risk of ethnic violence, various incidents, etc. Why did everything fail in the Balkans, and

how was it possible to avoid similar tragic developments in the Baltic region? In the latter case, all relevant parties emphasised the non-violent approach, patient and persistent negotiations, accommodation of the interests and views and policies of the parties concerned. It was not always quite easy, but it paid off well to all parties. Even today, both regions face the challenge of reconstruction, reconciliation, and of learning to live together, but in the Balkans, it is much more difficult after a decade of cruel wars.

The reconstruction has to cover all relevant dimensions: economic, political, humanitarian, psychological. The first one, the economic, may be the easiest: to reconstruct physically the infrastructure, the houses, the roads, the factories. All that may be accomplished in a few years. The latter dimensions are more difficult. To succeed in them requires a genuine will between all parties, in all segments of the society, to make a re-start, to learn to live together in peace, taking each other's views and interests into account. The outside world can and should provide its support to such an effort, to persuade and to encourage the process, but at the end of the day, the outsiders really cannot impose their will, if the former enemies, conflicting parties are not genuinely willing to change their minds and policies. Regarding the former Yugoslavia, it is yet uncertain if such a genuine will is to be found there, in any of the ethnic communities concerned.

After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, one explanation that has been offered has been that the federation was an 'artificial' structure from the beginning, that it was in a way 'doomed to fail', for instance because, according to this Huntingtonian civilization explanation, nations professing different religions could not live together at peace for long. That is a simplistic and historically false explanation. Nevertheless, even if that were the perception of some parties or outsiders, it must not be approved, because in a multicultural Europe and world all nations have to learn to live together in peace.

The disintegration of course is to be taken as a reality now. If we use the metaphor of a puzzle, we could state that when one takes a few pieces from a puzzle, the whole puzzle disassembles. Of course, Yugoslavia as such cannot be reassembled, but its constituent parties are to be pieces in a larger European puzzle, where again Serbs need to learn to live in peace with Croats and Bosniaks and Kosovars, and Kosovars and Bosniaks have to learn to live together in peace with the Serbs, etc. It is impossible to imagine and to approve a future with an integrated Europe and disintegrated Balkans.

Years ago, I attended a seminar with tens of young participants from the Balkans discussing their future. I quoted from a statement by a nineteenth century Finnish philosopher, Zacharias Topelius who taught that it is God's wise order that nations need each other, so they have to learn to know and help each other, "in order to love each other as brothers". I remember that one

young man (Serb?) then stated that he can perhaps imagine to live together with (Croats?), but never to love them or any of them (but he might have been a Croat or Bosniak saying the same about Serbs). And yet, that has been possible in the past and is possible at present. Well, in the beginning the general goal-setting may remain at the level of learning to live together at peace, until everyone has internalised the norm of solving all social conflicts without resorting to force and violence, and thereby a security community, a value community and a healthy community will have been achieved.

BROCK, Lothar:
The Responsibility to Protect
– A Precarious Achievement

The responsibility to protect (R2P) is a recent invention. It was conceptualized by the ICISS in the wake of the Kosovo War of 1999. It was confirmed, in principle, by the UN World Summit meeting of 2005 and it was reconfirmed on different occasions by the Security Council which also referred to R2P in Resolution 1973 mandating the use of force for the protection of civilians in the case of Libya (March 2011). That is a remarkable career for a normative concept which deals with basic issues of international law.

R2P goes beyond international humanitarian law on the protection of civilians in conflict as laid down in the Geneva Conventions and its Protocols. It permits, in the most extreme case, the use of force against the will of the respective government if this should be necessary to protect people from excessive violence. Thus, Gareth Evans who played a central role in introducing R2P after the Kosovo-war in 1999, interprets the concept as a decisive step towards "ending mass atrocity ones and for all" (Evans 2008). But it is hard to see how that could be achieved. Some fear that R2P may even contribute to an erosion of the UN peace system as envisaged by the Charter and thus open up the way for more wars and more mass atrocities that tend to go along with them (O'Connell 2011). Are such fears well-founded? Is R2P just another trick for taking exception from Art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter which categorically prohibits the unilateral use of force? May R2P even backfire on those which it is supposed to help and instigate more conflict with more suffering for people? This is what quite a few observers fear, especially in the global south but also in the liberal West (Cunliffe 2011). And because of such fears R2P is highly controversial. The intervention in Libya did not settle the issue and the difficulties of the international community to reach an agreement on how to react to the civil war in Syria has added new fuel to it.

In what follows I will argue that the R2P is a historical achievement. It combines the responsibility of states towards each other with their responsibility towards their people and even with the responsibility of individuals *vis-à-vis* the international community. But it is a precarious achievement since it may pit the responsibility of governments towards their people against their responsibility towards each other. The R2P may eventually function as an important follow-up to the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights. But it may also amount to a fake promise designed to cover up self-serving agendas and thus to undermine international law in the name of advancing it. So this historical achievement has to be handled with care. Why this is so, I will explain in three steps.

I will first locate the invention of R2P in the evolution of international law. I will then address some of its pitfalls. In a third step, I will talk about the chances to cope with the respective problems in a constructive way.

The evolution of international law

R2P is a recent invention, but like all inventions it has a long history. I would like to point out three lines of development which are of relevance her. The first one refers to reducing (and hopefully overcoming some day) collective violence as a means of conflict resolution (curtailment of the right to use force); the second refers to the efforts under international law to mitigate the destructive effects of collective violence (humanitarian international law); the third refers to the recognition of individual rights and responsibilities under international law.

(1) In his famous treaty on the Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant called modern international lawyers "miserable comforters" because they offered more reasons for justifying war than for avoiding it. It was not before the end of the 19th century that international lawyers made a concerted effort not only to regulate the use of force in war but also to deal with the right of states to go to war as an expression of their sovereignty (*liberum ius ad bellum*). In this respect, the two Hague Peace Conferences – though still preoccupied with the regulation of permissible ways of warfare – played a crucial role. They set in motion of process of normative change which did not prevent the escalation of war but set limits to the right of states to wage war: The Covenant of the League of Nations ventured to replace the unilateral and alliance-based use of force by collective security (as envisaged by Woodrow Wilson). It also called for a cool-off period of three months in any acute dispute which was to provide the space for a pacific settlement. The Briand Kellog Pact of 1928 went beyond the League's Covenant by outlawing wars of aggression. The UN Charter of 1945 took the decisive step by providing for a general prohibition of the unilateral use of force (Art. 2/4 of the UN Charter). As a concomitant, the UN Charter also makes provisions for the peaceful solution of conflicts (Chapter VI) and for collective action for securing or restoring international peace (Chapter VII). The history of these stipulations can be read as expressing normative change from the right to wage war to the duty to settle disputes peacefully or – if necessary – by the application of collective force. Of course, Art. 51 of

the UN Charter also re-affirms the right to self-defense. But Art. 51 is located within Chapter VII and is clearly subordinated to collective peace-making. It only comes to bear in the case of an armed attack and it only may be taken up until the Security Council takes appropriate action. Thus, the UN Charter is quite clear in spelling out *the responsibilities of states towards each other*.

(2) Emanating from the first Geneva Convention of 1864, the second line of development reflects efforts to limit the effects of collective violence on people and on things. This refers to two concerns. The first one deals with what is allowed in war and what is not. It responds to the growing destructiveness of modern weapons (Hague law). The second concern is directed at shielding the individual from unnecessary harm (Geneva law). This concern reflects the increasing human costs of wars and addresses the rights of those who do not or *no longer* take part in the hostilities. After the Second World War, these two concerns more or less merged under the term of "humanitarian international law" which is codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1948 and the Additional Protocols of 1977. The second Additional Protocol of 1977 opens up these rules and regulations to non-international armed conflict. These stipulations refer to *the responsibilities of states towards their people*.

(3) The third line of development concerns the recognition of human rights as a legitimate concern of the international community and the recognition of the individual as an actor that can be held responsible under international law. The "internationalization" of human rights took place with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; the concomitant "individualization" of international law was introduced with the Nuremberg and Tokio trials which held the political leaders of Germany and Japan responsible for war crimes committed during the Second World War. This practice was followed up by the special tribunals set-up by the Security Council on the wars in Yugoslavia, the tribunal on Sierra Leone and the establishment of the International Criminal Courts. These innovations refer to *the rights and responsibilities of individuals in the world of states*.

My thesis is that R2P combines all three lines of the evolution of international law: the responsibility of states towards each, the responsibility of states towards their people and human kind as a whole, and the responsibilities of individuals as actors in a world of states. But it is not identical with humanitarian international law which is treaty law and thus based on consent while the R2P up to now is a concept for achieving compliance with ba-

sic human rights stipulations by enabling and by enforcement action. Let me explain.

R2P in international law

When the Cold War ended while intrastate wars continued, the question came up as to how the international community should react to the atrocities committed in these wars. Of course, atrocities had been committed before. But during the Cold War they tended to be seen through the ideological lenses of the East-West confrontation. Thus they were defined as a secondary issue. This changed when the Cold War ended. Now, mass atrocities were witnessed as such and they had to be addressed as such.

One answer was that chapter VII could be applied to intra-state conflict to the extent that the gross violation of human rights (including the rights of minorities), the break-down of public order or the violent interruption of a process of democratization constituted a threat to *international peace*. This was the justification which the Security Council applied when it authorized interventions in Iraq (in the wake of the second Gulf War in 1991), in Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994) and Bosnia (1995).

Another answer referred to the idea of *humanitarian intervention* as a means to prevent gross violations of human rights regardless of whether these violations threatened international peace or not. Throughout the history of the modern state system, intervention for humanitarian reasons has been considered as a possible exception from the legal norm of non-intervention (Jahn 2012). Under the UN-System, the legal framework for humanitarian intervention changed. Now, humanitarian intervention not only faced the legal norm of non-intervention, but also the prohibition of the unilateral use of force. During the years of the Cold War, this issue was already taken up. One of the references cases was the Indian intervention in the war of cessation between East and West-Pakistan in the early 1970s. Some international lawyers felt that this intervention was justified as a move to end gross violations of human rights and therefore could be taken as a precedent for the admissibility of humanitarian intervention. Others felt, that this would undermine the prohibition of the use of force which was already being undermined by various interventionist practices (Franck/Rodley 1973). As mentioned above, in the 1990s, humanitarian intervention was brought up again with a new sense of urgency. Those who stressed the imperative of "saving strangers" (Wheeler 2000) asked what was to be done if the Security Council failed to agree on sanctions against gross violations of human rights. This was the case in the struggle between Serbia and Kosovo. The Security Council, while determining that the intra-state situation constituted a threat to international peace, did not agree on sanctions. Thus, NATO

intervened on its own and it justified this intervention (though not in a clear way) with the need to rescue the people in Kosovo from ethnic cleansing by the Serbs. On the background of the cases in which there was *no* outside action to stop genocide or mass murder (Rwanda and Srebrenica) the Kosovo war stirred a profound debate on the admissibility of humanitarian intervention (Holzgrefe/Keohane 2003). The then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, spelled out the dilemma as he saw it by asking how the international community was to deal with gross violations of human rights if intervention and non-intervention were equally unacceptable (ICISS 2001, VII). This call was taken up by the ICISS which then came up with the idea of the responsibility to protect.

The ICISS did not really solve the dilemma formulated by Kofi Annan. Its central idea rather was to mitigate it in three ways (ICISS 2001): Firstly, it determined that the prime responsibility to protect people from mass atrocities lies with the respective governments ("sovereignty as responsibility") (Deng et al. 1996). The international community was only to come in if governments were unable or unwilling to live up to that responsibility. Secondly, the ICISS called upon the Permanent Five members of the Security Council to refrain from using their veto in cases where this did not contradict their vital interests. With regard to this issue, the ICISS also suggested to prolong the line of decision-making by bringing in the General Assembly according to the Uniting For Peace Resolution if the Security Council failed to live up to its responsibility. If the General Assembly could not agree the decision was to be left to regional organizations. If all of this should not work, so the ICISS argued, the Security Council would have to blame itself if a state or a group of state decided to act on its own. Thirdly, the ICISS differentiated the issue of intervention into three parts: the responsibility to prevent, to react and to rebuild. This implied that the focus was not only on military intervention but equally on prevention and on peace-building.

This concept of the responsibility of states and of the international community was introduced by Kofi Annan into the ensuing debate on the reform of the UN (A/60/L.1). Only four years after the report of the ICISS had been published, the UN Summit Meeting of 2005 confirmed the basic idea of the responsibility to protect, though in a specific way. It stresses even more than the ICISS the primary responsibility of the state and it sees it as the first duty of the international community to *enable* the states to live up to their responsibility. Only if this does not work, the international community, represented by the Security Council, is to step in with enforcement action. Such enforcement action was to be taken in line with the norms and regulations laid down in Chapter VII, but also in Chapters VI and VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter. At the same time, the R2P opens up the way

to combine these measures with the prosecution of individual actors under criminal law. Thus, even before the decision was taken to intervene militarily in Libya, the Security Council authorized prosecution of Gaddafi and his entourage by the International Criminal Court.

Most importantly, R2P limits what governments are allowed to do under a state of emergency. No matter what the situation is, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, genocide and crimes against humanity are outlawed and are objects of international concern regardless of any treaty agreements. In this regard, R2P may come to function as a follow-up to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by spelling out what these rights imply in situations of armed conflict.

R2P does not only serve as a material link between the protection of human rights on the one hand and collective action by the Security Council under Chapter-VII on the other. It may also help the Security Council to broaden its agenda under Chapter VII by stressing the need to move from the idea of sanctions against, to the idea of support for, governments in conflict in order to enable them to live up to their obligations under international law. In this respect, R2P may be seen as taking up the basic principle of peace keeping in so far as it spans chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter by emphasizing the protection of human rights on the basis of consent and not of confrontation. Also, the emphasis on enabling action can be read as following up on the three pronged concept of the responsibility to prevent, to react and to rebuild (UN Secretary General 2009).

So what is the problem with R2P?

Some Pitfalls of the R2P
Some advocates of strong action on behalf of people in conflict tend to claim that the World Summit version of the R2P amounts to "protection lite" in comparison to the older concept of humanitarian intervention. Why? Because the advocates of humanitarian intervention claimed that individual states had the right to intervene in cases of humanitarian emergencies. The R2P in its 2005 version, in contrast, mentions only the Security Council as competent actor. According to this reading, R2P will rarely be applied and may eventually even sink into oblivion. Under this perspective the Libya resolution would not confirm the advent of a new normative order but simply the mood of a historic moment in which the "usual suspects" among the permanent five of the Security Council (Russia and China) did not know what to make of the "Arab spring".

Other observers have claimed that the World Summit resolution on the R2P is not as restrictive on the point of competency as it seems at first sight. Thus, Alicia Bannon has argued that the Summit resolution underlines the

need for international protection in such a way that the issue of who is competent to act is subordinate to the need to act. Along this line, Bannon interprets the mentioning of the Security Council as a mere statement of preference. Preferably, the Security Council should act. But if it fails to do so, others may act. This "solution" of the issue of competence would foment new distrust especially on the part of the Global South (Brock 2009). To wit, some of the states that originally agreed to the respective Security Council Resolution on Libya, later-on interpreted the military engagement of NATO as amounting to a unilateral intervention because it was directed at regime change. The inability of the Security Council to agree on strong and timely action in the case of Syria could then be interpreted as reflecting the mistrust created in the case of Libya.

So R2P seems to be in a dilemma: either it is irrelevant, than nobody has to fear it, or it is relevant but then there is the danger of misuse, because it will be the powerful states that will determine the conditions under which the responsibility to protect is discharged (Cunliffe2011, Introduction, 5). Besides such objections there is quite another line of criticism which refers to the delicate issue of self-determination.

The question here is to what extent an external intervention into intrastate conflicts curtails the right to self-determination. To illustrate the point: During the great demonstrations on Kairo's Tahrir Place in Kairo, some people reportedly followed the slogan: "I will rather die by Egyptian bullets than letting me protect from the West".[1]

In a recent study Philip Cunliffe observes that the R2P falls behind "humanitarian intervention" for the very reason that the language of protection obscures the fact that protection involves intervention. Thus R2P yields all the advantages of intervention to the powerful states that are likely to wield it, while offering a new vocabulary for justifying their action by turning prohibited intervention into admissible protection (Cunliffe 2011 a, 65). In brief, R2P on the one hand would be a device for reducing the political costs of intervention, on the other hand it would interfere with "the freedom of people to be self-determining" which is guaranteed by sovereignty and non-intervention: "It is the people themselves which must impose their will on the state." (Cunliffe 2011 a, 61). The concern behind this observation is that R2P eliminates the subjects of emancipation by turning them into objects of international care.

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[1] Gerald Drissner, Westen, schwirr ab!, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung Januare 22, 2012, p. 11.

What are we to make of such observations in the face of people in Bengasi or Syria calling for external intervention?

The R2P as a precarious achievement
In Luhmannian terms, the central function of law is the counterfactual stabilization of expectations. In other words, law is to stabilize the belief of everybody in the relevance of law. That is not a matter of make-belief. It is a matter of life and death because if we all would think that there is no law to go by, then we would end up in a vicious circle in which the belief that there is no law leads to lawless behavior which in turn strengthens the belief in lawlessness etc.

To what extent does the R2P stabilize counterfactual expectations that law does not simply open up new arenas of lawlessness but actually helps to civilize conflict? I think that depends very much on the way in which we talk about R2P. We should not expect too much, but neither should we ask for too little.

What can we expect? We can expect that the struggle over the R2P will go on, perhaps in a different terminology. But in substance, the debate will continue because of the state of normative integration at the international level which has already been achieved around human rights. In all likelihood, regional aspects will gain in importance. This already seems to happen. It can create more trust and reduce suspicions.

To be sure, in regions, too, individual states pursue specific agendas. Thus the present regional efforts to protect people in the Syrian conflict reflect the tensions between Sunnite and Shiite groupings in the different states and between states like Iran and Saudi Arabia. But that should not tempt us to draw premature conclusion. There will always be obstacles to peace and human dignity. But that does not render the pursuit of norms and values illusionary. Obstacles rather call for more ingenuity in overcoming them.

The fact that humanitarian concerns always interacts with narrow self interests should not render us hopeless. This is life. This is the way every one of us lives when we are torn between our hope for the protection of people in the Kivu provinces of the DRC and our simultaneous desire to have unrestricted access to electronic equipment. It is not always our self interest that triumphs. Rather what we consider as our self-interest is co-determined by our beliefs in certain norms and values. And along this line, there is room for change.

There is a fundament gap between processes of normative integration at the global level on the one hand, the continuing dominance of the state as the source and focus of political legitimization and self-determination on the

other. The basic issue is to bridge this gap. R2P can make a positive contribution here, if only as an arena for a more systematic debate on these issues:

Firstly, it underlines the need to balance humanitarian concerns and issues of peace. Our American colleague Mary Ellen O'Connell calls for more emphasis on the responsibility to *peace* than on the responsibility to *protect* (O'Connell 2011). That may help to mitigate interventionism. In the end, however, the two responsibilities go together. The one should not be defended at the expense of the other. R2P is yet another argument for preventing war. And preventing war may widen the political space for protecting people in conflict.

Secondly, the R2P can help to re-orient the struggle over norms from *enforcement* to *enabling* pertinent actors to live to their obligations. The 2005 World Summit Resolution stresses the need to *assist* governments in meeting their responsibility to protect. There is some wisdom in this provision which has not been addressed sufficiently up to now (UN Secretary General 2009). In this respect, R2P could help to re-direct the ongoing debate on sanctions as a means of norm enforcement towards incentives and confidence building.

Thirdly, we have to work on a sober analysis of what is to be learned from the interventions of the past twenty years with regard to protecting people in conflict. What is the record? Of course, there is always the argument that it is too early to tell. But such stock-taking is needed as a working platform from which to proceed in order to achieve a more adequately institutionalized international order.

Let me end with a quote from an ardent critic of present international law, Bhupinder Chimni. "International law has always served the dominant social forces and State (…). Yet, we need to guard against the trap of legal nihilism through indulging in a general and complete condemnation of contemporary international law. (…) it needs to be recognized that *contemporary* international law also offers a protective shield, however fragile, to the less powerful (…) in the international system" (Chimni 2006, 26).

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SIMAI**, Mihály:**
Global Economic Governance in the Post-Crisis World

The global crisis has been an important challenge for practically all the institutions of multilateral cooperation. It is an important proof of the often-emphasized reality, that globalization without effective global or regional institutions is leading the world into chaos. The world has moved into a more uncertain phase of global interconnectedness, mutual vulnerabilities. The Great Crisis has made clear that avoiding the derailment of globalization of trade and finance and the protection of globe from neo-fragmentation and protectionism call for enhanced global cooperation and an efficient, flexible and coherent system of global governance.

The Origins of the Concept

Defining terms and categories, particularly in social sciences, has always been a widely recognized problem. Researchers often work with analytically imprecise categories that are understood and applied differently by different disciplines, schools of thought, or professions. Governance is such a category. In earlier centuries, probably Thomas Payne, was the very first, who used the word itself in national context with the "good" attribute. According to him, good governance means the "proper exercise of political, administrative, and economic rights at all levels." In its using, it is in many ways all embracing and vague. According to the Oxford Dictionary, governance means "the act or manner of governing, of exercising control or authority over actions of subjects; a system of regulations."

It is almost impossible to trace the origins of the use of the category "global governance" in the dictionary of politicians or of the academic world. An American economist, who introduced the concept in one of his books, in 1980, Harlan Cleveland defined it as the management of the "nobody in charge world." Lawrence Finkelstein, an American political scientist published his paper in the first issue of the journal, Global Governance, an article in 1995. "What is Global governance?" he wrote the followings: Does global mean what has been signified by international, interstate, intergovernmental, or even often transnational? If so, why not using one of those terms, instead of choosing a more ambiguous one? ... Ambiguity affects not only what is meant by global but also what is meant by governance. ... At least it must be clear that it does not mean "government" or we would not say that instead. Since the international system notoriously lacks hierarchy and gov-

ernment, the fuzzier word governance is used instead.[1] In my book on the "Future of Global Governance: Managing Risks and Change int he International System", published in Washington by USIP Press in 1995, I characterized global governace as less than governing but more than managing the global system and included all those institutions, which are setting the norms and defining rules and implementing the multilaterally agreed policies.

The Levels of Global Economic Governance
The institutions of global governance are not only the multilateral organizations. They comprise a complex system, which includes three interconnected levels: national, regional and global. The national level is still the most important. Its decisions are shaping the two other levels. In fact, the governments of the countries decide on the mandate of the international organizations, they are playing a crucial role in financing them. In fact, the governments decide on the main issues on the agenda, they elect or select the leading officers of the multilateral system In the final analysis, all these depend on the interests, values, policies and of course on the world-order visions of the most important powers. When the identity and number of the players is changing, as for example in the early 21st Century, new challenges and opportunities emerge for the global governance process. As the world economy is becoming increasingly multipolar, no country or bloc of countries has the political and economic leverage to drive an international agenda. The United States will continue to be the only truly global power for many years to come, but it increasingly lacks the resources and domestic political determination to act as a global leader and primary provider of global public goods. There are not yet ready candidates; however, leadership and the domestic problems are dominating policies. The US is struggling with the consequences of the crisis and particularly such issues as its large debt, unemployment and the future of the US $. Europe is preoccupied with the changing interests of its members in a number of issues. This has been reflected for example int he struggle for saving the euro zone. Japan has complex political and economic problems of its own, and rising powers like China and India - are much focused on managing the next stage in their development to take on new international responsibilities. During the financial crisis, the G-20 looked like a forum in which the most influential developed and developing states could harmonize their interests for effective, collective management, at least in some areas of global governance. Thus, providing the necessary financial foundation and authority for credible solutions to global prob-

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[1] Finkelstein, Lawrence S.: What is Global Governance? In Global Governance, 1995 .1. p. 367.

lems and coordination of policies of states and harmonizing the actions of the multilateral organizations. It is still not clear but the pobability increased, that G-20 effective cooperation will be short-lived.

The second level of global governance is regional. This level has become particularly important since the establishment and extensions of the European Union, which can be considered as one of the most ambitious experiments to date in supranational governance. It is of course a work in progress, and the European paradigm is itself very specific to the conditions and pressures that prevail in Europe. Our continent was ravaged by two world wars and by the holocaust, leaving millions of men and women dead and many more millions in search of peace, stability and prosperity. One should therefore be cautious about ascribing universal values to what so far has only been a part of our European world.

A space of pooled sovereignty has been created at the heart of the European project, a space on which the members of the EU agree to govern among themselves without having permanent recourse to international treaties. The essence of the European governance paradigm is the coming together of national political wills to act together in the framework of a common project and an institutional set-up that can make it work. The combination of these three elements rather than just the governance methods used.

There is also the fact that Community law takes precedence over national law, and then a supranational body like the European Commission that has been given the monopoly of initiating legislation. There is also the EU's Court of Justice whose decisions are binding on national judges, and a parliament composed of a "senate" of member states, the council of ministers, and a "house of representatives" elected by the European demos, the European Parliament.

Taken together, these things make the European Union a radically new economic and political entity when it comes to international governance.

There are of course many other regional integration groups and other organizations for the governance in different areas, mainly in trade issues. However, none of those organizations could develop a comprehensive regional economic governance structure, due to the lack of interests, incentives, or possibilities of the member states.

In some respects, European integration offers some useful lessons also for the third level of global governance. This is the network on multilateral organizations and cooperation regimes on global scale. The first lesson is the importance of the rule of law and of enforceable commitments. Global governance has to be anchored in stakeholders' commitments and in rules and regulations with mechanisms that deserve respect. The second lesson is the importance of coherence, which must start at home and includes multiple

accountabilities. The third lesson for global governance is respect for the principle of subsidization; the international system should not be overburdened with issues better dealt with at the local, regional or national level. The fourth lesson is related to legitimacy. National governments need to be held accountable by their voters, political parties, civil society, parliaments, or citizens for their behaviour in international organizations.

The most important global organization, in fact, the center of global governance is the United Nations, with its Security Council and the comprehensive system of specialized agencies, programs, committees, and commissions.[2] These institutions are functioning in practically all the areas of human actions, starting from the very early stage of family planning and human existence, education and health, through, global processes of output, consumption, cooperation. In global economic governance the Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO, the BIS, and the different Gs are playing a crucial role. After the Asian Financial Crisis the G20, as a group of the most important states of the world has become a very important forum on global level. The global financial and economic crisis, which is increasingly called as the "Great Crisis" by the press and many economists, resulted in the transformation of this group into a kind of a global "steering committee" for the management of the global multilateral efforts.

As in the case of national or in fact any governance activities, there are four stages of the process:

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[2] The most comprehensive approach in the context of the management of the crisis and the necessary changes has been raised in the UN General Assembly. These incuded the following:

1. What are the global consequences of the current financial crisis and its impact on the growth and development?

2. What can be done to address the systemic root causes of this crisis,including the establishment of a transparent and accountable global system of policy coordination and fundamental reform of the global financial architecture?

3. What should be the underlying ethical and social bases for reforming the current international economic governance system? What are the practical arrangements, decisions, and processes that must be undertaken to justly and democratically implement the needed reforms?

4. What are the long-term challenges to sustaining public oversight and accountability over global market processes and what could be the transformation required in international relations between developed and developing ountries and the Global South.

5. What are the developing country concerns and capabilities in playing an active role in global economic governance? What initiatives should developing countries undertake to establish a just and developmentpromoting economic system?

6. What kind of agreements should the international community reach at the United Nations' Review Conference on Financing for development to contribute to finding a durable systemic solution to the present crisis?

7. What are your views on possible actions required, including deep reform of the global financial architecture and what should be the role of the United Nations General Assembly?

1. Agenda setting,
2. Policy options definition,
3. Decision on actions, and
4. Implementation.

Emphasis is put on the third stage. This is probably the most difficult and the influence of the conflicting interests is the greatest. Virtually all issues of some global interest can be put on the agenda of at least one committee of the UN, or of other international organizations. The decisions on the implementation and its process require consensus, majority support, or at least, the active political and financial involvement of some important power. One may add on national level a fifth stage, evaluation of effectiveness. On global level, it is a rather difficult task, measuring the effectiveness or the success of global governance system and its actions. These must be related to the character of the problems, the mandate of the institutions, also from the perspectives of the international beneficiaries and losers.

The "Great Crisis" and the Changing Global Economic System
This paper is dealing with some of the main issues of global economic governance in the post-crisis world. The turbulence and the distress of the world of the early 21st Century have deeper roots and broader sources than the crisis. The last decades of the 20th century and the first decades of the 21st century[3] can be characterized as the age of multiple global transformations, with many adverse consequences, but sometimes, also with important new opportunities for certain actors of the global system. In this approach, I have drawn the theoretical and conceptual inspiration from Karl Polanyi's "The Great Transformation." Some of these, like the demographic transformation, the super-urbanization, the changes in global power structure, and the consequences of the global ecological crisis are rooted in the legacy of

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[3] Mihály Simai: The Age of Global Transformations: The Human Dimensions. Budapest, Academia, 2000

the 20th Century[4]. The global consequences of the emerging new world-wide system of capitalism in the globalization process, in the role of states in economic and social development and in the different regions of the world may be more visible in the later decades of the 21st century. The coincidence of major transformations within a given era, are rare in human history. The different transformations, the evolving new factors and forces resulted in already a complex, diverse and turbulent world by the 21st century, before the crisis. These also explain why consequences of the crises, including particularly the current one may greatly differ not only in the North and the South, but also for the individual developed and the developing countries.

Interest in global governance has been renewed by the crisis.

It has been generally recognized that the economic downturn, which started in 2007, could be characterized as the most serious global crisis since the great depression of the 1930s, with long term and in some areas devastating consequences. It has started as a financial crisis and spread rapidly at first to the whole financial system and than to the rest of the economies. Here I want to emphasis that even a systemic crisis does not imply the collapse of a system, but it is a major disturbance or turbulence blocking or seriously hampering its functioning. There have been of course different crises in the past. They have been the sources of many ideas, including those, which declared or promised certain "endings" - the end of history, the end of geography and the end of nation state. In connection with the current crisis, it has become suddenly fashionable to anticipate the "end of globalization" the end of neoliberalism or even the end of capitalism. Many, in the aca-

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[4] The 20the century has been indeed one of the most controversial era of human history. It was the era of nationalism and of internationalism under different flags and ideologies, using peaceful or violent instruments. It was the century of decolonization, the disintegration of the great empires. The century has included some of the worst dictatorships of human history and the unprecedented broadening of freedom and democracy. Revolutions and counter-revolutions, world wars, national liberation wars, religious, class, ideological and ethnic conflicts paved the bumpy road toward the third millennium. Civil society do-gooders preaching human solidarity: Narrow-minded dogmatic and violent fundamentalists' movements, which leaders were declared as terrorists, and later they became leaders of their new countries. They are political leaders now who were responsible for the mass murder of millions, and are still considered as the heroes of certain groups. Global organizations of criminals and many other strange, violent, or non-violent groups were among its main actors. Ninety per cent of those scholars who lived and worked in human history have been shaping and developing the rapid progress of science and technology, embodied in new products, processes, consumer goods and horrible weapon systems. A radical improvement in the quality of life of many millions, mass poverty and misery, expectations, disappointment and despair of billions are all parts of the controversial heritage of the century behind us.

demic world are rejecting the neoliberal prophets in favor of Schumpeter and Keynes and even Marx in an attempt to search the future of the capitalist system.

Those, who have been talking about the crisis of globalization or of multilateralism, comprise also an important group. A well-known American journalist-analyst, Fared Zachariah suggested for example the following idea: "More broadly, the fundamental crisis we face is of globalization itself. We have globalized the economies of nations. Trade, travel and tourism are bringing people together. Technology has created worldwide supply chains, companies and customers. But our politics remains resolutely national. This tension is at the heart of the many crashes of this era – a mismatch between interconnected economies that are producing global problems but no matching political process that can affect global solutions. Without better international coordination, there will be more crashes, and eventually there may be a retreat from globalization toward the safety – and slow growth – of protected national economies."

The tasks and possibilities of global governace, including economic governance in the post crisis world cannot be confined to the issues related to the consequences of the global crisis. It is necessary to take into account the main structural characteristics of the global economy before and after the crisis. Many problems, challenges, risk factors are not new. Ten years ago, the former SG of the UN Kofi Annan made an important statement in his Report to the GA of the UN about the state of the world, walking on a crossroad. There are periods in history when humanity is at a crossroads, when the paths that are followed influence large numbers of people in fundamental ways for hundreds of years. We are in one of those periods right now, as the decisions we make over the next decades on such important issues as the global environment, the population challenges, on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and many other global challenges, will affect the lives of billions of people worldwide for countless generations. This is due to the more or less unprecedented changes.

The structure of the global economy has radically changed during the past decades. From among the sectoral shifts, directly related to the crisis, the most important change has been the fast increase of the financial sector and the expansion of the "paper economy." This category has been probably used first by a famous economist of Polish origin, Michael Kaleczki. He described it as the financial deepening, the securitization, the increasing role of social security pension and health insurance institutions and services and contrasted it with the shrinking "real economy." The paper economy is that part of the national or the global economic systems, where there is no material production and the movements of money, stocks, bonds and other finan-

cial instuments, dominate it. During the past 25-30 years, there has been an extremely fast growth of the paper economy. Since the 1980s, it has increased three times faster, than the "real economy": industry, agriculture, the related services, transport, communication, commerce. The spread of the paper economy stimulated the unprecedented growth of the global financial centers. In the medieval period "city states" emerged as the centers of trade. In the 20th century important centers of global money trading emerged, this concentrated stocks and commodity exchanges, private financial istitutions. During the last decades of the century, they became the global concentrations of the paper economy. The main actors in these centers were financial conglomerates, investment, and commercial banks insurance companies, underwriters, broker houses etc. These centers, like London, New York, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Singapore, Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam, Geneva, Dubai, etc are not only connected by the mobility of capital, but through the interconnectedness of the stock exchanges they are functioning 24 hours. They play a crucially important role in speculation and in the rapid spread of panics as well. These centers also became very important in the national economies. The London center is responsible for 15 per cent of the GDP int he UK.

All these changes paved the road for the rapid growth of the paper economy and promoted an unprecedented degree of speculation. Especially in advanced economies such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the financial sector has accounted for an unsustainable share of corporate profits and profit growth. While the paper economy and the real economy is interconnected both in national and international framework, the vitality of the real economy – the economy that most people depend upon for their livelihood has been undermined. During a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and prolonged stability, market participants sought higher yields, without an adequate appreciation of the risks, and failed to exercise proper due diligence. The instability and volatility of the paper economy can devalue the economic base of real lives, or in more macro-scenarios can lead to the collapse of national and regional economies rather fast.

An outstanding British political-economist, the late Susan Strange called this unstable system "casino capitalism," referring to the views of Keynes. In her book, "Casino Capitalism" Susan Strange likened the Western financial system to a vast casino. As in a casino, the world of high finance offers the players a choice of games. Instead of roulette, blackjack, or poker, there is dealing to be done – the foreign-exchange market and all its variations; or in bonds, government securities or shares. In all these markets, you may place bets on the future by dealing forward and by buying or selling options and all sorts of other recondite financial inventions. Some of the play-

ers – banks especially – play with very large stakes. There are also many quite small operators. There are tipsters, too, selling advice, and peddlers of systems to the gullible. In addition, the croupiers in this global finance casino are the big bankers and brokers. They play, as it were, "for the house". It is they, in the long run, who make the best living. She goes on to observe that the big difference between ordinary kinds of gambling and speculation in financial markets is that one can choose not to gamble at roulette or poker, whereas everyone is affected by "casino capitalism". What goes on in the back offices of banks and hedge funds is apt to have sudden, unpredictable, and unavoidable consequences for individual lives.

The center of the global financial and economic crisis of 2007–2010 has been the "paper economy," where the global interconnectedness of the financial institutions, the main actors of "casino capitalism" has been the strongest. In the financial sphere, one of the main consequences of the crisis has been the massive destruction of global financial wealth. Most of it concentrated in the developed countries. The experts of the Bank for International Settlements estimated the total loss of 2007–2010 at US\$ 50 trillion. It was roughly equivalent to the world's GDP for in 2008 that year. The interruption to the normal functioning of the global financial system brought with it a severe credit crunch in the developed economies and a sharp reduction in the external financing available for developing economies. This decline in lending reflected, first, a greater unwillingness on the part of financial institutions to grant new loans owing to the increased level of average risk.

The financial crisis quickly spread to real economy, chiefly because of four factors: the credit crunch, wealth destruction and the shrinking disposable incomes, the decline in world trade and worsening expectations for the evolution of economic activity. It has become the most internationalized crisis of the post second world war era.

The crisis did not solve the main problems, which were its causes and produced or exacerbated serious, wide-ranging, yet differentiated impacts across the globe. It has opened an era of global slump, or depression with some important characteristics. The severity of these characteristics differs, but they are representing a long-term problem for the global economy:
- large unemployment, poverty and hunger;
- relatively slow global growth and fluctuations with economic contraction;
- negative effects on trade balances and balance of payments of many countries;
- dwindling levels of foreign direct investments;
- large and volatile movements in exchange rates;

- large and ever-growing budget deficits, falling tax revenues and reduction of fiscal space;
- slower growth of world trade;
- increased volatility in the prices for primary commodities;
- declining remittances to developing countries;
- sharply reduced revenues from tourism;
- reduced access to credit and trade financing;
- reduced public confidence in financial institutions;
- reduced ability to maintain social safety nets and provide other social services, such as health and education;
- increased infant and maternal mortality in many poor countries.

There are different estimates and projections concerning the duration of the depression. Most probably, the second decade of the 21st century will be influenced by the above factors and their political, economic, and social consequences. All these will have to be added to the global costs of the crisis. The most serious long-term human consequence is of course unemployment, which hit particularly strongly the youth.

New Problems and Tasks in the System of Multilateral Cooperation in the Post-Crisis World

The global crisis has been an important challenge for practically all the institutions of multilateral cooperation as the world has moved into a more uncertain phase of global interconnectedness with the dangers of mutual vulnerabilities. During the crisis, the restructuring extension and central role of the G20 in the global governance process has been probably the most important "innovation" in the institutional framework of multilateral cooperation in the 21st century. During the acute phase of the crisis, the need for cooperation was obvious and the role of G20 was generally accepted as a steering committee of global governance. The most important institutional decisions of the G20 included the much broader mandate and increased possibilities of IMF and the coordination of certain national crisis management measures. It has become evident however that the major state actors had no comprehensive vision and their interests are increasingly diverging. The latest meeting of G20 in Mexico revealed the danger: increasing irrelevance in an era, when new interrelations developed between the domestic and international sources of growth, between the old and new centers of industry, services, trade and technological development. All these would require radical changes in the institutions, instruments, and efficiency of global economic governance. Due to the central importance of the global financial sector, the

most urgent tasks emerged in that area. In Europe, the crisis of Euro is an important reflection of the problems.

Effective policies and actions are needed for the long-term stabilization of the financial sector, not only in the Eurozone, but also on the different levels: on national, regional and global level. It will be a very difficult task to reform of the global financial system and develop mutually agreed rules in order to avoid the repetition of future financial crises, and make the system safer on macro and micro level with institutional changes, macro-, and micro prudential measures. These should include also the private institutions. The Basel oversight institutions started working also on long term measures for the strengthening the banks, insurance companies, and improving their transparency and security. From among the measures, the new Basel rules are of utmost importance in terms of capital requirements, in terms of liquidity monitoring, and all what is the core of the new banking supervision. The rules are not only dealing with the banks themselves; it is the full body of the system the non-bank financial institutions, the money and security markets. There are proposals on the table for monitoring and supervising both the creation and the propagation of complex financial instruments, requiring the greatest transparency in the markets where they are traded. As for the latter, the idea will be to cover all market participants, be they banks, hedge funds, or credit rating institutions. Similarly, a way will be found to bring the "shadow" banking system into the orbit of regulatory principles and oversight in the new regulatory landscape.

The management of the global trade regime is also a crucial task of global economic governance. The multilateral trading system is at a fundamental crossroads. Unilateral trade liberalization has been strong over the last two decades, as states have reduced barriers to trade and investment across most sectors of their economies; but the process has slowed over the last couple of years. The financial and economic crisis resulted in a growing opposition to trade liberalisation increased the demand for protectionism to protect key national businesses and jobs. Most members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) kept so far the worst domestic protectionist pressures under control. The regulation of the financial system and the governance of the trade regime require different policy responses but to solve the problems in one domain it is necessary to solve them in the other. The difficulties with concluding the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations demonstrate not only the difficulties of conducting multilateral trade negotiations in the 21st century but also expose serious fault lines in the contemporary architecture of trade governance in particular and global economic governance more generally. The recent trend amongst larger countries to go outside of the WTO to reach trade deals carries the risk of undermining the fab-

ric of inclusive, fair and stable institutional arrangements that underpin international trade.

One should not exclude the global eco system from the tasks of economic governance. Its all aspects are interrelated with global production and consumption, finances and trade. At this stage, the issues related to the climate change are in the center of international efforts. RIO20 in July 2012, which was considered as a new step in finding more effective multilateral means to halt global warming and deal with many other environmental issues, did not bring the expected new commitments. Two international approaches to achieving climate security remained open: the first is to follow a negotiated path on the basis of shared values, agreed timetables and simultaneous efforts and criteria underpinned by the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in the framework of multilateral negotiations. The second approach is to go along the route of unilateral initiatives that are applied indiscriminately, do not distinguishing between relative development levels, and are governed only by the laws of competition.

One of the often-neglected conditions of global governace is the necessary data and the quality of analysis.

There is a vast array of financial and economic statistics and the processing power to crunch them. As Claudio Borio of the BIS puts it, "The main reason why crises occur is not lack of statistics but the failure to interpret them correctly and to take remedial action."

Policymakers, governments, institutions are not necessarily equipped with the best knowledge for understanding the meaning of the data from the point of view of the influence of different categories in the governance system. There is not only an information gap but also an intellectual or knowledge gap between the different levels, governments, international organizations. For all the effort expended on data gaps, the constant evolution and footloose nature of the financial system complicates matters hugely. As bank whizz-kids dream up new products, it will be hard for officials to keep up. Indeed, there is a good case that new financial techniques are created precisely because regulators cannot spot or understand them and therefore do not penalise them for being risky.

Global governance also requires predictable and fair funding for tackling the most urgent global problems. The most obvious source of such funding is global taxation of carbon emissions and of financial transactions as well. These taxes would not only help to fund development programmes but would also play a vital role in steering such policies as those needed to curb global warming and reduce harmful currency speculation.

Conclusions

In all these issues in the coming decades of the 21st century, multilateral cooperation will become even more important for a number of reasons. The global financial and economic crisis, with its social dimensions has been a warning that the abilities of states to manage their domestic problems have been declining in many areas. These include finances, trade, employment, environmental degradation, terrorism, rising crime, urban decay, drug abuse, and so forth. The existence and the growing importance of global problems is another factor of the needs for global cooperation and collective actions. The sustainability of the system depends increasingly on the capabilities of the countries to keep the world together with the help of some form and structure of global governance. Sustaining and strengthening global comprehensive security will remain of course fundamentally important in future multilateral cooperation. The crisis proved that global economic security should be a major component of it.

The global crisis has been an important challenge for practically all the institutions of multilateral cooperation. It is an important proof of the often-emphasized reality, that globalization without effective global or regional institutions is leading the world into chaos. The Great Crisis has made clear that avoiding the derailment of globalization of trade and finance and the protection of the globe from neo-fragmentation and protectionism call for enhanced global cooperation and new flexible system of global governance as the world has moved into a more uncertain phase of global interconnectedness, mutual vulnerabilities. The restructuring, extension and central role of the G20 in the global governance process has been probably the most important consequence of the crisis for the institutional framework of multilateral cooperation. The most important decision on the new role of IMF, on harmonizing national policy measures and many other matters has been taken in its "minilateral" framework. The management of the crisis has been an important proof for the positive role of coordinated actions.

The world is in a race between implementing ever-increasing ways to improve the human condition and the seemingly ever-increasing complexity and scale of global problems. Technology is not enough to help get humanity through the looming environmental, economic, and social conflicts as we move toward a crowded world of about 9 billion people by 2050. We need serious global policies that are implemented through governments, corporations, education systems, NGOs, United Nations systems, and other international organizations. We also need changes in human values to be discussed within and among religions, media, entertainment, and the arts. We need better decisions and decision-making processes. Everyone has a part to play in the great race between increasingly complex problems and the ways to

improve the prospects for civilization. It has become evident however that the major state actors have no comprehensive vision, strong commitment and financial means to take the initiative and carry the responsibility for implementing those changes, which could manage and reduce the sources of global risks.

If current trends in population growth, resource depletion, climate change, terrorism, organized crime, and disease continue and converge over the next 50 to 100 years, it is easy to imagine an unstable world with catastrophic results. If current trends in self-organization via future Internets, transnational cooperation, materials science, alternative energy, cognitive science, inter-religious dialogues, synthetic biology, and nanotechnology continue and converge over the next 50 to 100 years, it is easy to imagine a world that works for all.

Some analysts consider the first global financial and economic crisis in the 21 century as an important turning point in the multilateral system. One may see it is too early to arrive into firm conclusions about it. The world may miss the opportunities for the radical improvement of the multilateral system due to the inertia in the system, including the role of the diverging interests in regulations or other measures. As it happened also in the past century, due to the economic difficulties and social tensions, which may be resulting in protectionist policies, global cooperation may be stalled, derailed or even reversed. The future path of the global community largely depends on the collective wisdom, capacity and commitments of the countries for strengthening the analytical, normative, and managerial capabilities of the multilateral organizations. The global crisis made the selection of a new path much more difficult. It has increased on one hand, the dangers of long term global stagnation, resulting in protectionism and trade wars. At the same time, it has opened new possibilities for collective actions. In this era, the fall out from the crisis will be severe. People have been thrown into a deep sense of insecurity; misery and hardship increased for many poorer people everywhere. We should not cede this moment to fascist, right wing populist, xenophobic groups, who will surely try to take advantage of people's fear and anger for their ends. The role of social sciences is particularly important at this stage in promoting the better understanding of the complex social problems of the post-crisis world and in the search for democratic, action-oriented solutions.

VAMBHEIM, Vidar:
> ***War on Terror(ism) – or Dialogue?***

Abstract

This article discusses dialogue as an alternative to the "war on terror", and asks which *kind of dialogue* is useful in the context of asymmetric conflict, such as the "war on terrorism" that is currently dominating the global scene. From the standpoint that the "war on terror" is no great success, two models of communication are presented:

1) Dialogue or negotiations between high-ranking political and military officers;
2) Open meetings and symmetric dialogues between all stakeholders in a conflict, including extremists.

The effects of these two models are discussed in elucidation of three empirical examples of asymmetric conflict: Northern Ireland, Iraq after the US invasion in 2003 and the US/West vs. Taliban/Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan/Pakistan. The article argues that in the two former cases, mediation and negotiations probably preceded the change of attitude among the belligerents, especially those of the rebel groups using terror tactics. However, in the third case, there is hardly any indication that religious Jihadists will participate in a genuine dialogue. The paper presents a third model for dialogue that embeds symmetric dialogues in a wider structure of dispute and dialogue.

Background – The 'War on Terror(ism)': Not a success story

After 1990 the frequency, intensity and mortality of violent conflicts has been declining worldwide. There is one exception to this: *Terrorism, with the Middle East, North Africa, and Central/South Asia as the hot spots.* If we define terrorism as "the use of organized violence against civilians to create fear or terror for political or ideological goals" (Mack (ed.) 2010b: 36); or "the use of armed force by the government of a state, or by a formally organized

group, against civilians." (Mack, 2007:2)[1]; and use the number of attacks and casualties as main indicators, the number of terrorist *attacks* and campaigns of one-sided violence tripled in the period of 2000-2006 (Mack, 2006: fig. 2.1, cf. fig. 1.4)[2, 3], and the number of fatalities from terrorism were substantially higher in 2006 than in 1998 (Mack, 2007: fig. 1.1).[4]

The surge in terrorist attacks and fatalities reached apex during 2007, as the tide of terrorism in Iraq culminated (Mack, 2007: fig1.2-1.3, p.14), but development since has been very uneven. It has partly moved to new hotspots in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Mindanao, and there is no reliable reduction on the horizon.[5, 6] The risks now appear to be related to the strength, motivation, and reach of international Jihadist Salafis (Kepel, 2006) such as Al-Qaeda & affiliates, as well as local and regional terrorist groups (Mack, 2007:14; Jones and Libicki, 2008). Al-Qaeda affiliated national jihadist groups like the Taliban appear to be energized in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and possibly Nigeria, while Al-Qaeda claims to be stronger than ever in several places, as distinct from secular movements that apply terrorism as a guerrilla tactic (Jones and Libicki, 2008, Mack, 2007).

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[1] I find this definition reasonable, as it delimits the concept of "terrorism" to *intentional attacks on civilians, irrespective of whether the actor is an insurgents or a state*. One-sided, state-based violence is included in the numbers, while collateral casualties as a consequence of armed clashes between belligerents or armed groups are excluded. However, genocides and politicides should be subtracted from the number: Despite the fact that terror is an important goal of such actions, they are a different phenomenon than terrorism: While terrorism is considered as a tactic, i.e. a *means*, in war and violent conflict, genocide and politicide are goals in themselves. They also produce very high casualty numbers. Hence, if these are confounded with terrorism, we get very inflated and misleading statistics on *terrorism proper.* A wider definition including collateral casualties and attacks on compounds would make statistics more uncertain, numbers confounded, and discussion more confusing.

[2] Mack (ed.), 2005, *Factsheet*:
http://www.humansecurityreport.info/press/Terrorism-Factsheet.pdf;
Mack (2006), fig2.1:
http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/2006/figures/Figure2.1.pdf

[3] PRIO 2009 http://www.prio.no/News/NewsItem/?oid=84112

[4] Numbers and definitions are contested. However, even Mack (2007), who is very reluctant to accept that terrorism has been on the rise since 1998, admits that *including Iraq,* it has surged since 1998.

[5] http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/figures.html;
http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/figures/Figure_1.4.jpg

[6] http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/figures/Figure_1.3.jpg

In a study on terrorism covering the period 1982-2007, Jones and Libicki conclude that the "war on terror," which was initiated *to wipe out Al Qaida and their allied networks,* had so far "not significantly undermined its capabilities." Al Qaida has been involved in "a wider geographical area" post 9/11 2001 than before, and "its organizational structure has also evolved" (Jones & Libicki, 2008: 139). This is alarming, since the main argument *for* a "*war* on terror" was that terrorist groups would interpret invitations to negotiations as a sign of weakness, which would encourage them to intensify their attacks. Only bloodletting and suffering would pull out their sting, and destroy their capacity and motivation to commit terror actions.

Therefore organizations like Al-Qaeda would proliferate and grow until they were tracked down, uprooted, their leaders imprisoned or killed, and their organizations closed down. After 2008, this strategy has been intensified, but so far there is little evidence that it has been successful.

Dialogue as an alternative to terrorism and 'counter-terrorism'
The alternatives to war and violent suppression of terrorism (such as war, counter-insurgency, 'counter-terrorism', targeted assassinations etc.) are some form of mediation or negotiation based on dialogue. Below, I shall present two models of communication, and test their applicability on cases of asymmetric conflict. The two models are

1) an asymmetric, *top-down,* power-oriented model, and
2) a *symmetric, dialogue-oriented model.*

Having discussed their applicability, and identified weaknesses in each of these models in the kind of asymmetric conflict we are currently observing in the Middle East and Central/South Asia. I shall present an alternative model, and investigate whether that model may be useful for the purpose of reducing or ending the waste of lives connected with the "war on terror".

Two alternative models for structuring communication in peace mediation are

1) dialogues and/or mediation with *two* or a few political or military leaders involved in secret or open talks[7];
2) a model that brings all parties, interests, goals and stakeholders into symmetric, empathic dialogues, and where wing parties, ('extremists', *potential spoilers*) have a place more-or-less on a par with others. I shall refer to that model as the Galtung Model.

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[7] 'Open' here means 'known to the public'. The talks are always behind closed doors.

Two models of dialogue

Dialogue version 1: Political communication: Two kinds of actors (alpha and beta actors)

Figure 1: The alpha/beta model

The term Alpha here signifies major/dominant actors, beta signify minor/dominated actors. Alphas talk, betas listen/ watch. In this model, there are dialogues between Alphas, either two by two or many by many, as in international summit conferences. There is little or no communication among *betas,* and the best betas can hope for, is the role as *spectator,* e.g. when media are let into the summit to broadcast dialogues between Alphas.

Usually, betas will not see or hear the dialogue as it goes on; they will see a TV broadcast, a well-rigged "conversation" on a rigged stage with arranged scenes. Two or more Alphas, sitting in armchairs positioned so that the figures can talk, but not sitting opposite to each other (chairs are turned towards each other, in an angle of 45–60°. Alternatively, there are two speakers' platforms with microphones, so that the two Alphas can make their announcements to the world. The two Alphas shake hands and disappear from the screen until the next political performance. A more engaging form of meeting between Alphas, from the betas' point of view, would be the broadcasting of a real dialogue, discussion, debate, (or *dispute*) between them. However, in international politics, this virtually never happens.

Critics of this model argue that the model excludes most stakeholders and creates distrust in the very process, and consequently they often discard the outcomes in advance. Therefore, openness, and an atmosphere of *confidence* among all parties is a precondition for creativity and willingness to try out new solutions, on which all problem-solving depends, and on which sustainable peace depends: Achieving sustainable peace is *problem solving with high complexity*. Good and reliable outcomes depend on new approaches and

solutions to known problems, in order to untie Gordian knots and get past impasses. That cannot succeed in an atmosphere of distrust, fear, covert goals or suspicion thereof.

Talks between powerbrokers alone, and especially secret talks, also create distrust in the process, as well as in the motives of those who participate in the process, among those who are excluded from the talks. The latter are usually/always

1) most of the people, who are reduced to spectators;
2) those on the political wings, who are most willing to *restart* or continue a conflict, and apply violence to achieve their goals.

The latter especially may decide to make their voice heard anyway, and one terror attack may be sufficient to sidetrack a peace process and bring violence back on stage. Therefore, it is essential that the phase of problem solving is characterized by trust, a relaxed atmosphere, and participation of all parties who have a direct interest in the outcome.

Dialogue version 2: Symmetric dialogues among all stakeholders
According to Johan Galtung, dialogue presupposes a minimum of *equality and symmetry among the involved parties,* and conflicts always have more than two parties. Therefore, dialogues must be among all stakeholders in the conflict. They must also be characterized by settings which facilitate dialogues among many (or all), and especially so that actors at different levels can communicate across conflict lines/ borders. This can be illustrated thus:


Figure 2: Multilateral, open, symmetric dialogues
(symmetry among all participants)

The numbers 1, 2 and 3 represent three (or in principle n) sides in, or perspectives on, a conflict. Alpha and beta represent major/dominant and minor/less-powerful actors on each/both side of the conflict.

The motto for this kind of dialogue is: *Talks must be open, transparent and characterized by trust.* Only in such an atmosphere can thoughts flow freely, creativity blossom, and many suggestions to be voiced and heard, so that surpluses of proposals/ solutions are available. Motto: Violence, not conflicts, is the problem; many options are always better than few, and all, who have a stake in the conflict must be invited to the dialogues. The more suggestions, the more options are, and the more options available, the better possibility that one of them can be cultivated and adapted, so it can fit all, a true Darwinian world of ideas, with mutations of ideas, surplus of ideas and survival of the fittest idea(s).

The goal of creativity is to discover or invent solutions nobody has thought of, or dared to voice before. The mediator/facilitator *especially* must have a great amount of, and a large space for, empathy: Often solutions have to be *invented, worked out, and voiced* by the mediator, since the participants' positions and opinions are more or less pre-defined and fixed by their group and group loyalties. They are agents of larger collectives, and therefore have a narrow/ restricted role-repertoire, and a tendency of self-censorship.[8] However, even when the people in the negotiation room are agents of collective bodies, audacious ideas and suggestions can more easily be expressed in informal and relaxed circumstances than in formal negotiations. In informal conversations, representatives of collective bodies need not necessarily meet in the capacity of representatives (or agents) of certain interests, programs, goals or values. If they meet informally, - and not as representatives or agents of collective bodies, - solutions can be expressed informally, as outlines/ideas to be explored. Groups with 'extreme' viewpoints should be invited to informal dialogues, because they will make their voice heard anyway, e.g. in the form of violent actions when agreements between those who participate in the negotiations are in the process of being finalized. Informal dialogues may also be a solution when some actors for various reasons cannot meet one another in public, which is usually the case with states and terrorist organizations.

Groups that have a stake in the conflict, but are excluded from negotiations, will often act as spoilers, acting in ways that are violent, destructive and demoralizing for all involved parties. Informal dialogues may also be a

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[8] During Camp David, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak reportedly warned Yasser Arafat: "If we don't finish the job now, at the next meeting I will no longer be prime minister." To which the Palestinian leader retorted: "If I give in on Jerusalem, I will be killed and then you will have to negotiate with Ahmad Yassin." (David Hirst: Camp David exposes 'final status' fallacy *Daily Star*, 28 July 2000:
http://www.fromoccupiedpalestine.org/taxonomy/term/153?page=4).

solution when some actors for various reasons cannot meet one another in public, which is the case with states and terrorist organizations.

Does the multilateral, symmetric model work?
There is a weighty argument against model no. 2: This kind of dialogue is only practicable, or sustainable, among friends and not among adversaries, even less among adversaries who deeply distrust each other, and certainly not among hardboiled warriors who have been involved in violent conflict, even terrorism and counter-terrorism, for decades. I shall discuss this objection below in the light of two empirical examples, before I present a revised model.

Two examples

Example 1: Iraq 2007.
The *surge* of soldiers in Iraq in 2007, supported by improved military intelligence, is widely recognized as the decisive step that turned the tide of violence in Iraq in autumn 2007. However, before this surge, numerous diplomats and mediators during spring and summer 2007 worked intensively with dialogue among different home-grown Iraqi groups, which were involved in the civil-war-like situation that developed from 2005 onwards.

Throughout the summer of 2007, the John McCormack Graduate School of Policy Studies (Massachusetts, USA), assisted by Martti Ahtisaari's Conflict Management Initiative (CMI) and experienced negotiators from the peace settlement in Northern Ireland and South Africa, brought together a broad spectrum of fighting groups from the internal divisions in Iraq by setting up dialogue processes. They included active participants in the inter-group violence, which had developed after the US invasion. On September 3 2007, representatives of 16 groups published a joint agreement to work towards a robust framework for a lasting settlement and a set of recommendations to start negotiations with the aim of reaching national reconciliation.[9]

The participants stated the following "urgent concerns" and principles:
1. *Inclusivity*, power-sharing, abstaining from violence as a means of resolving political differences.
2. *Commitment* to the agreement by all parties:

all parties must *strictly observe* all principles in the agreement, briefly summarized in point 1 above.[10] This commits all parties, including US forces and Iraqi authorities, in their relation to the signatories to the agreement.

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[9] www.cmi.fi: Press Release, Sept 3, 2007

[10] Direct links to the press release and the full text by CMI:
   http://www.cmi.fi/?content=press&id=73
   http://www.cmi.fi/files/Helsinki_agreement_English.pdf

The implicit rule of game laid down in principle #2 is that "if one defects, all may defect." This is a highly realistic approach, and there is little doubt that these talks contributed to de-legitimizing and isolating Al Qaeda in Iraq and facilitated their defeat and partial expulsion / ex-filtration from Iraq. General Petraeus' new tactics, decentralizing both power and responsibility for security to local groups like the Sunni "awakening councils", may have been decisive in bringing down the number of terrorist attacks and casualties, but the political work which *prepared the ground for this tactics*, was done by mediators *before* the "surge", and before the change in military tactics. There was a change in mood already early in 2007, characterized by war fatigue and a longing for "normalcy" among Iraqis. This change was reinforced by the above-mentioned mediation during the summer of 2007.[11] This fact indicates that even in counter-insurgency tactics, mediation may be a *precondition* for success, and may have to precede devolution or hand-over of military powers to local groups. This point has been almost entirely disregarded in public discussion and scientific reports on Iraq and other places where terrorism suddenly started to wane.[12]

Example 2: Northern Ireland.
The peace process in Northern Ireland, leading to the Good Friday agreement and subsequent actions to ensure its implementation, was characterized by *a long list of measures* that were agreed on by all involved parties. The *process* that lead to peace in Northern Ireland was a drawn-out one that lasted for at least 2 decades[13]: It started with secret talks between Gary Adams and John Hume in the mid-1980s, and lasted for almost a decade before the signing of the joint Declaration on Peace (Major-Reynolds, 1993). It was then another five years before the Good Friday Agreement, and then another seven years before the IRA declaration in 2005, which formally ended IRA's armed campaign, and committed the organization to democratic politics

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[11] Jones & Libicki (2008) give a detailed account of Petraeus' measures, and their effects in Iraq. However, they also disregard the international mediators, such as the Ahtisaari group.

[12] Even Jones & Libicki (op.cit.), who show the effects of Petraeus' counterinsurgency tactics, fail to show how the diplomacy by Iraqi and external mediators partly *preceded* the change in military counter-insurgency tactics, when the US started to mobilise the Iraqi "awakening councils."

[13] From the perspective of Betty Williams and the Community of Peace People in Northern Ireland it took *three decades.* They started their campaign against violence in 1975.

from then on. Since then, there was no recourse to the violence of the past, although some fringe groups still carry on.[14]

The issues focused on during these talks were a broad range of political problems requiring a solution: The constituencies of MPs, devolution of powers, police reform, and dealing with historical and actual/contemporary grievances of both communities; moreover, how to rebuild trust among former adversaries.[15] A precondition for dealing seriously with the real stuff of the conflict was *trust:* First trust at the personal level between Adams and Hume, then trust between the larger political organizations, constituencies and communities that were involved in the conflict t(he IRA/ Sinn Fein and the pro-British organizations and Protestant community in Northern Ireland), then between the British government and public, and finally trust in their own ability to come up with workable solutions to the problems that created the conflict.

Example 3: In an empirical investigation
In an empirical investigation into how terrorism ends, Jones and Libicki (2008) show that in 40% of their cases, terrorism ends when the organizations or their leaders are accepted or integrated in a *political processes leading to some solution.[16]* In 10% of the cases terrorist organizations lay down arms or are dissolved because they are defeated militarily, in another 10% they lay down arms because they reach (some of) their political goals, and 40% end because leaders and cadres are arrested or killed due to efficient intelligence, local informers and local police investigation. However, religious terrorist groups very seldom lay down arms due to such factors, or because of bloodletting. These groups are in fact the least likely to lay down arms (Jones and Libicki, 2008). This is partly due to the fact that their political goals are wide, amorphous and non-negotiable. However, the fact that political goals may be amorphous or malleable does not reduce the ability of the mentioned organizations to make and adjust strategies, as well as to ad-

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[14] There have been incidents every year since 2005, but none of them has restarted the conflict. In January 2008, a bomb was found and dismantled outside a school in Belfast. According to the police, it was meant for a military installation, and the group behind the attack was of former IRA-members who are dissatisfied with the peace process. However, just like the Omagh bomb, this further alienated the perpetrators from their constituencies, the Catholic majority in Northern Ireland, as well as the IRA/ Sinn Fein, who were now solidly planted on the peace track.

[15] There were a number of actors involved; a separate, let alone *secret*, agreement between the two main actors, the British Government and IRA/Sinn Fein, would not have solved the conflict.

[16] Jones and Libicki (2008) count 102 such cases (Jones and Libicki, 2008, Appendix A: 14-186). The PLO and the IRA/UVF are two well-known examples

just to new situations tactically. All of this is evident in the cases of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

"Dialogue" is the answer. What is the question?

Taking into account the meagre success in the 'war on terror', as well as the fact that *one efficient spoiler alone can sometimes destroy a peace process* although an overwhelming majority of the people wants peace; three questions have to be formulated explicitly:

1) Is it possible to win (all) hearts and minds in a struggle against terror/-ism by means of open dialogues?

If the answer to question 1 is not affirmative

2) Must we involve all stakeholders, or should participation in a peace process be qualified, and would-be participants *prioritized* according to some peace related criteria, such as their willingness to make compromise and join the peace process?

3) From a realistic perspective: Who can have meaningful dialogues with whom?

Terrorism (and state 'counter-terrorism') is a consciously chosen strategy by actors and groups who have abandoned or rejected other alternatives and have decided to start a cycle of violence by appealing to deep-seated "myths justifying hostility" (Kaufman, 2001: 210) which are also alive in their community and among their constituents. Therefore, change will take the form of *a* series of ideological and political "battles" among people of the same culture or civilization. These battles will take place among people who share some interests, values, symbols, history, religion, culture, language, cosmology or other features of identity. Nevertheless, they deeply disagree on other issues, such as the priority of human rights, humanism, tolerance, empathy, violence, war as a means to an end -instrumental violence-, *jus in bello*, prisoner treatment, universalism in ethics, democracy, freedom of impression and expression, economic order, justice, rationalism in politics and ethics. Moreover, the limits to the exercise of political and military power in the name of religion, nation, ethnic group, or democracy etc. are disagreed as well.

The conflict of ideas within each side/on all sides of a conflict in the conflicts with the highest intensity (i.e. among actors who are categorized as belonging to the same side of an ongoing conflict although they may not identify with either side) will cover the values, we consider as 'holy', 'absolute' or 'key' in our cultural identity. These values are civilization, community, ethnic group, nation, religion and political order, etc. Even though, actors may agree on a set of values. They may disagree on the priority of those values, about *absolutism in value issues,* which values should be considered

absolute (e.g. religious values versus human rights); and *what means* we are prepared to use to rescue or promote those values. 'Are we so sure of the righteousness of our own ideas and ideals that we will sacrifice our sons and daughters for these idea(l)s'? Moral debates seldom reach the level where the very *idea of martyrdom* as a driver of war is brought up for discussion (Koenigsberg, 2009). If that is the case, the idea of martyrdom has to be confronted directly, not as a 'consequence' of conflict, but as one of the root causes of violent conflict. Both in the Western /'Christian' world and in the Islamic world we have a long history of cultivating the idea of martyrdom and the ultimate sacrifice: giving one's life in war as a heroic act.

Both in the Islamic and Western world we need a broad discussion about what principles are worth sacrificing for, whether the principles involved in the dispute are really principles, and if they are derived from holy (or basic, constitutional) works, are these fundamental/holy principles worth dying for? We have to discuss this, but also our legacy of enlightenment, democracy, freedom, equality and social responsibility. How much we value individual freedoms and the right to live in personal safety, which mean to us, and what we mean by empathy or solidarity with the most needy, and whether we recognize the right of the individual to criticize our own cultural and religious traditions.

'We' / the West also have to find out how are we related to theocratic regimes and theocratic social orders, to the problem of moral relativism and ideas of economic, cultural and political supremacy in the Western/ Christian civilization. Moreover, how to the problems of taboos and absolutism, and ideas of moral supremacy in the Middle Eastern/ Islamic civilization (and in Christian fundamentalism). We also need to discuss the problem of ethnocentrism and double standards – open as well as latent ones – in both civilizations.

In the West, a question that is different from the main issues in theocratic or autocratic states. Can and should we sacrifice (some of the) freedom of expression in text, pictures and other cultural utterances, liberal principles in our criminal law system, liberal /tolerant and "negotiating" childrearing practices, (some of the) individual freedoms for the young people generally, and girls especially, in experimenting and discovering their own way in life. Alternatively, should we try to accommodate Islamic prac-

tices in order to integrate Muslims in our political life? Where are the limits to political flexibility and adaptability?[17]

The answers to these questions by the most belligerent actors on both sides are often surprisingly similar; despite differences in the way, they formulate and legitimize their answers.[18] In addition, they also tend to reject the legitimacy of the questions posed above.

One reason for the survival and proliferation of some terrorist groups may be the spiritual dimension to the kind of terrorism they perpetrate. This is probably underestimated by national as well as international secular powers that are fighting against them: These groups refer to a holy order and war as duty towards God, the religious community and fear of / hopes for the afterlife. This makes such groups persevering and resistant to political arguments, as well as military ones, as it provides the perpetrators of such terrorism with legitimacy among a deeply religious constituency. Reilly describes the willingness to commit terror in the name of God as a "spiritual disorder," a "perverted outcome of a search for meaning" among men who feel a loss of meaning in the modern/western/secular political order (Reilly, 2007).

Juergensmeyer describes terror justified by religion as an attempt at "symbolic empowerment", which is especially important for marginalized men who feel alienated, but also disempowered by modern, secular development (Juergensmeyer, 2000: ix). These men resort to violence against what they perceive as a "world gone awry." According to Kimmel, some of these men see contemporary development as the result of a conspiracy of evil forces, where (male) honour, justice, social order and clearly defined (gender, class/ caste, race etc.) roles and identities, to which they attach so much *meaning*, is about to break down. They *prefer meaning* to (modern) values like freedom, democracy, peace, and equality, and try to act to project this conclusion onto the rest of the world Kimmel, 2009).

The combination of "myth-symbol complexes" and "opportunity to mobilize around them" (Kaufmann, 2001:212), often combined with excessive fear

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[17] When Osama bin Laden said, "Americans love life while Muslims love death," he pointed, although in a morbid and twisted way, to deep-seated difference between the normative systems in a deeply religious culture and a secular culture. This difference may ring more dramatic, when expressed in bin Laden's words, than it is in the everyday life of the two cultures. However, the difference may be important grounds on which belligerent actors recruit suicide bombers, and legitimize their actions. Therefore, such differences should be discussed in relaxed dialogues in order to avoid misunderstandings. That can happen only if we allow a moral discourse on violence and peace that *transcends the cultures in which the ideas of martyrdom and identity work.*

[18] In the case of Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the explicit verbal messages are, for example, extremely ethno-religious, despite their incantation of Ummah.

and ideas of being involved in a cosmic struggle between good and evil (Galtung, 1996)[19], makes it extremely difficult to eliminate, or even successfully suppress religious terrorist groups by violent means. For the members of these groups, violent attacks confirm their worldview, and arguments from outsiders tend to have no impact. They combine the components of their worldview into a kind of *identity politics*, which feeds charismatic leaders with supporters and recruits with almost unbreakable bonds to their leaders.

Questions to address. Premises for dialogue.
Summing up the discussion above, religious terrorists insist on submission to their will on the basis of myth-symbol complexes familiar to – *and meaningful* to – sections of the population to which terrorists appeal, sometimes even with support from secret state agencies, or the *deep-state* of a country (Rashid, 2008). These actors are as much at odds with ordinary, secular citizens ("infidels") among their own constituency, as they are with "Westerners." They perpetrate ruthless attacks on ordinary civilians who would otherwise be indifferent or negative to the "cause" of these men. Terrorist actions force neutrals to become attentive, obedient, silent and cautious. They want to attract media attention, achieve symbolic empowerment through media reach, and recruit supporters and cadres to their organizations. Terrorist actions work as recruitment adverts for their organizations, and once the fear or expectation of violence is established, the rules of the game change in favour of violent actors on both sides of the conflict. This is common to all terrorism.

However, religious terrorists have an additional perspective: Eternity. From their perspective, they are engaged in a cosmic battle between two forces of a Manichean type (Galtung, 1996:16). They see the world around them, in culture, politics, economy etc., as a multifaceted, complex attack on the spiritual world order as God once created it, which was meant to last as it was *forever*. They feel humiliated and disempowered by visible as well as invisible 'forces' that encroach upon their world. Some of these men conclude that these forces are representatives of the Devil. They resort to terrorism to save or restore "God's order," "moral order," "purity" etc., the way they see it (Juergensmeyer 2000:184-195). Suicide bombers truly believe that they will achieve grace, redemption and reward for their deeds in the afterlife.

On this background, there is reason to see religious terrorism in a different light than secular terrorism, and to review experiences from Northern Ireland and Iraq, before we apply them on religious terrorism. For example, the experience from Northern Ireland and Iraq apparently support Galtung's

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[19] Galtung (1996) calls this Manichaeism.

model of empathic, symmetric dialogues in all directions, among all parties and stakeholders. However, what the cases of Iraq as well as Northern Ireland *also* teach us is that we have to pay close attention to several decisive details and preconditions for successful talks, such as:

- Who can talk to whom, from a realistic point of view?
- *The possibility to have secluded talks:* Not all parts of the process can be open. As shown in both the above-mentioned cases, and as shown even more clearly by the Palestinian-Israeli talks in Oslo, there is a time for secluded talks, and a time for publication. On this point, the critique of the "Alpha approach" in model 1 is exaggerated.
- *Legitimacy* of the process among the belligerents "own" constituencies is crucial
- *Timing*, not least of publicizing that talks are going on, and of results
- *Potential spoilers,* who must be involved in the peace process *somehow*: Spoilers can and often *will* try to revive violence if they are excluded from the peace talks.
- The *opportunity structure*: There are risks and possibilities involved in both pursuing/continuing a violent path, and in abandoning it. Although states as well as terrorist organizations claim to be fighting for long-term goals that cannot be traded off for short-term gains, they also need legitimacy and support among their political core supporters, as well as in the wider community to which they appeal and seek support, and from which they are recruiting cadres. The fact that the public may force the belligerents to the negotiation / mediation table is an underestimated factor.

On this background, I will present a model that has been applied before, with success:

Figure 3: Two spaces x two kinds of actors

Comments to figure 3[20]:
The Alpha actors in figure 2 are now called "Militants/ Belligerents", and the betas are called "Soft/Moderate". "Groups" may be nations, communities, organized political or other groups within nations/communities or supra-state actors (NATO, UN etc.). The difference between figure 3 and figure 2 is: In figure 3, symmetric dialogue is considered a realistic option for only one type of actors, *those who recognize one another as equals,* and are interested in dialogue*.* In times of conflict, this means that symmetric dialogues are possible among moderates on both sides of the dividing line, but not between hardliners, and in reality also not between hardliners and "softliners," even though they are members of the same group, sharing important aspects of history, culture, language, nation, religion etc. (i.e., have a shared identity). The difference between models 1 and 3 is that in model 1 betas are passive *onlookers* to Alphas in action, or receivers to their announcements. In model 3, they are *active participants in political processes*, and claim to be heard and respected as political actors on a par with Alpha actors.

The lack of realism in carrying out genuine dialogues between "softliners" and "hardliners" is taken into consideration in model 3. This exactly what model 2 disregards.[21]

Model 3 shows an important aspect of the communication that took place between two kinds of actors, on both sides of the iron curtain during the cold war. While hawks on both sides dug deeper trenches and built higher walls between the camps, invested ever more in sophisticated military weaponry, thought they could *win* a nuclear (and star) war, and escalated their belligerent propaganda to ever new heights, peace movements in both camps *confronted* the *cold warriors on their own side*, the war profiteers

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[20] In this figure, the concept of "identity" might be substituted for "space": The vertical dimension refers only to the fact that there are belligerent/militant as well as moderate / "soft" actors on both sides of a conflict line. "Soft" or "moderate" actors communicate with/against actors with whom they share many decisive identity markers, such as language, history etc., but they have different attitudes and opinions on war, violence and hence issues related to the ongoing conflict. However, the social space in which they communicate is "bounded" and apparently closed to people outside that space. Therefore it is difficult to communicate with likeminded on "the other side." This is partly due to the conflict itself, which creates imagined community of interests, as well as physical and psychological boundaries which are hard to overcome or perforate.

[21] Imagine a symmetric, relaxed dialogue between Cheney and Al Zawahiri, or Livni / Perez of Israel and Mashaal / Haniyah of the Hamas, searching for a rational solution to their conflict. Possible ? Theoretically maybe, but highly unlikely, and therefore excluded from the range of possibilities here. However, dialogues and symmetric encounters between peace actors from both sides of the divide in Israel – Palestine is a fact, and has been so for decades. Such contacts are possible also between peace actors from the West and Afghanistan or Pakistan, although this is limited by terrorism and war itself.

in their "own" military-industrial-scientific complex, and the duplicity of the talk of "freedom" on the one side and "equality" on the other side. Influential groups of professionals and NGOs more and more explicitly expressed their loyalty to the cause of peace, and war lobbyists and the war industry in the east and west were confronted with the (un)ethical consequences of their ever-more sophisticated weapons. In the west, leaders of the peace movement were subject to surveillance and bullying by intelligence services, police and mass media. In the socialist camp, the leaders of peace movements were treated even worse: Gagged, arrested, interrogated, put in house arrest or prison like enemies of the state. However, people on both sides resisted the pressure, visited and met with one another legally or illegally, supported and demonstrated for, and kept up the good dialogue with their peace partners on the other side. From this perspective, the peace movements came out of the cold war as the *winners over the cold war.* I shall now try to apply this model to the 'war on terror/-ism.'

Can dialogue work on terrorism?
The global/warlike Jihadists have not been winning the battle of "the hearts and minds" of Muslims: An overwhelming majority of the world's Muslims dissociate themselves from terrorism. Among Muslims who accept terrorism as a means of 'just war', most limit their support to *defensive* war, i.e. to local or national defence against states or powers which encroach upon Islamic territory, such as in Palestine or Afghanistan. Very few Muslims defend violence, let alone terror, as a means to expand Islam, or establish a new Khalifate (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007:95), and there is no evidence to support the idea that the extremists are in a process of "winning" the hearts or respect of Muslims (Pew, 2010:3,8). This does not imply that fundamentalist Islamist groups are entirely out of step with Muslim way of thinking, or have less support than Western belligerents, in the Muslim world. This is where the myth-symbol complex comes in: Many are prepared to defend their faith or the Prophet by the sword and not only by the tongue, and a minority of extremists may always appeal to, and mobilize on, deep-seated myths and fears of the other. It *does* imply however, that there is a difference between defensive Jihadists and offensive ones, that this difference is important, and so is the difference between local, defensive Islamists and Jihadist Salafis (Kepel, 2006) like Al-Qaeda. The latter groups work to expand Islam by the sword, consider Western civilians as legitimate military targets, and hence use terror attacks against unsuspecting civilians worldwide, while groups like Hamas apply terror tactics locally against occupation of a territory they claim the right to. The latter type of groups refers to the right to self-defence according to international law.

However, it is also a fact that alienated young Muslims are continuously being recruited in ever more countries, and that they are recruited to extremist organizations by means of two very typical western inventions: The "CNN" effect (immediate TV broadcasting of terrorist attacks) and *the internet*.[22]

In the West, repeated opinion polls have shown that an overwhelming majority among the public were not keen to participate in wars in other foreign countries unless the UN sanctioned the action.[23] This resulted in a continuous western majority against the war in Iraq, and a weak support of that in Afghanistan. However, the opinion on terrorists among local populations, such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda among most groups of Afghans and Pakistanis, is often no more positive than their view of the West. Consequently, there is a potential for mobilization against terror(ism) among the Afghan and Pakistani peoples that has so far not been developed in the service of peace.

Summing up the evidence, it is clear enough that the 'war on terror' has had a limited effect on terrorism, and the groups it was designed to hunt down and destroy are capable of giving the USA more resistance locally now than in 2001. The total number of terrorist activities observable since 2007 does not (yet) indicates a sustainable reduction in terrorism. Religious guerrilla groups using terrorist tactics usually do not surrender, they can hardly – if at all – be eliminated by physical means (at least within the limits of *jus in bello* and international humanitarian law), and trying to exhaust their forces by bloodletting is a highly uncertain undertaking, which may easily backfire. Modern war history, from Vietnam to the Middle East and Central Asia indicates that guerrilla groups and terror(ist) groups can use pinprick actions successfully in campaigns to blood-let and exhaust a militarily superior enemy. This is because they have a much longer time-horizon than states/large armies, because their war is a lot cheaper in economic terms and because "counter-terror" tactics from a superior power tend to victimize civilians, which only serves to reinforce recruitment to guerrilla terrorist organizations, especially in areas where tribal or religiously motivated honour codes prevail.

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[22] A simple Google search provides 60 such sites in a few seconds (checked January 2009). However, the most belligerent sites are not easily available.

[23] In most West-European and even some East-European countries, as well as in most countries around the world, a majority (in many countries 60-90%) were against the invasion of Iraq, and continued to be against long after the invasion. Two exceptions to this were the USA and Israel, where a majority were in favour of the invasions, at least up to 2006. Since 2010, the support for the US war in Afghanistan has declined in the USA, and in 2011, the majority want troops brought home earlier than the determined date.

This implies that military suppression does not work well against such groups. However, open, symmetric dialogues according to model two have not occurred so far and are not likely to: The identity gap and the gap between the worldviews of these actors are too wide: people with worldviews and perspectives as different as international jihadists and (e.g.) secular Westerners, however open-minded, will hardly find much common ground. Further, between parties/actors with such different identities, the question of *who you are* will easily overshadow the question of what you think, which interests you represent, what are your goals etc.

However, large numbers of people, probably the majority on both sides, can find common ground on exactly one point: They want an end to war and belligerence *immediately*, and are prepared to sacrifice a lot to achieve it with non-violent means. Moderate people *can* join forces with moderate people on the other side of the dividing line. They can change their situation as passive onlookers and potential victims of violence, and become actors in the struggle to stop an ongoing madness. This implies that the battle for peace is a sharp battle over ideas *within* each of the religions, cultures or civilizations over which the belligerents are fighting. This is where model 3 may be a useful tool.

Concluding remarks

The decline in major conflicts and fatalities worldwide since 1990 can be partly explained by an escalation of third party mediation, and a strong escalation of international peace activism by NGOs, UN Organizations, UN peace making and peace keeping missions (Mack (ed.), 2005; PRIO, 2006; Mack, 2010, Jones & Libicki (Rand), 2008).[24] They hardly tried such approaches so far, or on the ongoing war between states and terrorist groups. However, we should not overlook some notable experiences.

In Iraq, mediation lead to agreements on division of territories, mutual respect, peaceful interaction and power balance among Iraqi groups that were fighting for control over territories in a situation, in which the state had virtually lost control over large sections of its territory. This resulted in de-escalation of what *might have resulted in a full-scale civil war,* and possibly further de-stabilization of the whole Middle East. So far, the wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which may be decisive for the future development of

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[24] Two other factors that have contributed substantially to this development are 1) the establishment of international tribunals and trials for war crimes and violations of humanitarian law, culminating in the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and 2) the decline in the number and impact of authoritarian regimes (2 out of 3 have disappeared since 1970s). Despite their importance for the broader discussion to which this paper relates, those two factors are outside the scope and focus of this paper.

terrorism, have developed into a quagmire, rather as Iraq did in the period 2003-2007. This is partly because terrorism in both places is inspired by religious convictions, and such terrorist groups can hardly be beaten by military means, as their goals are many, wide, amorphous, and often leaning towards the extreme. Although violence tends to subside when concrete political conflicts are solved, i.e. when a form of political settlement is found, *or* when insurgents using terrorist tactics are integrated into ordinary political processes, this is not necessarily the case with religious terrorism (Jones & Libicki, op. cit.). Rational choice models of conflict resolution or conflict settlement do not work well in such cases, because myth-symbol complexes feed fear and anger (Kaufmann, 2001, op.cit.). In other words, cultural codes partly shape the preferences on which the rational-choice models rely. People who share the same basic codes and identities with those, who exploit these myth-symbol complexes for belligerent purposes, best understand the cultural and normative frames, in which choices and arguments are embedded. Hence, cultural insiders are the ones who can rock belligerent actors in such conflicts.

An often forgotten lesson from the cold war is the way NGOs*,* especially peace movements, women's movements, religious movements and environmental movements *on both sides of the iron curtain perforated and undermined the negative attitudes* that spurred, motivated and provided legitimacy and *popular support for the maintenance of the iron curtain* among the constituencies on both sides*.* If it were not for the work of the peace groups, *the mental iron curtain* might have foiled the fall of the political iron curtain, prolonged the life of the cultural and social iron curtain, and survived them both for a long time. The protagonists of "Realpolitik" may have underestimated this fact. Dialogue combined with dispute, as shown in figure 3, can contribute to undermining the kind of blindness following on from "Realpolitik," by undermining the stereotypes, enemy images and (blind) fear on which the hawks feed.

Model three refers to experiences by peace movements during the cold war. To the experiences that have lead to an increasing number of negotiated settlements of hard conflicts, to methods that contributed to de-legitimizing violence and terror methods, and de-legitimized the *culture of impunity,* that has been a companion of (civil) war and terror, at all times, until quite recently (Mack, 2005).

Whether this kind of approach can also contribute to bringing down global, violent Jihadist terrorism and (Western) state-/counter-terrorism, we will not know until religious leaders and others in the Muslim world who have an impact on potential recruits of Islamist terrorist organizations give an unambiguous message to these organizations. The message of Western

electorates brought some of the main Western protagonists for war down from power. However, the hope for *change* that came with the US election in 2008 will be undermined if the threat-perceptions, especially fear of Islamist terrorist attacks, do not subside among the public in the West. The messages from Muslim-to-Muslim must be as unambiguous and clear-cut as the messages that were sent to the Western hawks by the Western electorates during recent years. If the threat-perceptions and images of Muslims as dangerous are re-invigorated by renewed terror campaigns, and especially if there is one more "big" attack in the West, peace actors all over the world can only hold their breath.

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FARKAS, Péter:
The Crisis and the Lessening of Security of Economy. Financial Imbalances and the Mainline Model of Capitalism[1]

Introduction

The complex system of international security involves the security of economy, the extent of which has become one of the major aspects for investors on the international scene when they are about to make decisions. Over the past decades, the loss of equilibrium and the painful 'stop-go style' growing of most economies of the world undermined the cohesion in (almost) every one of the societies, and made social polarization grow extreme. Moreover, the hardships in localities have added up the world over, and lead to the heretofore four-year-old global crisis. As all these have considerably lessened the international security (including the security of economy), the mainline model of capitalism – which scholars and politicians thought to be the best possible of all such models – has become distrusted.

Profound analyses indicate trends, especially the dangerous ones, well before those start unfolding. Judit Balázs, whose lifework this volume is meant to acknowledge, is one of those rare authors who foresaw the dangerous tendencies as early as in the 1990s. "Towards the end of the second millennium, it is becoming more and more obvious that certain currents in world economy – rooted in and right after the period of the Cold War – are on the way to developing into a worldwide crisis. The Soviets' model of 'socialist-type economy' has collapsed, but its rival model, the 'market economy for social welfare' of Western Europe, has also developed system-rooted symptoms of crisis. While 'real' economies the world over have been retarded by shortage of capital, parts of the otherwise insufficient amount of operating funds are further drained from them and directed to the owners of the financial bubble; that practice seems to be getting more and more self-generating." Balázs also put it: "Should the course of development lessen the gap between the East and the West, the North and the South, the security of

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[1] A recent essay of mine: *A világgazdasági válság] elhúzódásának mélyebb okairól. A pénzügyi egyensúlytalanságok és a modell [Main Causes of the Prolonged Crisis of World Economy; Financial Unbalances and the Model] 2012, has been abbreviated and recomposed here to highlight the aspects of security of economy. (The Author)* – Translated by *János Máté*

world economy would gain more and more stability. As a matter of fact, we witness opposite tendencies."[2]

In her mentioned opuses (Balázs 1997; 2007), Balázs focused on one of the most appalling problem of the neoliberal style of international management of economy: the self-generating financial bubble and its consequences (see monetary imbalances). These are the subject-matters of the present paper too. In those years of the past, when (under the umbrella of the Research Institute for World Economy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) both Balázs and me used to embark on studies, detailed analyses – focusing on the extent and possible effects of the 'monetary overhang' – were carefully worked out. Balázs summarized some of the results like this: "On the global scene, the total of the liquid capital is on the rise, and a growing proportion of it takes the form of refugee capital. The latter offers investors a higher level of profitability and so it drains even more sources from national economies (thus from the world economy itself)... So the 'money-driven-economy' nurtures and fattens the 'financial bubble', which – like a 'time-bomb' – hangs above the future of world economy."

Crisis in vain

In the world economy, the financial bubble (and its 'twin', the equally immense indebtedness) started to grow in the second half of the 1970s, and kept growing even after September 2008. Then the recent global crisis broke out as a result of a Janus-faced phenomenon: a gargantuan amount of virtual capital (in the form of printed paper and computer-digits) on the one hand, and unharnessed real capacities on the other. While shallow observers might talk about 'abundance of capital', the 'real' economy (that has physical existence) is frequently retarded by shortages of operating capitals. As it can bring along crisis-deepening conditions, which lessen the security of economy, it might be a serious threat to the balance of world economy.

Crises of all times have at least one positive aspect – they do away with the cancerous accumulations of capital (be them in the form of non-marketable commodities, or factories that produce articles beyond effective demand, or amounts of liquid capital without lucrative lines of business to invest in). They have, says Schumpeter, 'the potential of creative destruction'. The crisis in the first decade of the new millennium, the most shocking of all crises after the Second World War, there is without just this positive aspect. At best, there is to be seen some short-time-effect; not even on the

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[2] See Balázs 1997. The conclusions she had made in that work proved to be so meaningful that a revised version was published ten years after. See Balázs 2007.

horizon can be seen any real solution to the appalling tensions or to the im-balance-provoking disproportions.

Data (sufficient in terms of both quality and quantity) prove: not only the giant financial bubble has survived the present crisis, but some superflu-ous productive capacities of the 'real' economy as well. The latter is most rarely focused on. Besides them, though on a slightly smaller scale, there have survived some structural tensions as well as some financial difficulties.

Continuing growth of financial bubble. Superfluous productive capacities
Let us first focus on the most important indicators of the global flow of capital:
- The total of outstanding accounts (receivable at banks in international business) amounted to USD 35 bn. in December 2008; that changed to 34 bn. in December 2010. (The same was true at the end of 2011.) In fact: the situation has remained virtually unchanged.[3]
- At the same time, indebtedness (the total of such founds on the interna-tional scene) has risen considerably – due to government-bonds issued rapidly by states in order to finance their bank-saving and /or economy-incentive programmes. According to BIS-furnished data, the total of state bonds amounted to USD 23.8 bn. in December 2008, and to 29.8 bn. in September 2011; that equals to a 25.2 percent rise.
- The largest of all these items was the total of speculative transactions[4] and off-board and in-between market dealings, which – in spite of the crisis – moved slightly upward from USD 598 bn. at December 2008 to USD 598 bn. at the end of June 2011; that equals to a 5.2 percent in-crease.[5] It is not without significance, that the total of 'global deriva-tives' – which usually slumped in the periods of previous crises – has been staying unaffected even though it amounts to ten times of the total of world's global GDP. The turnover-rate showed an upward turn over the period of the crisis.[6] The total of currency-movements and deriva-tives amounted to USD 3.3 bn. in 2007 and to 4.7 bn. in October 2011. It means that – in terms of the world's base-period global GDP – the pace of turnovers accelerated from 18 days to 15 days on the speculative (OTC) markets.[7]

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[3] BIS (2010a), (2011), (2012a).
[4] Currency-transactions, interest-operations, equity-turnovers, commodity price movements, security agreements and depository for securities (CDS).
[5] BIS (2011), Statistical Annex, p. A7, p. A113 and p. A131, and BIS (2012b).
[6] The total of daily transactions was USD 1.5 bn. in 1998; 1.2 bn. in 2001; 1.9 bn. in 2004. (BIS 2010b, p. 7.)
[7] BIS (2010b), p. 7. and Bech (2012).

The mentioned three ratios indicate that, contrary to the periods of previous crises and decelerations, the asset value of international money transactions has increased (or remained stable) this time, while the financial bubble, due to the acceleration of speculative transactions and the increase of the amount of state bonds, has kept increasing.

In 2009, the stock markets as well as real estate markets and the market of raw materials suffered considerable losses of value; nevertheless, it has proven to be a temporary tendency.

Indexes of share prices fell below 50 percent in the first six months of 2009.[8] In the middle of 2012, the American S&P 500 stock exchange price index regained its 2008 value, while its European equivalent – the DJ EURO STOXX PRC – rose to 75% of its previous. Stock markets in the newly rising countries showed a USA-style soar. Japan's Topic index has remained the only unrecovered one.

The average prices of raw materials, including food-ingredients, suffered a 25% loss from 2008 to 2009, but later on, it changed its tendency and turned doubled–due to speculation-driven strong demand for crisis-immune stocks and shares. The present price-bubble may burst at any time. Over the same period, the number of starving humans has risen by hundreds of millions.

At the end of 2011, the prices on the real estate markets were 25% lower in the USA, while in Europe they were 10% lower than their levels before the crisis.[9]

Over the period of the past four years, the depression has remained permanent. As a result of that, a W-shaped crisis is all the more likely to come, even though (for the time being) considerable loss is only showing itself on the real estate markets. The world's stock markets just slightly suffered, and the surplus on the market of raw materials has grown into a giant bubble. The global flow of capital has become stronger due to the vastness of speculation and abundance of state bonds. The financial bubble has grown further.

The superfluous productive capacities of the 'real' economy survive
In our time, one of the crucial factors is the superfluous productive capacities of the 'real' economy. Such capacities (as well as value-creative services) are most rarely focused on, and thus the insufficient scientific background makes this issue difficult to overview. Nevertheless, some pieces of information are available. For example, it has become known that direct investments

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[8] In this period, a great amount of wealth disappeared from money markets; the total amount equals to two-thirds of the world's global GDP.

[9] WEO (2011) and WEO (2012).

have saved General Motors and other car-manufacturers from going bank-
rupt. Another well-known fact is that the car-industry, with one third of its
assembly line capacity redundant, has gained considerable impetus from
bonuses on car wrecks. That indicates that the rate of capacity-utilization in
the car-industry is approximately 66%. Rescue packages have also been re-
ported to save corporations of other branches of industry, where state sub-
sidies lessened the reduction of work force. At a number of other places,
consumption incentives were used to enhance the level of production. In Ja-
pan, for example, both consumers' bonuses and cash were used several
times to encourage consume-propensity. China subsidized the price of some
small, electricity-driven household-machines.

The decrease – caused by the present crisis in the industrial production
of the economically developed countries – was much less significant than
what the one in the first half of the 20th century had suffered. It is so, in
spite of the fact that the fiscal tension that triggered the new crisis was con-
siderably higher, and there have grown superfluous productive capacities in
the 'real' economy (car-industry, dot-com, real estate- and building-
industry). More specifically: from 1929 to 1932, the industrial output de-
creased by 46% in the US, by approximately 40% in Germany, and by 30% in
France,[10] while in the years of the present crisis the decreases were 'merely'
12.5%, 17.3% and 15% respectively. Obviously, state rescue packages and
monetary inducements and demand-enhancing abated the go-downs. Also in
that direction, show some US statistics about superfluous productive capaci-
ties of the 'real' economy, which has remained almost untouched in spite of
the decrease in industrial output. Data, furnished by the Federal Reserve, in-
dicate a 14% decrease in industrial output in 2008 and 2009, while the su-
perfluous productive capacities decreased by only 2.9%.[11] We possess no
relevant data of the 1929 to 1933 crisis, yet there is little risk in saying that
the 21st century rescue packages prevented many productive capacities
from annulment. The superfluous productive capacities of the 'real' economy
still form a crucial factor.

Endangered global economic security
Over the periods of the previous crises, the amount of internationally-
circulated capital decreased. Contrary to that, our present one has caused an
increase (mainly in forms of speculative capital, interbank-payments and let-
ters of credit). The price-level of raw materials and the number and the vol-
ume of stock exchange dealings show a record high, and a great deal of su-

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[10] Berend (1987), p. 298
[11] Federal Reserve (2011), Table 5.

perfluous productive capacities still exist. For a year and a half on end, the growth of national economies seemed to have stabilized. These dissimilarities are well worth some analysis.

The main reason has already been mentioned. Experts and self-educated interest-takers know the plausible explanation: the main actors of the world economy, especially some senior officials at the government of the US, have taken drastic actions to prevent the new crisis from being as shaking and deep as the one was eighty years ago. They created rescue packages for banks and demand-extending incentives for the markets as well as (non-protectionist) abundance of capital to maintain the liquidity and flow of capital in the world economy. The total value of different-type state-packages amounted to more than the world's yearly GDP.[12] All these were intended to avoid the devaluation of capitals and a double-digit recession. The amount of money (supplied by the central banks in the US and in the Euro-belt countries) showed a 10 to 15% increase both in 2009 and in the first half of 2010; after a short 'resting period', a new phase of increase started in 2011 to stimulate the economy. All these equal to a Keynesian-style, calculated, unprecedented-scale, anti-cyclic state-interference applied by the economically developed countries as well as China.

So far, such an avoidance of a deep crisis and shocking devaluation of capital seems to have been successful, even though a gargantuan price had to be paid for it. While the previous crises generally entailed restructuring, this time it usually failed to happen or remained marginal. As it has been mentioned above, the abundance of money still exists, and the danger of the explosion of the financial bubble is still hovering over the world economy. As rescue packages prevented 'real' economy companies from going bankrupt, the non-lessened capacities of production include less effective segments, which thus cannot be replaced by ones that are more effective. National economies still trouble with unbalance of payment, causes of which still exist. The hunger for outside financing has remained unchanged or just slightly lessened even in those societies, which had previously been dubbed as 'over-consuming communities'.

In the middle of 2012, the world economy is in an insecure position. The international monetary system, with special regard to conditions in the Euro-belt countries, may possibly turn jumpy – that makes capital market actors as well as politicians feel troubled. Greece, Spain and perhaps Italy or Belgium are considered to be possibly near to going bankrupt, and the danger is aggravated by the chance of domino-effect. Detailed calculations draw

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[12] The most sweeping programs had their effects before the end of 2009. For the volumes, see DESA (2009).

and re-draw maps of 'credit-losing' areas, lists of banks possessing uncollectible debts, and the 'at least or more' amounts of possible rescue packages that the Irish, the Spanish, the Italian (and the Russian) banks may need. The ailments of real estate markets may also have a multiplying effect.

Such dark sides of the financial bubble represent 'one-by-one' threats. The moment they join, they shall create an even larger danger, for the markets can possibly turn panic-stricken on suspicion that funds probably yield profits far below the expectations; that equals to owners' equities may worth less than their denomination. There is a danger of states and/or banks and/or companies starting a new circle of going bankrupt. What makes it unusually dangerous is that any one of these may cause a domino effect with regard to the present tension of the monetary system. A good example to that was that the devaluation of the Lehmann Brothers' modest amount of stock-value triggered a worldwide crisis. Even some disregard of an otherwise modest payment obligation may trigger a multiplying effect by throwing suspicion on the real value of stocks and shares. The latter may well be questioned. It is so, because the speculative funds amount to ten times the world's total yearly GDP and the total of national debts is also extraordinary high. Bad debtors make the positions of many banks uncertain. A bubble of real estate business is clearly visible in China. The price-level of raw materials is speculation-driven high. On the US stock markets, the capitalization ratio is extraordinary high; it amounts to 170% of the US GDP. In the first half of 2012, a large bubble of dot-com is showing itself. Etc.

Some experts say that the scale of the present crisis should stay well below that of the 1929–1933 crisis. This assumption may hide in the background of the fact that hardly any efforts have been done to stabilize the international monetary system, or to improve the destabilizing factors or to prevent the speculative transactions of money from destabilizing national budgets.

Such state of affairs may result in an (almost) overall financial crisis, but it is not absolutely necessary to happen. For example, the US government is determined to start new rescue packets in case of necessity. History provides examples of continued improvement of world economy even among tense circumstances. However, there must be paid a heavy price for it in forms of reduced level and poor prospects of growth; of difficulties in production-finance; of the structure of economy turning inflexible; of debates over issues of international trading and financing; of unavoidable state interference in economy; of settling international-level insolvencies under the authority of consortiums. In addition to all these, the impairment of world economy, the restrictions introduced in the interest of rule-setting actors, and the social consequences must be taken into account, too. All in all: the overall financial crisis is not necessarily occur, but it is more and more likely to happen.

From the point of view of economy, all these mean that security keeps lessening even if the big collapse fails to come round.

The cause of the budget deficits – theorizing on the mainline model of capitalism

The process of globalization, the unification of financial markets, the massive circulation of capitals created, on the international scene, financial imbalances, and an unprecedented financial bubble. The latter represents a volatile accumulation of virtual values, so it distorts the economic conditions; all those call for the limelight to be focused on the mainline model of capitalism. For the first time in the history of capitalism, the increment of speculative investments is higher than that of the investments in 'real', productive economy. That results in distorted market relations and in worldwide income-redistribution – all those in favour of the large-scale investors and the richest countries.

The second most important cluster of problems with the model – or, rather, the system at work – is that humans are gradually squeezed out of the labour market (in other words, the organic composition of capital is growing). Moreover, while competition for jobs is fostered worldwide, the capital-investors are taking an ever-larger share of the proceeds (a statistically suggested fact).[13] The unprecedented intensity of capital- and income-concentration (as well as the fervour to accumulate wealth) reduces personal incomes, so makes demands insufficient, which – over the decades – result in sluggish markets. The gap between the levels of the average income of the top 10% and the bottom 10% percent of the population is constantly widening; public utility services are getting scare; the network of social benefits is getting loose (if they existed at all). A great proportion of humankind is deprived of basic conditions of human life and forced to live in ghettos. However, these problems and consequences of the mainline model of capitalism are not dealt with in this essay, which analyzes mainly the factors and drives of the monetary system.[14]

Here and now, the focus is on the root cause that gives rise to unprecedented scales of financial difficulties in more and more countries. In all probability, such difficulties derive from interest-relations and methods inherent in the mainline model of capitalism.

1. Problem

Parallel with the economic development and the unfolding of globalization, the acceptance of the neoliberal model resulted in narrowing public reve-

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[13] Artner (2011)
[14] See Farkas (2009)

nues while the obligations of the states remained more or less the same or turned enriched.

The divergence of these tendencies is the main cause of state budget deficits as well as increasing levels of national debts.

Despite the known neoliberal principles, the data in *Table 1.* suggest that – in the front line countries of economic development – the importance of the state budgets (including the expenditure of local authorities) is not any less; the total/GDP rates have hardly changed in Europe but have increased considerably in the US and Japan.

Table 1: The rate of budgetary expenditures/GDP in the US, the EU and Japan (%)

	USA	EU	Japan
1970–1990	30,7	41,0	27,7
2009	46,9	39,8	37,8

Source: OECD-data-base (2010).

Over the past thirty years, the states' role – in regulating the 'real' economy and elaborating incentive schemes – has softened, and become virtually non-existent on the field of the international circulation of factors of production. In terms of productive capacities and infrastructure, the total of public property has shrunk; governments tend to wriggle out of obligations such as public utility, welfare, social and cultural undertakings. In present day capitalism, however, the historic-political role of states alters and gains more importance in five spheres of social life.

1.) in monitoring and handling the environmental impact of market movements,
2.) in endeavouring to counteract the excessive polarization of the society (in order to prevent social unrest),
3.) in endeavouring to secure conditions for competition on an international scale,
4.) in endeavouring to counteract – mainly by providing rescue packages – the impacts of the excessive market fluctuations,
5.) in enriching the infrastructure for social and economic purposes, and maintaining public utility services.[15] The latter being the main cause for the proportion of budgetary re-distribution/GDP remaining unchanged.

On the other hand, financial revenues of states have been turning more and more difficult to realise.

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[15] For more on that, see Farkas (2010)

a.) Governments, adopting neoliberal principles, privatised a great number of state owned companies (especially the ones in the public utility factor); thus failed to collect direct revenues from them afterwards.

b.) Trade-liberation resulted in a sharp fall of customs revenues.

c.) One of the basic aims of the transformations of taxation-systems was to counteract or at least to postpone the breakout of the crisis.

The result has left a larger part of profits untaxed; that (on the one hand) eased the pressure on capital-owners and investors but (on the other hand) further reduced public revenues.

2. Problem

Problems come with the otherwise unavoidable process of globalization.

On the one hand, it widens the road for large-scale investors and economically most powerful countries; it also lets the logic of global economy and centres of integration gain ground. On the other hand, it leaves less and less modes and implements for national governments to control and/or alleviate the problems of their economy. This problem consists of two most important things: the contradiction between the logic of the process of globalization and the endeavour of national governments to control national economies. That very contradiction manifests in the clashing of interests those of the large-scale global investors on the one side and the interests of the financially less muscle actors of economy on the other. As Tamás Szentes put it, "The interdependence is mutual, yet asymmetric."[16]

National governments have less and less legal-and-effective means to regulate and modulate factors of economy. Through the process of globalisation, some phenomena on the international scene – such as cooperation; division of labour; supranational integration; multinationals' decisive role; production and trade and finance turning out to be global – have become self-contained, following nothing but their own rules. The less muscle a country, a region, or a company has, the more exposed to the phenomenon it will be.

Muscle actors are most interested in pulling down the national boundaries, in creating global markets and in rendering all economies under one global system of management. That is how they make profits on the global scene, gain hegemonic (monopolistic or oligopolistic) market-positions, throw (in case of need) responsibility upon others and charge them with the expenses. Such interests are clearly expressed in the neoliberals-conceived Washington Consensus, which the main actors of world economy systematically apply in their dealings with the economically less developed. Though the post-industrial countries must also observe these 'rules', that costs them less than the surplus of indirect revenue they gain over from other actors of

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[16] *A függőségi viszonyok egyik friss elemzése* [A Fresh Light on Interdependence]: Szentes (2009)

world economy; the latter have to comply with these rules and thus suffer heavy losses. From the (un)employment point of view, the situation is diverse, for the deployment of production to (half) periphery countries entails deployment of jobs, too, through which many people in the developed countries become jobless or receive hardly any rise. In the face of inflation, the nominal stagnation counts to be a setback, the incomes/GDP rate is on the shrink. Nevertheless, liberalization is most painful for most countries on the (half)periphery, where the internationalization of the home markets is a precondition to debt-rescheduling. That is, in addition to the debt-trap caused financial disadvantages, the societies of those countries also suffer losses via unfavourable internationalization of production.

A good example of such aspects of the system is the troubled financial positions of half-periphery countries in the Euro-zone. A number of experts – from Joseph Stiglitz to Paul Krugman, and Hungarians like Péter Róna and Annamária Artner[17] – emphasize that the uniform-like common currency has been tailored to the needs of the post-industrial countries, which collect most of the advantages. Obviously, the countries in the Euro-belt are far from matching the theoretically optimal criteria of any currency zone. The mentioned uniform has proven to be too tight for the less developed countries, for it deprives them of such major means of regulation as having decisive words on money supply, on interest-rate policy, on currency-devaluation, on open-market operations and on irregular custom regulations.

3. Problem

As it has been mentioned, the state budgetary expenditures have remained on the previous levels or increased, while budget receipts diminished as governments lost a number of major means of regulation (*see problems 1. and 2. above*). Consequently, budgetary deficits increased and thus entailed the acceleration of indebtedness. That, on the second turn, resulted in a higher rate of state-debt and in aggravating burdens (incumbent refinancing). In post-industrial countries, the same contradiction appeared no sooner than the first decade of the new millennium, this time on a lot higher level.

For the time being, there is no sign of any solution; that is only natural with regard to the fact that the main actors' interest has remained unchanged. It is also important that the crisis has not been deep enough to bring about changes of the mainline model of capitalism.

In the middle of 2011, the continually deepening indebtedness caused concerns in the US herself; there experts realized that the peril, that had undermined most developing countries, might fall on the US as well. They saw a two-way option; the first was to reject, by Congress, any further increase of

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[17] Artner – Róna (2012)

the maximum level of national debt/GDP. That is: to apply just that restrictive policy which the US had previously instructed other countries to follow. However, should America not be going deeper into the indebtedness, the trust in her creditability is likely to evaporate, and so the crisis is almost sure to resume into a "W"-form recession. Such a prospect is pregnant with very serious consequences upon the world economy. The second option is to let the rate of the national debt/GDP go rising, in which case the US herself may helplessly fall into an upward spiral of indebtedness. As early as in 2011, the international financial services companies made the first cautious steps to degrade the US level of creditability; a kind of a step that may push up the cost of future refinancing.[18]

Both ways are of destructive nature; that seems to be proven by the examples of many developing countries, where – since the 1980s – successive governments have been going all the more deeper into the debt-trap in order to avoid a declaration of bankruptcy. However, the US is not one of those many countries; she is the "flagship" of the boom of global economy.

4. Problem
While in the 1950s and 1960s (the blooming period of welfare capitalism) states stimulated the demand via regulations, the neo-liberal age of capitalism, under the control of multinationals and large scale investors, did it by making loans. This has driven so many states into the debt-trap.

In other words, the post-war states reserved some of the extra profits in order to use them in counter-cyclical actions in times of economic depression. Demand-incentives and social benefit programmes were also used for that purpose. From the end of 1960s onward, the fading efficiency of that method brought large-scale actors to solve their immediate problems by drawing loans. What, at the beginning, had seemed to be just a technical step to be made by state politicians as well as company managers and private individuals, soon turned out to be a serious problem. Besides the carelessness and ignorance of all these actors, investors' equity caused the increase of the amounts of loans outstandingly, who took actions in order to get most of the profits and incomes under their own control.[19]

All these tendencies have unfolded on an unexpectedly large scale. The total of states' debt may approximately cover the world's one year overall GDP. Data – published by the 'bank of central banks', the BIS in Basel – prove

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[18] IMF data proves that the rate of the US budget deficit was 9.6% in 2011, and shall probably be not less than 8.1% of the GDP in 2012 (WEO, 2012, p. 204).

[19] One of the first examples to this kind of loan-making was seen when, from the middle of the 1970s onward, the 'oil-dollars' were put out to regions in the third world and to the so called 'socialist countries'.

that the total of all sorts of debts amount to several times the global GDP. Some statistics presume it to be ten times of that. Though these figures seem to be exaggerating the case (for example, they presumably involve owe-chains), the problem is going to prove very difficult to handle.

The situation is something of a paradox – given it was just the abrupt application of the otherwise balance-restoring Keynesian methods that ruined the states' balances of finance in the years of the crisis.

5. Problem

Capitals' international scope of activity as well as other aspects of the process of globalization made it possible to finance more-than-large-scale monetary unbalances of national economies; thus, *that* is one of the main causes of the accumulation of gargantuan deficits on the one side and the abundance of capital on the other.

In the period of 'welfare society', the normal level of any nation's deficit or surplus stayed below 1% of the relevant GDP; any level higher than that was considered to be exceptional. Nowadays, levels between 5 to 6% count to be customary, and levels over 10% are not unprecedented.

Here and now, let us refer to just one example, that of the US balance of international payments, which is perhaps the most perilous of the kind. As her post-war economic positions were slowly receding, the US became interested in such a new world order that might give a larger scope of activity to her muscles. The idea of 'free movement of capitals' was chosen as a carrier, while the interest-rate policy, the investment securities and state bonds served as instruments to drain the savings of other countries. Therefore, the US managed to ease her position by distributing her own problems among the nations. In other words: America started a(n almost) worldwide spreading of her own economic tensions.

In addition to earning profits from her foreign investments, America took her share from the debt-services of developing countries. In the 1980s, the US became a net capital-importer; her international balance of payment turned negative, and has remained so in all the years (but one or two) since. That balance deficit showed a sharp rise after the Millennium; it amounted to 800 billion dollars (6% of the GDP) in 2006. Ever since the beginning of the 21st century, the rest of the world – with a few exceptions like those of the countries in Central and in Eastern Europe – helped the US to maintain her excessive level of consumption. Intrinsic of the neoliberal world order is that it forces the less developed countries to finance the more developed ones (a tendency partly hidden and partly explicit in the balance of payments[20]). In terms of GDP, the

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[20] The hidden factors, among others, are the accounting prices; the net balance of debt-compounding; and some proportion of the refugee capital.

so drained capital deprived the former by 3 to 4%, and enriched the latter by 1.5% (except in the US, where it covered 3 to 5% of the GDP). Not only China financed that surplus but also Nigeria and the poor region of Black Africa (excluding South Africa).[21] Scientific literature refers to it as "pervert flow of capital"; the term is not really felicitous since it results from the existing system of power-relations and interest-enforcement. Under the existing conditions (largely influenced by the crisis), the US reduced the deficit of her international balance of (current) payments; nevertheless it is still very high, amounting to 3.1% of the GDP (2011) and it is scheduled to be even higher in the coming years.[22]

Summary: the unfolding process of globalization gives rise to such interest-relations and economy-managing methods which wear out the liquidity of the countries of the (half) periphery by draining capital from them to the countries in the centre. The course it has taken, leads into a deadlock, from which neither restrictions or artificially created abundance of capital provides escape. It is liberalism, the basic principle of the mainline model of capitalism, that has – since the 1970s – made the less able bogged down in the debt-trap. Nowadays liberalism is undermining even the post-industrial economies. As early as 15 years ago, Judit Balázs described the situation as follows: "The economy has lost all trustable theories; the two most characteristic concepts – the Keynesian 'revolution' and the Friedman-invoked 'monetary counter-revolution', both born in the 20th century – have proven mistaken." [23]

All these resulted in the unsteady character of 2012 world economy.

Future models – in relation to economic security[24]

One type of the crisis (named 'intermediate' or 'interim' crisis) is partial, not overall. The deep worldwide crises of economy – that is: the periods of excessive slackening of economic security – stand for more than the cyclic crises; they mark different periods of capitalism. A new period is about to start if a new mode of operation comes to a point; beyond that the deepening tendency of the profit-rate cannot possibly be compensated. That point is, in Rozsnyai's words, 'the crisis-point'.[25]

In 1873, such a crisis-point marked the prelude of a new period. That period was characterized by accelerating capital-concentration and the

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[21] The financial aid, in the form of international relief-founds, is worth far less than the amount of capital drained from these countries; the poorest of African countries may make the only exception. See: UN (2010), p. 73.

[22] WEO (2012), p. 208.

[23] Balázs (1997)

[24] See more in Farkas (2007)

[25] Rozsnyai (1994)

emergence of monopole-capitalism. The overall crisis in 1929-1933 made state-interference acceptable (with regard to its embryonic forms known since the wartime economy of 1914-1918). In the 1974 crisis, the role of transnational companies became decisive worldwide. In the meantime, it opened the door for ideas and interests of neoliberal capitalism to conquer the world. Such crisis-points occur in accordance with some type of industrial revolution.

Beyond doubt, the present crisis, too, has a crisis-point. That is: there must come to existence a new mode of operation, scope of which is not known yet. Professor C. Thurow is right at saying that any change in the direction of the way of capitalism is brought about by either great crises or all-people's movements.[26] The power of the latter – see the level of influence present day trade unions and labour movement have – is rather indecisive yet (but may provide unexpected turns). Most likely, the economic 'musts' shall shape the social-economic model of the future.

1. If the present crisis – softened by rescue packages – stops deepening, the financial bubble is likely to keep growing for a few more years to come. However, even in that case, a modified, cushioned model should replace the present neoliberal one. In that, capital flows, bank-transactions, the activities of equity-investor companies and hedge- funds as well as financial-service-companies should come under intensive control. So at least that was accepted at the G20 conference in April 2009. In the international institutions and organizations, the weight of the developing countries – especially that of the newly rising ones (Brazil, Russia, India and China; 'the BRIC' countries) and perhaps South Africa – is expected to grow, but their authorities may not unlimited in the future. In the centre countries, state-interference with the economic issues (especially in economic planning as well as in working out and applying incentives) is expected to turn more intensive. Nevertheless, they may force the countries of the periphery to accept neoliberal ideas as 'conditions sine qua non'.

2. Should the crisis deepen seriously, should global economy suffer from more serious losses, a *'global-governance-style Keynesian model'* is likely to come, in which a number of steps seems sure to be taken. For example, the international financial bubble would be thoroughly controlled or even cancelled. The multilateral institutions should introduce reforms. Forgiveness of debts should ease the burden on a wide range of countries. The developmental state should gain legitimacy. Governments of the world should not be hindered in their efforts to apply counter-cyclical policies. Economic policies the world over should be coordinated; envi-

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[26] Thurow (1995), pp 310-311

ronment-protection should be a front line issue. All these would assume a kind of a change in the political system itself. Income restructuring and redistribution of development-funds should stabilize the balance of international payments. A multilateral world would fit to such a set of principles (contrary to the US-dominated, unilateral, neoliberal model).

3. There is yet a third model worth mentioning; that might turn real only after some future crises will have lead to social unrests. The model's provisional, descriptive names – *social/socialist/sustainable* – are optional. In this model, emphasis is less on the responsibility of the individuals and more on the full employment of all the able-bodied. Generally applied and granted 'social and economical rightfulness' – both for individuals and for collectives – would involve a number of issues. For example, an appropriate number of jobs, nobody below the minimum-level, personal rights to accommodation and medical care etc. Strict observance of the law-on-environmental-protection and widespread use of 'green-technologies' should be of prime issues. Further, in this far-future model, some different forms of public property (first public utility companies) should have a lot larger ground of activity than they do nowadays. That may not be in contradiction with the simultaneous existence of private enterprise.

History teaches us the lesson that these are the possible frames for us to make plans for the future. Different variations of every one of the models may not be excluded. Moreover, no model exists isolated; there is no unmixed model or model without overlaps on other models.

The conclusion of all these is that if the crisis further deepens, and if it results in an increasing level of unemployment, the world may turn chaotic, and economic security shall keep lessening. History also teaches us that, in situations as this, right-wing voluntarism shall invoke 'a world of true order', which recruits dark forces of fascism. In addition, there will be an increased danger of settling conflicts via war. Therefore, the survival of the present model of economy is sure to prolong the crisis; that, in return, shall bring further peril on the global security.[27] A globalized version of the Keynesian model may use income-redistribution to counteract the social differentiation, and apply a number of other measures to rebuild security both in society and in economy. Thus, the introduction of that old/new model may ease

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[27] In Judit Balázs' words: "If – in addition to effecting negatively the field of 'real' economy – the crisis awakes doubts about the theoretical background, one may justifiably suspect to be a witness of a historical paradox. It is so, because the factors of economy are gaining weight (even priority and strategic importance) within the complex system of security, while – on the other hand – the same economic factors are getting all the more instable because of the principles of the present economic model." (Balázs 1997)

the present tensions. In every case, humankind needs a post-capitalist, so-cially-sensitive model, mindful on environmental issues. Only such a model may stabilize the security (in terms of economy and society) as it may call for wide layers of social strata to accept and maintain it.

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MUTHIEN, Bernedette:
> ***Conflict (Resolution) in the Global South***

Introduction

A South African woman of colour writes this chapter. The discussions are focused on South Africa, and could be extended to other countries in the global South.

There can be no peace or democracy without human rights and justice; hence, the notion of *positive peace*, rather than the more traditional view of negative peace (absence of war or 'formal' or violent conflict/s). At present, there exists no positive peace, or human security, anywhere in the world. For example, in developed countries many people are unemployed, with millions in the USA living well below poverty levels.

Nonviolent conflict, by its very nature, is creative, allows for fluidity and transformation, and thus is a positive concept.

> Conflict occurs when people disagree on ideas, values and [or] goals. Not all conflict is necessarily bad. If handled well, conflict can help and challenge people to find creative ways to resolve a problem. Conflict "gives a creative opportunity for development and change" [Burnley: 1988: 55]. Conflict does not have to lead to violence. Michael Banks describes conflict as "a catalyst for social processes": conflict provides "stimulus, challenge, change and progress" [Banks, 1987: 260]. [Muthien, 1998: 6].

Hence, post-conflict environments especially afford unique creative spaces for transformation and insertion of historically marginalised agendas, as well as fertile grounds for reconciliation.

In this chapter, I discuss human rights and justice with respect to South Africa.

Historically marginalised sectors in South Africa, like women and LGBTQI or queer[1] people, bolstered by local activisms and international allies, were able to insert their own agendas into our Constitution and other key legislative and policy measures that guaranteed widespread social equity and freedom from violence, on paper at least.

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[1] LGBTQI is lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex, at present the most inclusive way to describe beyond-heteronormative people. The use of the far simpler term 'queer' is part of a radical global movement's aim to reclaim previously pejorative terms.

In line with this, and led by the African National Congress (ANC) during the negotiations in the early 1990s, South Africa began a process of ensuring women's political and wider participation with one of the world's highest representativity in especially government. Local government has not yet affected similar equitable gender ratios, showing the challenges of putting policy into practice and local resistance to macro change.

Similarly, various legislative and policy measures pertaining to gender and gender violence have been instituted since 1994. In particular South Africa's Domestic Violence Act (DVA) of 1999, and Sexual Offences Act of 2007, both of which define gender-based violence (GBV) very broadly and inclusively, irrespective of gender and other statuses.

It was precisely the work of activists, engaged with and by the new democratic government, largely composed of former activists, who advocated for, and drafted these germinal pieces of legislation. The problem of implementation, which requires further funds and intersectoral collaborations, remains, especially on the part of the police and judicial system.

In every possible field of legislation in South Africa, activists have left their mark. Our progressive environmental laws reflect our green movement. Labour legislation reflects a balance between the demands of capital, and the needs of workers, as well as the country's imperatives for macro-economic stability, growth and poverty reduction. Indigenous people (the Khoe-San or Bushman is the first nation of people of Southern Africa) have been active in shaping their place in the new democracy. Children's rights and legislation have been shaped by rights NGOs like Molo Songolo and RAPCAN, and health, especially the HIV & AIDS challenge, has been radically challenged and transformed by e.g. the Treatment Action Campaign, while housing is kept on track through the activisms of e.g. the radical Landless People's Movement. Civil societies, in the form of organised NGOs, employ litigation, most often successfully. Yet sometimes compromising in acknowledgement of the "progressive realisation of rights" - i.e. that the state can only fulfil its constitutional obligations to provide for the people when it has the necessary resources to do so this, especially in relation to housing and health, - to hold the state accountable to its germinal Constitution. It does seem as if the civil movements that operated, and were mostly repressed, under apartheid are thriving in the more open democracy of the present. During August 2005 a stalwart of the domestic anti-apartheid movement, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) launched the new UDF (United Democratic Front, the largest domestic anti-apartheid coalition during the 1980s), as a new mass movement to combat poverty, without support from the ruling ANC. With all its contradictions and challenges, the

new South Africa does seem as if it is living its ideals of democracy, more than a decade after our first general election.

Security policy in South Africa

Security policy in the democratic South Africa was born during the lengthy multi-party negotiations process of CODESA[2] (1990-1994), with activists and academics actively involved in the process. These negotiations led to the Defence Review, a broad network of government (especially the military), civil society (including the Coalition for Defence Alternatives) and academics. And the redefinition of South African security away from the traditional notion of national security, to one of human security, with a policy acknowledgement that the greatest threat to South African security will not be from a neighbouring country, but in reality is poverty. This was during the relatively exciting late 1990s, when the country was pregnant with the possibilities of transformation and justice.

This fairly progressive, if not outright radical, domestic definition of security, still begs the question who defines security, and on whose behalf, as well as whose interests are served by the definition? More people were killed in any number of conflicts in the world, especially Africa (e.g. Darfur, Sudan) than during 9/11 or the London transport bombings.

So whose security, security for whom? An extensive report released during 2005 by the University of the Witwatersrand's Institute for Socio-Economic Research (WISER) suggests that security, and private security in particular, is in the eyes of the beholder. Rich white people, and the tiny 1% black elite, who speak of their lack of domestic security, and spend millions annually on private security companies, largely and ironically staffed by former apartheid security personnel, can be contrasted with poor black people in townships that police and ambulance services will not even enter, who merely ask for jobs and food. According to the WISER report, it is the rich (99% white) that feel most insecure, and spend most on private security, while it is the poor (99% black) that are, in fact, the least secure and subject to daily *violences*[3].

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[2] Congress for a Democratic South Africa.

[3] The use of the plural "violences" is intended to emphasise the complexity and diversity of violence, e.g. in Johan Galtung's [1996] 'triangle' of violence, from direct/personal to structural/institutional to cultural/ideological.

Gender differences in violence

Women are particularly affected by daily violence, which fundamentally infringes on their lived security[4]. As Lisa Vetten puts it:

> ...it can be extrapolated that the 52 733 rapes reported by the SAPS [South African Police Services] in their 2003/04 released data is more accurately calculated as falling somewhere between the region of 104 000 and 470 000 actual rapes having taken place. [2005: 2]

Vetten's relatively *conservative* extrapolation for that year suggests that between 285 and almost 1,300 women were raped a day, i.e. one rape occurred every minute. This national emergency is compounded by access to other common aspects of security, such as police services and justice, as Vetten attests:

> The legacy of apartheid legislation such as the Group Areas Act, as well as the under-resourcing of rural areas shifts costs on to women that obstruct their access to justice. In 1994 for instance, 74% of the country's police stations were located in white suburbs or business districts (Department of Safety and Security, 1998). [2005: 4-5]

In a landmark 2005 case, South Africa's Constitutional Court ruled in favour of a plaintiff, who sued the Minister of Safety and Security, because three police officers, in uniform and on duty, gang raped her. Lynette Denny[5] asserts that:

> the incidence of rape specifically, rather than other forms of gender-based violence, is equivalent to that of tuberculosis in the country, "approximately 300 in every 100,000" and hence "rape is our number one public health problem" and should be considered a "national emergency". [Muthien, 2003: 13].

In 1999, South Africa gained yet another moment of fame, with its entry into the *Guinness Book of Records* for the country's high rape statistics. The Medical Research Council's extensive report on intimate homicide or femicide, the murder of women by their male partners, was released early in 2005: her male partner in *every six hours* murders a woman.

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[4] For further explication cf Muthien 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011. And www.engender.org.za under Publications.

[5] Personal interview, March 2002. Prof Lynette Denny, head of the University of Cape Town's Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, several years ago founded a simple cervical screening project in Khayelitsha, a local township, to combat easily preventable cervical cancer, by providing free pap smears to indigent women. Interview part of extensive research project reported in Muthien 2003.

Predictably, violence against women is not unique in South Africa. Spain's efforts since 2004 to combat their own epidemic of femicide caused a media frenzy. During 2005 the World Health Organisation (WHO) completed an extensive international survey[6] of GBV, which affirms Amnesty International's 2005 report[7] on GBV, and the work of researchers across the world, especially in developed countries like Germany, of a minimum of 30% domestic violence, i.e. at least one in three women are battered by their male partners across the world. The WHO states that this rate is up to 69% in some countries. Even Oprah Winfrey regularly covers the issues of GBV and femicide on her talk show, accompanied by well-researched articles in *O* magazine.

The WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence Against Women (initiated 1997, published 2002) asserts:

> Violence against women (VAW) is one of the major public health and human rights problems in the world today. It is a universal phenomenon, which cuts across boundaries of culture or class and which affects millions of women worldwide. Its serious consequences on the health and well-being of women and their children compel us to act towards its immediate prevention and elimination. Violence against women is both sustained by, and in turn, helps to sustain women's unequal status in society. [2002: 3]
>
> Data from a wide range of countries suggest that partner violence accounts for a significant number of deaths by murder among women. Studies from Australia, Canada, Israel, South Africa and the United States of America show that *40–70% of female murder victims were killed by their husbands or boyfriends*, frequently in the context of an ongoing abusive relationship. This contrasts starkly with the situation of male murder victims. In the United States, for example, only 4% of the murdered men, between 1976 and 1996, were killed by their wives, ex-wives or girlfriends. [2002: 114, 118, emphasis added]

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[6] WHO's "World Report on Violence and Health", written by Henriette Jansen, includes two rates for intimate partner violence: "In 48 population-based surveys from around the world, 10-69% of women reported being physically assaulted by an intimate male partner at some point in their lives. In large national studies, the range is between 10-34%... Physical violence in intimate relationships is often accompanied by psychological abuse, and in a third to over a half of cases by sexual violence.

[7] "Making Violence Against Women".

In South Africa and elsewhere, largely *women* (and children) are raped and killed *by men*. This is an undeniable fact, and hence brings home the gendered differences in violence. More women are killed in the world every day, during conflicts and in times of peace, than male combatants and non-combatants combined. These women die easily from preventable conditions during pregnancy and childbirth. By virtue of their physiology and socio-economic status from AIDS and other illnesses, by virtue of their gender from sex selection before or during birth (infanticide/femicide), and due to their gender, from violence and murder, at the hands of men whom they often know and love (domestic violence and rape). Even the institution of marriage challenges the notion of security for women, as the WHO multi-country report shows that husbands routinely rape their wives:

> sexual assault by an intimate partner is neither rare nor unique to any particular region of the world. For instance, 23% of women in North London, England, reported having been the victim of either an attempted or a completed rape by a partner in their lifetime... The prevalence of women sexually assaulted by an intimate partner in their lifetime (including attempted assaults) has also been estimated in a few national surveys (for example, Canada 8.0%, England, Wales and Scotland (combined) 14.2%, Finland 5.9%, Switzerland 11.6% and the United States 7.7%). [2002: 151-152].

Hence, South Africa and Spain are not exceptions, but mere expressions of the same global theme of generic societal violence, and violence against women specifically.

Engendering Security

Why are there such high levels of endemic violence against women by men in societies, supposedly at peace (not at war with other countries)? Phrased differently, why is there such silence about a global war being fought against 50% of the world's population, against specifically women's bodies and souls? Moreover, if women are by far the majority of survivors of gender-based violence, why are women in particular so silent about it? Especially since the majority of women give birth to and raise the boys and men that perpetrate such violences against women and children. Every rapist, every batterer, was birthed by a woman.

For decades archaeologists'[8], anthropologists and other social scientists have shown that for approximately 5,000 years we have been living under a

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[8] E.g. the work of the late Marija Gimbutas, and Heide Göttner-Abendroth, URL: www.hagia.de, in addition to Engender's gender egalitarian studies links: http://www.engender.org.za/matriarch.htm.

system of rule that is based on domination and oppression, competition and violence, insecurity and fear[9]. This dominator system functions by creating differences where there are none, such as between black and white, between women and men, between heterosexuals and homosexuals. Identities are formed by Othering, where I can only be black because I am not white, a woman because I am not a man, heterosexual because I am not homosexual, where one binary opposition rules over and oppresses the Other. It does not tolerate anything in between these artificially exaggerated polar opposites. Most contemporary religions, including Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and their respective wars of conquest fought in the names of their respective gods–Jews against Pagans, Christian 'Holy Crusades', Islamic *jihad*s–are part of this dominator system, the rule by (some) men over Others, especially women. The use of violence as a method of control is a critical expression of this dominator system, which is also called patriarchy.

A very simple expression of patriarchal violence is the war being waged between two kinds of fundamentalisms, both originally and ironically born in the Middle East–Islam and Christianity – through international terrorist networks[10], pitted against the military might of the USA[11], which is fundamentally supported by conservative Christians. European debates on allowing Muslim women and girls to wear headscarves can be juxtaposed with the societal prevalence of crucifixes and other symbols of Christianity. It can also be evinced by the entire foundation of the European Union on Christianity, and repeated rejection of Turkey's application to join the EU, especially ironic given the significant influence of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, visible through architecture and the very origins of modern science[12] and philosophy (which predates and informed the Greeks). Ironically, the post-Newton empiricism that modern science is built on was derived from the work of Alhazen[13] during the 10th century, and centuries later by the Italian, Galileo Galilee (1564-1642), an inductive science that is different to the classic Greek methods of deduction and assumption.

Men, masculinity and violence

While women and children are by far the majority of survivors of violence, men are also profoundly affected by violence. The WHO multi-country study shows the extent of men as survivors of rape by other men:

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[9] Cf Muthien, 2004. "Engendering Security". URL www.engender.org.za

[10] with cells present even in South Africa

[11] Supported by its allies, and the UK in particular, specifically targeted for bombings by terrorists.

[12] E.g. Teresi, 2003.

[13] Born in Persia during 965, his non-Western name is Abu Ali al-Hasan ibn al-Haytham.

> Studies conducted mostly in developed countries indicate that 5-10% of men report a history of childhood sexual abuse... Most experts believe, that official statistics vastly under-represent the number of male rape victims. The evidence available suggests that males may be even less likely than female victims to report an assault to the authorities. There is a variety of reasons why male rape is underreported, including shame, guilt and fear of not believed, or of being denounced for what has occurred. Myths and strong prejudices surrounding male sexuality also prevent men from coming forward. [2002: 154]

Perpetrators of violence, of all genders, are themselves brutalised by the violence they perpetrate, and it is a well-known fact that the majority of child abusers are themselves survivors of child abuse. New soldiers in militaries around the world are routinely brutalised during their training to instil aggression and encourage them to kill their 'enemies'. The construction of masculinities is itself premised on violence, from a denial of emotion and sensitivity (e.g. "boys don't cry"), to inculcating aggression and excessively competitive behaviour. The European football competition evinces this win-lose system of and for men starkly, with losing team members crying in the midst of jubilant victors, while many of us join in this win-lose competitive frenzy without thinking of alternative, collaborative ways to excel, non-competitive sport to get our citizens fit and healthy.

Even witnesses of violence are brutalised by vicarious trauma. So no single member of our global society is immune from this violence. All *Al Qaeda* has done through its so-called terrorism is to bring the violence of the global system back home to the global North, to form a complete circle of violence, to have the snake's head bite its own tail.

Female heads of government and other institutions of social control, spend billions of Euros to combat gender violence, legislation and policy *have not* and *will not* fundamentally alter this dominator system. The only way society will be transformed to equity, justice and nonviolence will be through fundamental shifts in consciousness, undoing the violences of over 5,000 years, of combining modern technology with the ancient pre-patriarchal systems of egalitarianism[14] and cooperation, fluidity and tolerance.

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[14] *Cf* Graham Kemp and Douglas Fry's edited volume, *Keeping the Peace* [2004], for examples of ancient and modern societies that routinely employ nonviolent conflict resolution to 'keep the peace'.

The Legacy of Colonialism

It took centuries of brutal oppression, and often violent opposition, for European countries to relinquish control over their colonial territories. And over fifty years of legal apartheid for white supremacists to relinquish control of Namibia and South Africa. Like the apartheid rulers, those in power will not relinquish their power unless they believe they have no choice. In this same way man, who by the nature of their constructed identities, benefit structurally from the dominator system, will not relinquish power without significant struggle. Unless it is repeatedly shown how this same system of domination brutalises men individually and collectively, as masculinities studies shows. In addition, the costs of maintaining the violences of patriarchy are clearly shown to outweigh its benefits. For the past forty years, feminist economists have shown the deleterious economic effects of GBV on the world. Even sexual harassment in the workplace has the victim/survivor lose valuable productivity time[15] in the midst of the trauma, while the perpetrator loses productivity through not focusing on his work, and often repeats the harassing behaviour wherever he is employed. The WHO's 2004 report, *The Economic Dimensions of Interpersonal Violence*, attests:

> Interpersonal violence is expensive. For instance, estimates of the cost of violence in the United States of America reach 3.3% of the gross domestic product. In England and Wales, the total costs from violence – including homicide, wounding and sexual assault– amount to an estimated $40.2 billion annually 1. Evidence abounds that the public sector–and thus society in general – bears much of the economic burden of interpersonal violence. Workplace violence in Australia resulted in costs to employers of $5 582 per victim and $837 million annually in damage to the Australian economy... Internationally, a report commissioned by the ILO on the costs of violence and stress in work environments estimated that losses from stress and violence at work represented from 1.0% to 3.5% of the gross domestic product over a range of countries. [2004: XVII, XVIII, 79 or pages 11, 12, 36 of downloaded pdf]

In similar ways, that apartheid brutalised *all* South Africans, irrespective of skin colour, so too the unequal global economic system brutalises the global South. The new South African government feels compelled to implement structural adjustment programmes that see its poorest people suffer more economically than under apartheid. With so-called "stable macroeconomic fundamentals", and a mandate for the ruling African National Con-

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15 E.g., WHO's The Economic Dimensions of Interpersonal Violence, 2004

gress from more than two thirds of the population, the South African government now promises aggressive development beyond its black economic empowerment programme that enriches only a small black elite that almost twenty years after liberation owns a mere 1% of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Whites, who structurally benefited under apartheid, still control 99% of the wealth in South Africa, almost two decades later.

A fitting example of white elite resistance to sharing wealth more equitably, let alone legally, is the diamond company. De Beers, who before the first ever general election in South Africa in April 1994, and with the approval of the apartheid-era South African Diamond Board, shipped tonnes of unpolished diamonds out of the country, thus avoiding payment of 15% export duty to the new democratic government[16]. Thus, both the government and the country's citizens were robbed of billions of euros that they could have spent on development and combating poverty.

The gender ratio of wealth ownership, and resistance to transformation, should be equally obvious. Naledi Pandor, South Africa's former Minister of Science and Technology, quantifies gender inequality in the country:

> Of the 364 listed companies and state-owned enterprises in South Africa, only seven have women CEOs, and three out of every five have men-only boards. Although women account for 41% of South Africa's workforce, only 15% of executive managers and just 7% of all directors are women… We have… only one woman vice-chancellor [head] in our 22 universities. [*Mail & Guardian,* September 2 to 8, 2005, page 20, edited version of address at the "Women Creating Wealth Conference," on 11 August]

These real constraints face new democracies of the global South, like Brazil and South Africa, fairly equally, how to remain part of structurally unequal economic global relations, as a matter of survival, a system that requires significant cutbacks in social spending, while simultaneously caring for its citizens. Only the global North can significantly alter the violences that structural economic programmes wreak on real people, only developed countries can fundamentally alter unequal trade through e.g. the WTO. To name but one example, even if all of Africa unites, and a pan-African government takes control of all indigenous natural resources, like diamonds, it still needs a market to sell the diamonds to, to turn raw materials into commodities. Diamonds without markets are worthless rocks in a capitalist consumer society. Diamonds without value and desire is precisely why De Beers

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[16] E.g. Nic Dawes, 2005

has had a stranglehold on marketing diamonds, more latterly to India and mainland China, and also controlling the value of diamonds by releasing limited quantities onto world markets. Networks and collaborative programmes of developing countries, such as the African Union and NEPAD, will take a very long time to become globally effective, and to shift fundamentally unequal global power relations.

The world's hero, Nelson Mandela, shared a Nobel Peace Prize with FW de Klerk, who is directly and personally responsible for several recorded instances of genocide in South Africa. Democracy in South Africa required both an oppressive government, and a broad liberation movement, *simultaneously* willing to negotiate sharing power. Without the active cooperation of each party to end centuries of brutal oppression and genocide, our relatively peaceful transition would never have been possible.

Overcoming hatred and violence

Hatred, revenge, fear and insecurity, will only benefit 1% of the world's population who own the world's wealth. Peace, growth, and development all require trust and forgiveness, of self and others, even in the absence of perpetrator/s and/or full disclosure of atrocities.

Structural violence mirrors personal or direct violence, so that rape survivors cannot reclaim their lives without forgiving perpetrators they may never encounter again, perpetrators who have long forgotten the individuals they so routinely brutalised in seemingly endless spirals of violence. So too blaming the South African government for our people's poverty will not achieve as much as actively and constructively engaging with government to transform our society. Even the corporate sector, through investment in development, are contributing to transformation, with Vodacom, a leading mobile phone network, supporting the establishment of holistic rape care centres throughout the country, and its competitor, MTN, contributing significantly to our government's 16 Days Campaign to End Violence Against Women and Children. The same principles apply to global relations, and transforming global relations, for the benefit of the entire world's people.

The South African state cannot govern without taking into account the welfare of its people. So too the global North cannot survive while the majority of the world's populations live in abject poverty. The sellers *and* buyers of armaments, supported by their respective governments, should take equal responsibility for funds that should more productively be spent on development and genuine human security, especially during transition from active conflicts.

Governments, like South Africa, who borrow from the World Bank and buy Presidential jets and billions of Euros of armaments from European com-

panies that bribe senior government employees, are as accountable as the G8. People who wake every day and go to work and pay their bills are as accountable, through their silences, as those who physically perpetrate violence. We are all, each, responsible for our world, for development, justice and peace. And as the majority of South Africans, of all skin colours, under apartheid, who *chose* to not join the liberation movement, now benefit from our new democracy, so too all the world's population benefits from peace and justice. In our modern world, ignorance and innocence have become obsolete words.

Acknowledging Diversity
Throughout interviews in a recent anthology, Audre Lorde speaks of the need for recognition of diversities, while forging a united front against oppressions:

> we cannot separate the struggles for liberation because it is, eventually, all human liberation. Moreover, until we come into that concept, until we broaden our viewpoints so that liberation does not remain the private province of any one particular group, until we do that, we are going to be working against each other, and working against ourselves. [Kaminsky, 2004: 4-5]

Bernice Johnson Reagon affirms the strategic, even if most challenging, need for unity:

> at a certain stage nationalism [more homogenous groups] is crucial to a people if you are going to ever impact as a group in your own interest. Nationalism at another point becomes reactionary because it is totally inadequate for surviving in the world with many peoples… You do not coalition building in a womb… as Che Guevara said shortly before he died, the great revolutions are those revolutions guided by the basic principles of love. [2000: 345, 355].

North-South cooperation requires a new consciousness, a new honesty that has us first scrutinise ourselves, our own governments, and our own trading and other practices. Peggy Antrobus speaks of a counter-cultural approach that would validate alternative sources of power, and of her notion of "personal transformation," rooted in agency:

> The kind of personal change that I envisage is one that would challenge leadership to recognize shortcomings and contradictions within oneself, to be consistent, ethical and honest about one's own limitations while experiencing one's own inner power. Above all, this kind of personal transformation would prevent us from thinking ourselves superior to others and trying to control or dominate

others, but would rather help us to take responsibility for our actions and ourselves. [2004: 132, 172–175].

Conclusions: Eradicating poverty, building peace

As South Africa can never be secure until poverty is redressed, so too 9/11, the Barcelona train massacre, the London transport bombings, and other terrorist attacks show that the global North will never be secure until developing regions have secure, equitable democracies. Desmond Tutu asserts that for him, the African principle of *ubuntu*

> speaks of the very essence of being human… you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and compassionate. You share what you have. It is to say 'My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.' We belong in a bundle of life. We say: 'A person is a person through other persons'. It is not 'I think therefore I am'. It says rather: 'I am human because I belong. I participate. I share.' [1999:31]

Every development Euro in Africa is an investment in the security of Europe. The Cold War-era investments in despots should be replaced with combating poverty, disease, and violence, especially against women and children. Our freedoms, our democracies, our security, are all inextricably linked. So-called terrorism shows our mutual human vulnerabilities, beyond our suits and other ethnic accoutrement, evinces our interdependence. In addition, begs us to work together as equal partners, north-south, men-women, for the freedom and security of our entire planet and all its diverse inhabitants.

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REYCHLER, Luc[1]:
> ### *Raison ou Déraison d'état*
> *– Coercive diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa*

Abstract

A first glance at today's world confirms the prevalence of raison d'état in international relations, and shows a higher level of raison in the defense and promotion of national interest. We are living in the least violent period in history. Despite all of this, the 'reason of the state' remains the focus of critique. The bad press relates to

- the challenges of f the reason of the state by other interests at lower and higher system levels,
- the cost-ineffectiveness of ways and means used to defend or promote national interest, and
- changes in the moral-political climate.

Most disturbing are the coercive diplomacy and military interventions of the West in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). These interventions may benefit particular interest groups, but overall they are foreign policy failures. Within the decline of Western influence in the MENA lie seeds of hope for healthier relations in the future.

Reason of the state and the state of reason

The concept 'raison d'état' has many meanings. In essence, however, it refers to the primordial duty of a government to use its hard and/or soft power[2] to defend and promote the vital (existential) interest of the nation-state in a cost-effective way and in tune with the international moral political climate. In today's world, practices like mercantilism, colonization or an unnecessary militarization of foreign policy have become unacceptable. The primary concern of the raison d'état is the state's survival and security. While defending or promoting vital interests, other values may be temporary devalued. Machiavelli, one of the fathers of the raison d'état, claims that 'a prince... cannot observe all the virtues for which men are reputed good, because it is often

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necessary to act against mercy, against faith, against humanity … in order to preserve a state'[3].

A first glance at today's world confirms the prevalence of raison d'état in international relations and shows a higher level of raison in the defense and promotion of national interests. The interest of the state or nation is still a key for shaping, making and legitimizing foreign policy. The raison d'état prevails over competing values. The war on terror, for example, was justified in the name of the protection of the American people and implemented at the expense of the economic development and the civil rights of the American people. The 'état de raison' has improved. Countries pursue their interests in a less violent way. Indicative are the statistics in the Canadian Human Security Report and recent book by Steven Pinker on the decline of violence in history and its causes. The 2005 Human Security Report reported a significant decline in the number of violent conflicts[4]. Steven Pinker, a Harvard professor of psychology, observes that the human race is losing its appetite for violence. He claims that the 21st century – the century of terrorism, genocide in Darfur, civil war in Somalia, etc. – is the least violent era in human history.

The advances are attributed to changes in human nature, especially enhanced self-control, empathy, morality and reason. The forces of civilization increasingly encourage the good in us to get the upper hand. Strong centralized governments, international trade and the empowerment of women all help to make us kinder, gentler human beings. Of great importance is what he calls 'the escalator of reason' or the tendency of people to reframe conflict as a problem to be solved through brain instead of brawn[5].

Critiques of the 'reason of the state'

The use of 'raison d'état' to justify questionable security or foreign policy decisions has prompted several critiques. The critiques relate to (a) the competition of the reason of the state with other interests at lower and higher system levels, (b) the cost-ineffectiveness of some of the ways and means of defending and promoting the national interest, and (c) changes in the power relations and the moral-political climate.

Competing interests (reasons)

Particular interests

The foreign policy-making process is the least democratic sector of decision-making. The lack of transparency of the security and foreign policy-making

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[3] Nicolo Machiavelli, *The Prince.*

[4] http://humansecuritygateway.com

[5] Robin Marantz Henig, 'Why is this guy smiling?' Book review of Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and its Causes,* Allen Lane, 2011

process in most countries of the West eases the disproportional influence of particular groups and this at the expense of national interests (the interest of the citizens). The military industrial complex, the oil business, the financial intellectual complex[6], religious organizations and foreign lobbies shape American policy towards the Middle East and North Africa. The lobbyists subvert the rule of law for the sake of the special interest they represent[7]. The recent resignation of Liam Fox, the minister of defense of the UK, resulted from the exposure of his links to his friend Wirrity (a lobbyist claiming to be an advisor) and a raft of businessmen, lobbyists and US neocons[8]. The distinction between personal, particular interests and governmental activities became blurred[9]. Let us listen to some critical voices.

— The electoral process is controlled by money. The 400 richest Americans control more wealth than half of the US population[10] does. Paul Krugman, worries about the existence of an American style oligarchy. 'With American wealth increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few people, democracy is under threat '.[11]

— Conformity pressure and taboos: After 9/11, the conformity pressure with respect to the policy in the Middle East increased significantly. Taboos and political correctness curtailed the freedom of opinion. The American House of Representatives voted 407 to 6 to call on the Obama administration to use its diplomatic capital to try to block the Palestinian initiative to seek statehood at the United Nations, while threatening to cut the 'Palestinians' funding if they proceeded to seek statehood. Similarly, when Israel stormed into Gaza in 2008 to halt rocket attacks, more than 1,300 Palestinians were killed, along with 13 Israelis. As Palestinian blood flowed, the House, by a vote of 390 to 5, hailed the invasion as 'Israel's right to defend itself.'[12]

— Disproportional impact of lobbies Jeremy Ben Ami, in a recently published book' A new voice for Israel' calls for reasonableness in the Middle East. He is aghast at the way the United States is enables hard-line Israeli politics that make peace less likely. He studied the

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[6] Pankaj Mishra. A dead end looms for our young, in *The Guardian Weekly* (02.09.201), p.21. The mantra of economic growth has justified government intervention on behalf of big business.

[7] Niall Ferguson. America's 'Oh sh*t' moment 'in Newsweek, November 7, p. 41

[8] 'Minister's resignation exposes Tory links to American right', *The Guardian Weekly* (21.10.11), p. 14

[9] Peter Preston. Contradictions of freedom. Review of Haether Brooke's book 'The Revolution will be digitized. Heineman, in The guardian Weekly (14.10.11), p.39

[10] Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson. Interview with Michael Moore 'A good 50m Americans are nuts', in Financial Times, September 17-18 2011, p.3 (Life and arts)

[11] Paul Krugman. Oligargy, American style, in International Herald tribune (5-6.11.11), p. 7

[12] Nicolas Kristof. Balance on the Middle East. in International Herald Tribune, Friday, August 5,2011, p.7.

impact of major Jewish organizations, like the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), that embraces hawkish positions because the Jews that donate and vote are disproportionately conservative. The same is true, he writes, of Christians who are most passionate about Israeli issues. He concludes that the 'the loudest' eight percent' have hijacked Jewish groups to press for policies that represent neither the Jewish mainstream nor the best interests of Israel.[13]

— Missing data. Data that are vital to evaluate foreign and security policies are very difficult to get.[14] This impedes the development of an informed and enlightened public opinion. Which interests groups shape the foreign and security policy in the Middle East? How do they influence the decision making? How many people have been killed in the liberation of Libya? How many Iraqis or Afghanis? It is easier to find data of first class victims than of 2d and 3d class victims. First class victims receive detailed and personalized attention (Galit); the information of second-class victims is less accurate and personalized (Palestinian prisoners); third class victims are faceless inaccurate statistics (civilians killed or seriously wounded in Libya or Afghanistan). What were the alternative policy options and their respective costs and benefits? How many member countries of the Arab League abstained, voted against, or were in favor of the Security Council 'No fly zone 'resolution of March 17.

Human-centric interest (human security)

The inclusion of human security came into currency in security studies in the mid-1990s and served useful purposes[15]:

- it shows that the state-centric approach does not adequately address the security of the citizens within the state;
- it pays attention to the broad definition of violence[16] that looks at several factors which can reduce the life-expectancies of the people[17];

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[13] Nicolas Kristof, op cit.

[14] Marco Mancassola. 'Wikileaks', in Courrier international (21-27.07.2011), p.42

[15] Pauline Kerr, 'Human security', in *Contemporary Security Studies*, edited by Alan Collins, Oxford University Press, 2007, p.91-108.

[16] The narrow definition of violence pays attention only to the number of people killed or wounded as consequence of armed violence; the broad definition operationalizes violence as the reduction of the life expectancy of people resulting from the use of: armed violence, structural violence, psychological violence, cultural violence, ecological violence and bad governance.

[17] The life average expectancies of a people can be lowered by the use of physical violence, structural violence, psychological violence, ecological violence, cultural violence, bad governance and corruption.

- it reminds policy-makers that the concept of security should encompass properly functioning states. States with low levels of human security may appear stable, but tend to be instable and vulnerable. For example, think of the implosion of the Warsaw Pact countries or the Arab spring revolutions in the MENA.

The interests of the United Nations.
Although the United Nations is still a relatively powerless organization and dominated by the West, it continues to reflect the aspiration and the need for more effective global governance. The globalization and the increasing interdependency, sensitivity and vulnerability of countries require more good governance at the global level. The demand for more effective and legitimate governance at the global level has been jolted by the negative impact of human behavior on our natural environment (climate, natural resources, etc.).' It cannot be denied that even the most ethically acceptable notion of foreign policy, involving privileging the interests of the people of the state in question, may be regarded as illegitimate from a global perspective.'[18]

Raison planetaire or the planetary interests [19], [20].
In his book "The planetary interest" Kennedy Graham suggests that contemporary political and institutional arrangements for problem-solving, based on sovereignty as a principle and the nation-state as a decision-making unit, are not equipped to handle planetary problems; he argues that, henceforth, the planet and humanity must be considered as a single-entity for decision making purposes. He introduces and develops the idea of the planetary interest as a vital conceptual tool to assist citizens and policy-makers in understanding emerging global problems and approaching them with global solutions. The book includes contributions from current or former politicians, who discuss the particular global problems threatening their countries, looking at the ways in which the planetary interest can help them pursue a legitimate national interest.

The demand of cost-effective security, failures and limits of military power
- *The demand of cost-effective security policies:* The confluence of the many crises that confront the international community (financial, ecological, the marginalization of the majority, the weaponisation, the increasing number of weak and failing countries, the competition for natural resources and energy, etc) demands more cost-effective and sustainable ways of resolving conflicts. War is inhuman; moreover, it is

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[18] Chris Brown. Practical judgment in international relations political theory, Routledge, 2010 p. 220
[19] Raison de planète': term coined by Jacques Haers, University of Leuven, Belgium.
[20] Graham Kennedy. The planetary interest: a new concept for the global age, UCL Press, 1999

one of the least effective ways to handle these crises. They are very good at killing and destroying; and they predominantly benefit the conflict entrepreneurs. The world will never been able to deal with the climate, when it does not succeed to improve the human climate. This means resolving conflicts constructively and building sustainable peace. Strategic history describes many formulas for defending and promoting the interests of states or groups of states: the establishment of an empire, unipolarity, bilateral- and multilateral balances of power, collective defense, collective security and security community. After the Second World War, European countries transformed one of the most violent regions in the world into a security community, characterized by defense and economic cooperation and a high level of objective and subjective security. A security community is a cost effective and durable system for assuring security within the European region[21].

- *Foreign policy failures, follies and collapses:* Several scholars are drawing our attention to foreign policy failures, follies and disastrous decisions. The research is associated with names, such as[22] Barbara Tuchman, Jared Diamond, Robert Jervis and John Stoessinger. Recent examples of foreign policy failures are the armed interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq; the aims were not achieved and the operations turned out to be very expensive. Some foreign policy failures have been called follies or policies pursued contrary to the self-interest of the constituency or state involved. To qualify as a folly, the policy adapted must have been perceived as counter-productive in its own time given a feasible alternative course of action available. Folly is universal and unrelated to the type of regime: democratic or undemocratic. The militarization of Western foreign policy in the Middle East, the deregulation of the financial markets, and the inadequate policies vis-à-vis environmental crises are (come close to being called) follies. Barbara Tuchman warns us that 'Social systems can survive a great deal of folly when the circumstances are historically favorable, or when bungling is cushioned by large resources … Today, when there are no more cushions, folly is less affordable'[23].

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[21] Karl Deutsch coined the term 'security community'. See also T.R. Reid, *The United States of Europe*, Penguin Books, 2004

[22] Barbara Tuchman, *The March of Folly. From Troy to Vietnam*, Sphere Books, 1985 p.21; Jared Diamond, *Collapse. How societies choose to fail or succeed*, Viking, 2005; Richard Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 1976, Princeton University; John G. Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War*, 9th ed., Wadsworth Thompson Learning, 2005; Irving Janis. *Victims of Groupthink*, Houghton Mifflin 1972

[23] Barbara Tuchman. *The March of Folly. From Troy to Vietnam*. Sphere Books, 1985, p. 21

- *The limits of armed violence and coercive diplomacy:* Coercive diplomacy seeks to resolve crises and armed conflicts short of full-scale war. 'It is a reactive strategy relying on threats, limited force and inducements to influence an adversary to stop or undo the consequences of actions already undertaken'.[24] Full-scale war, brute force (Shock and Awe) is an influence strategy that deprives the adversary of any choice by forcing compliance upon it. It has become evident in the MENA, that brute force and coercive diplomacy are not the most effective venues to resolve conflicts, change regimes or impose democracy. In addition, the assumptions that deficits do not matter and one does not have to choose between 'guns and butter' have been proven false. America and the most assertive European countries (the UK and France) lack the resources –economic, political and military – to support large scale, protracted conflict without, at the very least, inflicting severe economic and political damage upon themselves[25]. The 'guns versus butter' rule is back. Weaponized Keynesian economics must be rejected, except in those cases where it is being used to defend lucrative contracts. [26] Finally, wars have become less useful to divert the attention of the people from political-economic problems and rally people around the flag. The current economic situation (growth pessimism and unemployment) in the West is creating uncertainty, dissatisfaction and tension[27]. In October 2011, a poll by the National journal either found that 59% fully or strongly agreed with the aims of the Occupy Wall street (OWS) movement. [28] OWS or the 99% mainly protests social and economic inequality, corporate greed, corruption, and influence over the government – particularly from the financial sector – and lobbyists. [29] In America 17.1% of those below the age of 25 are out of work. In Europe, youth unemployment averages 20,9%. Britain's youth unemployment is over 20%.[30] In Spain, it is a staggering 46,2%.[31] The International Labor Organization (ILO) warned that a jobs crisis in the world caused by the

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[24] Peter Viggo Jakobsen. Coercive diplomacy, in Alan Collins. Contemporary security studies, Oxford Univesrity Press, 2007, pp. 225-247

[25] Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Limits of Power: The End to American Exceptionalism*, Metropolitan Books, 2008, p. 11.

[26] Paul Krugman. Bombs, bridges and jobs, in *International Herald Tribune* (01.11.11), p. 7

[27] Stanley Pignal. Growth pessimism triggers warning of recession, in *Financial Times* (11.11.11), p. 4

[28] Edward Luce. Why America is embracing protest, Financial Times (31.10.11), p. 9

[29] Occupy Wall Street (OWS) in *Wikipedia*.org/wiki/Occupy_Wall_Street (08.11.11)

[30] Richard Senneth and Saskia Sassen. Britain's broken windows, in IHT (12.08.11), p. 6

[31] Rage against the machine, in *The Economist* (22.10.11), p. 13

global economy slowdown threatens a wave of wide spread social unrest engulfing both rich and poor countries.[32]

Changes of the moral-political climate

International stability depends not only on balancing power, but also of the legitimacy of the internal and foreign policy behavior of nation-states and of the international system.

- *Non-interference vs. responsibility to protect:* In 1996 Francis Deng argued in a book 'Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa', that when nations do not conduct their internal affairs in ways that meet international standards, other nations not only have a passive right, but an active duty to do so[33]. The most important normative principle of international law, established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, non-interference in another's internal affairs was turned upside down. In effect, Deng replaced the long-standing definition of sovereignty as 'supreme authority within a territory' with a new definition sovereignty as responsibility to protect people in a given territory. The adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle by world leaders assembled at the UN in 2005 is presented as one of the great normative advances in international politics since 1945[34]. The latest application of the R2P principle is the intervention in the Libyan civil war or 'the escalation of an internal conflict protect Libyan people'. R2P is a doctrine born of good intentions, but there are some drawbacks
  — it leads to fables of righteousness and evil,
  — war involves a descent into barbarism,
  — the aim can be distorted, as it was by NATO, and
  — R2P its only applicable to relative powerless countries. We need to answer tough questions. Was the international community confronted with a large scale, actual or expected loss of life or ethnic cleansing? Did the intervention respect the precautionary principles of:
    (a) right intention (exclusively humanitarian),
    (b) last resort and
    (c) proportional means, and reasonable prospects of success?[35]

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[32] Larry Elliott. Jobs crisis threatens global wave of unrest, warns ILO, in *The Guardian Weekly* (04.11.11), p. 16

[33] Frances Deng et al. Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, The Brookings Institution, 1996. Amitai Etzioni, New Common Ground: A New America A New World, Potomac Books, 2009

[34] Ramesh Thakur. The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use of Force in International Politics, Routledge, 2011

[35] David Rieff. R2P, RIP. In International Herald Tribune (08.11.11), p. 6

> It's too early to consider this a successful case of R2P. There are missing data, such as the 'hypothetical number of life's saved', the number of people killed in the process and the destruction caused by bombardments of NATO and the rebels.

- *Representative global international governmental organizations (GIGO's).* There are also growing demands for more representative global IGO's. These demands are furthered by
  - (a) the changing power relations, as reflected by the BRIC countries, and
  - (b) the cognitive dissonance between the promotion of democracy at the national level and the resistance of democratic changes at the international level by the West.
- *Violence prevention and sustainable peace building:* After the Cold War, international governmental organizations, Departments of Foreign Affairs, and non-governmental organizations started to pay more attention to the prevention of violence and peace building.[36] Despite the aspirations and the commitment to make the world more peaceful, most of efforts boiled down to crisis management and to reactive instead of proactive violence prevention.

Coercive diplomacy and armed intervention in the MENA

The rosy picture of a more peaceful world suggested by the statistics of the Human Security Report of 2005 and Steven Pinker is contradicted by

- (a) a 25% increase of the number of armed conflicts from 2003 and 2008 after declining for more than 10 years,
- (b) an increase in military expenditures during the last ten years – democratic countries account for more 70% of the global military budget [37] – and
- (c) the military interventions and use of coercive diplomacy by the West [38].

In the 21st century, the West threatened, militarily intervened in and sanctioned nine countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Libya, Pakistan, Yemen, Syria and Iran. In this paper the West refers mainly to the US; its closest allies (Israel and the UK) and the members of the respective coalitions of the willing.

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[36] W. Bauwens and L.Reychler. The art of conflict prevention, Brassey's 1994

[37] SIPRI yearbook 2010

[38] During the last decade, the term 'the West' is used more frequently, especially with respect to the foreign policy in the MENA. The term refers the US, the most assertive NATO members (the UK, France) and Israel.

A two dimensional approach of relations in the MENA

The foreign policy of the West in the MENA is determined by two factors: the possession of oil and the compliance or deference to Western interests. Compliance implies an assured flow of oil at reasonable prices, purchase of sophisticated weapons, engaging in anti-terrorism and not supporting so-called radical Palestinian parties. Consequentially, four types of countries can be distinguished.

	Oil-rich	**Oil-poor**
Compliant	Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar receive diplomatic and military support/ no interference in internal affairs/ no public critique of the repression of liberation movements.	Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan are rewarded (Egypt received annually 1.3 billion) / there was until the Arab spring not much internal interference or critique of the repression of opposition or democratic movements. Egypt and Tunisia are the only countries with relatively peaceful revolutions.
Uncompliant	Iraq, Iran, Libya are the object of increasing coercive diplomacy including economic sanctions, boycotts, military threats and/or interventions. The regimes are relegated to the axis of evil and treated as rogue states.	Syria, Lebanon (especially Hezbollah)[39], Palestine (especially Gaza) and Afghanistan are the object of military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and/or occupation.

Figure 1: Drivers of Western foreign policy toward states in the MENA

- *Oil rich and compliant countries:* Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain are protected and receive diplomatic support; there is no interference in internal affairs; there is no pressure for democratization and the repression of liberation movements is not publicly pilloried. Most of these countries house American military bases. They also are buying great amounts of weapons and military services from the West. The protests of (discriminated) Shiites in Bahrain were brutally repressed. For the past three decades, the Saudi monarchy has viewed Iran as its nemesis. Saudis have relied on the US, Arab nationalism and Sunni identity to weaken slow Iran's power.[40] They are especially concerned about the realization of the 'Shiite crescent' stretching from Lebanon to Manama that King Abdullah of Jordan once warned against[41]. Qatar, a small country

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[39] The interventions of 2006 and before

[40] Vali Nasr. When the Arab Spring turns ugly, in IHT (27-28.08.11) p. 6

[41] The West should not encourage a sectarian showdown, but support a redistribution of power among Sunnis, Shiites and Christians. The Shiites are not getting a fair share in the current power structure.

with 300.000 Qataris and 1 million foreign workers with Doha as capital city, has become a key player in the Middle East. It played a significant role in driving the Arab League vote on Libya and Syria. The Arab League is now dominated by the richest countries in the Arab world [42]. It is easier for the West to manipulate.

- *Oil deprived and compliant countries:* Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan are rewarded for their compliance (Egypt received annually 1,3 billion dollars) and the interference in internal affairs was minimal. Egypt and Tunisia are the only countries with relatively peaceful regime changes (revolutions). From these experiences, the West could learn that regime changes can be achieved in less violent, less destructive way and more humane and cost-effective ways. In both countries, elections have been held. In both countries the revolutionary spirit lives, but resonates less. In Egypt, there is a widespread gloom that the country is stagnating, its economy heading toward a cliff, while the caretaker government refuses or fails to act. [43] Some 40% of the population live on less than 2$ a day and among the country's unemployed as many as 90% are young and two thirds never worked.[44] "It's a surreal situation. People … were so proud after the revolution. Now the revolution is starting to get a bad name because the situation is getting worse."[45] The economic support from the West is inadequate. Jordan's pro-democracy protest provides a test of the ability of the kingdom to reform a divided and resource-starved country. Jordan is dependent on the generosity of governments in the US, Europe and the Gulf. Money will continue to flow, as long as the country fulfils its goal of joining the Gulf Cooperation Council, a Saudi-led group of oil-rich nations.[46] Everything in the resource-starved countries revolves around youth unemployment, the price of food and the bad economic climate. The pruning of the public sector will hit many parts of the society hard.
- *Oil rich and incompliant countries:* Iraq, Iran and Libya have been the object of coercive diplomacy, including the implementation of sanctions and the use or threat of armed violence. The regimes were relegated to the axis of evil and depicted as rogue states. Their leaders were staged as enemies of civilization, which gave the West an excuse for interven-

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[42] Bigger sphere of influence for tiny Qatar, in IHT (15.11.11) pp 1 and 5, Et le vainqueur pour 2022 est…le Qatar, in Courrier international (13-19.10.11, p. 13-17
[43] Heba Afify. Egyptians' hopes turn feeble, in IHT (03.11.11), p.8
[44] Guy Dinmore. Fear of a 'clash of civilizations appears to be overdone, in Financial Times (09.09.11), p.2
[45] Roula Khalaf.Egypt's unfinished revolution. In Financial times (29.10.11), p. 19
[46] Tobias Buck. Rifts in the valley. In Financial Times (16.08.11), p.7

ing in the region. Kaddafi, the head of a third rate military country, was an ideal scapegoat.

— Iraq. During the last 30 years, Iraq has suffered from political repression, wars and/or sanctions. The far more innocent men, women and children have died in Iraq over the past decades as result of UN sanctions and the unwillingness of the Iraqi regime to cooperate with the UN than died in the course of the war that led to these sanctions.[47] The Iraq sanctions were collective and included a near total financial and trade embargo. They began August 6, 1990, four days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, stayed largely in force until May 2003 (after Saddam Hussein's being forced from power), and certain portions including reparations to Kuwait persisting later. Richard Garfield, a Columbia University nursing professor cited the figures 345,000-530,000 for the entire 1990-2002 period for sanctions-related excess deaths. [48] Conservative estimates count in Iraq from 2003-2011, approximately 135.000 dead, 140.000 wounded, 1.700.000 internally displaced and 1.8000.000 refugees.

— Libya. The intervention in Libya turned the international attention away from the failing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Gaza and Pakistan, and it was presented as a humanitarian mission. In fact, the military coalition of the willing escalated an internal war in order to install a more compliant government with democratic demeanor and privileged access to oil contracts. The war ended with a wounded and brutally sodomised body of the Kadhafi. Missing are the number of people wounded and killed and the destruction. The transition is expected to be difficult because of the proliferation of weapons in the country; the political contradictions between the rebels within the transitional government and the conflicting interests of foreign powers still busy in Libya. Weak and failed states are easier to penetrate; outside powers have democratic proxies and interfere in national affairs at will. The Economist worries about the impact of other players like the Gulf States.[49]

— Iran. In 1979, Iran saw the first peaceful regime change in the Middle East. Since than the country has been the recipient of an increasing number of sanctions (economic, military, diplomatic); it has been stigmatized as a rogue state belonging to the axis of evil; it's surrounded by US military basis and forces, and frequently has been threatened with military strikes. Recently there has been a demand

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[47] Chris Brown. Practical judgment in international political theory. Routledge. 2010, p. 223
[48] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_sanctions#Estimates_of_deaths_due_to_sanctions
[49] Libya and its friends: All too friendly, in The Economist (12.11.11), p. 50

for stronger 'crippling 'sanctions (embargo the oil exports; seize Iranian assets in the US; blacklist Iran's central bank; make contact with Iranian officials illegal, etc), and for the bombing of its nuclear installations. The country has not forgotten the CIA coup that ousted Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953; America's green light to Saddam Hussein's war against Iran in 1980, which caused 1 million casualties. Iran is an authoritarian capitalist country with a human rights record that does not differ from America's authoritarian friends. Is has not fought offensive wars during the last three hundred years. It is the last oil-rich country that is not planning to comply with the demands of the West in the region. It is blamed for its support to Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Libya; to have the intention to destroy Israel, and to build nuclear weapons. The first claim is true. The second is a distortion of what was meant by the destruction of Zionism. Ahmadi-Nejad clarified in an interview that this did not imply the physical destruction of the state Israel; he compared it with the end of apartheid in South Africa and communism in Eastern Europe. Concerning the nuclear issue, the latest IAEA report warns that Iran appears to be on a structured path to building a nuclear weapon. This would be a setback for 'the West', because it would be more difficult to constrain the only remaining incompliant country. Analysts talking about a "ticking bomb" are not very serious. The main motivation of countries to acquire nuclear weapons is deterrence; to prevent hostile action by another state. The military policies of the West in the Middle East are creating a serious insecurity dilemma and they steepen the feelings of insecurity of Iran. Efforts for acquiring can be expected from isolated and insecure countries, like Israel or Pakistan. The depiction of Iran as a devilish country is exaggerated. It is a pretext for pursuing a policy that facilitates arms trade; the deployment of a mix of increasingly sophisticated sea-and land-based missile interceptors around Europe and the friends in the Middle East; further militarization and control of the region, and containing and constraining Iran. This policy will not lead to sustainable security, but promises a more dangerous world. [50]

- *Oil deprived and incompliant countries:* Syria, Lebanon and Palestine were frequently the object of military aggression and coercive diplomacy.
  — Palestine. The Palestinians have been longest victimized people in the region. The have been the object of irredentism, segregation,

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[50] Yousaf Butt. The delusion of missile defense, in IHT (21.11.11), p. 6

military repression and all kinds of sanctions. Israel, an ally of the At least, west could do what it wanted, until now. The country possesses the mightiest, most sophisticated and experienced army in the region; it guards the biggest open-air prison in the world; and it pursues a policy of irredentism and segregation on the West Bank and in Gaza. Each year America transfers 3 billion dollars of aid. Since 1980, it has received approximately 100 billion dollars. The 'peace negotiations' were an extension of the coercive diplomacy of Israel. Recently the Palestinians were seeking affirmation of statehood at the UN within the 1967 borders (22% of the historical Palestine). The vast majority of the UN members are ready to swing behind the claim to statehood. The pressure of the US and Israel blocked the recognition by the UN Security Council. In the UNESCO however, Palestine became a full member. 104 countries voted in favor (representing 77,6 percent of the world's population and 14 voted against (7.3%). [51] Consequently, the US decided to stop funding the UNESCO (80 million a year or 22% of its operating budget. The recognition of Palestine as a state is an important precondition for genuine peace negotiations; it is considered unnegotiable.

— Syria. The conflict is escalating and could turn into a violent civil war. The international community is divided, but it seems to abstain from military intervention as in Libya. The West asks Assad to step down and imposes punitive sanctions on Syria's oil sector. Russia insists that both the government and the armed rebels cease fire. Navi Pillay, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, was expected to call for Mr Assad to be referred to the International Court[52]. Some analysts voiced concerns that a crackdown on the Syrian oil sector could result in some kind of collective punishment experienced in Iraq, while countries such as Sweden generally dislike sanctions. The UK has been worried that the sanctions will weaken the regimes ability to provide for the 30 per cent of the Syrian people who relies on it for jobs, pensions and housing.[53] These punitive measures weaken both the regime and the state, and could turn it into an anocracy.

— Afghanistan. The story of Afghanistan is well documented. The tenth anniversary of the war and the reconstruction efforts are disappoint-

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[51] Kishore Mabubani. A letter to Netanyahu: time is no longer on Israel's side, in Financial Times (11.11.11), p. 9

[52] Anna Fifield. West unites in calls for Assad to step down as US imposes sanctions on Syria's oil sector, in Financial Times (19.08.11), p. 1

[53] Anna Fifield and Alex Barker. US sanctions need European allies 'backing to hurt Syria, in Financial Times (19.08.11), p. 4

ing. The war has passed Vietnam as the American military longest war. The situation is a stalemate; the security has deteriorated; the economy depends on foreign aid and most people remain in deep poverty. Between 14.000 and 18.000 civilians have died because of the fighting; there are 415.000 displaced people and 2.913.000 refugees (2011). [54]

Characteristics of the Western policy in the MENA

The Western policy vis-à-vis the Middle East and North Africa could be depicted as follows:

- The aim is to control the region to secure access to oil at reasonable prices and assure markets for military and other products.
- The control is achieved by (a) allying with Israel and compliant Arab countries, (b) increasing military presence, (c) turning incompliant states into weak ones and containing and constraining Iran.
- To achieve support for the interventions after 9/11, the US and its main allies (Israel and the UK) (a) exaggerates threats and manipulate fears; (b) insists that there is no time left for further deliberation and that immediate responses are necessary; (c) stresses that there are no alternatives to the use coercive diplomacy and armed intervention to deal with difficult Arabs;[55] (d) polarizes the world by dividing countries in two groups: those who are with us and those who are against us, (e) sells foreign involvement through appeals to human rights, values (f) highlights and embellishes the international support for the interventions, and (g) reminds their own citizens of the exceptionalism of their country. Especially, conservative American and Israeli politicians suffer from this political syndrome[56].

Assessing success and failure?

The success or failure could be assessed in two ways:

(1) by distilling and clustering the success and failure arguments from the discourse in the West, and intuitively estimate their weight

(2) assess the success/failure of the interventions more systematically on the basis of a set of objective criteria.

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[54] The limits of power. The Guardian weekly (14.10.11), p. 22. US had a simplistic view of Afghanistan, The Guardian Weekly (14.10.11) p.12. Afghanistan 10 jaar na de invasie: bedrogen door westerse beloften, in De Morgen (1.10.11), p. 15

[55] Hans Magnus Enzenberger. Giftige wolken boven Europa, in De Morgen (17.09.11), p. 18.TINA =there is no alternative.

[56] John H. Johns. Before we bomb Iran. IHT (16.11.11), p. 8

Success and failure discourses

A preliminary synthesis of opinions-arguments favoring or criticizing the policy of the West in the MENA looks as follows (see *Figure 2*). This is a difficult debate full of taboos and conformity pressure. A silent majority of people, however, disapproves the MENA policy.

	Successes/strengths	**Failures/weaknesses**
Security	Homeland security has improved International terrorism has diminished / Al Qaeda is weakened/ Bin Laden killed. Suicide terrorism stopped	The root causes (direct and indirect occupation) have not been addressed The security is unsustainable
Economy	Access to oil secured New reconstruction and investment projects Good for high tech arms trade (drones).	The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are very expensive (more than 3 trillion$)
Political	The Israeli government can continue its irredentist policy and delay genuine peace negotiations. We enabled the development of democracy.	The US and Israel have became garrison states. The irredentist- and segregation policy of Israel is counterproductive and has a very negative impact on the image of the West. The impact of Israel on the policy of the West in the MENA is disproportionally high and dangerous. Big powers should never allow smaller allies to shape their security policy. The situation is comparable with the role of weaker allies (e.g. Serbia) before the First World War.
Military	Military presence and control is assured The MENA was an ideal testing-training ground for new weaponry and doctrines	We have experienced the limits of military power. We have not seen the results. Destroyed and weakened states do not guarantee stability. Our policies have produce many negative impacts (insecurity dilemma, arm escalation, and humiliation)
Cost-effectiveness	We succeeded in developing low risk military interventions with light boot print s/ nobody was killed in Libya. Air warfare (missiles and drones...) reduced casualties considerably.	The wars caused an enormous amount of casualties and destruction in the target countries. The risk free interventions could lower the threshold for initiating wars. The opportunity costs are enormous. These interventions, and especially the Israel-Palestine conflict usurps too much diplomatic time that is urgently needed to deal with other challenges and opportunities in the world.

	Successes/strengths	*Failures/weaknesses*
Ethical	'Surgical strikes' reduce collateral damage We fought for democracy / human rights: the emancipation of women	The suffering of the people is very high (casualties/ internally displaced/refugees /destruction of houses and infrastructure/ reduction of life expectances.
Soft power	We have helped to spread free; people are thankful.	We have lost a lot of soft power in the region. The West has become a negative international role model in international relations and international law.

Figure 2: A preliminary summary of arguments depicting the MENA policy as a success or failure

Systematic assessment on the basis of objective criteria

A more systematic assessment of the reasonableness of the MENA policy can be made on the basis of seven objective criteria.

1. *Were the aims realized and the national interests enhanced?* At first sight most military operations may appear successes: Al Qaeda is weakened, Bin Laden murdered, suicide terrorism reduced, the Kaddafi regime toppled, etc. A second look, however, leads to less positive conclusions. The occupation and destructive interventions have fueled negative attitudes (hate) and the potential violence has not been eradicated. The difficult exit policy mirrors these problems. The latest Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projection calculates the possible war costs until 2021. Evaluating the achievement of the aims is difficult because some aims are made explicit; others are not made explicit and operate in the shadow of war. Most military interventions and coercive diplomacy seem to cater more to special interests than to the national interest of the intervening countries. They benefit the military industrial complex (MIC), think thanks and consultants, private security services, reconstruction business and foreign lobbies. It is difficult to end wars when influential groups are conflict profiteers.

2. *Were the interventions cost-effective?* There are human costs, economic costs, time cost and opportunity costs. Our own human costs have been drastically reduced by (a) better arms and intelligence, (b) the use of missiles and drones, and (c) the delegation of security work and fighting to private security forces and proxies.[57] Claims of cost-effectiveness have been seriously disputed on three grounds: (1) the price of the operations was higher than anticipated, (2) the duration of the wars was longer than

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[57] Jeffrey Gettleman et al. US proxy war in Somalia, in IHT (12.08.11) p.2.

expected, (3) the high opportunity costs opportunity, and (4) the availability of alternatives. The cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were higher than expected. In the latest Congressional Budget Office projection, the war costs for Iraq and Afghanistan from 2012-2021 could total another $496 billion. The total war costs would amount to $1,8 trillion, while Joseph Stiglitz estimates the true costs to be 3 trillion[58]. This is 20 times the yearly budget of the European Union. Most military interventions lasted longer than anticipated. The opportunity-costs were very high. A small part of the 3 trillion could facilitate the difficult transitions in Egypt and Tunisia. Some of that money could haven been used to develop proactive violence prevention and sustainable peace building. There were feasible and more cost-effective alternatives. The diplomatic demarches of Turkey and the African Union were sidetracked. Diplomacy has been given a secondary role in the Middle East and has been reduced to the coercive diplomacy. In contrast to the financial support given to defense and intelligence, the budget for diplomacy in the West is small. Intelligence and military operations are no substitute for the critical work of diplomats on the ground. Good diplomacy is essential for dealing with conflicts in a constructive way. America closed its embassy in Bagdad and severed diplomatic relations with Iraq in 1991. 'The 30 years freeze in diplomatic relations with Iran produced a US government that that knows precious little about a country that is integral to stabilizing American interest in non-proliferation, terrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq, energy security and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.' [59]

3. *Was the use of use of violence proportional and appreciated by the citizens of the target country?* Despite the technical and verbal efforts to reduce and hide the collateral violence, the wars have been highly destructive. They significantly reduced the human security of the citizens in the target countries. In contrast to the precise data on the casualties of the allied forces, the statistics of the dead, wounded, internally displaced, refugees and destruction of the target countries are unreliable. Putting together the conservative numbers of war dead in Afghanistan and Iraq, in uniform and out, the total is estimated at 236.000. The number can be multiplied by two or three to estimate the seriously wounded. Millions of people have been displaced indefinitely and they are living in inadequate conditions[60]. In the Lebanese war of 2006, large parts of the Lebanese ci-

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[58] Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War, The True Costs of the Iraq Conflict, Norton and Company, 2008.

[59] Reza Marashi. America's real Iran problem. IHT (11.11.11), p. 6

[60] http://costsofwar.org; http://www.unknownnews.org/casualties.html

vilian infrastructure were destroyed, including 400 miles (640 km) of roads, 73 bridges and 31 other targets such as Beirut's Rafic Hariri International Airport, ports, water and sewage treatment plants, electrical facilities, 25 fuel stations, 900 commercial structures, up to 350 schools and two hospitals, and 15,000 homes. Some 130,000 more homes were damaged[61]. In all of the conflicts (with the exception of Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories), it is very difficult to find reliable data on death and destruction. In a book on Iraq (*Cultural Cleansing in Iraq*), Raymond Baker, the editor, describes the willful inaction of the occupying forces, which led to the ravaging of one of the world's oldest recorded cultures. The authors documented the destruction of unprotected museums and libraries, the targeted assassination of over 400 academics and the forced flight of thousands of doctors, lawyers, artists and other intellectuals[62]. The suffering in target countries is not only caused by military interventions, but also by the imposition of sanctions (collective and/or targeted economic and financial as well as non-economic sanctions).[63] Comprehensive and collective economic and financial sanctions imposed by major players over a long period can have debilitating impacts. Five countries have been the object of very strong sanction regimes: Palestine (since 1967 and earlier), Iraq, Iran (since 1979), Libya, and Syria. Opinion polls show a low percentage of Arab respondents who express their either 'very' or 'somewhat' favorable feelings toward America and Israel, which have not improved. The relatively positive attitude towards the Obama's Middle East policy in 2009 dropped significantly a year later (2010)[64]. In April of 2011, the International Herald Tribune wrote that the use of drones in Pakistan and the killing of many innocents made people furious. This was reflected in an opinion poll about threat perceptions in Afghanistan: 7% identified the Taliban, 6.4% Al Qaeda, and 68% the US-led war on terrorism.[65]

4. *Have the chances of sustainable peace and security increased?* The verdict is negative, because (a) the root causes of the conflicts have not been addressed, and the (b) the unforeseen negative impacts and (c) the double effect doctrine. The 'war on terror' dealt with the symptoms of terrorism.

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[61] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Lebanon_War

[62] Raymond Baker (Ed), Cultural cleansing in Iraq: Why Musea are Looted, Libraries Burned and Academics Murdered, Pluto Press, 2010

[63] Jeremy Matam Farrall. United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of law. Cambridge Press; 2007, pp. 542

[64] http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2010/0805_arab_opinion_poll_ telhami/0805_ arabic_opinion_poll_telhami.pdf

[65] International Herald Tribune 1.4. 2011

It protected the homeland and identified and destroyed terrorists and terrorist networks, but denied the root causes (the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the external support of the authoritarian regimes and the installation of military bases on Arab soil). Deteriorating economic situation, food price inflation[66] and the high number of urbanized unemployed youth cause a great deal of the instability in the Middle East. The second reason for not achieving sustainable peace are the (anticipated or unanticipated) negative impacts on the conflict and peace dynamics of military intervention, collateral damage, coercive diplomacy, occupation, segregation, the support of friendly authoritarian regimes; and the exclusion of countries and communities from peace negotiations. The lack of concern about the negative side effects tends to be enhanced by the doctrine of double effects. The doctrine (or principle) of double effect is often invoked to make activities that cause a serious harm, such as collateral damage and destruction more permissible, because they are expected to bring good results. 'This reasoning is summarized with the claim that sometimes it is permissible to bring about a merely foreseen harmful event that it would be impermissible if done intentionally'. [67]

5. *Did the interventions have a high level of external legitimacy?* Overall, the international legitimacy of the military interventions and coercive diplomacy has been low. Approval by the Security Council is not a reliable indicator of international approval. It is more a reflection of power than of global public opinion. Ten members supported the UNSC resolution 1973 (demanding an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to the current attacks against civilians and imposing a no-fly zone and sanctions on the Qadhafi regime and its supporters). Five important countries (Brazil, Russian, India, China and Germany) abstained. Even among the nine states of the 22-member Arab league that voted in support of a no-fly zone (the rest were absent or voted against), discontent with the NATO stretching the UN resolution become visible. [68] When the aim of the Libya campaign shifted from protection of the people to toppling Kaddafi the international support dwindled. Russia and China vetoed a resolution condemning Syria. The Western policy in the MENA is also blamed for the use of double standards. Examples can be found in the Israeli -Palestinian conflict, the nuclear question, the imposition of democratization, the use of torture, the international criminal Court, and the war on terrorism. The US and the EU decided to consider the UN recognition of Palestine at the

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[66] James Mackintosh. Financial Times (12.11.2011), p. 16

[67] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/ Chris Brown. Practical judgment in International Political theory.   Routledge 2010, p. 232-234

[68] Jonathan Steele. Rebels must show restraint. The Guardian Weekly (26.08.11), p. 19

end of the only at the end of successful peace negotiations. This policy goes against one of the basic principles of peace negotiation (the recognition of all the primary parties). Instead, the US and the EU should assure the installation of the necessary preconditions for 'genuine' peace negotiations.[69] The depiction of Iran as potentially the greatest nuclear threat in the Middle East is another example of double standards. What about Pakistan and Israel or the nuclear powers arms spending spree? A report of the British American Security Council warns that the US will spend $700 billion on the nuclear weapons industry over the next decade, while Russia will spend at least 70bn on delivery systems alone. Other countries, including China, India, Israel, France and Pakistan, are expected to devote formidable sums to tactical and strategic missile systems. Several countries are assigning roles to nuclear weapons that go well beyond deterrence.[70] In addition, the democratization campaign is tainted by double standards. The attitude of the West towards democracy is positive, but it has some particularities: (a) only friendly democracies are welcome; democratically elected groups, such as the FIS in Algeria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine are ostracized and sanctioned; (b) it supports compliant authoritarian regimes; (c) it tolerates the segregation of the Palestinians and delays the recognition of an independent Palestinian State, and (d) firmly opposes the democratization of the international system and of the international governmental organizations, like the UN Security Council, the IMF and the Word bank.

6. *Were the ethical standards (of the civilized world) respected?* Several ethical principles were not respected. Questions have been raised about the right intention as well as the use of proportional violence, torture, the protection of innocent civilians, the consideration of alternative options, and the internal and external legitimacy. No comprehensive and comparative reports have been published on the ethics of the wars. However, three findings stand out: the *disproportionate killing and destruction of anti-terrorism,* the *high percentage of civilians killed* and maimed and the application of a principle of *'10 to 100 eyes for an eye'*. Most interventions are portrayed as anti-terrorism operations. Anti-terrorism is much more destructive and violent than political terrorism. It distinguishes itself by: (a) a higher number of innocent civilian casualties, (b) the predominance of collective sanctions, (c) disproportionate destruction, (d) the application of the 'ten eyes for an eye' principle, (e) the preference for operations with low risks for soldiers, such as bombardments with fighter

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[69] Luc Reychler. Time for peace, op cit.
[70] Richard Norton Taylor. The guardian Weekly (04.11.11), p. 11

planes, drones or missiles and the subcontracting security talks to private security firms, and (f) the relatively high security of the citizens of the intervening countries. During these wars people from the West could go on vacation and enjoy it's security fully. The culmination and duration of military intervention and/or coercive diplomacy has in some areas drastically reduced the human security and inhibited economic and political development. The Iraqis, the Afghanis and the Palestinian people have suffered most damage. In Iraq, Afghanistan, Gaza (2008) and Lebanon (2003) 92%, 61%, 79% and 61% (respectively) of the people killed were civilians. The ratio between the people of the intervening state killed and those of the target countries are: 1-28 Allied forces–Iraq, 1-7 Allied forces–Afghanistan, 1-109 Israel–Gaza; 1-11 Israel–Lebanon[71]; NATO – Lebanese 0-???. Ethical questions could also be raised with respect to selective humanitarianism (the different weight given to fellow citizens and the citizens of the target country) and the doctrine on the pre-emptive and preventive use of force.

7. *Did the interveners learn from previous interventions?* Yes, there was learning, but the learning curve flatter than steep. The military interventions and coercive diplomacy seem to obey Abraham Maslow's law of the hammer: 'It is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.'[72] There is the conviction that more bombing and military intervention can end the problem and deliver our peace. Albert Einstein is reported to have said that insanity consists of doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Not much has been learned about violence prevention and sustainable security or peace building. Most of the attention goes to crisis management and the development of low risk interventions (using drones, delegating land operations to armed rebels and subcontracting private security firms).

The end of pax occidentalis
The policy of the West in the MENA during the 21st century has been a history of failures. The coercive diplomacy and military interventions did not produce sustainable security and peace. Such a verdict should normally provoke changes towards policies that are more adapted to reality of the MENA. The exit policies in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya could be seen as indicators of such change. However, in each of these countries, the West keeps a military presence; Israel has no exit policy. The militarization of the region can be expected to last as long as powerful groups with strong lobbies benefit from

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[71] Luc Reychler,'s ongoing research about the statistics of the Ethics of War at the University of Leuven

[72] Abraham H. Maslow, *The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance*, Maurice Bassett, 1966, p.15.

it. These conflict profiteers are the military industrial complex, oil businesses, reconstruction firms, private security firms, favorable think tanks and media and foreign lobbies. One of the unexpected side effects of the wars is the liberation movements and the political revolutions. The liberation movements aspire not only to remove internal repression, but also the external occupation and interference in the region. In addition, the relatively non-violent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt show that endogenous non-violent struggles can be effective and much more cost-effective.

During the last ten years, the Pax Occidentalis[73] (the Western foreign and security paradigm) has been challenged and the limits of its logic are being exposed not only by the unsuccessful military interventions in the Middle East and North Africa, but by other seismic events as well. For example, the panic of the financial system(since the end of 2008), the problems related to the climate change, the nuclear accident of Fukushima (on 11 March 2011), and the wikileaks and its attack on Murdoch's media empire. The 'Operation unified protector' in Libya was a welcome distraction, turning international attention away from failures. Although declared a success, it is too early to draw such a conclusion. There are a lot of missing data and the killing of Kaddafi cannot be equated with a happy end.

Toward a more adaptive diplomacy

Within the decline of Western influence in the MENA, however lays seeds of hope for healthier relations in the future[74]. To improve these relations, more adaptive diplomatic thinking will be needed, with a higher level of sophisticated realism, transparency, accountability, proactive and long term planning, and reconciliation of competing interests at different system levels (human, sub-national, national, regional, global and planetary).

- *Sophisticated realism* aims at sustainable security and peace building. It differentiates countries in terms of interest and power relations, not in terms of medieval 'good and evil' categories. It knows the limits of coercive diplomacy and military intervention. It does not reward regimes that repress, colonize and segregate. Above all, it does not allow national or foreign lobbies with particular interests to determine its security strategy.
- *Transparency and accountability* is vital for the development of successful foreign and security policies. As mentioned earlier, the foreign policy process is the least democratically controlled activity in most countries

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[73] Luc Reychler,'Time for Peace: Europe's Responsibility to Build Sustainable Peace', Paper presented at the EUPRA conference, July 2011, Tampere (see http://www.diplomaticthinking.com)

[74] 'Crescent moon, waning West', *The Economist* (29.10.2011), p. 14

of the West. Internal and external interest groups whose particular interests do not always correspond with the national interest influence it. The least transparent activities are the covert actions of intelligence organizations and the secret forces. Illustrative is the American denial of the shooting of an Iranian passenger airplane above the Persian Gulf in 1988 or the covert actions to topple unfriendly regimes[75]. Transparency also implies the non-use of nontransparent language[76].

- *Proactive and long-term planning:* The factor time (the t-factor) is one of the most underestimated factors in conflict transformation.[77] Time is not always healing: proactive violence prevention can prevent escalation; many protracted conflicts are histories of missed opportunities; planning peace involves decisions about priorities, sequencing and synchronicity; there are last chances[78]. According to Thomas Friedman, Israel feels relatively secure after beating Arafat, Hezbollah and Hamas in three short wars. The brutality of these interventions has given Israel some time out. The international community will no longer accept another war with a large number of civilian victims. Therefore, the Israeli government must urgently adapt her policy and support the establishment of an independent and viable Palestine in 2011. The international community, including the Arab World, has offered the solution on a silver plate. In economics, time is money. In conflicts, it can make the difference between life and death, peace and war. This protracted conflict is lose-lose affair; it undermines the interest and legitimacy of the West in the region.

- *Reconciling competing interest or reasons at different system level:* In the end the building of sustainable security and peace requires genuine negotiations with all the key stakeholders in the region, including actors who have been stigmatized as terrorists, radicals or evildoers, such as Iran, the Taliban, Hezbollah and Hamas. The creation of sustainable security and peace requires an intensifying application of knowledge and rationality. The 'escalation of reason', as Pinker calls it, can force inimical actors to recognize the futility of violence and reframe it as a problem to be solved rather than a contest to be won[79]. Tomorrow, a rea-

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[75] Robert Fisk. 'Hoe Rupert Murdoch mij de deur uitwerkte', *De Morgen* (14.07.2011), p. 24

[76] Luc Reychler, 'Time for Peace', op. cit. p. 9

[77] Luc Reychler is writing a book 'Time for peace' on the role of time in conflict and peace processes.

[78] David Gardner, Last Chance: The Middle East in the Balance, I.B. Tauris 2009

[79] Clive Cookson, 'Peace process: despite appearances, the human race is losing its appetite for violence', review of Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and its Causes*, Allen Lane, 2011, *Financial Times* (8/9.10.2011), p.18.

sonable foreign will have to reconcile the interest of the nation, with the competing human-, regional, global and planetary interests.

A more adaptive and successful diplomacy is not only the responsibility of politicians and the diplomatic corps, but also of academics and research-ers. The latter can make a difference by (a) researching what's needed for sustainable peace building, (b) anticipating the positive and negative im-pacts, including costs and benefits of different policy options, and (c) helping to raise the accountability of decision-makers and -shapers for their policies.

Conclusion

The policy of America and her closest allies, after 9/11, turned the world into a wasteland of buried reason. That is how Shahrbanou Tadjbakhs de-scribes what was done to the Middle East. [80] I could not say it better. The policy of the West in the Middle East regressed from raison to déraison d'état? Reason was replaced by military muscle and coercive diplomacy. The war on terror inhibited progress? It gave the authoritarian states and Israel an excuse to keep people from achieving unalienable rights, like liberty and the pursuit of happiness. So much time, money and people have been wasted! While fighting wars, most Westerners could enjoy their safety and go on vacation. The West failed to see the connections between terrorism and its policy in the Middle East. It allowed the irredentist and repressive policy of Israel; supported regimes with poor human rights records and enlarged the Western military boot print in the region. Instead of resolving these problems, the war was framed as a clash of civilizations: Islam versus the Judeo-Christian world. Anti-terrorism became more destructive and deadly than terrorism. It claimed 'ten eyes for an eye '; violated human rights and even curtailed the intellectual freedom. You were with us or with the terrorists. The commemorations of 9/11 were moments of nationalism, respectful silence and expressions of rage. Missing from these events were reflections on the overreactions to 9/11 that harmed so many people. It is high time to unlearn the simplifications of the polarizing worldview and do more forward thinking[81]. This implies several changes.

1. Sophisticated realism that invests in building sustainable security and peace.
2. Transparency and accountability in the foreign policy shaping and making.
3. Calling out those in the media and think thanks who become the mouthpiece of politicians responsible for the déraison d'état.

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[80] www.opendemocracy.net/shahrbanou-tadjbakhsh/after-911-wasteland-of buried.
[81] Ralph Nader. Nader: painful 9/11 lessons. USA today (01.09.11), p. 10A

4. Maintaining the health and vigor of our own society; not becoming a garrison state[82]

5. Dealing more effectively with 'enemies 'and 'friends' which violate international law, undermine our and inhibit the building of sustainable security and peace in the MENA.

It is high time we stop pursuing national interests in an unreasonable way. It wastes people, money and opportunities to build sustainable security and peace. Lau-Tzu warned that arms are the tools of those who oppose wise rule; they should only be used as a last resort. 'Every victory is a funeral; when you win a war, you celebrate by mourning'.[83]

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[82] John Lewis Gaddis. George F. Kennan: An American Life.Penguin Press, pp. 784, in The Economist (12.11.11), p. 78

[83] Wayne Dyer. Living the wisdom of the Tao. Hay House, 2008, p. 61–63.

BIAD, Abdelwahab:
"ARAB SPRING": The Algerian exceptionalism

Since 2005, *The Arab Human Development Report* of the UNDP reports on serious structural deficits that hinder economic and social development of that region of the world.[1] Among the major problems, the report highlights a non-performing education system, the insufficiency of scientific and technological development, a chronic high unemployment of young, the status of women and *last but not least* a serious problem of governance.

The core question of governance deficit in Arab countries

The issue of governance is central in the Arab world, which is characterised firstly by the lack of democratic alternation of power. The result is that Arab leaders came to power for several decades (42 years for Kadhafi) often because of coups *d'état* (Libya, Yemen), of murder of their predecessor (following Sadate assassination Moubarak became President of Egypt), of palace revolution (Ben Ali remove the aging Bourguiba in 1987) or of dynastic succession. Dynastic succession is not exclusively the characteristic of monarchies (Al Assad father and son in Syria).

Frozen political systems are characterised by a non-renewal of elites in power and reliance on police control of the society. Tunisia and Egypt are examples of such systems with a total gap between the political system and the economic openness they advocate. The Regimes of Ben Ali and Moubarak thought to be solid in the West, suddenly but foreseeable relented under the pressure of popular protest. This protest is due to the authoritarian and undemocratic configuration of regimes in Arab countries.

Following the revolutions that toppled the regimes of Ben Ali in Tunisia, of Mubarak in Egypt, of Gaddafi in Libya and of Saleh in Yemen several people predicted a "domino effect" of the "Arab Spring." The bloody revolt in Syria seemed to prove them right. Even the monarchies of Bahrain in Jordan and of Morocco, otherwise thought to be stable, knew relatively important demonstrations during 2011 and 2012. Is Algeria capable of escaping from these revolutionary events, which spread over the whole Arab world?

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[1] *The Arab Human Development Report 2005,* UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States, United Nations Publications, New-York, 2006, 313 p.

The "domino effect" of the "Arab Spring"

It is worth remembering that much of the demonstrators' claims in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid or Tahrir Square in Cairo would be shared by most of the citizens of the Arab countries. Algeria makes no exception. Like in other Arab countries, also in Algeria there is a strong will for change, which is illustrated by the continuing erosion of trust between governed and governors. This distance between governed and governors is powered by a predatory economic system (corruption, cronyism, nepotism) that characterizes Arab societies in different extent. In these societies, a weak and often fragmented political opposition, as in Algeria, hampers any alternative of power.

Certainly, Algeria is not Gaddafi's Libya where any form of opposition is banned not Tunisia of Ben Ali where the press enjoys no freedom and not Syria with its one party system. The Algerian political system is characterized by a dual power (civil and military), which is due to the traditional influence of the army on the nomination of the leader of the President.[2] The "backbone of the regime" is the army and the security services without the approval of which no candidate can become president. The civil authority's attempts to control the military forces face strong resistance of the military hierarchy.[3]

Contrary to Tunisia, to Libya, to Egypt or to Syria, there is no personalisation of the power in Algeria. The duality of the regime (military and civilian) and the existence of internal centrifugal forces give the impression of a dilution of power characterized by a hardly transparent sharing of command between the President and the "military decision makers." However, some freedoms exists through an independent critic press (Al Khabar and El Watan to cite only the two major dailies, in Arabic and in French respectively) and forty different political parties (nationalist, liberal, secular, Islamist, socialist and even communist[4]). These liberties were achieved following the riots of October 1988 that put an end to the one-party system (FLN). Nevertheless, since the introduction of multiparty political system in the early nineties, the Algerian political society has undergone through a long process of fragmentation and dilution under terrorist violence.

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[2] On the influence of the intelligence services of the army. See Mohamed Sifaoui, Histoire secrète de l'Algérie indépendante : l'Etat-DRS, Editions Nouveau monde (Paris), 2012, 376 p.

[3] One president was overthrown by a coup (Ahmed Ben Bella), another was forced to resign (Chadli Benjedid), a third was killed in unclear circumstances (Boudiaf), and a fourth did not want his reappointment (General Zeroual).

[4] The Workers' Party is led by Louisa Hanoune, a woman activist of the Fourth Communist International (Trotskysts).

The similarity of the political, economic and social problems affecting the region could indeed suggest that the same causes produce the same effects. If there are similar elements with the Arab countries that have experienced revolutions, the Algerian specificity deserves to be remembered, which might explain why the domino effect had not automatically played. However, the troubled regional context – the regimes of the two neighbouring states (Tunisia and Libya) collapsed – has placed the Algerian power on the defensive as illustrated by the proposed reform project. The magnitude and the prospect of success of this project cannot be measured now. Facing a divided opposition, the Algerian government is just trying to gain time.

A fragmented powerless opposition
In Algeria, the democratic and secular movement is fragmented. This is the case of the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) of Ait Ahmed and of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) of Said Saadi, which prove to be rivals. The power has played on this rivalry and presented them to the public as "regionalist" parties (Kabylia). The Islamist parties are also fragmented between a fringe associated with the power (the Movement of Society for Peace – MSP of the Muslim Brotherhood), and another part with the opposition (al-Islah). As to the majority of small political parties that have no representative in the National Assembly, they are characterised by the absence of any real national roots and a formal presence in the elections.

This fragmented opposition does not weigh against the "presidential alliance" – composed of three formations, the "National Liberation Front" (NLF), the "National Democratic Rally" (RND) and MSP (Islamist) –, which dominate the Parliament (Assembly and Senate) and hold the levers of the government.

The opposition's fragmentation and its powerlessness, consequently was illustrated by the failure of the demonstrations to the call of the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (NCCD) in the early 2011. This coordination consisted of some political parties as the RCD, independent associations and trade unions. Its slogan, "establishment of a real democracy" has not mobilized the street. The power's response was a massive deployment of security forces and the prohibition of demonstrations Due to this failure, the CNCD has broken up. Its majority decided to explore alternative forms of action focused on fieldwork in order to mobilize civil society in depth for a regime change[5].

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[5] Layla Baamara, *(Més) aventures d'une coalition contestataire: le cas de la Coordination nationale pour le changement et la démocratie (CNCD) en Algérie* (Mis) adventures of a protest coalition: the case of the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (NCCD) in Algeria, Année du Maghreb, Vol. VIII, 2012 (Dossier: *Un printemps arabe – special issue on Arab spring*).

Thus, even if the protest movement took a political dimension for a while under the aegis of the NCCD, it could not reach a sufficient weight to threaten the regime. The lack of unity of the opposition and the unorganized civil society makes random any short-term prospect of opening up the political field. Another element that can explain the weak mobilization of the movement for change initiated by NCCD, is the trauma suffered by the country during the black decade of Islamist terrorism.

The "trauma" of the war against terrorism yet living

The memory of the "black decade" of terrorism officially qualified "national tragedy" is still present through the claims of the families of missing people and of victims of terrorism. The Islamist terrorism is reduced, but is still not eradicated as illustrated the periodical attacks of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which succeeded the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) after affiliation to Bin Laden.

The precedent of the October 1988 riots that shook the mono party system (FLN) in favor of a controlled political opening under the auspices of President Chadli (1989–1991) was not yet inspired from an authentic democracy, even if the "democratization" was also coupled with a timid economic liberalization (lifting the state monopoly on foreign trade, central bank independence, privatization of public enterprises).

However, this democratization has allowed the Islamist movement represented by the Islamic salvation Front (FIS) – the only organized force –, to arrive in front of the gates of power. The electoral success of the FIS in the first round of the elections in 1991 and the intervention of the army[6] cancelled this first and unique democratic experience of the country since its independence.[7] Cancellation of elections has brought the country into a deep political crisis with Islamist terrorism, violence and counter – terrorism.[8]

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[6] The military forces were afraid of the establishment of an Islamic republic promised by Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj (on this see the point of view of the ex- Defense Minister, Khaled Nezzar in *Algérie: échec à une régression programmée*, Publisud, Paris, 2001 ; see also the propos of the ex-Minister of Economy during the „democratic opening", Ghazi Hidouci, *Algérie, la libération inachevée*, La découverte, 1995)

[7] The President Bendjedi was forced to resign by the military forces in January 1992. The state of emergency is declared, the FIS is dissolved, its fringe part marginalized into terrorism. This is the beginning of the "dark decade" of the "dirty war" (1992–1999) or of the "national tragedy" following the different qualifications.

[8] On this "Algerian civil war," see particularly the analysis of Luis Martinez: *La guerre civile en Algérie*, Editions Karthala (Paris), 1998, 429 p.; see also Andrew J. Pierre & William B. Quandt, *The Algerian Crisis : Policy options for the West*, A Carnegie Endowment Book (Washington D.C.), 1996, 68 p.

The trauma left by this period is real with a balance of loss still approximate (between 100 000 and 150 000 deaths, more than 6,000 missing people[9] and thousands of displaced and material causalities in a magnitude of 20 milliards dollars). In addition, there is a deficit in the elite (executives, university teachers, journalists, writers, artists), because they were murdered or forced to leave the country under the pressure of threats.

The security context of the fight against terrorism allows the Algerian regime to "lock" the political system (the state of emergency that has paralysed the activities of political parties from 1992 to 2011), to "customize" the law at wish, and to maintain the control of the country.

All prospect of change in the power was upset mainly because of the disagreement between the leaders of the opposition particularly on the question of how to come out of the political crisis.[10]

On the other hand, we should not minimise the fact that the violence of the revolutions of the "Arab Spring" may have had a "repressive effect" on the Algerian public opinion. Thus, the images of the civil war in Libya and Syria could revive the fear of "fitna" (division of the Muslim community) and of "faoudha" (anarchy) which brings back bad memories for the Algerians.[11]

It is for the initiative of President Bouteflika that the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation came into force in 2006 and 7544 terrorists repented their crime between February 2006 (start – off its implementation) and June 2010. This text provides amnesty to repented armed Islamist and jurisdictional immunity for state officials. It threatens with jail those who criticize this "solution." Thus, making a tabula rasa of the conflict of the 1990s, the Algerian authorities ignore the claim of justice of the families of the disappeared and victims of the terrorism. However, the terrorism – although significantly declining ever since – has never ceased to exist.[12]

The fear of a revival of AQIM terrorism fueled by the instability in Libya and Mali is a real source of concern not only in Algeria but also in Maurita-

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[9] The figure of 6,543 missing people was given by the Chairman of the Committee for Legal Aid to the provisions of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, the lawyer Merouane Azzi (quoted by the daily *El Watan* September 29, 2011)

[10] The opposition was divided between supporters of the eradication of political Islamism (RCD Ettahadi) and followers of a political solution to the crisis through negotiations with the armed groups (FFS, and Islamist of the former Hamas party that became MSP)

[11] It is precisely in this context that President Abdelaziz Bouteflika warned those who called for a regime change that "no one has the right to resettle in one way or another, the fear into the families "(April 15, 2011 speech announcing the reforms)

[12] The official figure of 1,257 terrorist members of al-Qaeda slaughtered between 2006 and 2011 was released by the Chairman of the Committee for Legal Aid to the provisions of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation (newspaper El Watan September 29, 2011)

nia, the United States and Europe[13]. This fear may explain the distrust of Algeria towards the new Libyan authorities. This distrust is less because of the Libyan sympathy for Colonel Kadhafi – which is a connected problem – but because the orientation of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) is still unclear[14].

But the revolutions in the neighbouring countries and the up – coming claims in Algeria placed the Algerian government in a defensive posture and forced it to react, albeit belatedly, by granting partial reforms whose impact can not be measured yet.

The Algerian regime: between defensive posture and promise of reforms
Algeria, like other states has taken lectures from the fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes that nobody believed to fail. The Algerian government did not want to take an open position on these processes on behalf of the saint rule of non-interference. This strict neutrality illustrates the defensive posture against what is perceived as the two major risks induced by the Arab revolts: the contagion on its borders (Tunisia and Libya are neighbouring countries) and the prospect of a strengthening of AQMI. The instability in Libya and the control of the north of Mali by the Tuareg movements allied with al-Qaida in the arms trafficking in the Saharan region have fueled these concerns.

The reaction of the Algerian government was twofold. On the one hand, for the external front the government denounced the foreign interference (the NATO intervention in support of the Libyan revolution), closed the borders with Libya, and alerted the armed forces to prevent the infiltration of weapons and the jihadists. On the other hand, the desire to appease the "internal front" and to buy the social peace the government granted some reforms. However, this strategy may carry dangers for the country's future if it does not lead to real political changes.

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[13] A conference on the security in the Sahel was held in Algeria from 7 to 8 September 2011 bringing together representatives of countries in the region (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger) and extra-regional partners (United States, France, United Kingdom, United Nations, African Union). This conference is a part of the implementation of a regional partnership in the fight against terrorism and transnational organized crime.

[14] We remember that Abdelhakim Belhadj who led the revolutionary committee of Tripoli from August 2011 is a founder of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which is close to Al-Qaeda. The official position towards the conflict in Libya and especially the reception of Kadhafi's family members was not unanimous in the Algerian political class. See El Watan on 12 September 2011.

Appease the "internal front" by buying the "social peace"
The defensive posture of the Algerian government is illustrated by the willingness to meet the socio-economic demands in order to avoid an organized political contestation of the regime, which might lead to a revolt as in Tunisia or in Egypt.

Indeed, in recent years, a recurring practice of "protest" affects all the sectors of the Algerian society (strikes, sit-ins, spontaneous demonstrations against the shortage of housing, cost of living and youth unemployment). The riot becomes the favourite form of expression of the street to uphold claims in the absence of institutional channels for the peaceful settlement of conflicts. This "protest" is as much driven by the sense of injustice against illicit enrichment, corruption, as by the impoverishment of a large segment of the population that has the feeling of being excluded from the benefit of oil revenues[15].

These many "protests" expressing the distrust for the regime may aggregate at any time in a general revolt inspired by the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. In front of this major risk of explosion, the power deploys the strategy of redistributing the oil profits. In a few weeks, the government have spent several billion euros to finance micro-enterprises for youth employment, a significant increase in wages, an increase of subsidies on base commodities, a boosting of house construction. Like in Saudi Arabia, the oil revenue allows the regime to buy inner peace ... for a while. The government was able to draw at about 150 billion euros without relying on foreign exchange reserves to disarm the social unrest that could escalate at any time. In parallel, President Bouteflika has promised a wide program of political reform.

Move the debate on the land of reforms without affecting the practices of power
Faced with the propagating number of the expression of the will for change, President Bouteflika breaked his silence and announced the lifting of the state of emergency April 15, 2011[16] and a series of reforms aiming at "deepening the democratic process, strengthening the foundations of the State of law, reducing disparities, and accelerating socio-economic development." An ad hoc committee chaired by the President of the Senate was established in June 2011, which is responsible for proposing policy and institutional re-

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[15] See Chérif Bennadji, Algérie 2010: l'année des milles et unes émeutes, *L'Année du Maghreb,* Vol. VII, 2011.

[16] The decision to lift the state of emergency is in force since 1991, and it is effective from 24 February 2012.

forms and for collecting the grievances of political parties, associations and personalities[17].

The reforms announced by the President spread over a year. Its key element is the revision of the Constitution after the parliamentary elections in May 2012. However, the announced constitutional reforms without any concrete points will probably not undermine the "national constants" (Arabism, Islamic and Amazigh, republican nature of the regime, the army's role as guardian of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and the constitution, gender equality, national solidarity, political pluralism, separation of powers, respect for civil liberties).

The reforms consist essentially in a "tidying up" of the existing legislation with the revision of the law on political parties, associations, elections, the press and information with the promise of opening the audiovisual media[18]. In fact, these texts amend those adopted in 1990 when the multiparty system was introduced. Nevertheless, the implementation of these 1990 laws was compromised by the authoritarian practices of the power, thus making them senseless.

In fact, the main problems of the country are the authoritarian practices, the lack of transparency and the governance deficit. How to change political practices? How to involve citizens in the political life and overcome the depolarisation of society due to the practice of "locking" the power?

The Algerian Constitution has all the elements of a democratic regime (separation of powers, multiparty, human rights, equality between men and women), but the political system does not comply with its spirit. Therefore, the problem in Algeria lies less in the texts but rather in their application.

These reforms are not transparent. A part of the opposition has refused to enter into the game of the power denouncing these reforms spurious, because they are aiming at making modifications in the regime but not changing the regime[19]. Due to the promise of the President that after the parliamentary elections in 2012 the Constitution will be fundamentally amended, the FFS and the workers party demand the convocation of a constitutional assembly to establish a new regime.

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[17] The Commission employed about 200 people to make a diagnosis of the situation and the political practices of the country since the independence and to make recommendations within the mandate set by the President.

[18] The practice of press offenses often made journalists to censor themselves. (see the daily El Watan, 13 September 2011)

[19] See analysis of the new laws in: "Réformes politiques" ou verrouillage supplémentaire de la société civile et du champ politique. Une analyse critique (Report by a Coalition of Algerian civil society organizations coordinated by the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network), Copenhagen, April 2012, 72 p.

At this stage, it is difficult to decide on the extent of the reforms because the balance of power among the various components of power is hard to be seen. These reforms represent a major challenge for President Bouteflika who after a first presidential term devoted to the creation of national concord and to the defeat of the terrorism, and after a second presidential term devoted to the stimulus of the economy (big infrastructure projects) would like to have his third term under the banner of "democratic opening". Will he succeed at a crucial time when the country is celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of its independence? Nothing is less certain.

PALEO, Antonio and HARRIS, Ian[1]:
Peace Education in Spain

The roots of education for peace in Spain go back to the first International Peace Congress in the Hague, Netherlands in 1899, which addressed the problem that youth in every country were being educated for war. The result of these educational practices was the bloody first half of the twentieth century with its wars with consequences we still feel today.

Peace education in the first half of the twentieth century
In Spain, the figure of Ferrer Guardia is a key to understanding the processes of pedagogical renovation that began in the twentieth century. In August 1901, the "Modern School" was founded in Barcelona, a project that promoted a free teaching style and the transformation of enemy images. Conservative sections of the Catholic Church were suspicious of this educational freedom and felt threatened by it. In 1909, Ferrar Guardia was executed in Montjuic prison.

Peace education in Spain began in the 1920s and 1930s in movements to renew schooling. The first International Education Congress in 1921 in Argentina provided in its documents references to equality and cooperation between the sexes and other references to subjects covered under the heading "Education para la Paz." In 1927 in Prague, there was an important international conference entitled "Peace for Schools." The conference was divided into four parts--psychology, teaching, hands on learning, curriculum--and encouraged those in attendance to share notes from their practice. These efforts called upon teachers and educational centers to contribute to the reconstruction of a new society by teaching about how peace could be achieved.

Maria Montessori (1870–1952) was perhaps the greatest peace educator in the Twentieth century. Like John Dewey and the Catalan, Pere Rosselo, she argued for a positive concept of peace education, not only to demonstrate the horrors of war but also to stimulate a spirit of cooperation and understanding. Montessori is a key reference for peace education for her pedagogy and for her travels around Europe in the 1930s lecturing against a traditional education system that supported and even promoted fascism.

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[1] This essay grew out of a meeting between these two authors in Malaga, Spain on December 12, 2008. The material presented by Antonio Paleo has been translated by Ian Harris.

She considered peace education not only a goal for educational endeavors but also a method for positive peace. She contributed an optimistic approach to teaching that could lead to social amelioration by promoting a concept of human brotherhood to help make war outmoded.

It is easy to see how many teachers and professors would have believed in these emerging new models of freedom and pacifism. Franco seizing power in 1936 and the following repression frustrated these early efforts for peace education in the beginning of the twentieth century. Many unknown but important Republican educators went into the army at that time.

Peace education in the second half of the twentieth century

At the end of the nineteen sixties and the beginning of the 1970s, people were discovering Mohandas Gandhi and the nearby presence (in the south of France) of the Arc Community founded by Lanza del Vasto in 1948. The opening of Spanish society to the outside brought to many sectors an awareness of minorities, especially to the young and people related to base communities. At this time, the second surge of education for peace occurred in Spain at a time that coincided with demonstrations against the war in Vietnam.

In 1964 Lorenzo Vidal – poet, educator, and pacifist – founded the "Day School for Nonviolence and Peace" [el Dia Escolar de la No-violencia y la Paz (DENIP)] on the thirtieth of January, the anniversary of the assassination of

Gandhi. A proposal developed for the school, which was at first modest, provided a base for the majority of peace initiatives and activities that developed in educational centers throughout Spain. EL DENIP, as said its founder, "was a seed for nonviolence and peace deposited in the minds and subconscious hearts of educators and through them into society."

At this time, the Modern School incorporated in its 1965 charter, article two, "we pledge to make our students into conscientious and responsible adults who will build a world that will outlaw war, racism, all forms of discrimination, and human exploitation." Peace education received a nudge from progressive elements within the Catholic Church.

Justicia i Pau is a Christian organization that came into being in Cataluna in the year 1968 and its goal is the promotion and defense of human rights, social justice, disarmament, solidarity and respect for the environment. In the city of Granada in 1971 the Christian community founded by Pope Dodoy and Fermina Puesta (who received in 1994 the "Medal of Andalucia" or "Favorite Daughter" awards for her social and political accomplishments) developed a commitment with people in labor movements to start thinking of themselves as part of a nonviolent movement. This group lived together in a house and worked with the poor. Education for peace started with a group of people interested in nonviolence who were social workers interested in social problems and human rights. Among other activities brought nonviolence and peace to the schools and other institutions of education. Pax Christie from Barcelona used nonviolent methods against Fascism in their work for "Amnesty and Freedom," encouraging education for peace.

Pepe Buenza, an activist in the Democratic Union of Students for at the University of Valencia, was tried by a military tribunal on April 23, 1971 for refusing to do his military service. Within the Spanish military state his sentence and his testimony as the first conscientious objector popularized conscientious objection among the youth. Likewise, it helped promote nonviolence among the antifranco sectors of society. Gonzalo Arias, a writer and UNESCO translator, took some initiatives to oppose the sentence given to Pepe Buenza. He also was outspoken about the necessity of democracy in Spain. He put together a book, Aprendiz de la Noviolencia, in which he translated, edited, and made available texts of Gandhi and other nonviolent authors.

In the 1970s in Barcelona – Cantabria, Euskadi, and Andalucia – the first nonviolent groups were being formed. The movements for conscientious objection and nonviolence became part of the struggle against the Spanish dictator.

Young people in the Basque region started to meet in 1972 to plan nonviolent activities and support Pepe Buenza. This initial objective leads them to form Bakearen Etxea in 1977. Members from this group formed in 1980

the Community Lakabe in an abandoned town in Navarra. One of its activities was to spread peace education in educational circles. They treated peace as a necessary part of life. Twenty-eight years later Lakabe stood as an example of nonviolent community living.

In 1976, the Friends of the Arc Community in Tarragona organized a professional training course in nonviolence blessed by Lanza del Vasto. In Cantabria young conscientious objectors, volunteers in Peace Brigades International in Latin America, and educators created a group for peace education. One of their most important contributions was the diffusion of games and the dynamics of cooperation.

In the fall and winter of 1973, a group of workers from Malaga gathered regularly to reflect upon the life of Gandhi and nonviolent action. After three months of study and reflection they formed el Grupo de Accion Novolenta de Malaga (GANV) which lasted for 15 years until i1988. In Malaga in 1973, an affinity group started reading Gandhi and Vinoba. This initiative spread through Andalucia in other cities like Granada and Cordoba, etc. Stimulated by the threatened use of nuclear weapons, they were studying nonviolence. Until 1988, this group struggled to interest people in the province of Andalucia in nonviolence. In 1981, they started campaigning against war toys for children. In 1982, they protested against war taxes and lobbied in high schools, colleges and universities for disarmament education.

The group in Malaga started to recognize thematic groups: workers movements, conscientious objection, and opposition to paying war taxes, ecology, and gender equality for peace education. El GANV facilitated summer school courses in 1985 in peace education with the participation of 1800 teachers and developed a workshop that was described in the press with the following "To educate for peace is to educate for disobedience to injustices. Do not suppose that it will make your children tranquil but rather children that become capable of looking how to resolve conflicts nonviolently. Educating for peace means in sum to train children to think before reacting and choosing the most suitable solution among many options."

In 1977 at the end of the year, the first nonviolent camp was established in Vitoria. These gatherings became the basis to develop in Spain nonviolence and conscientious objection. One of the principal agreements was to strengthen the coordination between the different people and groups all over the country. During the meeting, there was an exchange of knowledge and experiences about education for peace. In meetings at the national level, people dedicated themselves to convene on a regular schedule to exchange experiences and develop curriculum for peace education.

In the beginning of the 1980s, John Paul Lederach visited Spain. For several months he interviewed groups and collectives related to the pacifist

movement for the whole country. He was working on a research project to study nonviolence in Spain. This resulted in a publication "Els anomenats pacifistes: la no-violencia a l'Estat espanol" (edited by Edicions de la Magrana, 1983)

Through these different contacts and exchanges of experience and information there developed in Andalucia an assembly for nonviolence in 1981. Groups and individuals from different villages and cities developed projects and protests throughout the whole Andalucian region (in the south of Spain). For seven years, these groups focused on the struggle against unemployment, supported rural agricultural workers, demonstrated against mandatory military service, and for peace education, equality between the genders, and the environment. During this time, the Assembly published a modest newsletter, "Adalucia Noviolenta," to exchange ideas and debates that were taking place throughout the region. This newsletter included tips and tools to help people practice peace education. From the beginning, a principle theme was not buying war toys. With the support of the group from Malaga, they spread to the villages and developed courses and workshops for teachers about peace education, nonviolence, cooperative values, active communication, conflict resolution, and disarmament.

In discussing the development of peace education in Spain, we cannot leave out the collective for nonviolence (CAN) in Madrid in 1982. From when they first met, they settled upon a definition of peace that was harmony itself in human communities and nature. This group dedicated itself exclusively to give trainings and develop peace education activities for teachers and their pupils. They covered themes like how to educate for peace, disarmament, and disobedience, thus developing an active participative methodology. In 1985, they published the first bibliographic guide in Spain for youth and children about peace.

In 1983, in Galicia a collective of professionals, teachers at all levels of educational enterprise, made a commitment to peace education. For many years, they published an information newsletter that linked them with the name "Novapaz." In April 2008, they celebrated the twenty-second meeting of Peace Educators from Gallicia and Portugal. A leader of this organization was Xesus Jares, a professor of education at the University of Coruna. He was also president of the Spanish Association to Investigate Peace (AIPAZ). He wrote many books on various peace education topics.

In 1986, the Galego Seminar for Peace Education was created for teachers at all levels from young children to university students to address the absence of didactic materials and theoretical presentations on various aspects of peace education--human rights, tolerance, solidarity, ecopacifism, nonviolent resolution of conflicts, and interculturalism. Through this semi-

nar, many teaching materials have been produced to cover the complex peace education topics.

In 1987, in Northern Spain the Basque parliament decided to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Guernika during the Spanish civil war by creating a center for peace research, named Gernika Goguratuz. Juan Gutierrez, a leader of this center, dedicated it to building peace through research, training, community intervention, and strengthening networks to share findings about how to construct peace.

In 1986, the International Year of Peace dedicated by the United Nations gave important recognition to peace education in Spain. Many public and private initiatives for peace including congresses and seminars were developed throughout the country. School systems through Spain established the thirtieth of January as a day of peace in Spanish schools.

In 1987, the Association for Human Rights established the Seminar for Peace Education that brought together people from both the formal and informal education sectors in Spain. They had an understanding of peace as a kind of education for liberation to promote social action for peace and justice, an education aimed at forming people capable of transcending obstacles received through current socialization, like values that emphasize conformity, self-centeredness, intolerance, ethnocentrism, and other aspects that contribute to structural violence on the planet. From their first meeting they have followed these three objectives:

- sensitize teachers to the necessity of teaching for human rights, peace, and development;
- train teachers and grow the number of groups for peace education;
- create, adopt, and diffuse teaching materials.

These materials have received many awards for their ability to get youth to think about and object to a world that is unequal, unjust, and diverse. In 1989, the second Catalonian conference was organized under the themes, "Peace Education, Human Rights, and Development."

The School for a Culture of Peace was founded in 1999 in Barcelona. Its director, Victor Fisas, has been working on culture of peace related issues, such as human rights, analysis of conflicts and peace processes, education for peace, disarmament and the prevention of armed conflicts. The objectives of the School for a Culture of Peace are:

- to promote understanding and the implementation of the culture of peace;
- to investigate and intervene in areas related to conflicts, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation, the arms trade, human rights, track II diplomacy and education for peace;

- to give training to people who wish to disseminate the message and practice of a culture of peace.

The phenomenon of violence in Spanish society has created a need to search for more peaceful ways of resolving conflict and lead people in master's programs to teach about mediation. Professional colleges at Spanish universities have been organizing courses and workshops on alternative methods of dispute resolution.

The UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace was created in October of 1999, through an agreement between the UNESCO Chair, the Bancaja-Caja Castellón Foundation and Universidad Jaume I. of Castellón (UJI) in Castillon. This postgraduate program offers an International Master in Peace and Development Studies and, in 2006, was officially recognized as a Master and Doctorate of International Studies for Peace, Conflict and Development. The Master offers courses in both English and Spanish. Between 50 and 60 students, representing over 20 different nationalities, attend the program each academic year.

The General Assembly of the United Nations declared 2001 to 2010 as the "Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence." Following this lead educational planners in Andalucia in 2001 initiated a plan for peace culture and nonviolence that included an internet site "School: A Place for Peace" that is linked to over 1700 centers. The Departments of Education in various Spanish provinces have developed courses and workshops on coexistence, conflict resolution, and mediation. In Barcelona Maria Carme Boque Torremorell has developed a series of workbooks and activities that are available to elementary teachers throughout that province. Educational departments working together with the mayors of many cities are offering training in mediation to help address challenges of urban unrest in contemporary Spain. These hopeful visions do not hide the enormous difficulties in facing a dominant culture of violence and individuals alienated from everyone else.

On the 13, 14, and 15 of September 2002 there was a celebration in Granada for the first Hispano-American Congress for education and a culture of peace. This Congress decided to support the United Nations Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence. This was a compromise among the world of education, the scientific community and the civil society, - all of which pledged to improve the quality of teaching that would reflect the principles of a culture of peace. People were responding to an understanding that education was not sufficiently recognized in the economic, cultural, social, and political realms. This congress coincided with efforts in Andalucia in favor of peace and co-existence. There was an emphasis upon practical understanding of political and social conflicts, not only in schools but also in society, culture, and identity. At the same time, this plan had an initial motive to ad-

dress growing concern about violence in schools not only to prevent in-stances of violence but also more profoundly to address the structural causes of violence.

Organized by the faculty of education at the university of Malaga on the 27, 28, and 29th of November, 2008 the first international conference for coexistence responded to the task of strengthening in every day life the various elements under the heading "culture of peace", concepts related to the necessity of creating a culture of difference, tolerance, negotiation, and dialogue.

Peace education in the beginning of the twenty first century

In postmodern times, educational institutions are experiencing different conflicts related to bullying. Civic and cultural violence are having a huge impact on the whole Spanish culture. These new realities in families and so-ciety – the new technology and means of communication, the diversification of ways of learning – contribute to a widespread redefinition and renewal of education to respond to demands to support social diversity and foster coex-istence. For educators, parents, and citizens themes are arising about how to live with diversity, how to teach and learn in multicultural societies, and to respond positively to the multi-faceted demands of coexistence.

Many other developments in Sevilla, Leon and in other parts of Spain should be included in a history of peace education. This popular movement to use educational strategies to decrease violence in Spanish society began in the Franco era and has spread into modern concerns about inter-culturalism and peace-building. This narrative has shown how educational and social change innovations come from the grassroots. This is not a cen-tralized movement. There was not room in this article to name them all the imaginative teachers, professors, community activists and citizens who have been pushing for peace education strategies to address high levels of vio-lence in daily Spanish life. Hopefully, others will write a more complete his-tory of what has happened to promote peace and nonviolence in Spain. De-fending historical memory is one way to resist totalitarianism.

CONVERGENCE BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE

BLAHÓ, András:

Centre-Periphery Tensions Regarding Central and Eastern Europe[1]

Introduction

Security issues have played an important role in widening the European Union with eight Central and Eastern European economies. The time since have proved these concerns to be correct. The present North-South tension within the Euro-zone highlights even more the West-East tensions inherent in the international relations since the Eastern enlargement. Various divisions – political and economic alike – have already been felt throughout the whole period of 2004-2012[2] (Balázs, J.1985, 1993, 1995, 1996). The worldwide economic crisis of 2008, however, has revealed even more the hidden tensions in these relations. The political events after the 2010 election in Hungary, those in Romania in 2012, the continuous anti-EU declarations of the Czech president present ample evidence to the fact: the enlargement has been based rather on political wishes and will but on firm economic reasoning. The outcome is a constant struggle between the parties to keep face and save the state of the European Union. Ongoing political and economic struggles around Greece, Portugal and Spain are other forms of fundamental problems within the European Union. It is worthwhile, hence to study the almost forgotten centre – periphery relations in this respect.

It goes without saying that proper understanding of the very causes and underlying forces of strained centre-periphery relations might contribute to a proper political response to the challenges involved. Notwithstanding, the world economic crisis has caused immense damage for Europe as a whole and for the individual member countries, as well. These harsh effects, however, have shed lights on the improper preparation of the European Community, the overemphasis put on the security and political aspects in the 1970s, 1980s and the neglect of other forms of capital, explained below. Four years in the crisis is a long time. Long enough to generalise the experi-

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[1] The present paper is a modified and enlarged version of the author's study „Centre-periphery relations between Western and Eastern Europe", prepared for the closing conference „Centre-periphery relations in a global world", organised by Sorbonne III., Paris, December 12-13 2012.

[2] Judith Balázs has called for proper attention of economy as a security elements in her early publications. See especially Balázs, J (1985, 1993, 1995, 1996)

ences, to draw the conclusions on which a more prosperous system of relations could be established between West and East.

The metaphor of centre and periphery can and has been used for describing mutual – perhaps unequal – relationships between two different entities. True, economists specialised in development inequalities (Amin, 1973, Wallerstein, 1974) gave its contemporaneous form.

The concept has registered a particular success at the global level, as an equivalent of the "developed world / underdeveloped world" or "North / South", "European centre/ Eastern periphery" pairs. This concept has thus been mostly used in the context of third-worldist thinking. This is an excessively restrictive use of a much more efficient notion. Thinking in terms of centre(s) and periphery(ies) allows reflecting on **interactions** between places in the World: links of reciprocal dependency where inequalities are the rule, but which are not working one-way. Symmetrical and asymmetrical interactions are part and parcel of world economic relations (Szentes, 2002), among them of those between Western and Eastern member states of the European Union. In this paper, we confine ourselves to the relations within the European Union, between old and new member countries, neglecting the already mentioned frictions between the Northern and Southern member states.

As Szentes has argued (Szentes, 2002) relationships between two types of parts of the world economy, thus flows and these relationships are asymmetrical. The centre is central precisely because it benefits from this inequality and, in turn, the periphery(ies) is(are) characterised by a deficit which maintains its(their) dominated position. The hereby-described system is auto-regulated: the centre reproduces conditions for its centrality and the periphery does the reverse. However, precisely because it is based on logic of (unequal) exchange, the system is dynamic. Whereas some peripheries may become "dead ends" (they are then said « abandoned »), others may benefit from their situation (advantage on the long-run because of a greater size, of a location in contact with the outside of the spatial system); this can generate either polarity reversals in a logic that remains globally identical or the system changes.

The centre/periphery model has thus a robust heuristic potential, provided it is not overused. Its use should be reserved to formalisation of any system based on inequality relationships. However, abstract references of the reflections below to the 'centre' and the 'periphery' defined for example – using the language of Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1986, Bourdieu 1998) – in conventional 'fields' of social interaction, seem also to be possible. Traditional 'centre-periphery' models usually focused on one of the selected dimensions of spatial relationships: economic, political or cultural. Classical economic theories include for example 'the world system' theory by Emanuel Wallerstein

(e.g. Wallerstein 1974), which divided the world into four basic categories: core, semi-peripheries, peripheries and external areas not included in the world system. In his theory, Wallerstein emphasised the economic dominance of the core over the peripheries as well as the weakness, non-stability and dependence of the latter on the core centres. Another area of the studies on the centre-periphery relations, which is important from a theoretical point of view, includes research concerning the emergence of modern nation-states and development of their political systems. Stein Rokkan is a classic researcher in this field, known for many theoretical papers on centre-periphery cleavages perceived in terms of political and cultural dimensions (e.g. Lipset, Rokkan 1967). The centre here is understood as the centre of political dominance that uses the state machinery to subordinate the entire territory of the country (region) to itself. Provinces/regions resisting these activities are the peripheries proper. In his studies, Rokkan also emphasized the important cultural dimension of the centre-periphery tensions. A modern nation-state makes an attempt to subordinate the sphere of culture to itself. In particular, it standardises the national language, and has ambitions to control the media. These aspirations are resisted by peripheral regions disagreeing to give up their cultural and religious distinctiveness. Significantly enough, the culture and religion spheres are largely of an instrumental character for the modern state; however, they are usually the key social resources for peripheral regions. (See Rokkan, 1970.) Another field of research concerning cultural relationships includes studies on the rebirth of regionalisms in postmodern nation-states. They highlight the significant role played by the cultural identity of periphery inhabitants and their occasional strong perception of the centre's cultural dominance (Keating, 1988.) The intention of the model presented here is to demonstrate the combination of the very relationship between the centre-periphery relations and theoretical concepts drawn from other areas of social sciences.

This paper aims at answering one question: what are the main motivating forces behind the centre-periphery relations between the Union and Central and Eastern Europe in a theoretical framework. In our approach the European Union, as the most important political and economic institution of the 27 countries in Europe will be seen as the "whole", consisting of the centre – the 15 "old" member states –, and the periphery, 10 countries so far[3]. The theoretical underpinning is not quite transparent, indeed. The European Union, though has all three branches of power, cannot be identified as a "state" in itself. The European Parliament is restricted (limited) in its legislative power: the main decisions come from the European Council. Hence, the

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[3] Cyprus and Malta are not considered here as part of the Eastern periphery.

decision making power of the European Union is not democratic (this is the so-called "non-democratic deficit" principle). The historical development of the Union, however, developed certain types of relations between the centre – the institutions of the Union – and the periphery. Especially important in this respect are the "common policies," where national decision-making is not possible[4]. Hence, in these fields of intra-European Union relations the decisive role is assured for the central institutions of the Union. The uniqueness of these relations lies in the fact that the peripheral states themselves are part and parcel of the "centre" decision. That is to say, the centre-periphery relations have two distinct dimensions: first, centre-to-periphery relations in the common policies, and second, a "joint" centre-periphery/periphery-centre type of relations. In the latter, the so-called "divided decision-making powers" play important role.[5] Needless to say, due to this multi-faceted nature of mutual relations between the centre and periphery in the European Union a multidisciplinary approach is only capable to shed lights on the fundamental, though not always equal inter-relationships.

Various forms of capital in centre-periphery relations in the European Union

Pierre Bourdieu's theory, and in particular his concept of the three basic forms of capital, may seem to be the common ground of various research fields concerning the centre-periphery relations discussed in the paper. Next to the classical economic capital, he also distinguished social capital and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986). He defined the social capital as the aggregate of the actual or potential resources, which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition. In other words, having a membership in a group that would provides each of its members with a credential that entitles them to credit in the various senses of the word, by the backing of the collectively owned capital. Needless to say, how well this concept fits to the European Union, as a cen-

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[4] The European Union enjoys exclusive decision-making power in the following fields: customs union, competition rules needed for the internal market, monetary policy for the euro-zone countries, common fishery policies, and common trade policy. This exclusiveness regards the signing of international agreements, as well when this is prescribed by European common law, when this is needed for harmonious functioning of the Union, and finally, when this concerns common internal rules or their possible changes.

[5] These joint – European Union and national states – powers are as follows: internal market, issues of social policy delegated by the Treaty on the European Union, economic, social and regional cohesion, agriculture and fishery, environmental issues, defence of the customer, transportation, trans-European networks, energy issues, space based on freedom, security and law, common security risks in the field of public health. See especially the paper of Erzsébet KAPONYI in this respect.

tre. The Union provides the member-states a "credential" – this is exactly the fact of membership – based on which various hopefully mutually advantageous relations are possible. Cultural capital comprises three main subtypes: '*institutionalised*' cultural capital in the form of formal education; *'embodied'* cultural capital in the form of internalised cultural norms, including aesthetic competencies, manners, knowledge of high culture forms, etc, and *'objectified'* cultural capital in the form of objects having cultural value. The three types of capital distinguished by Bourdieu are also the dimensions in which social status and hierarchy of two distinct regions – Western and Central and Eastern Europe – can be described. They seem to correspond to the dimensions of hierarchies between central and peripheral areas.

Iván Szelényi has utilised the concept of the three forms of capital to describe the divergences between individual societies and their evolution. Especially in his well-known book entitled *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists,* (Eyal, Szelényi, Townsley 1998), Szelényi drew attention to the fact that individual societies may be described from the perspective of hierarchies of various types of capital. Along with the evolution of societies, the relative importance of these capitals as determinants of social status within the society will also tend to evolve. These forms of capital can be changed into each other. Consequently, in certain periods and in certain social systems, the possession of specific forms of capital (e.g. economic, cultural or social) may result in special advantages, while in other societies and other periods, the same forms of capital will have a marginal value, and persons treating them as the main resource will not able to acquire any significant social position. Using these forms of capital, we can describe the divergences between individual central member-states and those of the periphery of the Union and their evolution.

Using Bourdieu's and Szelényi's works centrally planned countries could be described as fields with a dominant role of political capital which in Bourdieu's theory is defined as a sub-form of social capital. However, collapse of the socialist systems may be described as replacing the political capital by economic capital. The role of the latter became particularly important after liberal economic reforms had been implemented in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Whether economic capital became the dominant capital in the societies of the region is still a controversial issue. As it seems, it definitely remains subordinated to the political capital in Russia and in several of the countries in the region. It is a fact, that due the two-decade long transition, important changes have been implemented in the relations between political and economic capital *within* these economies. Large, substantial capital transfers between the Union (centre) and the Central and Eastern European member states notwithstanding, the dominant

form of capital in this relation seems still be the political capital. Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (1998) emphasise a particularly privileged role of cultural capital in the countries of Central Europe, especially in Poland and Hungary. They believe that, for example, the conversion of political capital into economic capital (commonly known as 'seizing the property rights to formerly state-owned assets by the nomenclature') never occurred there in a pure form. Cultural capital was the catalyst of the process and only owners of this capital managed to exchange effectively their privileged social positions defined by the ownership of political capital in the communist era for significant economic resources after 1989. Cultural capital in this sense was the motivating power behind the new elite (Szalai, 2007) in its strive for larger international role. The new political elites are the result of the combination of system-changing intelligentsia and the liberal, economic technocracy from the old system. (Szalai, 2011.) In order to establish the "real owners," both groups supported dynamic capital export from the centre, mostly from the European countries. By the mid 2000s, however, this group has firmly established its place and opposed the income-redistribution by the state in favour of foreign, mostly European capital. In short, owners of this cultural capital managed to improve their privileged social positions: they had started to grasp political capital, as well. In parallel to this change, the new elite started to oppose foreign direct investment in their economies, including large flows from the European Union. The real question is, however, will the new capital class be able to enliven local economies, or not. The results so far in this respect are not convincing, at all. The economic development in the region has not changed the semi-peripheral status of these countries: the foreign and domestic capital dominated sectors are separated, and even the domestic sectors are not vertically integrated into the national economy. Due to these multiple separations, the various sectors of the economy cannot support each other.

In the most developed Western societies (that is, in the core areas of the world system), the relations between economic and political capitals are rather ambiguous. The relation between the sphere of politics and the sphere of money is still disputed. Bourdieu claimed that the field of power was a dominant field in all societies since it could verify the principles of operation of all other fields. However, there are also opinions that the above mentioned statement by Bourdieu is no longer valid in the globalisation era, since the phenomenon of globalisation may in particular be regarded as a revolutionary process, whereby the importance of economic capital is increasing and the importance of political capital is decreasing. It is a symptom of which includes the dwindling strength of modern states versus multinational corporations. Interestingly enough, the Central and Eastern European

states seem to move against this general trend, at least for now. Disillusioned by the meagre results of the two-decade long transition, several countries opted for an enhanced role for political capital, including in some economies (like Hungary) new etatism (partial renationalisation). Political capital is used in these cases clearly to change the rules according to which the economic field operates.

Compensation among various forms of capital

In view of these considerations, we can say that economic capital in the theoretical model outlined here, especially in the globalisation era, may be defined as the dominating capital and as the key resource of the world's core regions as well. The contemporary centres are areas of a strong concentration of economic capital, and their social stratification system is characterised by the dominance of economic capital over other forms of capital as determinants of social status. In other words, the logic of economic capital may be described as the dimension of dominance, in particular the dominance of central areas over peripheries in geographical terms. At the same time, it could be argued that the peripheries very often use the strategy of compensation for their weaknesses to offset their dependence on the centre, in the economic dimension taking the form of advantages given to other forms of capital. In particular, one may discuss the reference to cultural and social capitals, mentioned earlier. For example, in the case of Poland cultural capital constitutes its key resource supposed to compensate for the peripheral status of the country and its deficit of economic capital in relation to the centre. On the other hand, contemporary Russia seems to be a country where political capital remains the key capital compensating for the peripheral status and dependence on the central countries. Hungary, where economic capital has played an important role up until the 2008 world economic crisis, political capital started to "regain" fields of influence, regarding both domestic and foreign owned parts of the economy. State power is enhanced in the interest of appropriate status and influence in the Union and in the world for the country.

Here, one may to draw attention to one important aspect of the compensatory privileges of individual forms of capital. Privileged capitals will play a key role in external relationships of the peripheries both with central areas and with areas located lower in the global hierarchy. In particular, one may indicate cases where the subsequent forms and sub-forms of capital are used by the subsequent levels of peripheries in order to compensate for their weaknesses against stronger partners and domination over weaker, subordinated regions. Russia and earlier the Soviet Union may serve as an example, which, as it has been mentioned above, may be described as a pe-

ripheral region in relation to the West, compensating for its weakness by an extremely strong privilege assured for the political capital position. Hungary is a particularly good example in this respect since it attempted to build its partial independence in the socialist period, mainly in the substantially changed economic dimension. The trust in the power of the Hungarian economic power, its status as a modified centrally planned economy, may be analyzed here as an ideology of compensation for the dominance of political capital by means of economic capital.

In this context, it is worth emphasising that classical compensatory capital, that is cultural and social capital, are characterised by a lower degree of liquidity in comparison to economic capital, as well as by limited possibilities of conversion and a longer accumulation period. Economic capital, in turn, is by definition characterised by a maximum degree of liquidity and an immediate potential for exchange. At the same time, according to many economists observing the way the world economic system operates, peripheral areas are characterised not only by lesser resources of economic capital but also by a significant level of instability. Perhaps even the stability of economic systems would be a better measurement of the position of the centre and the periphery in the hierarchy than the mere degree of economic affluence. This observation is extremely important seeing the drastic changes in the euro-zone of the European Union, where members of the centre – such as Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain – could not preserve the much-needed economic stability due to the world economic crisis of 2008. This way or another, fluctuations of the world economic system cycles include instability of economic capital resources in the peripheries, followed by instability of the economic elites in these parts of the world. Therefore, a way to ensure the stabilisation of the social position in such a structure is reference to capitals that are significantly less exposed to crises and sudden devaluation: in particular to social capital and cultural capital. Elites in peripheral countries (regions), building their status on these forms of capital, can ensure its stability in a much better way, since they are exposed to a lesser degree to economic cycles. This kind of development is visible during and after the financial crisis in Central and Eastern Europe. Relations between the new member-states and the Union have been strained by the unfolding crisis coming from the euro-zone. These countries not only face additional hardships – such as downgrading by international credit rating institutions – because of the deep crisis in the centre, but their domestic political capital has been affected, as well. The political elite fears further weakening of the economic capital gained in the last decade and voices unwarranted state support for foreign economic entities. At the same time, it can be said that the hard economic realities in the West have helped the amalgamation of local elites, es-

pecially in the sense of political capital. The criticism concerning crisis solution attempts in various central countries of the Union is only one side of the coin. On the other side one must see the strengthening call for "national solutions" as if they were some panacea for globally initiated problems.

The dual social world of the periphery

This strategy of the elite results in the creation of a dual social world in peripheral areas since the periphery creates its own systems of social hierarchies, which may be specifically described as systems privileging selected forms of capital with a compensatory function. However, social organisation logic is a dominant point of reference for the periphery.

The multi-dimensional social world of the periphery very frequently leads to social tensions between clashing systems of values and logics of social stratification. In the 'critical' perspective, most frequently connected with the leftwing social thought, such tensions are usually interpreted as an outcome of the dominance of the centre over the periphery, imposing the central system of values, institutions and language onto the peripheries. We will not dwell on this issue; we only indicate the existence of the above-mentioned conflict of the social organisation logic. Its nature may be diversified and cause differences in evaluation, but its existence seems to be more or less inevitable to a smaller of lesser degree. The conflict in question usually does not manifest itself in the form of tensions between representatives of the centre – in this case the European Union – and the periphery – countries of Central and Eastern Europe –, but more often it takes the form of disputes among the inhabitants of the peripheries themselves.

We may conclude that the social world of the periphery is characterised by a constant tension between various types of competing social logic. This tension often results in a dysfunction of peripheral institutions, which are frequently structured based on examples drawn from the centre, sometimes simply copied from the 'central' context. Tensions often turn out to be dysfunctional or they will unexpectedly modify their mode of operation, adjusting it to the environment in the peripheral context, to a different logic of social hierarchies and values. Sometimes it turns out that they serve total different social groups and other interests than those, which should theoretically be the beneficiaries of a given organisational type. Sometimes, despite their partial dysfunction, they are kept as important elements of integration with central areas, which formally require their existence or informally force the peripheries to maintain institutions compliant with the central standards.

The disruption of peripheral elites

The consequences of the above phenomena for peripheral elites are particularly interesting since those elites can best perceive the multi-dimensional nature of the periphery's social space. Ongoing relations between the European centre and Central and Eastern European periphery are loaded with important amplifications of various types of values. There is specific intermediation of social and economic life. In several findings, some of the Central and Eastern European elites are much more eager to take over values from the centre than transmitting local values to it. This critical view of some of the Central and Eastern European elites could be regarded as one-sided; however, it shows the tension that is a part of life of the elites in peripheral countries. On the one hand, they act as the centre's representatives in the periphery, and on the other as representatives of the periphery in the centre. Economic, political and cultural elites in relation to the social fields that remain under their control perform these functions. The periphery's cultural elites can also be described using Bauman's metaphor (1998) of 'translators' that is intermediaries in the explanation of the two worlds in question. They attempt to describe the world of the periphery in the language of the centre, and try to describe the social world of the centre to the residents of the periphery in a language that they can comprehend (and especially via the media that they have access to). As above, the notion of language should be primarily understood in an abstract sense, often described as "discourse." This involves a specific style, a sphere of social references and a certain linguistic and conceptual complexity. In addition to their 'ancillary' role, the periphery's cultural elites can be accused of supporting the centre in achieving a symbolic domination over the periphery, that is, of imposing the centre's cultural values on the periphery. In this function, the peripheral elites could be termed using the second of Bauman's metaphors that he applied to intellectuals in the same work, that is, the 'legislators' who impose values and cultural norms onto the periphery in the name of the centre.[6] In this way, the periphery can be perceived as an area that gives undue privileges to cultural. This is one of the several reasons, why democratic institutions in the periphery can have a much more 'window-dressing' nature than in the centre.

As has been pointed out earlier (Zarycki 2000), one of the practically inherent features of peripheral areas is the division into a *pro-periphery* and an *anti-periphery* orientation, prevalent in most of the dimensions of their social space. In particular, this division applies to peripheral elites and is es-

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[6] In this respect it is of special importance how the voluminous legislation enamating from Brussels is looked upon by the Central and Eastern European elite.

pecially well visible in the sphere of politics. Unlike the core areas, in the peripheral areas disparities between social groups are defined in terms of the role of the external world (that is, the centre) in relation to the identification of their economic interests, cultural values and political concerns. In general terms, we could say that the 'anti-central' party in the periphery will by definition be a champion of enhancing the role of, and protecting those capitals which in a given region are regarded as the key resources, compensating for the region's weaknesses vis-à-vis the centre. On the other hand, the 'pro-central' party will be a more or less radical proponent of subordination to the social logic of the centre and recognition of the hegemony of the forms of capital prevailing in the centre. As mentioned above, in the global scale, this will usually mean the logic of economic capital, whereas political capital can be regarded as the dominating form of capital in other contexts; however, such a role is unlikely to be performed by cultural capital[7].

Communication codes of the centre and the periphery
We should bear in mind that tools which have been developed as part of the so-called discourse analysis (e.g. van Dijk 2007) can be successfully used in the analysis of tensions between thus defined centre and the periphery. As mentioned above, the 'languages' used by the centre and the periphery can be viewed as disparate codes of meaning. In such a context and in the analysis of the discourse of peripheral elites in particular, the so-called code switching theory can be particularly useful. The dilemma connected with the choice of language (i.e. code) in which members of peripheral elites are to communicate, quite well pertains to the area of this specific linguistic concept.

In view of the above, it is only natural that in the majority of contacts with representatives of the centre, members of peripheral elites will use the central code. They will switch to the peripheral code as the only code, which is understood by both parties of the interaction[8], and in contacts with representatives of lower social strata of the periphery. However, when members of the peripheral elite communicate with each other, the choice of language

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[7] An important exception could be argued for Hungary, where from 2010 on a deliberate attempt has been institutionalized to strengthen local political capital (and elite), against the rule-pressioning European Union. The outcome has been strong and time-to-time harsh clashes between Hungarian and EU politicians with several infringement cases started by the European Union. However, having seen similar moves on the part of Romania (and partly in Poland), the Union lessened the pressure in this respect.

[8] Once again, more and more examples are to be found where the language of the local (country) elite is not well understood by the representatives of the centre. Local elites are pressing for the free and unconditional usage of their language and for a proper, unhindered understanding of it. The Hungarian case of 2012 shows this rather clearly, but important signs of this could be found in the attempts of the Greek local elite, as well.

is no longer obvious. On the one hand, it is possible to recourse to the central code. Its definite advantage is that it leaves aside social hierarchies of the periphery, especially those defined in terms of social and cultural capital. If the parties involved in the interaction are not fully-fledged participants of the interplay in the social field of the centre, then the social hierarchies of the centre, which are encoded in its discourse, do not have any immediate applications to them. In such a situation, the discourse becomes in a sense an abstract neutral plane for communication, which in many cases can be regarded as its asset. On the other hand, differences might evolve in the degree to which the centre's discourse has been mastered, or, more broadly speaking, the centre's culture because it extremely seldom comes as wholly natural for members of peripheral communities. The individual, who achieves a better mastery of the centre's culture, and especially its communication code, will automatically gain an advantage over all other individuals. In many situations, this will be an unfavourable circumstance, which will hinder reaching an accord. However, in other situations it may prove to be an asset, especially when individuals who are relatively better rooted in the central culture will want to emphasise their advantage. In extreme cases, a member of the peripheral elite may address representatives of peripheral lower classes (especially those who are defined in cultural terms) in a refined central code, even if the latter are not able to comprehend any of the communicated message. The only pragmatic message conveyed will be the stressing of the cultural superiority of the speaker, and the fact that such a discourse is literally unintelligible will in this case be seen as an advantage.

Similar dilemmas appear when representatives of peripheral elites want to choose a familiar peripheral code for their *internal communication*. On the one hand, it can activate the entire spectrum of social and cultural indicators of social status in the local context. References to them, which are implied by the very use of the peripheral code, can create additional and unwelcome barriers to interaction. In certain circumstances, emphasising such social and cultural disparities may be intended in order to stress the social distance, especially when persons who are privileged in a given sphere do this. However, in many contexts the choice of the peripheral code may result in a reverse implication: it may reduce social differences and build a sense of community. It is so because reference to the peripheral code will automatically imply recognising the centre as the common *'meaningful alien'*, which is often perceived more or less negatively. On the other hand, the peripheral code is a natural and fully internalised code for all representatives of the periphery, including peripheral elites. For this reason, using the code does not create such barriers as when communication is based on

reference to an external code, which in many cases will be internalised by the members of a peripheral community to a varying extent.

These reflections could be summed up by a conclusion that communication based on the use of the central code will normally imply negotiations concerning status, relating to the extent the central culture has been internalised by the interlocutors. Communication based on the peripheral code will imply the process of a mutual evaluation of its actors in relation to the fields of compensatory capitals, mainly social and cultural capital. In practice, communication (especially between sophisticated members of the peripheral elites) will frequently be characterised by constant changes of the code, thereby stressing both the freedom of movement in the two social worlds and the distance towards the speaker's own, multi-dimensional and ambiguous, social status.

The centre as seen by the periphery

As mentioned above, the centre will frequently profess its lack of prejudices or preconceptions vis-à-vis the periphery. In the centre, the domination of economic capital as a rule implies a much more impersonal attitude to member states in the periphery. This means that what matters in the centre is talent, skills and willingness for hard and competent work, and not social background. The centre, therefore, assesses the external world from the angle of economic capital. The centre's special focus on the logic of its dominant capitals can lead to a specific bias in the periphery's perception. In such a situation, the periphery is often viewed as obsessively clinging to its historical, cultural and social traditions. These dimensions of social life, especially in their peripheral manifestations, are the least attractive and regarded as insignificant in the world of the centre. This could reinforce the view of the 'backwardness' of the periphery and its 'parochialism', and activate many other stereotypes traditionally associated with peripheral communities[9].

The social hierarchies and divisions in the periphery based on cultural and affiliation criteria are very frequently regarded by representatives of the centre as expressions of Marx's 'false consciousness'. For the centre, the only 'real interests' are interests which are defined in the economic field, while other conflicts of interest tend to be perceived as aspects of the former. This is the reason why defining divisions in the political arena in cultural rather than economic terms, so frequent in the peripheries, is seen by the centre ei-

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[9] In this respect, it is worth mentioning the frequent criticism towards the Central and Eastern European countries while they aspired for membership in the European Union. The Union (the centre) was confronted by long references of historical, cultural values of the periphery, which seemed unrelated to the issue of membership. The peripheral countries, however, used this language exactly for stronger conviction.

ther as a manifestation of peripheral ignorance, naivety or 'backwardness'. Alternatively, as a sign of deliberate manipulation of the peripheral communities by the elites in their attempt to divert their attention from 'real', that is economic, interests.

We could speak about the phenomenon of the '*economisation*' of the periphery coupled with its concurrent '*culturisation*'. Whilst '*culturisation*' would strive to focus the centre's attention on the cultural dimension of the periphery, yet depicting it in a disorganised manner as a certain 'curiosity' and an aspect of mysterious exoticism, '*economisation*' is an attempt at a complete marginalisation of the cultural dimension. Such an approach may lead to the production of an utterly one-sided description of the periphery's social reality, created in the language of the centre[10].

Even if the way the periphery is perceived by the centre is not overly fraught with '*economisation*' or '*culturisation*', it can meet with critical reception in the periphery owing to the relativisation of the role of the periphery's social and cultural capitals, which turn the universally recognised values into objects of research and criticism. A particularly good example in the sphere of academic discourse involves works underpinned by the broadly understood postmodernist paradigm. On the one hand, these works, focusing mainly on culture and symbolic linkages, highlight the relationships which until now were rather unobvious, also those between the centre and the periphery, such as the '*culturism*' syndrome. They also help better appreciate the role of cultural capital (which is so significant for the periphery) in social science and beyond. However, while trying to enhance the status of the cultural field in academic studies or political debate, they do it in a way which mostly tends to relativise the periphery's cultural values and assets. It is so because although the '*deconstructed*' peripheral identities attract more attention, they are usually portrayed in the context which strips them of the status of absolute values they enjoy in the periphery. For researchers working from the centre (or members of peripheral elites who refer to the central discourse), peripheral identities are as a rule interesting social phenomena. Nonetheless, they tend to treat them as attention- grabbing illusions rather

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[10] A well-known example of a study in one-sided analyses of the social world of the (semi)-periphery using the centre's language is the work by Mouzelis (Mouzelis, 1986). In it, Mouzelis points out that narrowing the phenomenon of domination to the merely economic dimension is particularly inadequate in relation to countries, which are outside the world's core areas. In their case, other modes of domination should be distinguished which could, arguably, correspond to Bourdieu's types of capital. Both authors concurrently called for expanding the Marxist analysis of social inequalities beyond the strictly economic dimension, and Mouzelis demonstrated that it was particularly necessary in the case of peripheral regions.

than entities having a real existence, comparable to that of economic capital, which has a much more 'objective' nature in the centre, unlike cultural identities. For residents of the centre, financial assets are the criterion which determines their social status. In such a context, the sphere of culture, as being of secondary importance, can be an arena of casual 'games' with identity, its deconstruction, reconstruction and mutations created at discretion and at will. Such 'games' are much more difficult in the peripheries, where cultural identity and group affiliation can be of a considerably more 'objective' nature than financial assets.

What can we say about the future changes in centre-periphery relations in Europe? There is, first of all a danger that peripheral (semi-peripheral) economies will be detached from the centre. There are signs already that even with strengthening internationalisation (or, for that matter, with growing protectionism) the centre will attempt to distribute the burdens (costs) of the crisis on the periphery, much more so than ever before. However, secondly the pressures exerted by peripheral countries and regions on the centre might – slowly but surely – modify the behaviour of the centre in the West-East relations.

Situation of the peripheral countries is further aggravated by their substantially weakened capital attracting capacity. This feature in this part of Europe is much weaker than in the centre. These economies do not have proper economic force to give security guarantees to the foreign direct investors, as this is requested by the latter.

Finally, several Central and Eastern European peripheral countries have opened their economies, have used up their internal reserves in such measure that even with the strongest demand creating economic policy they will not be able to regenerate domestic markets.

The situation of the European Union is insecure, as well. In the likely case that the leading elite will not refrain from utilising long gone neoliberal aspirations, Europe will immerse in a prolonged recession. Not only will forces integrating the Union from within weaken dangerously, but at the same time in the political and social structure of Europe unwanted changes might come to the fore. The same is true for Central and Eastern Europe. Here, not only is the defencelessness with regard to world economic developments greater but democratic traditions are much weaker than in the centre countries of Europe. A structurally – both in political and economic sense of the world – weakened Europe will not be able to instigate further catch-up processes in Central and Eastern Europe. This might bring severe consequences in both parts of the European Union.

We can state therefore that the habit of an ironic treatment of the one-dimensionality of the central social world by the periphery, and the reserve

manifested by its representatives to the economic field as the key determinant of social status, are matched in the centre by the '*deconstruction*' of peripheral identities. While the centre regards peripheral cultural identities as a secondary and relative reality, and they are seen as subjective social '*constructs*' in the language of postmodernist social theory, the periphery, though it usually lacks its own independent and sophisticated language for social theory, tends to regard money as a relative social construct. This construct tends to come and go, and yet the periphery's basic social structures last on, regardless of economic crises and of 'ownership transformations', in and outside the European Union.

In view of the above, representatives of the central elites, who live in a comparatively one-dimensional social world, not only are unable to understand the periphery's communication code, but also frequently have serious problems with grasping the very idea of the multi-dimensionality of the periphery's social world. This seems to be the crucial problem while the centre affecting the way the periphery is perceived. In consequence, they are often viewed as strange and mysterious areas, and this perception can extend to the departing agents from the periphery. On the one hand, such mysteriousness can be regarded as a positive feature, which attracts attention, one that is associated with a higher level of 'spirituality' and 'deeper' culture that can be encountered in the periphery. On the other hand, however, such mysteriousness can be associated with backwardness, irrationality of the peripheral world, pre-modernity and superstitiousness.

Accusations of hypocrisy, distrust, insincerity, inconsistency and reticence voiced by the centre against the periphery's representatives can be seen as yet another consequence of the centre's inability to comprehend the multi-dimensionality of the social world of the periphery. At their best, the centre will see the utterances and social behaviours of the periphery's inhabitants, referring to disparate communication codes, as incongruous. Naturally, this list does not exhaust all the communicative aspects of problems that can appear in contacts between representatives of the centre and the periphery. It is to be hoped, however, that the problems discussed above convincingly show the analytical potential of the theoretical proposition put forward in this paper.

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Wage Convergence between Eastern and Western Europe

If one listens to the European Commission, one gets the impression that the Eastern European accessions of 2004-07 have been a success story. The mainstream press and the governments of the region mirror this view. With Southern Europeans now often portrayed as lazy and corrupt sinners, they are contrasted with Eastern Europeans who have neatly fitted into the EU. They adopted the common goals and regulations, and their GDPs are beautifully on their way to catching up with Western European ones, with some countries of the region even having overtaken various Mediterranean member states.

Only the ordinary people of the Eastern European macroregion do not seem to agree[1]. Whatever GDP figures might imply, Eastern Europeans[2] feel that they lack jobs. Rightly so, as data from Eurostat confirms that they have far fewer jobs than Western Europeans. Their wages are far lower, and they are even diverging in absolute numbers. Eastern European wages on average are lower than 30% of Western European wages according to Eurostat data. They are having few babies (natural population growth in most of the region is negative), and young and dynamic people are fleeing the East in droves. Most regions of Eastern Europe have migrational loss, with the notable exception of capital cities.

Some people would object, claiming that Eastern Europeans might have low wages, but they receive far more from their governments in terms of common services[3]. Not true. Virtually all Eastern European states spend less on their citizens (even on purchasing power parity) than Western European ones. Their educational systems are underfinanced without exception. Their highways are underdeveloped (with the exception of

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[1] For a more detailed elaboration of the non-convergence of Eastern Europe see Zoltán Pogátsa „Still an Iron Curtain: Competitiveness and Responses to the Global Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe" (Das Progressive Centrum, Berlin, 2010)

[2] In this piece Slovenia is not considered part of Eastern Europe. Its economic structure is far closer to the corporative Rheinland model of Germany and Austria than to the post-Soviet FDI dependent competition states of the East of Europe.

[3] For more, see „Investing in Europe's Future – Fifth Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion" *DG Regio, European Commission,* 2012

Croatia, Hungary and perhaps the Czech Republic), their railways are a scrapheap (except the Czech one).

But why is this so, in spite of the GDP convergence? Well, Gross Domestic Product is really just an indicator of output, not of wealth, even though mainstream media usually uses it confidently for the latter purpose. The two concepts are not the same. After a war, for instance, a country might have virtually no production, but this does not mean that it has no wealth. Within a few years, as businesses recuperate, production rebounds. Wealth is the underpinning: the accumulated common knowledge and capital of a country, established over generations, is what helps the GDP to re-emerge after the destruction. Reversely, a growing yearly GDP allows a country to raise its wealth. However, this wealth is not shared equally by everyone in the economy. How the wealth created is dealt out does make a difference. Essentially three entities in the economy receive a part of it: households in the form of wages, the state in the form of taxation, and owners of capital in the form of profits. Eastern European wages are not growing in line with GDP. This can easily be proven from publically available official data. The countries of the region have been engaged in a tax competition towards the bottom. Lower and lower taxes have meant lower and lower revenues for the state, and by logical extension, lower and lower capacity to invest in public goods. All in all, if there is massive growth in the GDP, but wages are lagging behind and government revenues are falling, one thing follows: profits must increase.

In a Western European economy, stagnant wages and booming profits would lead to a highly unequal society. This would be bad itself. It can empirically be proven that more unequal societies perform worse overall in fields as far away from each other as, education, crime, social trust, health and life expectancy[4]. In Eastern Europe, the situation is far worse. Transition from state socialism was based on foreign direct investment, which has resulted in an economic model where owners of capital are dominantly to be found abroad. They are the foreign shareholders of the multinational firms listed on stock exchanges. Thus at the end of the day a growing GDP in Eastern Europe means growing revenues for shareholders who sit in Germany, Switzerland or the USA.

What is the way out of this dead end street? States need to rid themselves of state capture by local oligarchs and transnational corporate interests. They need to regain the power to tax. This means fighting against corruption, closing the massive offshore drainage, and making the tax sys-

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[4] Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone* (Penguin Books, 2010)

tem more just and sustainable. On the expenditure side, they need to establish a policy capacity that was completely left out of a transition model that relied on the market solving the issues of the community. This has been a spectacular failure. The region needs to spend the money wisely on the common good: community infrastructure and job creation through training and education. It needs to establish social partners for the new development state: strong trade unions, employers associations, real self-governing municipalities, and a powerful civil sector. These vital elements of a functioning Western and Northern European economy had been left out of the mental framework of Eastern transition.

A higher standard of living needs higher wages. Higher wages come about because of higher productivity. One can draw up a so-called regression line, a graphical representation of the relationship between wages and productivity in European countries. This line is rather steep: a small increase in productivity leads to a higher increase in wages. Thus, Eastern European productivity ranges from 40% of EU average in Bulgaria to 80% in Slovakia, with corresponding hourly gross wages ranging from 3 euros to about 10. At the top end of the line, Norway has gross wage levels of 43 euros an hour at not more than 130% of EU productivity. The average level of productivity Europe earns you about 17 euros an hour. The lesson from all of this, that there is no better investment than investment into the factors, which raise productivity: primarily education. With a 20% increase in productivity, for instance, Hungary could double its tax revenues. This would be a much better policy to follow than fiddling around with a tax regime that is unsustainable at this level of productivity. The worst situation is in Slovakia. At 80% productivity level, Slovakia could have almost double the current wage level. Slovenia, at roughly the same level of productivity, does. Even more worrying is the fact that at five dollars and hour, the top end of the Chinese wage range is converging upwards with the low end of the Eastern European wage range, at around three euros. Being cheap has been a viable option for China, but in the last decade, even they have been moving upwards, based on a gradual increase in education, productivity, technology and knowledge. At increasingly similar wages, their prices are far lower. Eastern Europeans have the misfortune that in spite of the persistent wage gap with Western Europe, prices have pretty much converged. Eurostat estimates that food prices are around 80% of EU average in the East, while electronic and cloths in many cases are more expensive in the East than the EU average.

The current global financial crisis is not an ideal context to face up finally to the reality that the local populations are right and that the European Commission is wrong. Eastern European accession has indeed been

smooth, but convergence of living standards has not taken place. It is time for a reality check. The good news is that, with the single exception of Hungary, countries of the region are far less indebted than the rest of the EU. Thus, there is room enough to make the U-turn and start competing upwards rather than downwards.

KISS, Endre:

Karl Jaspers' Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik? *before the horizon of the post-socialist system change of 1989*

Karl Jaspers' exercised philosophic approach in this work[1] is a specific *philosophical politics* (philosophische Politik), which is at a special junction point of huge several related philosophic-political disciplines. It is no usual description of the field of the politics, also no usual political theory, but also no political science in the today always more explicit increasing consensual sense.

The relation between theory and practice is in every political philosophy a very much precise and determinant dimension. This distance cannot become too nigh because thereby the specific identity of the theory gets lost. However, it cannot also be too distant, because a too abstract description of the politicians annihilates the initial knowledge interest. *In the philosophical politics of Karl Jaspers, it looks however, in this point of view, completely different.* Here a quite continuous and very direct transition between theory (principles) and practice prevails. For many reasons (also methodological or scientific), it is exactly the mission of the philosophical politics to pursue the straight-line and uninterrupted validity (Geltung) of the principles in the political practice and to raise immediately as a topic of discussion a lack of those.[2] This immediacy does not abolish the difference between theory and practice; it builds spontaneously a constant bridge between them, while it represents this behaviour in an open or only hidden thematized *normative* way.

No chance that the pertinence of such a developed philosophic politics always rises in those *upset times*. The post-totalitarian transformation is a possibility of historic change in which, in a literal sense, so as the whole political system should be newly thought and newly reconstructed. This offers us the possibility, as it seems to us, to compare Jaspers' *incommensurable* analysis of the post-National Socialist transformation of Germany to the post-communist transition of Eastern Europe, namely from a *temporal* distance point of view, which corresponds comparatively to Jaspers' analysis dated in 1945.

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[1] Karl Jaspers, Karl Jaspers, *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik*? Tatsachen, Gefahren, Chancen München 1966 (*Where is going the Federal Republic*? Facts, dangers, hazards München 1966).

[2] The philosophical politics considers the whole political field exclusively only through the medium of the sense, or the interpretation. This connection becomes thematic in a lot of versions in our attempt. *The close relation between philosophical politics and post-totalitarian transformation arises first from the increased need of post-totalitary societies.*

The only knowledge of this philosophical politics, fronting the horizon, the specific methodology, and other philosophic disposals of which are mentioned. It cannot also be different because these both sides of the philosophical politics are never to be substantially distinguished from each other in the already mentioned immediacy of this attempt.

Jaspers thematized the difficulties of a philosophical politics of a supposed only systematic view in indubitable lucidity: "Tendencies point out, does not mean to predict. The factors of the political events are so numerous, endless, the chances so unpredictable that, like today, prophecy is mistaken. Certainly, it meets tendencies; how far, however, are these real, is uncertain and still depends on us..."[3] This declaration appears as moderate, however, on the other side, these disposals of the field of politics legitimize most categorically the philosophic politics. *Just with the existence of these conditions, the philosophical politics must venture general, universal and holistic assertions*, just so it has the chance to complete with the help of the specifically *philosophical* knowledge the blank spaces of the positive research.

The philosophical politics can come back to the most different motivations. The case is not rare when it can be led back to a philosophical-moral responsibility, in Jaspers' specific case, to its morally profoundly coloured scepticism facing the democratic process in post-totalitarian Germany. This conception immediately delivers our first comparative comparison: in the post-communist Eastern Europe we were fully convinced from the beginning of the success of this process, perhaps, therefore, lower waves of a renewal of philosophical politics also arose in this region.[4]

It cannot be our task to examine Jaspers' philosophic conception of the politics also in its historic change. However, there is no doubt about the fact that he did not believe, at the beginning of the thirties yet, that philosophy could be transferred in the politics, first of all because he couldn't yet identify at that time the entire chain of the communications in this field. The concept of the philosophical politics misleads clear flows of this former conviction, in the modification of which we believe to perceive clearly Hannah Ar-

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[3] Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik? p. 27

[4] A historic fact is that the public official version has almost forbidden in the first transition years (Transitionsjahren) to express scepticism because of the successful end of this process. From this reason, critical or negative behaviours created only the political parties, which were populist, or did not belonged, otherwise, to mainstream. However, because of its political position was an illegitimate, critical opinion about the certain positive end of these processes appeared illegitimate as well.

endt's inspiration, who as continually argued with attempts and questions of a similarly conceived philosophical politics.[5]

Jaspers' philosophical politics also grows up from its political criticism of Marxism. This philosophy appears in his paraphrasing description as a whole representation become of the society, became perfect (then "only the person appears incomprehensibly, but not the society"[6]). Karl Jaspers describes the Marxism as a bundle of *reductions*. They come valid in the following confrontations: (the person – result of his socialization, particularities – result of the place of the persons in the society, consciousness – function of the sociological situation, etc...). He explains this conception ever simply as "*raison belief*"[7]. It appears that he doesn't take into consideration, for the support of this qualification, the immediate falseness of these reductive assertions. *As far as Jaspers is concerned, the possible falseness of the basic statements* is not directly in question, but rather more for him the obvious reductionism. Now a philosophic politics develops itself completely decisively against every *reductionism*, it considers the aura of the concrete up to in such details as, the *Kennedy* imitation of Willy *Brandt* or the political personality of a Ludwig *Erhard*.

The philosophical politics (also according to Jaspers) examines the field of the politics under a more likely perspective as the usual political theory; however, this nearness and immediacy also go together with a *paradox*. The philosophical politics now appears of its articulation of the political life, which is simultaneously also clearly *far* from it. On one hand that is also because it still remains in the most specific political question most sensibly philosophical, on the other hand; however, also because it brings back suddenly a specific political problematics *on the fundamental principles*, what can be only rarely accepted in this immediacy in the practical discussion.

The political thinking has its own development in the history, which is evident to us. The philosophical politics appears at a proportionally high level of the political theory, we can say as a product of the further progressive differentiation. With this goes together, that the philosophical politics can draw not only a given political practice, but also realizations and convictions of established political *theories* in question. The philosophical politics holds a paradoxical effective position in the political practice between near-

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[5] S. about that point from the author of these lines: talk about the creation in the correspondence between Karl Jaspers and Hannah Arendt in: *Yearbook of the Austrian Karl Jaspers – Society*. Published by Elisabeth Salamun – Hybasek and Kurt Salamun. Volume 9, Vienna, 1996, pp 113-124, www gewi.uni graz.at / Phil / jasges / vol9.html.kiss

[6] Jaspers, Karl, *Die geistige Situation der Zeit* (*The intellectual situation of that time.*) Issue 8, Summer, 1932, 5. Edition, Berlin- New York, 1979, pp 138-139,

[7] Cf. 140.

ness and distance. However, with time, it can change; *initiatives of philoso-phical politics can become the common property not only of the political life, but also of the general political consciousness*. This confirms itself practically also in the whole mental material of Jaspers' philosophical politics[8].

Jaspers' philosophical politics enjoys from the beginning an *extraterri-toriality of the fundamental guestions*. It is not subjected to the usual political competition; it can still follow quietly the way of the constant pursuit of the fundamental in the political practice. It can allow him, for example, in *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?*, paying attention to the exact danger provided by a communism (on the mental line that the romantic egoism of the individual European nations can provoke, as well as a danger from the Soviet Union). At the same time, it is going for deepest moral and intellectual reasons against the "emergency act" on the field where communist party members are disadvantaged publicly[9]. At this point, in order to actualize, it must be admitted, that the whole development of the European Union did not reach, after 1989, the desired degree just in fundamental principles. *There was no new Karl Jaspers of the European Union after 1989*.

The post-totalitarian phenomenon assigns a *double way of life* to the politicians. The historic situation dictates them the necessity to restore a po-litical *optimum* or at least a political "normality", while the individual actors must/want to fight already at the moment of the restoration of this optimum for their own individual political purposes. Therefore, the actors of the poli-tics would have to implement at the simultaneously two kinds of the politi-cal activity. At the same time, they have to issue "*universally*" for the whole post-totalitarian society optimal political manners and, in parallel, they should construct a political stage, on which the individuals actors can follow, already undisturbed, their "*particular*" interests. No doubt, that this specific

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[8] It is absolutely plausible that many criticisms and suggestions of Jaspers were taken up by the political actors themselves and they realized 'It likely seems to us that possibly the later East politics (Ostpolitik) of Willy Brandt would have been completely independent from Jaspers' criticism and the analysis of the social democracy (SPD) and be Brandt's personal.'

[9] S. as other examples, the apparently contradictory opinions about GDR, about the possible rocket war or about the "endangered democracy" in Germany where, at the same time "noth-ing can happen". Therefore, the true responsibility and "big politics" cannot work. Also with the specifically Jaspers political fear the following regret goes together: The Federal Republic has no real responsibility of a sovereign state under the pressure of the reality ... " (270), be-cause both decisive dangers do not threaten it. Another such apparent opposition is Jaspers' affinity to the individuals and to the people and his simultaneous acknowledgment of the in-dependence of the political executive, with also the individual politician's personalities.

assessment itself of the problems is favourable to the birth of a philosophical politics[10].

However, Karl Jaspers also realizes another claim of the philosophical politics. It also namely belongs to the elasticity of this way of thinking, that the thoughts, but also *the criticism*s ascertain *themselves not only on the totalitarianism*, *but also on the current democratic organisation,* in other words, *the philosophical politics is one of the most important sources of the democratically oriented criticism of the democratic organisation itself*. It is obvious that the centre of this criticism of the real democracy is very close in relation with the post-totalitarian situation, as well as with the necessity to contribute to the *success of a political optimum,* also in a democracy-theoretical point of view. However as well, this phenomenon, also probably well-known in the post-communism, announces itself, that a so carried out criticism sometimes requires the highest courage of the critics, because he runs danger from the beginning that his critic of the new democracy with the reproaches of the same collapses, which appear from their part *in principle* against the democratic establishments. The comparison shows immediately that Jaspers, in that point of view, was less exposed to these dangers than so many representatives of the east European post-communist transformation were.[11]

Karl Jaspers' philosophical politics also reveals itself in this case as successful so *that its high morality is largely observed and recognized*. He becomes a moral example of the early Federal Republic, is often inquired as a judge in discussions fundamental, be possible as a *President* of the Republic and expresses regularly in specifically morally coloured sense and political questions (as in Rolf *Hochhuths* features of the German history).

Karl Jaspers also underlines, in the situation of the post-totalitarian democracy certain *anthropological* tendencies, which are unavoidable to the thinking in the social ontology. Of course, these qualities also play a role in the totalitarianism, remain decisive, however, also in the democracy, they build the true foundation of the politics according to Jaspers. This fundament expresses, according to him, so: "The people … want their comfort. The fact that something should not be in order in the foundations of the state, is

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[10] The reconstruction of this philosophical politics becomes – on much higher abstraction levels – clear to an alternative draft to political metaphysics of Carl Schmitt. Jaspers never integrated the more generally growing abstraction levels in an extensive notion of the political power. Politics remains Jasper's politics. Politics remains a bundle of actual relations of actual people and social groups.

[11] It sometimes does not at all concern already criticism; it often concerns the simple observation of phenomena. It is a bitter fact for the post-communist democracy that first qualified populists have pronounced the notion "Globalization" in the Hungarian parliament and have acted their way.

to them an irrelevant thought of the subversive critics…"[12]. The politics as a field is a constant practice of the *activity* that always has to take into account this basic specificity of the *comfort*. It also pretends that, according to Jaspers in the politics of the *individuality, the people* always belong to the most important actors; *the politics goes through the people*, who must be perceived and respected as persons in all their specificities. The politics may not minimize otherwise abuse the people (with a possible preference as to the maximization of the votes). Jaspers literally considers "this basic law was neither discussed by the people, who didn't know it, nor decided, but only confirmed by the parliament…"[13]

The request (or to speak elegantly: "the *revendication*" or "Zurückforderung") of the respect of the persons and the nations is, also in the modern democracy, a repetitive refrain in Karl Jaspers' philosophical politics.[14] At this stage, it becomes visible, that Karl Jaspers' philosophical politics accepts seriously a direction, which directed *against Carl Schmitt's political metaphysics*, another on the same theme analysis could inaugurate also a parallel to Martin Heidegger, which can come in question after the engagement of the philosopher in politics.

In his philosophical politics, Karl Jaspers also represents an always-personal coloured behaviour. His personal and theoretical views do not distinguish from each other; both build together this amount of knowledge, which is expressed in detailed issues. S*imultaneously,* this *is also a specific characteristic of the philosophical politics*. The philosophical politics is rather more a reflexive opinion building than the possibly analytic and communicative presentation of this amount of knowledge, of which this opinion building comes from. Jaspers is also in this point of view a *forerunning philosopher*, who talks about the "nowhere available totality (Ganzheit) of the truth in the mankind ". From now on, it is also again visible on a new point of view, that the philosophical politics and the post-totalitarian transformation(s) belong to each other, because the post-totalitarian democracy is an *example and a phenomenon without any precedent[15]* of world-history, which first categorization shouts almost after the attempt of the philosophical politics.

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[12] *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?* 52

[13] *Cf. 176*

[14] *Ebenda,* 93 – In this way of thinking, Jaspers expects from the politics that it almost expresses the wishes and the motives of the people and acts, completely in the way of thinking of Nietzsche's' lucid aphorism "about the ancient and new government" (*Human, All Too Human*). – This "union of the people" of qualified politics is expressed in Jaspers' analyses on Ludwig Erhard also at various levels.

[15] S. – about that point from the author: Monetarista globalizáció és magyar rendszerváltás. Társadalomfilozófiai tanulmányok. Budapest, 2002, 1-410, o. (Monetarist globalisation and Hungarian change of regime. In: Societal-philosophical Studies, Budapest, 2002, pp 1-410)

The post-totalitarian situation is a unique initial situation for every concerned society. In every case, it is a throughout philosophical situation in which the following words of the philosopher absolutely agree upon: "… men and women … (are) determined …, after the dreadful events, what they have arranged or what they have owed to create, really, a new political entity…"[16]. At this moment, the already mentioned leading elements of the post-totalitarian democracy come in action: what is aimed, can be a political optimum only, which they are obliged to, a slighter aim would perhaps still again entail the residual dangers of a new totalitarianism. Here, both qualitative and different aims of this democracy have to be realized: the acting structures of a (universal) democracy to be established and the democratic environment to provoke the (particular) political discussions.[17] *The maximalism of this objective is anchored in the situation itself. The almighty reason into this unique situation makes of Jaspers a reference of the new democracy* (of course, it would be another exercise to compare in detail his relevant role with other fundamental individuals of the new state).

As with the post-communist transformation, the theoretical picture of the earlier history of the country and Europe also appears with Karl Jaspers. Moments of a *structure-typological vision* become visible, which, in the post-communist case after the same mechanism, aim how this totalitarianism was actually possible and which end puts out the immediate present. Jaspers – without being able to aim any completeness – goes back to Max Weber "Wilhelminism" – critic in which the new relation was created just at that time of new Germany and Europe are emphasized as a central moment. *Mutatis mutandis* also left this structure-typological European discussion blow in the post-communist states (reinforced, of course, by the current EU problematic), and strangely – this is a praise for Jaspers – that we were in agreement, much earlier, in post-communist Eastern Europe about the essentially, not questionable European affiliation of the individual states, like in Jaspers' critical view of the German history. From a new point of view, the fact that Europe, simultaneously in both cases had *pragmatic politics* and moral-philosophical *normative* sense, now, underlines the relevance of the philosophical way of speaking politics.

The post-totalitarian condition is a *philosophical new beginning,* also in the sense, that totalitarianism represented a constraint system. As Jaspers formulates, "new" order must come, because up to now reigned one "external to the institutions" which did not correspond to the internal order of the

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[16] *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?* 34

[17] S. about that point from the author: "About both simultaneous projects of the post-socialist world". In: *200 years of Kants draft "to the eternal peace "*. Idea of a global peace order, Published by Volker Bialas and Hans-Jürgen Haessler, Würzburg, 1996, pp 130-135

citizens[18]. This is not of course just intellectually a new revelation; it is however extremely important for *the understanding of the unique revendications, which are, as obvious, applied to a post-totalitarian democracy*. Then everything in this system must be correct and must be implemented in a correct way, then every mistake committed here and lack immediately entails special dangers and threats. So can Jaspers' constant political fear be understood simply regarding the future of the German democracy, while he also simultaneously talks (in typically philosophical-political manner) about a danger that "nothing can happen in Germany"[19]. This duality accompanies his whole analysis; later Hannah Arendt also prepared it in clear problems to make the "problem solving capability" and the simultaneous constant "threat possibility" of the German democracy[20] plausible to the American readers.

However, this double language is far from incomprehensibility, anyhow, the post-communist democracy is full of it. Who would design, for example, a post-communist democracy as globally *endangered* because of the new status of the former employees of the secret services is not quietly solved. But, who would design a post-communist democracy as globally *not endangered* if the new status of the former employees of the secret services is not quietly solved. We must clearly see in this example, that both statements are true.

Jaspers knows very well, that the general revelations of the philosophical politics in the post-totalitarian situation still have to be kept more completely and taken into consideration. As it is the case in the usual democracies. Jaspers' following knowledge applies to all democracies (would be added as well: also for all normal human entities). "Therefore, the structure of the state has two sides: on the one hand the institutionally established and the laws, on the other hand, what happens with them and by them on the basis of the motivations of the people, whom they have arisen from"[21]. If we think about this statement in the context of the post-totalitarian situation, then the value of this statement would be evident in a more or less *harmonious* post-totalitarian structure. Because even in the democracy and just in the post-totalitarian democracy the unquestionable institutions are only considered as one half of the successful politics*, the other half of the*

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[18] *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?* 128 – The remark on the "internal order of the citizens" underlines it again, that democracy, for Jaspers, was not a political technique of the representation, but an order that must come from the persons and the people.

[19] *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?*, in several places, and also 270.

[20] Hannah Arendt, *In der Gegenwart*. Übungen im politischen Denken. *(*Essays on political ideas) München, 2000, Band II. 64.

[21] *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?* 261.

success should come, in the above sense, from the true motivations of the people. The previous history of the post-communist democracy shows a huge deficit in this field, which led in some cases, already until today, to clear disengagement phenomena of the new structures.

An *optimal* democratic new beginning would be one in which the classical party politics does not determine immediately the political field. The repeatedly brought on specific *doubled requirement* to the post-communist political system also lets itself easily perceived. In such a system change, *no historical vacuum exists* in which we can put, in an optimal way, the bases of a new democracy, on which bases then afterwards the new processes could soar. Jaspers sees correctly, that party politics (in their elementary forms, but also in their sophisticated variations, like in the building of the coalition, up to discussed problematic of the *big coalition* by him) reinforces quickly its particular spheres and, in many things not positively, has an effect on a specifically new democracy. *What generally applies to the party politics is also valid for individual parties*. The will of the parties, to come as fast as possible to the possession of the political power, leads the attention astray of their historical duties. Particularly in detail and differentiated, Jaspers sets up himself with this problematics in the case of the SPD, while he assigns an own historical mission to this party and (as it seems to us) so anticipates a historical period, in which the social democracy should play a central political role.[22]

Of course, we fully agree on this question with Jaspers: while party competition submits all fundamental moments of the transformation and transforms universal into individual problems let us remind of the regularly repetitive first hours of the post-communist democracies, in which, the parties, *alone and all,* were the institutions that generally profited of the full trust of the democratic public. In this historical and political context, the shaping of the oligarchic character of post-communist party structure had an effect (historically considered) in few moments and the *tendency of the emerging oligarchic structure* Jaspers surmised, became a reality, then the current power takes the sense of longer historical preparations.[23]

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[22] This analysis has many structural moments. Instead of a "turn" Jaspers revendicates a "return" of the social democracy, while he claims again for the commitment of the old social democracy despite all critics, which has still believed in big things and has alone also represented them. From the social democracy, Jaspers expects a politics close to the people and wants to warn this group about a too fast participation to the power (by "calculation"). (Also in the post communist Eastern Europe, we could give numerous examples of the fact that a party has lost its whole political future due to a too early participation in the political power).

[23] *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?* 269.

The problematic of *consensus building* also exists close to the double requirement to the post-totalitarian democracy. As considered today, this moment it appears that it played no crucial role for Jaspers. Jaspers is fully conscious of the differences between the inclinations of the individual parties, even under the individual political personalities; clearly, he never thinks that a possibly insufficient consensus building could bring a danger for the coming democracy. Finally, He holds the harmony between the government and the people for more essential than the lacks in the consensus building of the political elites. It appears to us, that he correctly estimated the post-totalitarian democracy of that time. In fact, these consensus problems could not endanger the expansion of the post-totalitarian democracy in Germany nor could become the organic component of the later political structures.

Quite the contrary occurred in post-communist Eastern Europe! Here the insufficient consensus building (which reasons can be obviously led back to the most different separate components) led to the often permanently growing political crisis, if not too much in the manifest *partition, if not division* of a country.[24]

The always-reiterated thought (also more coherent with the consensus building) of Karl Jaspers' philosophical politics, is that principles and fundamental rights can be considered seriously. Shall a new, post-totalitarian republic work so due to the post-totalitarian situation, we believe we might have sufficiently insisted.

What Jaspers carries out well again in this field, is that the generalization (presented indeed later in the literature) and the elaboration of his idea become a *philosophical component of the interpretation of the politics*. The philosophical politics measure namely democracy not exclusively to dictatorship and does not recognize triumphantly in every case that the democracy is perfect when just no dictator controls the scene. No doubt, the characteristics, qualifying each democracy, will be kept as basic principles. Expressed in a little bit modernized terminology, it can be named as the difference between "written" and "unwritten" constitution (democracy) or as a difference between "visible" and "invisible" constitution.[25] The violation of the invisible or unwritten rules in the post-totalitarian democracy creates ambiguities, which for the post-totalitarian democracy with just the same *disorientating* or just not *chaos triggering* consequences, which Jaspers has

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[24] S. – about that point from the author. "Reflexes of the social division in politics and political science". In: *Basic Problems of Citizen Freedom Today*. Published by Klaus M. Kodalle. Würzburg, 2007 (Königshausen&Neumann), pp 113-118

[25] S. „Written and not written Democracy in the Post-Socialist Transformation. In: *Between Triumph and Crisis.* To the condition of the liberal democracy after the downfall of the dictatorship in Eastern Europe**.** Opladen, 1998 (Leske + Budrich), pp 77-84

diagnosed so in a big number for Germany. From now on, the democracy as-
sumed and thereby from its legitimized ambiguities and from the so legiti-
mized doubled language a *culture of the lies* introduces itself again which can
have a directly demoralizing effect on a post-totalitarian society which de-
moralization mixes then to the continuous expansion process of the same
post-totalitarian democracy with the most negative, conceivable conse-
quences. Under another aspect, the same facts might be formulated so that
the non-respect of the democratic basic principles in a post-totalitarian de-
mocracy simply *compromises* the new establishment as well as the new el-
ites, in the lighter cases; a self-denial of the democratic principles follows, in
more difficult cases, an unintentional remembrance of the dictatorship it-
self.[26] These ideas, being completely accomplished, flow, (and we in addition
think to the long list of the qualified *cases of not democratically legitimized
behaviors of democratically legitimized political actors*), so we must agree
very much with Karl Jaspers: "The present, misfortune bearing (!) condition
is encouraged by the fact that we don't always take the fundamental rights
so seriously."[27]

Jaspers sees the problem of an "elite by hazard" (elite that can appear as
the result of a fast and unprepared transformation[28]. However, he also sees
that the people, the society in the democracy of transformation, are also an
independent and virtual absolute existing actor, which inclusion is, in the
transformation, the most important guarantee of a creative new democ-
racy.[29] At this stage, Jaspers expresses again a rich and differentiated vision
of the democracy. While democracy is not only a representative political
form of establishment, but rather – positively defined – the expression of
motives of individuals and people as Jaspers formulates it: "because the
power for the changement is in the folk as big as or bigger than the readi-
ness to follow a government."[30]

If we thought today, the *political fear* Jaspers' exceeded as proved dan-
gers and threats, then we misunderstand him strongly. These fears did not
express themselves essentially (even if not exclusively) by a direct expecta-
tion of a new totalitarianism, they expressed for a qualitative, and with true
notion, appropriated democracy, which only characteristics should no
longer be the absence of an evident dictatorship. *The break with the past is*

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[26] S. under footnote to 12 mentioned works. In addition, Arendt (a.a. O.62): "Bonn may not be
Weimar, but the processes of disintegration in the Bonn government ... show tendencies
which very look like those of the last months of the Weimar republic..."

[27] *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?* 177

[28] *Cf,* 267

[29] S. u.a. Footnote 14.

[30] *Cf,* 273

not a normal problem of the political practice or of the political theory. It is not only an example-task and a task without precedent; it is essentially a historical masterpiece.

Everything necessarily rouses the fear of the injuries this masterpiece can bring. This political masterpiece would claim for actual political art, which Jaspers often in a concrete way recommends. The concerned historical moment must be carried on for the creative historical event, *the history has to be corrected, the political optimum reached and in the concrete affairs the best equilibrium realized*. Moreover, everything must occur in clear consciousness of a world historical perspective and with the world historical responsibility. In the transition, it will be the actual history, and still more, the actual daily politics versus philosophy!

Everything rouses necessarily the fear of the injuries this masterpiece can bring. Simultaneously, the specific *equilibrium problems* of the post totalitarian democracy appear which according to Jaspers are numerous to occur. The new democracy must find its *weight* in solving all the questions. Everything can be done well, or not. The normal building act of a big coalition can be optimal to it; it can also be interpreted as a "kind of double-party dictatorship". In both cases, the sentence can be correct. The opposition in parliament can be counter-productive, the lack of opposition of high level can be, however, a bigger danger. As mentioned, there is no hiatus in the history; it's not possible to stop the flow of the history, only the genial action can guarantee the quality of the democracy. We have to grow in years to re-open the space to the fore-totalitarian politicians, which then prevents from the restauration of this fore-totalitarian period, which couldn't be perfect in the history, because the totalitarianism could namely overcome?

According to Jaspers, the political field exists through the individuals and the people. The *Oktroy-character* of the post-totalitarian democracy Jaspers presents is so impressive that the same problem is as much important in the post-communist transition, is understood from itself. The exceptional case and the contradiction are therefore obvious: *an Oktroy democracy is an opposition alive*?

However, with Karl Jaspers the foreign, international side of a post-totalitarian transformation also appears clearly, because totalitarianism in the twentieth century was always an international phenomenon. Practically, both post-totalitarian democracies are creations, which *want to win back their role and their importance in Europe*. According to Jaspers, this dimension of the post-totalitarianism also appears as *a subject of philosophical politics*. The new international orientation is also conceived in this sense. In fact, this moment of the reintegration, Europe replaces the whole usual foreign side of this process. Jaspers also very decisively points out, that this side

of the post-totalitarianism shows the same qualitative requirements, which are formulated in some other problematic fields of the post-totalitarian politics. The EU-integration itself must have *specific* post-totalitarian motives and inclinations, as Jaspers expresses it: "How all European governments can have politically only the self-confidence and dignity of the BRD, if it acts as an active member in the circle of the free states for the common self-affirmation"[31]. If once more we read the origin of this statement ("active member of the free states for the common self-affirmation"), we will have to establish that, behind each word, which refers to *circumstances*, more or less the *important motives* appear visible. It is just the philosophical politics, which brings both perspectives (referred circumstances and realized importances) together. And for that, we already approach *fundamental* characteristics of each post-totalitarian democracy: in its circle, *each concrete moment or otherwise pragmatic one has to support the values*, and adapt itself harmoniously in the process of realization of values. Also in the next statement, all situations carry their characteristics historically accepted, when we want, several times paned: "The big whole of the Western Countries, in which (the Federal Republic – E.K.) integrates with bright consciousness, gives it sense"[32]. Just this increased need of sense (which is explicit in Jaspers' sentence) and essentiality applies as the basic intellect of post-totalitarian politicians. The essence becomes the reality, Europe gives sense, therefore, we must choose, Europe, the big sense, reminds again of Nietzsche's[33] philosophical politics, namely by the political completely similar logic, Europe is, as a sense, the optimum for several always ruinous fighting nations. The "sense" of Europe, which appeared first as "only" a moral moment, moment of the deficit coming from the post totalitarianism, rises in evidence at the end of this idea movement also as the *political*, i.e. also *pragmatic* optimum, a sense-giving Europe reaches at the end a *realistic* attempt as it was moreover the case with Nietzsche. In this connection, it becomes enough evident how deeply problematically, a blind market oriented Europe had an incidence, with sense formulation and interpretation, in the post-communist transformation process of the east European states, and how shocking it might have acted on this population Europe, the sense questions of which were quite often considered as naïve.

    In their allocution on the occasion of the public commemoration ceremony of the Basel university (4th of March, 1969), Hannah *Arendt* conceives a picture of Karl Jaspers, which takes full account of the intellectual essence of the philosophical politics: "There have been since Plato not many philoso-

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[31] *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?* 232

[32] *Cf,* 232

[33] S. *Footnote*, 14.

phers for whom the action and the politics were a serious temptation. And Jaspers? He could have said with Kant, 'it is so sweet to think out constitutions', and he would not have been born in a country which ruins his big political talents in a mysterious way or does not allow reaching the movement, and he would not have been ill – one could have imagined him well as a statesman. And in a certain sense this basic talent, came as strong as the philosophical, in him after 1945, nevertheless, rightly".[34]

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[34] Hannah Arendt – Karl Jaspers, *Briefwechsel 1926 – 1969*. Published by Lotte Köhler und Hans Saner, München – Zürich, 1993. S. 720

Tóth, Imre:

Conflicts of Interests and Contradictions of Actions on the Field of Diplomacy among Bonn, East Berlin and Budapest (1988-1989)

Introduction

In the two-year period between the beginning of 1988 and the end of 1989, great contradictions were taking shape on the European scene. To name but the most typical ones: the Soviet Union's superpower position contradicted to the inefficiency of her economy; the rhetoric of the socialist block leaders contradicted to the socialist ideas' growing more and more unpopular; the structural crises in the 'peripheries' and 'semi-peripheries' were in contrast with the welfare of the 'centre', the countries in economically developed part of the continent. For all the participants, including front-liners as well as secondary contributors and observers, the only possible way to solution seemed to be to start co-operation based on a transfusion of technologies and vast amounts of capital from Western to Eastern Europe. All that assumed political reconciliation.

The frontier that the Cold War had created to separate the two halves of Europe looked sure to disappear – most political leaders of the day had a vision of that. Some of them found it hopeful, others looked at it with great concern. For example: Margaret Thatcher, then British Prime Minister, regarded the would-be reunification of the two German states as an unpleasant chance, and requested Gorbachev to take preventive actions.[1] Other, more ideology-minded politicians felt it likely that the process of disintegration of the socialist camp might induce communist hardliners to seize power in the Kremlin, where a chance removal of General Secretary Gorbachev, the initiator of the democratic movement in the Soviet Union, could have lead to a restoration of orthodox communism. Such a turn would have caused a setback on the fields of improving east-west relations. Though the nature of the necessary steps to be taken was clear, the outcomes looked unpredictable. The scene, as well as the 'timing' and the 'how' had to be chosen carefully, because some immature actions might have provoked dangerous reactions of the backward-minded. Such a destabilization would have meant some great amount of risk, aversion of which was in the interest of all the actors

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[1] *Thatcher Wanted Soviets to Stop Reunification of Germany*
http://www.wikio.com/themes/Pavel+Stroilov 12 Sept. 2009

including the United States and Western Europe as well as leftist soft-liners in the Warsaw Pact countries. (Borhi 2010, 24-25.)

As for the scene, the most obvious proposals would have been Poland or East Germany or Czechoslovakia or Hungary. In retrospect, it seems clear that – with regard to the former special circumstances and difficulties – the latter turned out to be the surest 'point of inflection'. It was so, in spite of the fact that the situation of Budapest, in terms of power politics, could have been further aggravated by a possible anti-Hungarian 'petit-coalition' of such rigid communist countries as East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. In case of their joined military action – rather like that of the Warsaw Pact countries against 'the spring of Prague' in 1968 – Hungary would have had no help from outside, thus would have remained defenceless. West Germany, though being one of the countries most interested in reconciliation, was on the side of 'well measured process' to such a degree that the guarantees Bonn had offered to maintain the safety of Hungary were rather vague.

Diplomatic policy in transit
Hungary, then one of the countries in the socialist camp, also showed most of the contradicting ailments. Tastes of the western style of living – action-films, beat-concerts, and leisure-activities – had a virtually unimpeded way to large sections of the Hungarian population. The 'free lifestyle' of western-ers seemed idealistic and/or exciting, and was well in contrast with the economic difficulties of the socialist countries, where most layers of the society had long forgotten the welfare achievements in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The ideological influence from the West increased simultaneously with the deepening of the economic decay. The interdependence of negative facts and feelings of 'the grass is greener in the West' enhanced social instability. Illustrative of the hardships were the multiple problems caused by the border fence referred to in the western press as 'iron curtain'. Technically speaking, the device had long been in a rather bad condition to such a degree that the frontier zone, Hungarian officials proposed was pulled-down in 1988. However, the task of dismantling the 'iron curtain' had not only technical and financial but political and ideological aspects as well.

Hungarian politicians interpreted the general sense of 'turn to the West' as something that means first and most of all a 'closer and wider co-operation with West-Germany'. Economic relations and traditional connections had long made both countries gravitate to each other. By then, most of Hungary's export to the West was dealt with West Germany, the latter receiving 8.5 percent of the total Hungarian export. On the other hand, Bonn's second largest trading partner in Middle and Eastern Europe was Hungary,

just behind the Soviet Union; these positions showed the mutual nature of interests. (*Länderaufzeichnung*, 1988.)

At the same time, the restricted scope of Hungarian diplomacy limited Budapest's ambitions to strengthen the ties with the West in terms of economy and politics. Consequently, experts in the diplomatic service had diverging developments to consider. In 1989, however, the Hungarian diplomacy was already able to focus, by and large, on the classic dilemma of what to say and what to do for maximum benefit of Hungary.

Conflict-avoidance
Bonn, then capital city of West Germany, became directly interested in the developments of Hungary's home affairs. The most appealing of all reasons was that, in 1989, a large number of East German citizens – in their capacity as tourists – had travelled to Hungary and turned up in quantities at Bonn's Budapest embassy to apply for political asylum. In fact, they considered it the only possible way left open for them to make their way to West Germany. Waves of refugees, though on a lot smaller scale, were not unprecedented. In 1989–90 GDR citizens inundated the embassies of the Federal Republic of Germany in Prague and Warsaw, its permanent representation in East Berlin, and even Danish and American embassies in the city. Lookwarm negotiations between Bonn and East Berlin had taken place afterwards. However, when such events turned out on the Hungarian scene, the problem – unlike that in the other cases – grew virtually unmanageable.

The largest wave of refugees, however, arrived in Hungary, from the spring of 1989. This was, to a great extend, because the rest of the world developed a more idealized image of the Budapest transformation processes than they actually were. It was further embellished by the pulling down of the cold-war iron curtain system along the Austro-Hungarian border, which started on 2 May 1989, and the fact that on 14 March 1989 Hungary – first among the countries of the Warsaw Pact – signed the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and promulgated it shortly. (Decree law 15 of 1989 on the promulgation of United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted in Geneva on 28 July 1951 and the protocol on the status of refugees signed on 31 January 1967.) In the wake of these events, the false information that the Austrian territories could be reached by an easy walk spread far and wide. Moreover, as a result of the news, increased worries in those who wished to leave the German Democratic Republic that the party and state leadership in East Berlin, who were watching the changes with numb obtuseness, would radically limit travels to Hungary and cut them from the opportunity of escape.

The makeshift refugee camps set up by the Hungarian authorities as well as the efforts of international human rights organizations to ease the situation provided but a temporary solution. There was no ready-made concept to handle the situation. A series of time-consuming talks could only have led to a modus vivendi via constructive stances on behalf of all the actors concerned. In the absence of that, East Germany's stubborn 'No!' to a soft-liner solution compelled the diplomats of all the directly involved countries to helpless inactivity – a good example of the scopes of diplomacy of the day.

In the prelude of the crisis, the ambivalent task of risking nothing yet achieving something concluded at the point of conflict-avoiding. One paralysing factor was that the top level negotiators of East Germany named the issue as 'coreless' and as 'resulting from some temporary unrest fuelled by the manipulated media of the alien West'. Nonetheless, the ever-growing mass of asylum-seekers made it impossible to deny the problem for long. The first – apparently non-diplomatic – steps on the East German side tried to reduce the number of refugees via administrative restrictions on the outgoing tourism; efforts that turned things from bad to worse. Examples of such 'soft measures' were the slow-down of transactions of administration, the 'No permit to leave the country' decision with regard to 'budgetary finance' (referring to the East German–Hungarian Bilateral Agreement on the exchange of currencies) (*Tóth*, 2009, 162.).

Therefore, when the foreign ministers of Hungary and Austria destroyed some pieces of the mentioned border fence on 27 June 1989, it seemed, for the shallow observer, an act to remove a physical obstacle. In fact, by giving the would-be dissidents a way out, it became an act of political significance. Moreover, as it happened in a border-zone separating Europe's Eastern and Western parts, it was rather a symbolic gesture, seeking approval, and enhancing goodwill both among the Hungarian masses and the public and political leaders in the West. Inevitably, such an action involved a political message, consequences of which Budapest and Bonn had to consider for and against.

Diplomatic policy in transit

Now turned penetrable, the open borders – dividing Hungary from Austria on the West and Yugoslavia on the South – helped Budapest to regain a great deal of sovereignty. The Hungarian diplomatic policy was in transit from the socialist-type commitment to a promising new relationship (and later on: alliance) with the western world. In the middle of 1989, some sort of a risk seemed to be unavoidable, so it was held necessary to seek for risk-minimization. In the spirit of that – in spite of Hungary's No.1 political intention to start a closer and wider co-operation with the West-German govern-

ment – Budapest officially regarded the problem of refugees a 'German-German' issue. That nature of policy-making of the day was illustrated well, when – on the same day – Gyula Horn, then foreign minister of Hungary, used a press conference to dismiss any conjectures about Warsaw Pact being disbanded. As he put it, "History created the special need for this Pact, and only the same sort of need might bring about its end". (Hungarian Telegraph Agency '*MTI*', 27 June, 1989). Obviously, that message was in conflict with the spirit of the scene, where, on the same day, that very symbolic gesture had taken place. Nevertheless, – contrary to the 'in system'-type contradictions we have mentioned above – this was an 'inter-system' contradiction, intimating Budapest's delicate position in that respect. With the course of time, it became more and more obvious that, besides turning to be the scene of the conflict, Hungary was one of the front-line actors. When it could no longer be denied, Budapest labelled her position as that of a 'neutral mediator'.

Such rhetoric was most advisable to all front-line actors. In the case of Hungary, socialist-block partners must have accepted it, because Budapest still appeared to comply with the mainline policy of the socialist block countries. Berlin's non-alliance stand by Hungary (the vague guarantees Bonn had offered to maintain the safety of Hungary) saved both Hungary and West Germany suspicions from their just then allies. By such proofs of 'keeping in the line', both Budapest and Bonn demonstrated their intentions to conform to 'their partners' general interests'. It had also proved the very readiness of the Kohl administration to accept the standpoint of most West German political parties, who insisted that East Germany's home movements themselves should bring about political changes without much demonstrative help from the West. The political powers otherwise representing diametrically opposed views agreed that in the interest of a long-term solution for the crisis, changes must be forced inside the GDR. The international environment also offered a suitable background to the latter. Border opening and the opportunity of unhindered relocation could lead to the subsidence of the wish, and mainly the strength, to enforce reforms. Instead of increasing tension in the international scene and between Germans, the solution was offered in the opposite direction, namely in the acceleration of the East German reform processes. In addition, the Bonn Government could refer exactly to Hungary as an example for the success of this undertaking. All this mindfulness was also to conceal the unpreparedness of West Germany to handle the crisis in case it escalates to an international scale. (*Tóth*, 2009, p. 161)

In a number of instances, such precise action planning became overwritten – in the symbolic and factual meaning of the word – by newspaper

articles, 'real time' radio, and TV reports. As the public is rarely open to accept any sophisticated explanations of diplomatic 'do'-s and 'do not'-s, the German diplomacy made efforts to convince senior state officials and media-gurus to lessen the number of articles and reports, as well as to organize panel discussions. In those, experts could have non-officially explained some hidden aspects of the situation to the public. Even in August 1989, after the 27 June destruction of some pieces of the mentioned border fence, diplomats from the Budapest Embassy of Bonn requested the Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn) and the Vienna Embassy of the FRG to leak out no information on the growing problem. First, possibly not on the number of German dissidents' successful crossings of the border, which could seriously restrict the manoeuvrability of the West German diplomacy. As several West German politicians put it, 'Illegal migration out of East Germany might not solve the real problem'. Under-secretary Walter Priesnitz, Head of Chancellery, emphasized it to the public that the reunification was only possible if East German citizens stayed in their homeland. (*Tageszeitung,* 9 August, 1989). Communiqués of the same sort were issued under the names of SPD-President Hans-Jochen Vogel and Hans Klein, Kohl's Minister for communicational affairs.

In spite of all these efforts, the crisis was not only holding on but escalating as well, and the West German leadership prepared for a more active part to play.

A destructive conflict: East Germany's dispute with Hungary and West Germany

As it has been mentioned already, the East German leaders denied the existence of the problem itself, so they failed to draw new perspectives. One of the fundamental mistakes they committed in this respect was that they felt nothing of the necessity of history. Instead, they rejected the think-over of any point of view other than their own one; thus, they made any trilateral negotiations impossible. Their habit of solving problems via totalitarian methods prevented them from seeking for some compromise even though that is the most professional solution for state-level diplomats. Moreover, the doublespeak style of the Soviet foreign policy of the day might have mislead Honecker's men, who, for some reason, probably focused only on Moscow's hardliner words.

As the problem was on the rise instead of getting under control, the style of the East German press turned more and more denouncing, accusing Bonn and the West German press of 'interfering with East German home affairs' and Hungary of being 'extremely liberal'. Honecker's diplomats repeatedly blamed all the other, directly involved actors for what they named 'un-

favourable developments', and tried to force actions which were obviously out of place. They insisted on Hungary's respecting the bilateral agreement of 20 June 1969, which obliged the parties to stop citizens trying to leave the country for any unauthorized destination. However, the Central European political atmosphere of the day had already made such an act outdated; the Hungarian negotiators realized that well, and rejected the East German proposal. The more the parties came through such cycles, the more indignant the East German negotiators turned, and so they provoked similar emotions in others. In the end, East Berlin's insensitivity to the necessity of reforms turned all parties and most European peoples dissatisfied with the leadership of East Germany.

The problem of those refugees who had occupied Bonn's permanent representation in East Berlin came to a solution on 8 September 1989, when East Berlin formally got his way by making his citizens return to their permanent residences in return for no other official promise but that their applications for immigration visa would be 'seriously considered'. This coded expression announced the sovereignty of the Honecker-administration, but it also implied an implicit 'yes' to virtually all the applicants. However, such a 'save face' solution had hardly had any chance to take place in Hungary, even though East Berlin hoped to make the problem an 'in-family' issue.

Constructive conflict between Budapest and Bonn
The cooperation between Hungary and West Germany could not have been without a conflict. That is only natural between a country, such as the German Federal Republic, with a privet economy and an unfolded democracy on the one hand, and a country on the other hand, like Hungary, whose policy was just transient from state-owned economy and autocratic policy-making to applying market economy and democratic systems.

As it has been mentioned before, Bonn held it undesirable to bring about the German reunification by supporting a massive flow of immigrants from the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany. Therefore, they left, at least on the surface, the problem of refugees to be solved by international human rights organizations (whom West Germany endowed a great deal of financial support), and by the state of Hungary (whom Bonn expected to give 'refugee-status' to the asylum-seekers in return for eased visa-procedures). All that fitted in the policy of 'well measured process'. (*Tóth*, 2009, pp 166-167) In addition to the above, another problem included the fact that the Hungarian government refused to treat GDR citizens as refugees. Although Bonn endeavoured to do its utmost to include them in the range of people protected under the UN refugee convention, this barely yielded any result. In a narrower sense, people forced to

leave their homelands on account of their religion, race, nationality or political conviction. Indeed, those who fled the GDR did not fit in this category. The fact of political persecution, on the other hand, could not be clearly deducted from the social and political system of the motherland. If Hungary gave refuge to them for political reasons, an utterly embarrassing situation would have been created vis-à-vis the other Socialist countries, especially, of course, the GDR. In the opinion of the Hungarian party, the state's refusal to grant the freedom of travelling was in conflict with the law in every respect, but could not be considered as political persecution. Moreover, the East Germans considered Hungary merely as a transit country, which rendered granting the refugee status rather difficult. (*Tóth,* 2012, p. 81)

Naturally, the competent persons in the donor country were very well aware of this fact. For this reason, they based their argumentation on the fact that the punishment or retaliation imposed on these people for emigration or illegal border crossing gave a political character to this limitation of rights. They were at a loss to know why the Hungarian authorities were prepared to consider political persecution during the period before leaving the country. They considered this attitude contradictory to the spirit of the convention. In addition to the repression, in their opinion, other discriminative measures may have justified the right to refuge directly jeopardizing the rights to life and freedom. These included, for instance, if livelihood was threatened as a result of discrimination, or other legal disadvantages were suffered because of it.

The federal government was, naturally, aware of the fact that the whole migration case was an extremely delicate matter for Hungary. For this reason, they made efforts at managing these affairs with the greatest circumspection and consideration. The Foreign Ministry used several different ways to force the solution. They were even ready to give political impetus to urge action by the Hungarian government. Within the framework of smoother transport, they held out the prospects of cancelling the visa requirement between Hungary and the FRG, which had been requested on several occasions by Hungary from the Bonn government. The solution seemed to be favourable also because in this case the Hungarian authorities could not refuse to allow the East Germans who had passports issued by the embassy to leave Hungary for lack of valid entry visas. (*Tóth,* 2012, pp 81-83)

In the first couple of months of the Hungarian-West German talks, the spirit of 'busy idleness' hung over the conference table. However, as the problem was on the rise, the public became more and more hungry for something worth mentioning, or perhaps one or two 'spectacular' steps – just a kind of thing in sharp disharmony with the strategy of West German diplomacy. No final solution seemed to be within grasp. On the contrary!

Summer holidays were coming to their ends, and that was bringing a deadline for East German holidaymakers in Hungary to make up their minds about applying for asylum instead of returning home. The Hungarian media estimated that their number had already mounted to 200.000 persons, some 10 percent of which was likely to refuse the return. Moreover, several thousands of East German citizens had to return from Bulgaria and Rumania via Hungary. Some German 'tourists' were also likely to arrive from Czechoslovakia.

Therefore, the problem of refugees in Hungary was likely to get from bad to worse. At the beginning of September 1989, activists of International Red Cross and of Maltese Charity Service had already lodged 5000 refugees in such small country areas as Csillebérc, Zánka and Zugliget, where conditions were unsuited to protect humans from the cold of winter.

With all these problems coming on the horizon, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Hungarian Prime Minister Miklós Németh, together with their foreign ministers, set together in the near-Bonn Castle of Gymnich, and started top secret talks. Unlike ordinary diplomatic negotiations, no minutes were kept; in retrospect, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher compiled a remembrance-document for later use by the chancellor. Rumour from some well-informed yet unconfirmed sources held that Németh had agreed to let all the refugees cross the Hungarian-Austrian border on 11 September –– prior to the CDU Congress scheduled to be held in Bremen. (*Akten*, 2005, pp 44; *Oplatka*, 2008.)

Summing up
Over the years of the 1980s, more and more elements of social and economical problems indicated the necessity of closer and wider co-operation based on a transfusion of technologies and vast amounts of capital from Western to Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact countries were all too cautious not to make spectacular steps in that direction, yet Hungary – with her diplomacy having had geopolitical orientation for the West – was given some scope to take the initiatives. Therefore, towards the end of the decade, it happened that, unlike the field of defence, Budapest had a limited yet existing sovereignty in terms of diplomacy. Comparative freedom was granted to strengthen the ties of economy with Western Europe, especially West Germany. In 1989, the refugee-crisis offered Budapest a special occasion to gain full independence. Both Hungary and West Germany were careful enough not to progress too fast for fear their allies might stop them. The East German actor was still strong enough to save face for a while, but was without the realization of what is called "the turning of the wheels of history". Whatever much the communist ideology had said about 'revolutions', the original

meaning of the word 're-volvere' refers to the hidden tendencies in social life, some tendencies which a careful diplomacy must feel in order to harness its potentials. Conflicts of expectations may occur according to the actors' interests, and contradiction of actions may characterize the diplomatically 'measured process'; all these can be seen of the examples of talks among Bonn, East Berlin and Budapest in 1989.

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Nováky, Erzsébet:
Alternative Scenarios for Hungary for the Year 2025[1]

The paper[2] presents how the Committee on Futures Research, within Section IX. of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS), sees the possible futures for Hungary for the year 2025, based on the expertise of Hungarian futurists and social scientists, including the opinions of younger generations. It offers insight to Hungarian society in 18 years from 2007, when the research began. In co-operation with experts coming from diverse scientific backgrounds and with those who feel responsibility for the future and are willing to act upon it, we need to continue discovering our horizon albeit in a different way and to embark on new roads. In summary, we need to change the HOW and the WHAT.

"The future cannot be predicted,
but futures can be invented."
(DENNIS, Gabor)

Research objective and approach

In 2007, Hungary and the Hungarian society were living in times of critical changes. Our hopes and anticipations concerning the change of the system have fallen short of expectations: although in the political and economic sense, and, to a great extent, in the social sense important transformations have been carried out. However, we still could not reach a new point of stability. In a continuously changing system, the stability that we hope for – meaning security, social welfare, and economic stability – can only be achieved and sustained through constant adaptation and renewal.

Hungary does not possess the necessary power or tools to lead or shape global and regional driving forces, so this should not be presented as an objective. However, a realistic aim could be the development of an early warning system about imminent changes, in order to be able to foresee and consciously prepare for their consequences. We can shape our fate and our future given our ability to make major decisions. For good decision-making, it is important to learn about the past and present, about the plans of other communities around us, but it is also crucial to think ahead in a future oriented, future conscious way. *The aim of our research was to support the future orientation and the future awareness of the Hungarian society, to bring the future closer and present it to a wider public.*

The selected time-span of the research is of human scale: we would like to get an insight into the present days of the next generation. We are focusing on the coming 15–20 years of Hungary, in the year 2025. Our aim is *not to present one precise prediction but rather to explore future opportunities, related fears and hopes of the Hungarian society and thus to prepare alternative scenarios for Hungary.* We would like to draw the attention to the fact that the present of the next generation is to a large extent shaped by us in the present and the near future, thus our responsibility is enormous.

About the future, we can only say that it is uncertain and changing rapidly. It can be expected that the next 15–20 years will bring changes that influence our world and our nation, both in social and economic dimensions. Our present characteristics bear the signs of transition that sometimes are even chaotic. In such a situation, small changes can often trigger processes different from past or present ones, breaking away from trends and leading us into new directions, creating an open space for new future alternatives. Next to the small potential factors, new elements that have never been seen or predicted before can surface and strengthen. Consequently, our aim is to uncover those signals that can hardly be sensed in the present, to which we

do not attach much significance today, as well as those possibilities that have a small chance of materializing, but have a potentially large impact on our future.

We are thinking in terms of individuals and society simultaneously. Certain "novelties" – tools, appliances or processes – may be well known to certain individuals, but on the level of society, they still bear a potential of renewal. (Due to the slow spread of the Internet in Hungary, the process of digitalization can be given as an example.) Other "innovations" have been present in the society, but individuals need to learn how to apply them or live with them (take e-governance for example). Developments at individual and society level are interconnected, which can induce and strengthen each other, which is why we handled this as a whole during our research. This approach proved to be extremely important when working on the alternative scenarios, since a future image of a society can only be understood if it is presented at the level of the individual.

Exploring changes is a complex task. We are looking for changes that shape our national future in two – sometimes overlapping – areas: in the first group, we study changes that *we can influence,* that we want and/or can modify (as, for example, demographic trends, health-care and nutrition, welfare, mental illnesses, education, sustainable households, crime, governance and administration, regional development). In the second group, we study changes that are expected to have an *important impact on the social, economic and/or environmental future of our country* (like globalization, technical development, and economy). These dimensions define the boundaries of the *scope of action* for shaping our country's future.

As a result of this selection, certain fields such as outer space research or paranormal phenomena are excluded from our research, since, in our opinion, these issues shall not play an important role in our everyday lives in the next 15 years. We also did not analyze in detail issues that are well researched and where critical questions, possible future developments and necessary actions are well known and accepted or have been thoroughly researched and documented – such as global warming.

In the first phase of the research, we asked experts of a given field – futurists as well as representatives of other sciences – to prepare studies introducing the expected and possible changes, the positive and negative tendencies for the next 15 years. The studies focused on mapping out possible social and technical/technological development paths and their boundaries, and on revealing possible dangers and pitfalls. The opinion of experts, their fears and hopeful expectations, are presented in the chapter called "Future possibilities." In the research process, we also mapped out individuals' possibilities and methods for social renewal: by conducting a *survey,* we ques-

tioned *representatives of younger generations* (who are anticipated to act as decision-makers in 2025) about their preconception of the future.

In order to see how young people relate to the future, we asked grammar school pupils and university students about how they think about the next 18 years. What are the expectations, fears, and hopes they have concerning different dimensions of life, what they expect as future employees, future citizens, and members of the civil society? How they envisage their personal life, their family circumstances and number of children, and what they wish to do in order to make their hopes come true and to make their fears go away or at least to abate them.[3]

On the social and on the individual level, *the present (i.e. the scope of action) can be found in the dual bonds of the past and the future.* The so-called consequence-future deriving from the past defines the starting point, the situation where different alternatives can come to life. Our concepts regarding the future, combined with our future expectations, act as a "pulling force" in the present. Thus, the feared and anticipated future possibilities and our future expectations, reflected in our hopes and fears, together shape our collective and individual decision-making and action process.[4]

In the second phase of the research based on *the future possibilities* formulated in the expert studies and on the *future expectations* derived from the empirical data, *alternative scenarios* were constructed.

The new futures methodology applied in the research can handle both the individual and the social dimensions of this dual bond, while expert opinions concerning special research fields and complex individual expectations work to strengthen the multi- and interdisciplinary approach and to support integration of unstable factors and innovative ideas in the future scenarios.

Heritage and global determinations

In Hungary, the generation reaching adulthood in 2025 shall be confronted by different kinds of changes. In case this generation has to wake up to these changes without any prior preparation, it will easily slip into the state of "future shock" without understanding where it lost track. *Today responsibility lies with us: although we cannot tell future generations what the future will be like, we can equip them with tools to think about the future.* One part of this future is already visible: certain processes and structures they

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[3] Individual and social renewal can also be traced among other groups, so the survey has also been conducted among PhD students and members of the Committee on Futures Research of the Academy.

[4] When defining future possibilities and future expectations, unstable factors can appear in the scope of action, which were taken into consideration both in the expert studies and at the time of conducting the survey.

will inherit from us, while others are being shaped by global determinations, already seen today.

What does this generation inherit? Firstly, there are trends and structures with predictable outcomes: the slow decrease of the Hungarian population, the increase of immigration, the aging society, the widening gap between the rich and the poor, the increasing interdependence of the Hungarian and European economy, the decreasing role of the state, the decreasing natural resources, the growing number of educated people, as well as the increasing demand for knowledge and innovative thinking.

Beside these trends and structures, the next generation is supposed to count with globally determined outputs, among which we can find economic, ecological, social-demographic and political problems as well. The *economic problems* include the deficient functioning of the world economy, the dominance of international financial markets, the debt-crisis, the primacy of profit-orientation, the expansion of multinational companies leading to financial, productive, and social restructuring, the significant differences in living conditions, the polarization of society, the maintenance and strengthening of the consumer society at all costs, the rising unemployment, the migration and the financial crimes. Due to the overburdening of the Earth, *ecological problems* will become increasingly visible: the lack of drinking water, global climate change and its consequences, global air pollution, exploitation and endangering of the environment (due to profit-orientation), the decrease of energy resources, the proliferation of dangerous technologies and weapons, and environmental hazards. As a consequence of these changes, we have to face *severe social and demographic problems:* population boom in developing countries, decreasing population in the developed countries, conflicts and possible clashes of civilizations, global migration, unsustainability of education, the deterioration of health, and the radical growth of criminal activity. These problems are reflected in the *political* sphere as well: the global dominance of the USA, local wars, religious conflicts and the spread of local conflicts, the open or disguised demonstration of power based on violence as opposed to democracy, international terrorism, global crime, the arms race, and confused ethical values shall all influence our lives.

The challenges that the next generation will have to face are not exclusively threats. There are certain processes that we have initiated today in order to support positive outcomes. One good example is the international trend towards motivating the redefinition of the role of state and, especially, state administration, in order to empower the state to respond to positive social models. Balanced and complex development is a key issue, since positive processes need to be supported from various angles and be developed based on synergies. The introduction of e-governance, the development of

citizens' digital competencies, and continuous innovation can only bring new quality to public administration if implemented together. However, in case of development at the level of administration, innovation, education, and health-care, it should be taken into consideration that the outcome of envisaged changes are not predictable and previous analyses of the long-term consequences carry an *average instability.*

There are certain processes and phenomena *(unstable factors)* whose outcome cannot be foreseen. The future that is yet to evolve stems from two sources: there are novelties, for which we feel the need, the hope that the circumstances will induce their emergence. In today's Hungarian society, for example, there is a need for a new type of representation, but it is still an open question whether it will bring about the reinforcement of the civil society, or some kind of new organizations of interest representation, or maybe some new political parties will assume this role.

Signs of the unforeseeable future can also derive from the so-called *seeds of the future* or *weak signals.* In this case, not even the above-mentioned expectation is present, since the change is in such an early phase that even the change itself and its direction and outcome are uncertain. Here, we deal with *events* or *discoveries* that can contribute to an emerging trend or with processes that are already present in certain dimensions (in certain social classes or regions) but *are yet unknown in our country*. These weak signals (as, for example, alternative medical treatments, spirituality, artificial intelligence in everyday life, the spread of robots) are hard to notice and identify at their initial phase, so it is hard to prepare for their impacts. Weak signals, however, refer to seeds of the future (meaning, they have potential) that can be used to create a better situation. Weak signals often appear at the weak nodes of the system, carrying a potential for change, which means that they often reveal alternative paths to the future.

Hungary faces challenges that appear in multiple dimensions, differing in content, structure, and dynamics, which need to be tackled differently. *In case of heritages and determinations, the key issue is the skill and capacity to adapt. Adaptation*, however, does not mean a passive tolerance but rather an *active preparation*.

Our relation to change is, therefore, a critical issue in shaping the future: we need to discover and accept our limitations; we need to identify our opportunities and prepare for the future, for the unpredictable and the unexpected. These expectations and opportunities are often expressed in forms of hopes and fears that we will discuss in the next chapter.

Future possibilities – our fears and hopes regarding 2025

The future possibilities that appear in our fears and hopes – like a menu card – were discovered systematically through expert studies during the research process. These can materialize as the continuation of the dominating trends of the past or because of change of discourse. During our research, we endeavored to widen the scope of opportunities, so we do not only present complementary alternatives but opposing ones as well – fear and hope are often the two sides of the same coin (see *Table 1*). We took the courage to outline radical scenarios as well.

Table 1: Fears and hopes

The analyzed issue	Fears	Hopes
Demographic trends, family	Declining births, decreasing population, and average family-size.	Younger generations feel the need to have bigger families and more children.
State of health, physical harmony, quality of life	Increasing burden on health care systems and, as a result, decreasing quality of health care. New illnesses appear partly due to unhealthy lifestyles and to rising mental problems. The older generations' state of health continues to deteriorate.	The population's state of health ameliorates due to increasing health-awareness, health-education, and the focus on prevention. The amelioration of the working environment of health care is in line with a special attention to health care employees. The population's state of health reaches EU norms.
Mental health, deviance, mental disorders	The number of outcasts who cannot or do not want to integrate is increasing, including the number of those suffering from depression. Many face mental problems and turn to drugs. There are an increasing number of behavioral problems among children. There is growing fear that narcotics will become a lifestyle.	Communities recognize the importance of preventing deviant attitudes, more and more NGOs aim to improve the situation of the ill, and to raising awareness among youngsters. Future oriented psychiatric research and care aimed to ameliorate the quality of life among the mentally ill is emphasized and supported.
Body culture, physical culture, sports, tourism	The population becomes less interested in sports and healthy living, the rate of overweight and inactive children increases by 25%, physical wellbeing is placed at the periphery of thinking. The media promote norms that lack physical activity and, thus, indirectly contribute to the spread of locomotory disorders.	Health-awareness is increasing among people; thus, sports are becoming more popular. Fields where multi-generation families and small communities can spend quality time shall be created, which helps to build communities. Physical education becomes a key issue in education. Creative tourism becomes popular.

The analyzed issue	Fears	Hopes
Nutrition, eating habits	Impoverishment leads to consumption of unhealthy food, especially among disadvantaged groups, large families.	In Hungary, eating habits are improving, bearing more resemblance to the Mediterranean diet. Healthy lifestyle becomes a national movement promoted by the media.
Minorities, drop-outs	The decline in the situation of minorities, particularly gypsy population, and fears of immigration strengthen. Functional illiteracy significantly increases, as well as the number of unskilled young workers. The risk of forming conflict-driven groups among minorities increases.	Acceptance and cooperation characterize attitudes towards immigrants especially among youngsters. Minorities living in Hungary become part of our community while keeping their cultural identities and roots without conflicts.
The homeless	Within the framework of existing institutions, it is impossible to (re)integrate the homeless into the society. This closed group of increasing size threatens social stability.	Homeless shelters are reorganized rationally. Communities turn to support the homeless since they recognize that most homeless people can be reintegrated.
Crime and prevention	Political-economic crime, especially corruption, gains momentum. Political terrorism and international crime, international terrorism and national crime become interwoven. IT crime is on the increase, investment fraud is spreading and the property-mafia gains grounds.	Owing to fundamental changes in the legal regulation and to strengthening cooperation with international organizations, corruption declines, environmental consciousness increases, investment fraud drops, IT crime is controlled, NGO and civil control development plays a critical role in curbing crime.
Bio- and gene technology	The hazards of bio- and gene technology applications become visible, the first negative consequences appear. The non-transparent research increases fear among population, which is further enhanced by the media.	Efficiency is further increased through biotechnological applications, contributing to economic profitability. Due to the widespread use of gene technology in agriculture, productivity increases, ripening periods shorten, production becomes simpler, crop losses are eliminated, and farming becomes more sustainable.
Nano-technology	Molecular reorganization presents new hazards. Reduction of sizes affects the deteriorative potentials and, thus, possibly endangers human health. There is an increasing threat of manipulation.	Interdisciplinary nano-science becomes a driving force of the industrial revolution. Developments and applications bring enormous success in medical science.

The analyzed issue	Fears	Hopes
Digital divide	The divide separating different social classes is deepening, especially along lines of education and location. The despair of those lagging behind threatens with social conflict.	The social divide becomes identified and known to many. The experiences of the past and the recognition of new challenges support the creation of social harmony.
Training and education	Changes bring new challenges to the educational system creating instability in the sector. Mobile and distance-learning appear only in isolated regions, traditional educational methods dominate the field. Unsuccessful adaptation reduces the quality of education and the respect for educators. Illiteracy increases in the society.	The developing efficiency of educational methods is in the focus of attention. Individually shaped learning techniques appear due to IT development and growing access to mobile networks. New learning methods – e-learning, community learning, distance learning – are becoming more important and complementing versions of institutional education.
E-governance	The spread of e-government further increases fear caused by the digital divide. The majority of the Hungarian population (especially the unskilled and the minorities) cannot profit from the new opportunities and they are left out from certain social processes.	The grown-up "digital generation" forms the world of digital natives who can navigate in the e-world with ease. Society responds positively to digital administration and uses it actively, which results in a more efficient handling of official tasks.
Globalization	Globalization bears the possibility of uniformization. Fears appear on the medium level: the new world of globalization collides with society on this level. The self-destructive character of globalization, apparent already in its actual state, can take shape. It reverses the social activity of the rich and poor. The biggest problem in the near future concerning globalization is the problem of natural resources. There is also a lack of actors taking efficiently part in solving global problems.	Actors capable of regulating the global world appear and strengthen. Nations together find the institutional framework of international police, international courts, their democratic control, and accept their global regulations and decisions. Regulations that could never be accepted at local levels due to the conflicts of interest (such as the decisions concerning the cohabitation of minorities within a nation-state) are introduced at the global level.
Environment	Non-renewable energy resources are on the decline, the state of the environment deteriorates at a shocking pace. Natural disasters become more and more violent and frequent. There are no universal actors for universal solutions.	The environment-awareness of society increases, sustainability is in the focus of education already at an early age. Consumption habits are harmonized with environmental capacities. Technical developments contribute greatly to the creation of environmental-friendly applications.

The analyzed issue	Fears	Hopes
Regional development	The developments are unbalanced, regional aspects are neglected in the process of planning macro-strategies, which facilitates that regional inequalities increase and centralization intensifies. Villages are abandoned consequently. Due to the appearance of new types of restructuring problems, new crisis areas emerge. Cultural traditions and values are being lost.	The territorial structure of the country is expected to become functionally differentiated and the important nodes are going to be modified. The situation of the border regions will improve due to "open" European borders. The role of Budapest changes acquiring new international dimensions. Local communities and civil organizations gain control in the development of smaller regions and villages.
Sustainable households	Consumers can become addicted to the shopping and entertainment culture, thus consumer society expands without control. The opponents of consumerism turn violent, and mall-vandalism appears.	In the future, sustainable households and new consumer habits develop. The concept of sustainability becomes a guideline in designing consumer and living spaces. The new eco- and bio-fashion such as eco-design becomes popular and widespread. Younger generations will wish to "return to nature."
Economy	Without essential changes in the economy, Hungary will slip back to the level of the most underdeveloped countries in the EU. Instead of monetary stability, financial markets will follow inflation cycles. The economy will be characterized by outdated import structure, resource- and energy-dependence, enduring deficit, high inflation, and unemployment rate. We will become more and more dependent on foreign capital, in order to keep up the direct investment flow; we will need to give even more allowances to foreign investors.	Regarding the important macro indexes and the structure of the national economy, we will catch up with the EU 15 average. A long-term national modernization strategy will be defined and reached through the cooperation of economic, political, and social stakeholders. The positive effects of this modernization process will be visible at the micro level as well. With proper motivation, small enterprises will be able to design new business tools and models, improving production indicators and innovation.

In summary: fears derive from the fact that participants (stakeholders and decision-makers) do not take responsibility, do not act to meet the needs of the community, do not take action for a better future, and do not accept changes in creative ways. On the other hand, hopes are regarded as realistic, because they call for long-term, responsible thinking and action, community values and interests are emphasized, and changes are approached in creative and positive ways.

Alternative scenarios for the future – Hungary in 2025
The fears and hopes defined by the experts serve to outline a realistic picture of Hungary's future. Of course, not all of these expectations will come true. Some of these hopes and fears will eventually materialize, but how, or in what structure they are going to take place, depend largely on how the Hungarian society can relate to these problems. The basic question is *how today's and tomorrow's decision makers* – high school and graduate students – *think about the future, how they can balance their views and suggestions, and what they intend to do in order to make the future alternative selected by the community come true.*

The two basic factors of our concept are the individual and the society. *We intend to understand tomorrow's society through the individual.* The roles that an individual assumes in different dimensions together make up a complex picture. Individuals act like little pieces in a mosaic, whose shape depends largely on *what individuals assume about the future, how they regard it, how they relate to change, what their wishes and preferences are, and, of course, what they are willing to do in order to make their dreams come true.* Based on the different groups formed by individuals, thinking about the future and acting for it – depending on the individuals' social status and role, with regard to their hopes and fears about the future – we can outline alternative scenarios, while keeping in mind the social potential, capacity, and willingness to turn it into reality.

We analyzed how grammar-school seniors and university students (who will be 36–40 years old in 2025) relate to the future through a stratified sampling survey, which is based on the Ward method. The survey was conducted by questioning 1000 grammar-school pupils and 500 university students. We have identified seven groups among grammar-school pupils: the "Conscious group" (23%), the "Rational group" (19%), the "Purposeless group" (16%), the "Good-guy group" (14%), the "Open group" (13%), the "Fearful group" (9%), and the "Drifters group" (6%). Based on a 500 sample of university graduate students of arbitrary selection, five homogeneous groups were formed with the Ward method (following principles of easy communication and cost-efficiency). These are "Individualist or sure-footed, pliant" (25%), "Life-planning engineers" (24%), "Treasury optimists" (16%), "Harbingers of troubles" (21%), and the "Drifters" (14%), which is also present among grammar-school pupils.

Alternative scenarios – descriptions
Along the two critical *scenario variables* shaping the future of Hungary – values (both individual and community) and social development (stagnation/decline and growth/development) as axes – *four scenarios were elaborated for the year 2025.* In these scenarios, there are different representa-

tions of the two dimensions – thinking about the future and acting for the future – characterized by the *four integrative forces: responsibility, community, activity, and creativity*. These integrative forces significantly influence the picture of the society, because different social groups and classes are shaping their own scenarios based on these values.

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                        Community values

       Scenario 4                          Scenario 1
       Drifting and                        Individuals
  wallowing together (without goals)   in the community network


Stagnation/decline                          Growth/Development

       Scenario 3                          Scenario 2
  Society of individuals left behind    Society of individualists


                         Individual values
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
Figure 1: Alternative scenarios

Community values prevail among the surveyed grammar-school pupils who belong to the "open group," the "rational group", and the "good-guy group", and graduate students who are "life-planning engineers" and "treasury optimists", with a desire for growth and development. Given that half of the questioned grammar-school pupils and 40% of graduate students belong to this group, favorable changes can happen with the help of these people. Consequently, their values can be crucial in Hungary of 2025, provided there is no external intervention. As a result, one of the possible, positive scenarios for 2025 should be one ruled by community values, growth, and development. We describe this in the *first scenario.*

Scenario 1: Individuals in the community network – integrative forces

Responsibility
There is increased individual responsibility because there are less stable nodes within the community, given the fact that the state assumes a lesser role in the regulation of everyday life. The majority of people in the community recognizes their own responsibility in avoiding trouble and thus puts more emphasis on creating harmony, healthy environment, healthy nutrition, learning, and different forms of self-training. Local decision-making processes change as well. Due to implementing the principle of subsidiary, local autonomy increases, local communities have bigger role and bear bigger responsibility in shaping their own future, while they have more decision-making competences mainly concerning local issues, but to a certain extent, concerning national issues as well. Members of the community set their priorities with responsibility and act jointly to achieve them.
Community
This is a critical factor in this scenario. Community takes on a different form for today's generations from what it used to be. Along with family, neighbors, and friends, we can find a virtual community as well. The individual and the community are in harmony. Community takes the form of a network, where everybody can find his/her place and shows solidarity with others. It is not possible for larger groups to fall through or to break away from the network. Individuals feel responsibility for their smaller and bigger communities. A good community is characterized by long-term thinking.
Activity
The stakeholders, the individuals forming part of a network can only elaborate an appropriate strategy if they harmonize their roles. In order to do so, stakeholders need to learn to think on "networking" lines, which go beyond linear thinking that used to characterize individual thinking. An individual living and acting as part of a community web has to interpret its own actions as part of the network while seeking to increase its power and lessening its weak points. Those who have recognized that they are interdependent on their community, act in various ways to serve community interests. In this society, everybody will do his/her best to support the community: children, youngsters, and the elderly as well.
Creativity
The millennium generation faces a huge challenge if it wants to break out of the present and find a new path among global and local determinants. All individuals need to adapt to conditions described above, while fostering creativity. It is an advantage that youngsters who belong to this scenario do not express similar views, given that cooperation of different or conflicting personalities can bring better results and more novelties. Those who are creative in different directions and those who are not creative on their own can together bring a new quality to creativity, thanks to the social energy induced by the community. This could also motivate others to look into the future with optimism, have high expectations, think positively, and act to achieve it.

It can be supposed that the influence of this community cannot prevail within the country. The majority of the world does not seem to be inclined to support Hungarian cooperation, but the influence works on the contrary. As a result, individual thinking – that characterizes approximately one quar-

ter of today's pupils and students – can become dominant and the society described in the *second scenario* shall evolve.

Scenario 2: Society of individualists – integrative forces

Responsibility
Responsibility is connected and limited to organizing the own life of the individual. It is plausible and even desired to get to know various religions. Members desire all imaginable novelties to increase quality of life in the long-run, which brings about the spread of eco-products, a smaller proportion of GMOs in the nutrition, gene-therapy in medical treatments, etc. They would not like to see a two-party (democratic) parliament and they do not wish to opt for home-schooling instead of traditional schools. This group gave the least uncertain answers.
Community
Here communities are not significant and are "ad hoc" or transitory. Group members are not bothered if the given community abandons them or if they simply drop out. They live self-supporting lives, mainly alone and form "single person groups". They prefer living in a consumer or entertainment society (theme-tourism, entertaining education), along with work-career-profit orientation.
This attitude might reflect the development of their adaptive capabilities in our globalizing world. They will certainly succeed better in life, if international capital becomes the "ruling" power. Members of this scenario think that it is crucial to develop technologies that increase the quality of life. They are pleased to see the spread of market economy and the privatization of the public service sector. They do not expect support from either the state or the society, so that they can pursue their individual interests without limitations.
Activity
The expectations and the future of the members of this group are closely connected to their activities. They are self-supporting, who take active part in shaping their future. They consider learning as an important element in their lives. Usually, they are supporters of a healthy lifestyle: they do not plan to consume drugs or smoke or drink in excess, thus they hope to stay in good health for long. Deviance is an alien phenomenon for them. As active members of the society, they would be charitable, collecting waste selectively, and not cheating on taxes. They expect the amelioration of their peers' and their own quality of life, they relate optimistically to the future, thinking that the key to success is in their own hands.
Creativity
The creativity of this individualistic group is very personal, not extending to the community level. Through systematic work, they become part of the society, creating advantageous conditions for economic growth. They will not become leaders of the society nor will they renew social structures, as this would require sacrifices, but they will always stay close to power centers.

There is a grave possibility that radicalism and opposition in Hungary will strengthen to such extent that much of the population will become *frightened,* while another part will become defiant and feel lost. This can be the case if a significant amount of economic power concentrates in the hands

of international corporations so that Hungarian communities cannot play a decisive role, lacking either the opportunity or the power to assert Hungarian interests or even their own interest. According to our survey, among the 18-year-old population 15% belong to the groups of "the fearful" and "the drifters," while the proportion of "the harbingers of trouble" and "the drifters" is 35% among graduate students. Consequently, external forces, their number is likely to increase in the future. This situation is described in the *third scenario*.

Scenario 3: Society of individuals left behind – integrative forces

Responsibility
The frightened do not take responsibility because they are frightened to do so, while those who are drifting and feel lost do not assume any responsibility towards others.
Community
Those who are frightened cannot find solutions for the community to face their fears of the future, because they do not even search for it. Those who feel lost live in changing and ad hoc communities from time to time.
Activity
Learning is not regarded as a positive path to take. They are not charitable, probably because they have never seen a positive example or they do not believe that they can afford it. Members of the frightened group tend to stay at home and they are abstinent. They adapt negatively to rules, i.e. they do not break rules, but neither do they accomplish them. They do not practice sports mainly because there is no good example to follow, but they do not believe that as a result they might become obese. In most questions, they are undecided, while they tend to reject issues if they feel incompetent. They refuse globalization as well as the EU.
Creativity
They are not creative, but members of the drifting group could be motivated to act creatively if they get guidance and support from society.

We cannot rule out the possibility that the situation in the world deteriorates to a level where the majority of Hungarians finds it unreasonable to try to create a better world or even to feel frightened or lost. According to the analysis of aggression-evolution, if a child keeps on being angry and furious without any result, after a while he/she will become indifferent. This is similar to the situation *when adults decide to stay indifferent as a community and they drift and "wallow" together*. According to our survey, 16% of today's "purposeless" 18-year-olds tends to think like that. However, among the questioned university graduate students we could not identify this behavior (perhaps such indifference hinders the chances of getting into higher education). The *fourth scenario* describes the vision of a country where the majority of the population is indifferent and aimless.

Scenario 4: Drifting and wallowing together – integrative forces

Responsibility
In this society, there is a conscious tendency to avoid taking responsibility. In a drifting country, citizens are passive and indifferent. They have no objectives, nothing to hope for, as apathy rules. They do not like changes and avoid challenges. As a result, people tend to have a lot of free time, which they spend at home.

Community
They spend a lot of time in communities but they do not develop attachment to it. They are not interested in either the present or the future of their direct or wider environment. They only belong to groups without any responsibilities because people prefer to spend their time with others around and then on their own. Some members, who are passive towards others, are actually seeking attachments and thus they try to create a strong and closed family. The traditional family model with many children seems to return: an alternative resource-accumulation is to invest in a large family rather than in financial capital. The current Hungarian family policy supports this model, since it supports big families living in very poor conditions. The national identities of these people are passive as well.

Activity
At their work, members of this community are only willing to perform the tasks assigned to them, expecting and requiring continuous control and guidance. Careerism does not exist; everybody looks for leisure time. Competition is put aside. There are some, who do not even want families or are unsuccessful in managing families, since they cannot take responsibility. An aimlessly drifting person will thus live alone without bothering about anybody else. Of course, he/she can still have children, even from different partners, as nobody cares about family planning. Those who are labeled as "aimless" (unfortunately many among high school seniors) do not act towards a better future, or caring about the upcoming years. Their lack of motivation is reflected in their future expectations. They can more easily define what they do not want than what they do want. They do not volunteer.

Creativity
This factor is absent, as most members of this community are not creative at all. At their work, they are only willing to perform the assigned tasks, expecting and requiring continuous control and guidance.

Alternative scenarios and integrative forces

In the four scenarios described above, integrative forces are present in different ways. The scenario of *"Individuals in the community network"* incorporates all four integrative forces in a positive way, while the scenario of *"Individuals left behind"* does not include any of them. Responsibility, activity and creativity characterize the scenario of *"Society of individualists,"* but it lacks the motivating force of the community. As a result, creativity in this scenario serves individual renewal and only indirectly affects the community. Community appears in the *"Drifting and wallowing together"* scenario, but it is rather a limiting force than a motivating one. The first scenario promises a positive and rich future, the second is still acceptable, while the third and fourth scenarios have very small potential to generate a better future.

Table 2: Scenarios and integrative forces

Integrative forces	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3	Scenario 4
Responsibility	+	+	–	–
Community	+	–	–	+
Activity	+	+	–	–
Creativity community/individual	+	–/+	–	–

We think that all four scenarios are plausible. *The first scenario is the most future oriented,* as it reflects that there is indeed another path available to take, we can envision and create a positive future that is different from present realities both at an individual and social scale. The second scenario could be considered successful until 2025, but later the selfish attitude of the isolated individualistic group would create an alarming situation, as the neglected and offended masses may trigger a destructive revolution that an individualistic group cannot handle. The third scenario is dangerous as well. Being frightened leads (after a time) to uncontrollable destructive aggression. The feeling of drifting and being lost is already the first step towards this and it can strengthen further on. Hopefully, we can avoid the unfolding of the fourth scenario.

It is not indifferent which of these scenarios will materialize. The different scenarios could reinforce different hopes and fears revealed in this study, consequently, very differing realities can take shape in the Hungary of 2025. In order to reduce instability, we should increase by all possible means the chances of achieving positive scenarios instead of the negative ones.

We are of the view that there are no past or present good examples that Hungary could follow as best practice without any alterations. Consequently, a new scenario, *a new way of life needs to be invented.*

Concluding remarks

Our research results indicate that the future of Hungary depends very much on how young people think about the future and how they act for the future. Therefore, enormous responsibility lies with parents and teachers: can we motivate our children in elementary and secondary schools to build on and not to demolish (or passively sit back) the present reality, due to selfish interests? If we can advance *consensus* and harmony between generations, we will be able to create a new and better future.

Reference

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A Path to Peace in the Trinity Sea System

Introduction
Stability and destabilization, crisis and order are organic for the life process of a complex social system. They usually coexist with one another. From time to time one becomes dominant in the life process of a society. The continuous process of globalization and societal transformation is confronted with the risk that opportunities for adaptation are diminishing, which makes the case for early and comprehensive preventive action particularly urgent. Preventive instruments must be elaborated appropriate to the community level, which have to do with preventing disasters, enhancing intra-state stability and reducing the element of unpredictability in the international system. If the long-term strategic perspective is lost, then understanding of the core vector for development is lost either. In this case, early warning can quickly turn into signaling the symptoms rather than causes of potential conflict and violence emergence. Thus, international involvement of the transformative type would serve the instrument for stagnation and status-quo rather than for development and progress with a view to equality and benefits to all.

This article examines the balance between peace-enhancing structures and risks, threats and challenges to peace in the System of Three Seas. Societies in transition from socialism to the market economy are often of considerable conflict and external violence. It is a challenge for peace workers to construct and maintain peacefulness within their society and in their relations with others. This article will look at common patterns of post-Soviet societies with one political class monopoly and experience of federation structure as a majority monopoly.

The Trinity Sea System in Transition
The transitional period is characterized by a noticeable acceleration of all vital social processes, an increasing number of conflicts and crises as an inevitable condition of the transitional period, and a social psychology, which lags behind the dynamics of material production and communications. At present moment, mankind is not ready, either morally or psychologically, to move into the next stage of its development.

In the modern global neighborhood, national, regional, international and global security creates complex, internally inconsistent network hierarchy. In

the first instance, the creation of global world would demand the decreasing of national, regional and international forms of security and security policy, which concern basic ideas, values and structures founded on pre-globalization myths. Society is a dynamic system. Its development and growth depends from positive and negative interaction.

At present, the central threat of international terrorism excludes a revolutionary way of transition within the framework of global world. Then changes should be carried out by evolution rather than by revolution, and adaptability becomes one of primary factors of the international and global security. Otherwise problems and contradictions will be accumulated and create unstable environment for all kinds of security. Science would be replaced by a revenge (including political) of religious consciousness and substantially increase the areas for confession conflicts, designed along extremely violent lines.

The beginning of the XXI century was marked by the balance in a range between "political globalization from above" and "antiglobalizm," including counteraction of political globalization. Such environment cannot be characterized as stable and safe. If globalization in general and political globalization in particular are considered as dominating in relation to interstate and international relations then operation in Iraq and Afghanistan could be considered as legitimate. If priority of globalization before the international system does not admit, then operation in Iraq is the aggression of group of countries against the sovereign member – state of the United Nations under the far-fetched pretext. Globalization reduces probability of interstate conflicts and wars (not excluding them absolutely); but simultaneously aggravates a competition in all spheres and all directions.

A new power structure is emerging that affects the local and regional initiatives for cooperation based on geographical contiguity, cultural affinity, political rationality and economic advantage. Peace-building strategy is based on the emergence of common interests and the growing role of interdependence in security policies. Accommodating policies are needed that bring states and societies closer to each other, eliminate misperceptions, and reduce incompatibilities of interests and facilitating cooperation.

In fact, NATO has occupied key role in the search for a workable security order in the Mediterranean and some contradictions existing between Euro-Atlantism and Europeism and in recent years between the USA and Turkey cannot undermine this domination. The enlargement of NATO in the Black Sea area (with Romania and Bulgaria as members of NATO) reversed a geopolitical picture of this region. Control establishment over the basin of the Black Sea is one of necessary conditions of implementation of the Western globalization project and, probably, one of important military-political

projects of the United States as Euro-Atlantic. Generally, the American presence here, corresponding to interests of the European allies, allows to realize more actively the next phase of formation of universal System of Three Seas (Mediterranean, Black Sea and Caspian Sea).

The logic of different security projects competition, where the prize is power to influence the making and managing of the transport communication and infrastructure, as well as the security order, is most tangible in the controversy over NATO expansion between Russia, the leading Western powers and China ambitions. Reintegration of the Eurasia space (Eurasian Union including Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Kirgyzia) is a countermove by Russia in this context. Accumulation of power stimulates and logically leads to expansion, the complexity of the forms of manifestation does not change an essence of its purpose – to grasp and supervise the increasing and bigger quantity of those material resources, which have vital importance for future development. However, expansion of system of values, most likely, gets a big urgency and value, than even aspiration to seize material resources.

The Caucasus is a geopolitical and cultural unit in the Black Sea area historically existing within superethnic formations. The Caucasus has played a significant role in the global cultural process as it permanently maintained a high degree of tension on account of the dynamics of ethnic groups.

The South Caucasus is a political entity and an economic factor as the link on the crossroads of the United Europe and the Great Middle East. The integration processes, which are common for the entire South Caucasus, could help overcome the regional conflicts and contradictions.

The post-modern world characterized by complexity, fragmentation and uncertainty requires common strategies. The perception of the basic categories of time and space underwent significant changes, i.e. extending of time and condensing of space, which inevitably led to the formation of a completely different, new system of world perception. The possibility of creating a united and identified South Caucasian space depends on how fully the peoples of the South Caucasus will manage to correlate themselves to European civilization, at the same time identifying themselves as a unique cultural community.

The entire history of the South Caucasus reflects a power struggle, with the different political and economic interests of the different superpowers behind it. Those superpowers were delivering their own influences via control of Southern Caucasus territories. Historically, the list of those superpowers includes Byzantium, the Ottoman Empire, Iran, Russia, etc.

Concerning the South Caucasus countries, they were never united. There is not a single case existing when they were united to defend or im-

plement their own interests. When talk about South Caucasus integration one should bear in mind the regional stakeholders/players: Turkey, Iran, Russia. Non-regional players also enrich the list of stakeholders today: USA, EU and China.

One of the significant issues is dealing with the sub regional frontiers of the South Caucasus. Thus, including Turkey in the regional structures will bring about the issue of either insulting Iran or including it as well. Incorporation of Russia naturally presupposes participation of Turkey and Iran on the one hand, and the United States and European Union on the other. It should be taken into consideration that the term "South Caucasus" divides the Russian Caucasus, does not diminish the Russian interests in the sub region.

The situation in South Russia (Dagestan, Ingushetia) is a challenge for security in the Black Sea region. It is connected with growth of Islamic extremism and its integration with corruption. Situation in the republic try to normalize by means of police and counterterrorist measures. It did not bring expected results. In Dagestan, the state institutes are privatized by political groups of interests and they are formed a little distinct from political systems of other Russian regions.

Being transformed under the influence of globalization and urbanization of the rural community, migration and a natural increase of the population in the conditions of weak, state institutes privatized by regional elite, create conditions for domination in regional economy of three markets: budgetary, administrative and violence market. Together these "markets" and their regulators, in the conditions of domination of the budgetary economy, form an institutional trap – a situation at which the competition and the related economic development are blocked by the main holders of a status rent, the income of administrative or other executive position. In addition, any innovations are perceived as threat to existing balance of interests, so – and to beneficiaries of this balance.

The ideal of political democracy, which practically all the post-Soviet leaders espoused in their battle against communism, is closely related to the ideal of market economy, greater economic freedom and democracy. Part of the attraction of the latter was, as we saw, the realization that without it political democracy would be an empty achievement. But it was also often regarded, especially in pre-independence times, as the principal means of carrying out, or of making inevitable, a social and economic revolution. In the post-independence period, the ideology of democracy was in various ways diluted and transformed. There, however, the main emphasis was on mechanisms of social causation.

The first thing to note is the definiteness and unanimity with which the leaders of the post-Soviet states whether in Russia or South Caucasus embraced the ideology of political democracy and their determination to enshrine it in their new state constitutions. Political democracy calls for an executive responsive to the popular will as expressed by elections, an independent judiciary, and the observation of a wide range of civil liberties. Elsewhere in the Caucasus, it was also generally accepted at the outset that the authority of the state, stemmed from the people and must have been founded on popular sovereignty. It was unquestioningly assumed that the new nations should become full-fledged democracies, with all the forms, trappings, and content this political system had only rather recently acquired in Western Europe. Thus, governments were made responsible to sovereign assemblies, directly elected on the basis of universal human rights, and fundamental rights and liberties were assured by explicit formulation and guaranteed by an independent judiciary. This was the general direction of thinking on fundamentals, which is all that concerns us in the present context.

There was hardly any realistic discussion in the West at that time about what this pattern of political development amounted to, whether it would work, and where it might lead. There is little even now. Memories of what happened after the break-up of the Soviet Union to the newly independent states in the post-Soviet territories and to the newly created democracies in Central and Southern Europe might have occasioned some uneasiness, but if so, it was not expressed. Little thought was given to the fact that the political structure of the Western countries was quite different when they were at a comparable stage of underdevelopment.

There is no example of a post-Soviet country that has established a durable and effective political democracy. No country ever attempted to realize the egalitarian ideals of the welfare state when it has been afflicted with a degree of poverty and inequality comparable of Russia. Only in respect to the rule of law and a representative parliamentary or semi parliamentary system could some of the countries of former Soviet Union, primarily the Baltic States, claim even a semblance of readiness for political democracy when they acquired their independence. However, the experience of the South Caucasus suggests that when a democratic form of government is imposed on an economically and politically immature nation is rapidly succumbs to authoritarian pressures and does so for internal reasons. It is difficult to realize political democracy on weak foundations. History repeats itself twice and in a farce for the second time.

Not only were the conditions in the post-Soviet states very different from those that prevailed in the Western countries when they developed po-

litical democracy. The political dynamics of that development were also different in the two cases. In West European countries political democracy had to be fought for through many decades, and that struggle, in turn, was a continuation of centuries of striving by better-situated groups to establish their right to a voice in governmental councils. In the face of increasingly organized and effective pressures from below, the privileged classes gradually had to concede an enlargement of the electorate. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, on the other hand, political rights were granted from above without the masses ever having demanded them. The mechanisms of managing and controlling public affairs involve a complex set of bureaucratic structures. However, governments no longer monopolize the functions of political command. A broad range of non-governmental organizations, private undertakings, and social movements now exercises these functions. The political system is no longer structured by government decisions alone but by a dense and complex system of networks and systems of functional co-operation.

The consequences of this fact are unfortunate in some respects. In West European countries, the protracted, and ultimately successful, struggle for modern democracy gradually brought about a considerable identification of the people with the nation-state, even if it sometimes brought a problem of assimilating minorities. The South Caucasian states still face the daunting problem of how to assimilate the majority of their peoples and make them feel and behave active and responsible participants in the nation-building process.

Considering the unusual features in the South Caucasian situation, the expectation that these countries could institute a fully democratic system of government, or that such a system, once launched, could function effectively, was not well founded. If we analyze the course of events since independence, we found that under the influence of different mechanisms of political causation the trend has been very different in the several countries involved. Some of the post-Soviet countries have a fairly stable parliamentary government; the others have come under some form of authoritarian rule. In no country has there been far-reaching social or economic reform. The political strength of the ruling parties derives from administrative resources rather than from the prestige, it acquired during the long, successful struggle for power and from its effectiveness as a party machine. It has also benefited from the system of majority elections, based on practice, which favors the big party over the small ones.

National identity became personified in mything the person, who as a charismatic leader served to unify competing and conflicting particularistic interests and thus strengthen democracy and give it direction and purpose. We may note, however, that that type of leadership tends to inject an ele-

ment of authoritarianism even when the individual concerned is pledged un-reservedly to uphold democracy; often it lends popular sanction to a dictato-rial regime, as it did in the South Caucasian countries. Since the personal fac-tor is individual and fortuitous and may work in either direction, it is not easily integrated into a theory that seeks to reveal the mechanism of social causation. In general, it comes into play as a response to, or a reflection of, the failure of democratic institutions to reach down to the grass roots. Over-all, Georgia's promised social and economic revolution failed to materialize. There might have been an opportunity to carry out effective reforms in line with the radical program of the ruling party in the first flush of the political revolution epitomized by the winning of independence, but if so, the oppor-tunity was let slide. The ruling party gradually lost its zeal for reform and became increasingly conservative in action, especially at the state and local level. The Saakashvili's government did not pay its debt to pensioners de-spite much more budget (partly financed by unlawful expropriations) than the former government had. Even if you count the mentioned increase, the whole debt will be paid only within next three years. What Saakashvili did is that paid only a part of the debt to pensioners and called it increases of the pensions. Another reform: traffic lights was overpaid by Tbilisi government and the head of the company, which installed the traffic lights, was an youngster-gangster who is now wanted for crime of shooting some road-workers for a childish reason. Introduction the Police Patrol was a kind of success because of two aspects: they are few and they do not take bribes from car drivers. However, professionalism of the new policemen is also low as they were not trained properly (they do not know law, do not have skill corresponding to new responsibilities).

This trend developed during Shevardnadze's later years, and has con-tinued since his removal. Concurrently there has been some deterioration in the moral tone of the ruling party. The stakes the politicians play for are not opportunities to advance the national interest but power, prestige, personal advantage, patronage, and graft. Those at the top who have preserved their integrity and their allegiance to social progress are not in a position to do much more than express their distaste or, occasionally, have a resolution passed at the national level confirming Georgia's interest in egalitarianism.

Georgia failure to make more progress in the direction of welfare de-mocracy reflects the fact that no significant attempts were made to organize the masses, or to impress upon them their stake in agitating for a break-up of the country's rigidly in egalitarian social and economic structure. The im-pressive façade of parliamentary democracy cannot hide the fact that politi-cal participation in any meaningful sense is confined to small upper class groups (including the urban "middle class" and the "rural elite" of middle-

men). The political behavior of the masses is largely controlled by individual personalities who appeal to religious sentiments, caste, or to regional loyalties and antipathies.

Russia's parliamentary system has proved to be remarkably stable, but it is the stability of stagnation. Politics has become immersed in ethnic, and religious emotions and a radical nationalism is rampant. Under these circumstances the personalization of politics made for instability, because none of the rival leaders was able to acquire sufficient stature to impose his will on the conflicting groups. The interests appealed to are rooted relatively deeply in the class structure but there have been no successful attempts to rouse the masses to political action in their own behalf. The fact that for all of its ineffectiveness and instability – manifested at times by open fighting and emergency rule – political democracy has not succumbed to some form of authoritarian rule.

There are no other countries in the region have retained functioning systems of parliamentary government. In the case of South Caucasus, the preservation of political stability depends to a large extent on a contrived balance of interests between ethnic communities sharply differentiated by economic role, religion, customs, and language. Much depends on whether the upper class, which enjoys important political advantages and privileges, can have better social and economic position faster, than its neighbors can – the more dynamic, partly prosperous, and better-educated community – grow impatient with the political discrimination they suffer. Conceivable that the alliance, faced with serious internal strains between the wealthy leaders of the major communities might seek to preserve stability at the expense of some dilution of political democracy. The stability of political democracy in Armenia even more clearly rests on a highly in egalitarian power structure inherited from the Soviet times. If ordinary Armenians are given free rein to exhibit their immense zest for democratic processes and freedoms, it is perhaps because they have not yet been offered a serious challenge to the interests of those who control the levers of political power. Nor are there any deep ethnic or religious divisions for politicians to exploit as in other parts of South Caucasus. Politics in Azerbaijan has been personalized as in Georgia because electoral contests have been largely devoid of ideological content.

For a variety of reasons, political democracy failed to take root in other countries of the region and some form of authoritarian regime replaced it. The changeover was commonly justified on the ground that under the prevailing conditions, the Western mode of political democracy, with its party system, was ineffective, corrupt, and disruptive of national unity. There is no simple explanation for this difference. Levels of living are higher in Russia

that in the region generally, but this does not apply to the South Caucasian states. Ethnically and religiously, the population of Armenia is homogeneous, but this is not true of the populations of Azerbaijan Georgia, and Russian society is very deeply split by social cleavages. The fact, then, that political democracy still functions, though very imperfectly, in the four countries we have surveyed suggests that its collapse elsewhere in the South Caucasus must be due to factors other than those just mentioned.

A major cause of its failure was the fact that the ruling party was not prepared ideologically or in other respects to handle public issues in a democratic and parliamentary way. The ruling party had no any clear aims or program of action to offer the new state. The powerful upper class who dominated its councils had no experience and little interest in rooting political activity in democratic appeals to the people.

Many of the difficulties Georgia and Armenia experienced in trying to work out a system of political democracy are also traceable to their thoroughly inadequate preparation for independence. Neither Georgia nor Armenia was able to build up a disciplined national political movement like the former Communist Party, and non-violence never became part of the philosophy and tactics of their struggle for power. Their disorderly transition to independence and democracy put a further premium on anarchic resistance to authority. They had both suffered greater war damage than most countries in the Black Sea region.

In Georgia, the adoption of a Western type of parliamentary government after the Revolution of the Rose was little but an opportunistic adjustment to an external situation dominated by the Western powers. The chances of its taking root were slight in view of the country's authoritarian tradition and lack of Westernization. The Kocharyan regime and the Ilkham Aliev regime in Armenia and Azerbaijan correspondingly followed the regional pattern and adopted a system of political democracy, but only as a gesture to its American and European protectors; little attempt was made to make it work.

From the stand point of modernization and economic development the contrast between the countries that retained a democratic form of government and those that moved toward authoritarianism is more apparent than real. In any case, it is not possible to say that one form of government has proved more conducive to the application of policies of economic and social reform than the other has. On the contrary, the various political systems in the region are strikingly similar in their inability or unwillingness to institute fundamental reforms and enforce social discipline. Whether democratic or authoritarian, they are all in this sense "soft states."

The trend to authoritarianism owed little to outside forces. There has been little explicit ideological influence from the Western countries in this respect, although South Caucasus observers might have inferred from the experience of these countries that economic progress is possible without political democracy in the Western sense and perhaps impossible in a poor country without more disciplinary government. Even an advanced Western country could have trouble in making political democracy work.

One fundamental weakness of South Caucasus democracy stemmed from the manner of its inception, namely, that, as we mentioned, it was handed down from above and was never struggled for by any large section of the population. Without this background, the people were not sufficiently organized or knowledgeable to use their votes to advance their own interests; consequently, political power remained in the hands of the upper class. From this, an important corollary follows. It is that when democracy faltered or failed in the region, it was never because the masses had organised themselves so effectively that the governing elite felt they had to take drastic action in order to safeguard their own privileges or to preserve stability and further economic development. For the most part the lower classes have remained apathetic and disunited. The conflicts that undermined political democracy in the region were conducted well above their heads; they invariably took place among the politicians or between them and the military, with higher civil servants, big businessmen, and bank managers each playing a role, though a different one in the several countries. Whether the political change-over was justified as necessary to prevent a complete breakdown of government or to evolve a system more suitable to the "genius" of the people, the important point to remember is that the bulk of the population was not involved in its genesis and not much in its outcome.

This does not mean that the masses of the people are content with their present situation; this is far from being the case, particularly in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia where their poverty is extreme. There is often a sullen dissatisfaction among the underprivileged in the provinces far from the Center that may be revealed to the sympathetic inquirer but is politically abortive, since there is no avenue whereby the individual can make his protest effective. Where a large proportion of the population is poor, where sharecropping is the pattern of tenancy, and where tenants and upper class are on very different levels of prosperity and social status, there provinces are a complex system of human relationships with crossing interest lines that impede concerted action by the poor. "Lower class" dissatisfaction has been increasing with the rise in the relative number of "educated unemployed"; among university professors and students, particularly it has brought about obstructive and disorderly behavior of all sorts, again with little strategic

purpose. Generally, the cause of such conduct is petty and accidental; there have been few attempts to consolidate the grievances and form a movement to push planned reforms.

The relationship between these undercurrents of dissatisfaction and the promises of large-scale social and economic reform, made most often at election time, is a complicated one. As the masses are split and not apt to organize for political action in their own interest, radical promises would not seem necessary to win their support or, rather, acquiescence. We also observe that when the politicians involved assume office, they are given much less prominence. However, in the higher strata, where programs are formulated and ideological declarations made, there seems to be a feeling that the inertia of the people might be a passing thing. It is possible that the import of the radical policy pronouncements will gradually dawn on the masses and that this will lead to their activation. The dissatisfied elements among the "middle class" intellectuals could play a crucial role in such a process. More fundamentally, the radical programs reflect a feeling among many of the people at the top that reforms are necessary and should be carried out. To a limited extent, they also reflect in imaginative understanding of how people living in great poverty must feel – or how they would feel if they were rational.

In view of the immense difficulties the countries of South Caucasus have experienced in trying to establish genuine political democracy based on Western institutions and practices, it is perhaps worth asking whether they should not try, instead, to duplicate that earlier phase of political development through which the West European countries passed on their way to becoming welfare democracies. It might be argued that a system of representative assemblies elected because of human rights of functioning effectively and producing a government that, by virtue of its stability, could afford a considerable measure of civil liberty. As a result, all manner of political systems – "guided democracy," government through consensus, indirect elections, and direct authoritarian rule – were instituted in place of full political democracy, but the older West European pattern of representative government based on a restricted suffrage.

This last solution would presuppose the existence of a stable upper class society with a ruling class confident in its status and power. In post-Soviet states, the basis for such a society was weakened by the illegitimate privatization (Russia), corruption and total criminalization of business (South Caucasus), irredentism and clan structure of the ruling class. More important, it was undermined by the spread of the liberal ideologies of political democracy, market economy. These ideals gained a certain hold over the ruling upper strata, at least to the extent of upsetting their confidence or

making them cynical (in modern times cynical people are hardly the architects of a stable society). Even when the ideals were poorly realized, their influence and prestige were such as to prevent a peaceful, stable upper class state from coming into existence.

A quasi-democratic upper-class state cannot be created once political, social, and economic equality has commonly been accepted as a moral imperative and a goal for planning.... In a sense, the South Caucasus and Russian authoritarianisms represent a sort of "equality" since no one has the franchise, and the president claims to speak for the people. Presumably, depriving only the lower strata of the population of their right to vote would be regarded as less "democratic"; it would be like standing for sin against virtue. The whole trend provides an illuminating example of the power of myth politics, even when it is being distorted. Seen in the proper historical perspective, these authoritarian rules may be regarded as substitutes for what these countries do not have and cannot create, namely, stable upper-class regimes comparable to those of the Western countries when they began to industrialize.

In every case, the armed forces have been the instrument whereby these substitutes have been created; indeed, under modern conditions an authoritarian rule is hardly possible without the backing of the army and the police. Actual or potential opposition at home and strained relations between neighboring states in South Caucasus generally – because of the repercussions of the Soviet era or unresolved conflicts inherited from the post-Soviet period – have led the several countries in the region to maintain military establishments that are very large in relation to their scanty resources. Aid in cash or in kind in different proportions from the United States has contributed to this build-up. All post-Soviet States felt insecure. In general, the armed forces have been acclaimed by the articulate strata of the population as a symbol of independence. During the early democratic experiment, they attained stature because they were not greatly involved in politics, and consequently were not tainted by demagoguery and corruption.

It is often pointed out that in at least two respects army rule should have a wholesome effect on policy formation in countries of the South Caucasus type. For one thing, a modern military establishment must incorporate rationalism or must break down. It must be thoroughly "Westernized" in the sense that it must conduct its affairs according to purposeful plans. Secondly, within its ranks it must enforce discipline, the one quality most lacking in the South Caucasian countries. Furthermore, an authoritarian rule is apt to create an intellectual vacuum around itself by suppressing public discussion – a situation particularly exemplified in the case of Russia and other post-Soviet states of South Caucasus and Central Asia. Moreover, bureau-

crats and military officers have not proved immune to corruption, even when an important reason for their takeover was malpractice in the earlier, less authoritarian regime.

These various strands represent a complex of possibilities that can have different results in different countries. These seem to be no way to determine conclusively whether a given authoritarian rule will work in the interest of development or whether it will only stabilize relative stagnation. More basically, it is not easy to see clearly the direction in which the countries in South Caucasus are drafting politically. All that can be said with any certainty is that the various forms of democracy or authoritarian populism they now have or will develop are, or will be, crucially different from the systems of government the Western Countries had at a similar stage in their history. Once again, we have to view South Caucasus as a specific post-Soviet area. Nevertheless, whatever the direction of their political evolution, from the standpoint of economic development and modernization these countries are likely to be torn between the need for greater social discipline and the need to win approval of the articulate strata. Western countries can give them capital and technical know-how, but they cannot instill social discipline or make it attractive.

In one sense, all regimes in South Caucasus will have to be more "democratic" than the Western upper-class states of times past. They are bound to work harder for cooperatives, trade unions, local self-government, community development, and the uplift of the poor generally. They must try to copy the modern "organizational state" of the advanced countries. This means that even the authoritarian regimes must resort to "democratic planning." For instance, it is no accident, how Vladimir Putin, expounds and tries to realize the notion of "guided democracy" in Russia. With regard to civil liberties, however, the political regimes in South Caucasus are not now, nor are they likely to become, as "democratic" as the stable upper-class states of Europe. The latter could afford a generous measure of civil liberty precisely because they felt so stable and secure.

The reaction in Western countries to the fate of political democracy in South Caucasus has been inhibited and ambivalent, mainly because it has been influenced by double moral considerations. The intellectual dilemma of Western commentators is all too plain. They want to believe that the countries of the region can be and, indeed, are democracies. This is reassuringly simple in the case of the Baltic States, which does have a functioning parliamentary system. The contrast between their political system and that of Central Asia or the South Caucasus can be easily drawn in terms of democracy versus authoritarianism. When blatant dictatorships make their appearance, the Western commentator is reluctant to criticize them for not be-

ing democratic, as long as they are anti-Communist. The Revolution of Rose in Georgia was generally welcomed because it was thought to be in the interest of more effective government and because Georgia could be expected to be firmly pro-NATO and pro-EC state. By the same taken, Geidar Aliev and later his son's Ilhkam Aliev's regime were condoned for a long time in Azerbaijan, despite of their obvious authoritarian tendencies.

On a more respectable intellectual level, there has been a growing realization of the immense difficulty of realizing democratic ideals under the conditions prevailing in South Caucasus. Western writers have increasingly tried to be neutral about the form of a regime and more interested in its efficiency from the standpoint of stability, though they continue to make manifest their preference for democracy. Nevertheless, the political issue most often discussed is still whether or not these countries are heading toward Europeanization as a special form of modernization for the formerly communist dictatorships. It is generally assumed that economic progress, educational advancement, and radical economic reforms will prevent such a development. Although the idea that political democracy will engender economic and social reform still prevails, we also find the contrary idea that democracy dampens efforts to revamp conditions in the direction of greater equality. Whether the South Caucasus States are in fact democracies or only so by the definition of their constitution, is to be determined by the action that the government takes on this important question, and the people's reaction to it. Such action again is to be considered not merely in terms of legislation, but of social attitude, economic policies and political power. The new states, which have accepted the political forms without interpreting democratic values in terms of their own life, must of necessity, therefore give the impression of being imitative and artificial, and may, in course of time, become a parody of popular government – a dictatorship or an oligarchy behind a façade of democratic norms. This is the major problem of democracy in the new states of South Caucasus.

Conclusions

The System of Three Seas (Mediterranean, Black Sea and Caspian Sea) contains both specific and general elements with regard to their development and to the reaction by the international community to the conflicts development.

Different projects of region-building offer a unique opportunity to strengthen political, economic and cultural ties across the regional areas. Regional solutions are more suitable in stability promotion, and military stability is linked with the broader strategic context.

With regard to the development of the conflicts, it appears that the ethnic, cultural and historical complexity of the regions as well as the high degree of violence until the recent history have to be regarded as specific and individual elements of the crisis which cannot be easily generalized. However, the strengthening of regional forces, based upon nationalism as well as the erosion of the basis for dialogue, the escalation of rhetoric and the escalation from rhetoric into the use of force may be seen as general elements.

The reactions by the international community allow a distinction between specific and general factors. The attention focused at and the concrete fears about setting a precedent for the self-determination of so-called non-recognized states, or partly recognized states for the volatile situation would have to be seen rather as specific factors. On the other hand, the most relevant general factor may have to be seen in drawing misleading analogies. Lacking knowledge had to be closed either by retrospective analogies (namely traditional stereotypes), or prospective analogies (to superficially similar problems where one tried to avoid a precedent.

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HONOUR

Oswald Spring, Úrsula: *Judit Balázs*

It is with great happiness and also emotion that I write about my friend, colleague and longstanding peace researcher, Prof. Dr. Judith Balázs. We were both born under the sign of Capricorn, she some years earlier and in January, while I rushed into the world the final part of the year. I have had the privilege of knowing her now for more than three decades and can personally bear witness to her fruitful academic work and her activities as a dedicated peace researcher. It is a great honour for me on the occasion of her 70th birthday to share some reflections about her academic life, her struggle for justice and her ability to negotiate the peaceful settlement of conflicts in the complex world of conflicts in the Middle East.

As I have followed Judith Balázs' work for more than three decades, she has deeply impressed me through her personal integrity, her social responsibility as a scholar and her ability to create public awareness. She has had an impact on the policies of her country and on the evolution of international organizations. However, she is also a teacher and has trained students at various levels in economic security and peace-building. In personal terms, she has had to overcome the general prejudice against female scholars and to gain a voice and be accepted in the very male-dominated field of economic science. In order to be better trained and equipped, she pursued several courses of study in Germany and Hungary, first at the Humboldt University in then East Berlin in 1974, and later at Budapest University, where she obtained a doctoral degree in economics (Dr. Oec.) in 1978. In 1980, she joined the Hungarian Academy of Science, and in 1999, she completed her habilitation at the Budapest Defence University, where she achieved a further doctorate (Dr. hab.) in military sciences. During the same year, she was appointed by the Ministry of Education as a full professor in the Department of International and Regional Economics in the Faculty of Economics at the West Hungarian University in Sopron.

This long career not only demonstrates her tenacity in bringing her work to a high level, but also illustrates a life that was never easy, living as a woman in a country behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War for decades. Hungary, her native land, was severely affected during World War II. As a small child, she suffered the threat of war and personally experienced the history of her country, repeatedly divided and belonging for long periods both to Western Europe and after World War II to Eastern Europe. After World War II and during the Cold War she experienced the conflict between

the communist and capitalist worlds, in which her small country was directly involved during the four decades when Hungary was allied to the USSR through the Warsaw Pact. She saw liberation and democratization emerging in Eastern Europe, first in her own country and later in Czechoslovakia, both only to be squashed by military force. In this complex situation, life was not always easy, and she learnt from childhood onwards to care about basic access to food, limited resources and freedom.

Her long period of study also vividly illustrates how women with children face the struggle to manage their household, the education of twin girls, their husband and their academic work. Nevertheless, her tenacity helped her overcome the different problems in her life and she gained the highest academic grades. Today she can be proud not only of her personal achievement, but also of that of her daughters and now her two grandchildren. I remember her showing me their photographs – first the twins, and more recently her grandchildren.

Her professional life began at the Hungarian embassy in East Berlin, where she was able to use her language skills. Besides her mother tongue of Hungarian, she is fluent in German as well as in English. In the late 1970s, she went back to Hungary as a senior researcher; she became an adviser on environmental protection in 1994. We had many discussions and exchanges about this subject, especially following the first Rio de Janeiro Summit on Sustainable Development, where we dreamed of a green utopia and collective responsibility with nature. As I was myself the first General Attorney of the Environment in Mexico, we were able to exchange experiences and ideas about how smaller countries could maintain their biodiversity and create a consciousness of the effects of consumerist behaviour and excessive use of fossil fuels. We discussed the abuse and pollution of basic resources, and discussed how to create a sustainable way of life for the future of our children. She was convinced that rational management of the economy could stimulate reasonable behaviour alongside development processes designed to care for people and the environment, while I was working on the recovery of the environment, water management and the reduction of air pollution.

Her work on economic security inspired me, especially when both of us were convinced that narrow military security has brought only destruction, war, division, poverty, lack of democracy and environmental problems. It is always a great risk for women to start to address security issues, but Judit did her analysis well, linking the former Soviet military strength with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, especially after 9/11 when George W. Bush declared the war on terror. She was trained in the confrontation of East and West and the end of the Cold War raised new hopes and expectations for

small eastern European countries in the whole Hungarian academic establishment. For her it was clear that nobody could confine people to specific borders or ideological frameworks. She understood that modern technology, especially the Internet, could be used both for peaceful social movements and for terrorist groups, so that the important issue is to contribute to an open society where opposing interests are discussed peacefully and systems are not violently imposed.

Her personal experience of the Cold War in the city of Sopron near the border with Austria, where the "free" West was only a few kilometres away but closed to people from the East, led her to seek for alternative ways of dealing with world conflicts. Her work with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute and other peace research institutes and researchers from all over the world at IRPA also deepened her economic understanding of the elites who live at the cost of all of society and of the environment. The violent interruption of global movements of capital, and the speculation that her own country and many others were taking away workers' hard-earned savings, led her to think about new ways of avoiding such speculative behaviour. What could be the economic tools that would prevent the patrimony of millions of people being shifted in a few minutes or hours into the pockets of these global elites?

From her travels around the world, she came to understand that every culture has created productive processes, including those of science and technology. Every culture, not just those of the West, has the right to be respected. Western culture is itself socially constructed and based on specific interests, mechanisms of control and structures of power that can either reinforce the status quo or force a change, as has recently happened in the North African countries. Her visiting professorship at the Higher Technological Institute in Egypt led her to perceive that cultural mechanisms are so deeply internalized that the people generally see them as natural. However, the members of a society also share cultural products; they link people together through their identity patterns. These are precisely deep belief structures reflecting processes of cognition that have legitimized power structures based on complex relationships and on interdependencies often associated with discrimination and control that are able to progressively destroy natural and human systems. This reinforced her determination to promote understanding and peace-building among different cultures

When Judit was working as Secretary of the *European Peace Research Association* (EURPA) from 1992 to 2000, we again had the opportunity to compare two different regional peace associations: in Europe (EUPRA) and in Latin America (CLAIP). We were both aware of the complexity of social ac-

tors, institutions, regimes, and worldviews that maintained profound injustice not only for poor people, but also for mother earth herself, and Judit made use of her economic background and creativity to find peaceful ways to deal with emerging conflicts. She was convinced that only a process of negotiation would bring well-being and sustainability. The empowerment of small countries, including active involvement in international organizations of appropriate regions in the North and in the South that may be a path to peaceful negotiation, as a way of meeting a sustainable agenda that promotes well-being for everybody, and not just for the top billion.

To try and to realize this utopia, Professor Judit Balázs organized the 20th Conference of IPRA in Sopron, where I happened to know personally the city authorities, the famous vine cellar and the beautiful surroundings. With great optimism and with the unconditional support of Secretary General Katzuyo Kodama from Japan, she was finally able to overcome the problem of lack of financial resources and many other organizational difficulties, and IPRA could elect Luc Reychler as its new Secretary General.

Judit's intellectual curiosity brought her to explore not just environmental problems but also mental health difficulties. She analysed suicide behaviour in cases of depression with co-morbidity, where another medical condition occurs alongside the depression and where a major depressive episode may lead to loss of life, while her economic training always brought her back to the economic security approach.

She was convinced that many societies, countries, scientists and peace researchers understood that a new system of justice must replace the imposed occidental one. In different societies, she found ways in which collective problems were resolved by personal aspirations and necessity, but still led to living together harmoniously. For Judit Balázs sustainable living together also means sustainable peace, as a desideratum linked to harmony, cooperation, well-being, agreement, and caring about nature. Sustainable peace attempts through preventive political solutions to avoid the escalation and spreading of conflicts. She found not just in Arab culture but throughout the world, many ways in which people deal with conflicts and increase peace-building processes. It was Egyptian societies, living in the difficult environmental conditions of the desert with little water, who developed thousands of years ago an equilibrium, a deep respect for and unity with nature, now increasingly threatened by the development of the megalopolis of Cairo. Traditionally, people have developed a deep knowledge of environmental management that enables them to live in peace with nature in the framework of their sociocultural structures, thought this is often at the cost of discrimination against women and making them invisible. The UN Human

Rights Conventions have been for her a way of promoting both social development and sustainable peace with a gender perspective.

Five decades of reflection, action and the struggle for peace and justice have resulted in a rich scientific oeuvre with books, published scientific articles, book chapters, newspaper articles, radio and television interviews and conference papers. With her excellent academic achievements, Judit has now the right to enjoy the results of her work and to play with her grandchildren, though she is still very active in the worlds of academia and peace research.

The thinking and public activities of this extraordinary scholar are also vital at this time, as wealth becomes even more concentrated and the environment reaches a tipping point where for the first time human survival itself may be threatened. Her critical reflections are as urgent and as timely as when they were first written. For present and future generations of students, teachers, politicians and social leaders they represent a crucial material for value-oriented action. As scientists, Judit Balázs and her rich scientific oeuvre remind us that promoting social equity and peace-building, especially for women and girls living in extreme poverty, is an ethical obligation. Her innovative and often provocative academic thinking and her publications are an example of how to explore new ways of dealing with present and future problems and continuing her work towards a more equal and sustainable society in a peaceful and multicultural context with the aim of a sustainable peace.

MEHL, Regine: *Dear Judit!*

22 years have passed so far, since we met for the first time: It was at the IPRA conference in Groningen, Netherlands, July 1990. Karlheinz Koppe, my former boss at the Peace Research Information Unit Bonn (AFB / PRIUB), introduced you to me – and I immediately knew: That is the woman and the researcher, who is capable to impress me for a lifetime – to several extents.

- *First of all*: There is this impressive, wise and smart woman full of humour – even mordant black humour and overwhelming irony towards all the fun, the challenges and the traps of an academic and family driven life – including strokes of fate …
- *Secondly*: You are a fantastic professor and scholar – at a time! Your abilities to teach young academics and your academic bibliography are of extraordinary quality.
- *Thirdly*: You are just a woman full of warmth and care for others. However, even these qualities are traversed by your humour and power.

I always feel honoured to be a friend of you – I wish you all the best and a wonderful life, in particular after all your "official" work engagements.

Bonn, November 2012

Yours in friendship,
Regine

APPENDIX/INSET

Balázs, Judit: *Curriculum Vitae*

In the course of more than four decades of work in scholarly research, teaching and the organization of research, she has dealt principally with economics, peace research and related disciplines.

She was born in Nagykanizsa, a small town in Hungary: she is living in partnership. She is the mother of twin daughters and she has two grandchildren. She is a Hungarian citizen. Apart from Hungarian, she speaks, reads and writes German, English and Turkish and she reads Russian.

Her interest in economics dates back from her secondary school years in Nagykanizsa and grew into a sound basis during her higher studies at the Budapest and Berlin universities of economic sciences.

She graduated from the Department of Foreign Trade of the Berlin University of Economics Sciences, after which she worked in the commercial representation of the Hungarian Embassy in Berlin. Her duties there included preparing scientific analysis to serve in the preparation of government-level economic policy decisions, following and evaluating German-German trade and relations between the GDR and the developing world and forecasting anticipated trends in the development of the Third World.

Her interest increasingly turned towards the developing world and she began to make a more thorough study of social and economic questions of the developing countries. The Asia section of the Humboldt University in Berlin, where she was active until 1980, provided an institutional frame for this. Within this field, she attributed special importance to the question of capital accumulation and to the late appearance of 20th century capitalism related to this.

Her research was directed at the questions of original accumulation of capital in the 20th century. The appearance and survival of pre-capitalist form of capital, the role of state intervention, the creation of the state sector and its operating mechanism, distribution relations within the frame of the mixed economy, the processes of distribution-redistribution, the differing operating mechanism and profit relations of private capital and social stratification and economic growth.

In 1977, she earned a PhD degree summa cum laude. In her thesis, she analyzed the above questions in the example of Turkey and drew general conclusions for the development of those countries, which set out late on the path of capitalist development, in the 20th century. She pointed out the dif-

ferences between classical and late capitalist development, the special features of the emergence of this capitalism, introducing the new concept of dependent capitalism into the literature of economics, characterized in addition to the spontaneous elements, by state intervention and the decisive role of foreign capital. Her thesis: *Die Türkei: Das Phänomen des abhängigen Kapitalismus* was published jointly by K. Schwarz Verlag of West Berlin and the Akadémiai Kiadó (Academy Publishing House) of Budapest.

Returning to Hungary, from 1981, she continued her scholarly work in the Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Following this scope of her research further expanded, both regionally and structurally to include almost the whole of the Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to the earlier questions, she was able to deal with numerous special African questions, such the factors impeding economic growth, the causes of the crisis phenomena, their consequences, the questions of urbanization, pseudo-urbanization and the related internal migration, and the relations between the subsistence economy and commercialization.

In 1983, she was entrusted with the organizing of the anniversary conference of the International Peace Research Association; she subsequently took an active part in the work of this world-peace research organization, as well as in numerous other prestigious international organizations dealing with peace and conflict research. As a result, she enriched her research field with the subject of peace research. In 1984, she was appointed deputy director of the Centre for Peace Research Coordination of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences that had been set up in 1982. She directed her interest principally towards the origin of conflict and cores of conflict emerging in the developing countries and region, to the possibilities of a peaceful solution and to study of social and economic effects of armament.

In 1985, she earned a second doctorate, from the Budapest University of economics Sciences.

Over the past years, her scholarly interest has been concentrated on the following fields:
- Social and economic processes in the Sub-Saharan region, the Mediterranean region and in a few Far Eastern countries;
- the analysis of economic growth and social transformation, democratization processes, peace research, comparison of alternative paths of economic growth, indebtedness, armament, the horizontal spread of arms technology in the Third World;
- industrialization of the regions at a low level of development, inward-turning industrialization and urbanization, stabilization programs and their experiences, the evolution of political structures, militarization.

As the change in the Middle East directed attention to this region, her field of research further expanded to include analysis of the transformation, taking place in this region, examination of the possibilities of catching up with the world economy, and comparative analysis of Finland, Austria and Hungary.

In the course of the last four decades, she made study trips of several weeks to England, Sweden, Finland, North Korea, South Korea, Turkey, Bulgaria former Czechoslovakia-Czech Republic, Slovakia India, Japan the Soviet Union-Russia and the Central Asian Republics. She took part in some fifty international conferences–including events of the IPRA, Pugwash, and EADI-in different parts of the world, presenting papers at each of them on one or other of the above themes. She received personal invitations on a number of occasions to give lectures in Germany, Denmark, South Africa, Turkey, India and England.

In 1966, she directed a three-week seminar in Budapest for future UN diplomats, on behalf of the UN University in Tokyo. She also organized or directed numerous other conferences, including events held for the UNESCO, the UN and other international organizations.

In 1989, through the intermediary of the counsellor in African affairs to the Swedish government, she took part in a fact-finding mission to South Africa at the invitation of the South Africa Foundation, operating in that country. She went with the aim of informing the Hungarian governmental and other authorities on the social and economic changes that took place in the region and on the steps that had taken to dismantle apartheid. Her activity was a part of the preparations for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In 1990, at the invitation of the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa, she spent three months in Pretoria where she studied questions of the social economic integration of the Black population.

In 1988, she was elected member of the presidium of the IPRA at its conference in Rio de Janeiro; she was renewed in this post in 1990 and for the third term in 1992 and she was also elected member of the executive committee.

- In 1990 the African and Oriental Studies and Trade Development Foundation was set up under her direction, with the aim of directing, organizing and conducting regional economic, social, cultural and trade studies in these areas.

- In 1994, in the time of tragically exodus in Burundi on the request of the Swedish Government she completed a mandate to act as peace mediator between the two ethnic groups the Hutus and the Tutsis.

She was a founding member and member of the presidium of the European Peace Research Association (EuPRA) formed in 1990. As the mandate of acting president was going out, she became the president of EuPRA and she served this function almost 10 years.

She headed the Hungarian section of the „Peace and Disarmament" international cooperation among the Academies of Central and Eastern Europe. She was also requested to act as the East European coordinator of the international organization Woman and Peace.

She was in charge of a number of major research programs being carried out within the frame of the Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Up to 1995, her position was senior research fellow of the Institute for World economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and director of the African and Oriental Studies and Trade Development Foundation set up in 1990.

Subsequently, she was invited to act as one of the founder of Faculty of Economics at the University of West Hungary. Here she founded the Department of International Economics and acted as its director. Besides this, she was also director of Department for Regional Geography. In 1999, she habilitated in the Military Academy, on military sciences; subsequently she received the appointment for full Professor. The topic of her habilitation was focused on the impact of weapon trade on world economy.

In 2001, she was requested for Vice Rector for Research and International Relations of the University of West Hungary. In this period, she received also Jean Monnet Professor scholarship.

Over the past years, her scholarly interest has been concentrated on a very new field: economic security. She introduced this subject as a unique discipline, and she is the only professor in Hungary teaching this very interesting topic.

In 2006, she got an invitation from Egypt to give lectures on the topic mentioned above. Her visiting professorship mandate lasted until 2009, during this time she became acquainted with Islam, and she extended the area of research in the matter as well. After returning from Egypt, she continued her research and teaching activity at the University of West Hungary, but at

the same time lecturing in different Commissions of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

She has published more than 200 scholarly articles in Hungarian and foreign journals as well as numerous articles in newspapers and magazines. Radio and TV have interviewed her on a number of occasions, both in Hungary and in many countries of the world. She is author of 11 books in Hungarian and foreign languages. Out of this, six books are dealing with the economy of Turkey.

She has membership in the following Hungarian organizations:
- Committee for Future Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Hungarian Association of Economists Co-President of the Hungarian-South African Society;
- Member of the English Speaking Union;
- Member of the Society of Military Scientists Governing Board of the Hungarian UNO Society.

She received various awards such as Award by the Hungarian Minister of Education for the title Széchenyi Prof. (1998-2002), Jean Monnet professor given by the Highest Committee for Education of the European Union, Award by the Ministry of Education: "For the Hungarian Science", Award by the University of West Hungary "For excellent and outstanding work".

Besides her scholarly activity, she has also dealt with literary translations that have appeared in journals and foreign newspapers, and a volume of her translations of Turkish prose and masterpieces of contemporary dramas appeared in the Modern Library series in Hungarian under the title of Do Something Met (Bir sey yap Met). She also has a cookery book entitled „Turkish Flavours"

Her hobbies are writing, dancing and having the sense for humour in everything.

Selected List of Publications

Books

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Pictures of Judit Balázs

Judit Balázs and IPRA

Sussex, England (1986)
Paul Smoker †, Hakan Wiberg †, Birgit Brock-Utne, Judit Balázs

Groningen, Netherlands (1990)
Hakan Wiberg †, Saana Osserian †, (Lebanon) is speaking, next to her Judit Balázs, and Paul Smoker and Elise Boulding on the other side (Elise was married to the world famous economist Kenneth Boulding, Elise was nominated for the Nobel Piece Prize.

Groningen, Netherlands (1990)
Standing next to me Sister Perpinian Mary Soledad.

Groningen, Netherlands (1990)
The lady in pink blouse is Elise Boulding.

Kyoto, Japan (1992)
Birgit Brock-Utne, Lothar Brock, Judit Balázs

Brisbane, Australia (1996)
Together with an aboriginal dancer.

Suwon South Korea (2002)
Judit Balázs, Kazuyo Yamane

Suwon, South Korea (2002)
Judit Balázs, Attila Fábián

Suwon, South Korea (2002)
with Boutros Ghali, former UN Secretary-General

Sopron, Hungary (2004)
Welcome speech from SG Katsuya Kodama

Sopron, Hungary (2004)
Audium of Plenary

Sopron, Hungary (2004)
Presidium of Plenary

Sopron, Hungary (2004)
Audium of Plenary

Sopron, Hungary (2004)
Audium of Plenary

Sopron, Hungary (2004)

Judit Balázs, György Köteles (Preisdent of the Hungarian Peace Association)

Sopron, Hungary (2004)

Katsuya Kodama Secretary-General and Judit Balázs

Sopron, Hungary (2004)
Happy 20th Birthday IPRA!

Sopron, Hungary (2004)
Attila Fábián and Katsuya Kodama

Sopron, Hungary (2004)
David Kruger (USA)

Sopron, Hungary (2004)
Audium of Plenary

Sopron, Hungary (2004)
Former SG, Kevin Clements

Sopron, Hungary (2004)
Katsuya Kodama, Judit Balázs, David Kruger

Sopron, Hungary (2004)
always friends with Regine Mehl (in blue dress)

Sopron (2004)
midnight dance with Luc Reychler

Sopron (2004)
Lothar Brock, Birgit Brock-Utne, Kevin Clements, Judit Balázs

Leuven Belgium (2008)
Judit Balázs, Chadwick Alger

Judit Balázs the woman, the human and the tutor

At the age of 25

Vice Rector in, 2002

Colleagues-friends, 2005
Emese Égető †, Mrs Péter Simon (Ica) †, Éva Tóth, Erzsébet Gidai †

Banquette with the first set of graduates, 2005

Tirana EuPRA, 2009

Cairo, Lecture in the Hungarian Institute of Culture, 2009

Lecture in Turkey, in, Sakarya, 2010

This time, I am the listener, 2012